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Ciii) 
SUMMARY 
This is a report of an investigation into how occupants react to a 
fire in a building. 
Although there has been little directly relevant previous work, a 
number of allied research areas appear pertinent. These studies fall 
broadly into three categories, namely disaster research, panic research 
and fire simulation research. From these one may derive a general 
conceptual model which postulates that the determining factor in stress 
behaviour is the need for the individual to reduce, by whatever means 
are available, the level of perceived threat. 
In view of the limited resources available, the original research 
plan envisaged the collection of in-depth information from a small sample 
of fire incidents. A Pilot Study conducted on this basis, with the • 
researcher acting as interviewer, indicated a number of serious 
difficulties. A second Pilot Study was undertaken utilising Fire Service 
personnel as the agents for data collection. This proved to be a 
feasible technique, and a revised research plan was conceived incorporating 
both large scale and small scale studies. This strategy called for a 
quantitative examination of behaviour in a broad range of fire incidents, 
together with a qualitative investigation of a sub-sample of these, fires 
which resulted in rescues, injuries and fatalities. 
Twelve Fire Brigades covering a wide variety of hazards agreed to 
participate, iin the main study. A questionnaire was devised for recording 
details of the incident and occupant behaviour at the time of the fire. 
By this method 2193 building occupants were interviewed at the scene of 
952 fire incidents. 
The resulting information was considered under four main headings, 
namely Fire variables, 
Behavioural variables. 
Building variables, Personal variables and 
Considerable effort was expended in defining the 
severity of the fire, and eventually a series of measures were used, 
including a derived Fire Severity Index. Dwellings constituted 62% of 
the sample. Behaviour was examined at two levels, a sequential analysis 
of the actions which individuals undertook, and a specific study of 
responses involving evacuation, re-entry and movement through smoke. 
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(iv) 
The main findings of the quantitative study were that incidents in 
Dwellings differed substantially in the nature of the fire, characteristics 
of the occupants and manifest behaviour from other occupancies. Dwelling 
occupants were more likely to be women, untrained, without previous 
experience of fire, and to consider the incident extremely serious. They 
tended to be concerned with contacting the Fire Brigade or with actions 
which minimised the risk, and during the course of the incident were much 
more likely to leave the building. The exception to this were the 
occupants of high-rise flats who left the building less frequently than 
people in other types of dwelling. 
Over all occupancies the main effect of increasing Fire Severity was 
to decrease the proportion of people who contacted the Fire Brigade or 
fought the fire, and increase the proportion who warned others and left 
the building. Occupants were relatively accurate in assessing the 
seriousness of the fire. Men were more likely to return into the building 
and to move through smoke. 
The qualitative study of fires involving rescues, injuries and 
fatalities revealed tht these were much more likely to occur in Dwellings. 
The incidents were generally of High severity. Whilst fires involving 
rescues and fatalities share similarities, incidents involving injuries 
have different characteristics. The majority of the Injury incidents 
involve attempts to move a burning object, often a chip pan. Matching 
the Fatal incidents with Non-Fatal incidents of equivalent Fire Severity 
showed that inappropriate behaviour was a causative factor in the 
majority of the former. 
It is suggested that future studies to examine general behaviour in 
fires should concentrate on in-depth examinations of a small sample of 
incidents. A specific investigation designed to alleviate the major 
problem caused by cooking fires is also strongly recommended. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This research project was undertaken to study the behaviour of 
people who were involved in fires in buildings. Due to the difficulties 
associated with such studies, there have been few systematic attempts to 
examine the behaviour of a cross-section of the population in real-life' 
stress situations. The Present Study must therefore be regarded as 
exploratory research. Other than the general theoretical framework 
suggested by previous work on human reactions to stress, there are no 
established models from which to draw hypotheses. Indeed, remarkably 
little is known concerning individual or group reactions to fire, other 
than accounts which are carried in the news media. By virtue of their 
news-value, such incidents must, by definition, be unusual in some way. 
Often this distinguishing characteristic is in terms of the number 
killed, the age of the victims, the severity of the fire, or the 
particular type of building involved. The above factors all carry some 
emotive value which ensures they are reported 'to the public at large. It 
would be unwise, however, to conclude that the behaviour in such fires 
is necessarily representative of behaviour in all fires. We cannot 
therefore restrict our study simply to these incidents. 
The aim of the Present Study is rather more ambitious, in that we 
are interested in describing, and attempting to interpret, behaviour 
within the whole range of fire incidents. This will include fires which 
differ widely in their characteristics, occurring in a variety of building 
categories, occupied by a broad spectrum of individuals. As an initial 
step we will attempt to define the population of occupants, which is the 
subject of inquiry. 
-l-;-l-TIIE-STUDY-POPULATION 
Each year approximately 800 people are killed in fires, 4,000 are 
injured and approximately 3,000 are either rescued or escape from 
buildings by emergency means. If we define involved as "occupying the 
building at some stage in a fire incident whilst aware of the fire", we 
may argue that such individuals represent the extreme values on a scale 
of involvement in fires. The population which is the subject of this 
investigation must be much larger, comprising as it does all people who 
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are exposed to the threat of fire without necessarily being injured by 
or rescued from it. The actual size, however, is difficult to define. 
We may attempt to estimate it for specific types of building by 
amalgamating information from several sources (see Appendix 1, p.32l). 
In Dwellings, for instance, the number of persons involved each year is 
estimated at 95,460. Figures for other types of occupancy are much more 
difficult to estimate as there is little immediately available information 
on which to base calculations. In a fire in a large factory for example, 
it is impossible to know what percentage of the individuals within the 
establishment were aware of the fire. Extending the range of assumptions 
however, it is possible to arrive at estimates for other occupancies 
(see Appendix 2, p.322). On this basis it is tentatively suggested that 
the total population of persons involved in fires may be as large as 
365,460 in a given year. The overall probability of being involved in a 
fire is thus 6.5 x 10- 3 per annum, although this will naturally vary 
between occupancies. For instance, the overall risk to a hotel guest 
appears to be some ten times as large as that to a person in his own home, 
although the risk of being killed is substantially the same (Fry, 1969). 
1.2 FIRES AS A CATEGORY OF ACCIDENT 
Fires are generally regarded as a specific category of accident, 
and their incidence is often compared with other categories, such as 
road traffic and industrial aCCidents. It has been shown (Warne et aI, 
1971), that in the case of injury-producing fires such comparisons are 
valid, and that such fires conform to a three-stage model of the general 
accident process involving exposure to risk, the start of the accident 
and the occurrence of injury. Fires however differ markedly from most 
-types-of-accident in that the time over \~hich they take place is 
relatively long, whereas most other accidents are of very short duration. 
The important implication of this extended time period is that for fires, 
in contrast to other accident types, the opportunity exists for a wide 
range of behavioural reactions, upon the success of which is largely 
dependent the occurrence or extent of injury and damage. 
The most satisfactory method of studying an event is to observe and 
measure its characteristics as it occurs. In general, this is not a 
feasible technique for studying accidents because of their comparative 
------- ----------------------------------
rarity and their unpredictability in time and space. To overcome these 
difficulties, on-the-spot methods of investigation have been developed 
successfully in many fields of accident research (Haddon et aI, 1964). 
Such methods have utilised techniques for the analysis of objective 
evidence, crumpled metal, skid marks, injury-type, failed instruments 
and so on, to supplement the statements of eye-witnesses and victims in 
reconstructing the course and behaviour of people in accidents. However 
the destructive nature of fire renders the collection of post-hoc 
objective evidence more difficult. Forensic experts can estimate causes 
of ignition and spread of fire within certain confidence limits, but in 
many cases this evidence can only be related to the behaviour of the fire 
participants in the most general way. Attempts to study fire accidents 
are therefore inevitably more reliant upon subjective reports than other 
categories of accident. 
A further important disparity betw,een fires and other accidents is 
that almost all fires in which people are involved offer a potential 
threat to life. That this fact is not unrecognised is shown by the 
results of a recent survey conducted for The Home Office (Sales Research 
Services, 1968). More than 70% of a san~le of city dwellers interviewed 
confessed to being afraid of fire, 30% of whom classed it as their worst 
fear. The special nature of fire is also recognised by the Legislative, 
in respect of the precautions and regulations which are drawn up to 
protect the occupants of buildings. 
1.3 FIRE PROTECTION 
The principles upon which present codes of practice governing fire 
protection were first laid down in the Fire Grading Report No.29 (Board 
-orTraae;-1952). This report was based upon a mixture of then-existing 
scientific knowledge, practical experience and commonsense (Silcock, 1969). 
A major preoccupation of this and subsequent reports has been planning 
for means of escape. Briefly, the over-riding principle is that in 
theory a man should be able to turn his back on a fire and escape by his 
own unaided efforts. A critical factor in escape planning is "travel 
distance", which is the distance involved in moving from a location 
wi thin the building to a "position of safety". The position of safety 
may be defined as the exit of the bUilding or alternatively a fire-
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resisting enclosure, and travel distances are measured accordingly. In 
essence the travel distance is an estimate of how far an individual may 
have to move through smoke. The basis for recommended travel distances 
is intuitive rather than scientific. There has been some research on 
the movement of people in buildings (lIankin and Wright, 1958), and on the 
movement of crowds (Henderson, 1971). However, the relationship between 
these measures of subjects moving under non-stress conditions and 
movement under threat of fire has never been explored. Furthermore there 
is no evidence extant concerning the degree to which individuals will 
move into smoke. 
Much escape route planning is based upon concepts of ideal behaviour. 
For example, the effectiveness of most escape routes is dependent upon 
the self-closing nature of fire-check doors. It is a common observation 
of everyday life that a door placed across a line of communication or 
access will eventually be secured permanently open. The value of the 
door as a fire or smoke-check thus becomes zero, and the potential 
effectiveness of the escape route is consequently degraded (Silcock, op cl t).L 
The codes of practice apply only to certain categories of bUilding. 
Dwellings for instance are not included, although they account for 50% 
of fires in buildings. In addition, there have in recent years been many 
changes in the design and size of buildings. It is conjectured that 
traditional escape planning, based upon total evacuation, may be 
inappropriate in some large and complex buildings. 
1. 4 DISCUSSION 
The brief outline above has been included to provide some insight 
-into-the prinCiples underlying codes of practice for fire protection in 
contemporary buildings. Research efforts in the Present Study were not 
directed towards investigating any specific aspect of the codes, but 
rather addressed towards examining the general problem of behaviour in 
fires. However the inclusion of certain of the study variables was 
influenced by their obvious relevance to the provision of means of escape 
from buildings. 
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In view of the clear dependence of effective escape planning upon 
knowledge of human behaviour, it is surprising to discover that there 
has been little attempt to systematically investigate the patterns of 
behaviour which people adopt when faced with a fire situation. The 
costs associated with the fire protection of buildings are large, being 
estimated at typically some 5% of building costs (Maske11, 1971). Yet 
many aspects of such provisions are based largely upon intuitive notions 
of how people will behave. 
There is, of course, a'large amount of literature associated with 
people in fires. Much of it however consists of post-hoc speculative 
accounts of incidents and subsequent unsupported assertions concerning 
behaviour. Inevitably incidents of spectacular reaction to fire receive 
disproportionate publicity and are perhaps thought to be the norm for 
behaviour in fires. Yet it is not known to what extent such behaviour 
occurs, not what characteristics of the individual or the situation will 
determine its occurrence. There can be little doubt that involvement in 
a fire is perceived as an extremely stressful experience. The study of 
human stress is aCknowledged as an important area within the behavioural 
sciences, and findings from many diverse fields may be relevant to the 
study of behaviour in fires. We will examine some of them in the course 
of reviewing previous research in the following chapter. 
C H APT E R 2 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
------
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2.0 PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
As stated earlier, there has been little scientific work concerned 
specifically with behaviour in a fire situation. The majority of the 
literature is centred upon accounts of large, multiple-fatality fires 
such as the theatre fire in Chicago in 1903 (Foy and Harlow, 1928), or 
the night-club fire in Boston in 1942 (Benzaquin, 1959). Such incidents 
have been descdbed as classic "panic" incidents. However the accounts 
of them are essentially journalistic and descriptive, providing few clues 
to the determining conditions of non-adaptive behaviour. Studies in the 
fields of disaster research and psychological stress are more fruitful, 
and provide the basis for a theoretical framework within which we may 
attempt to interpret behaviour in fires. 
2.1 DISASTER RESEARCH 
The first systematic studies of disaster were conducted soon after 
the Great War (Prince, 1920). Much of the work originates in the USA, 
and has recently become preoccupied with the possible consequences of 
nuclear attack (Healy, 1969). The term "disaster" implies extremely 
widespread death and destruction, and indeed most of the studies have 
concentrated upon very large scale disasters. In many cases they were 
the consequence of climatic or geological phenomena, earthquakes, floods, 
or tornadoes. Many studies have concentrated on the effect upon the 
community as a whole and its organisations. Perhaps one of the most 
comprehensive was that conducted by the National Opinion Research Centre 
between 1950 and 1954 (Dill, 1954). The data is based upon approximately 
1000 interviews of people who had been involved in more than 70 disasters, 
ranging through tornadoes, explosions and earthquakes to aircrashes, 
industrial fires and 'accidents. The main findings of the study were that 
panic behaviour was in fact comparatively rare, and that the amount of 
warning given of an impending disaster could have very substantial bearing 
on actions taken. There was some evidence that inadequate warnings 
could lead to more substantial loss of life than no warning at all. A 
similar study was conducted by the Disaster Research Group of the National 
Academy of Science (Fritz and Marks, 1954), although in this case 
attention was focussed more upon the organisations involved in disasters. 
A useful division of disaster research into seven phases was proposed 
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(Powell, 1952), and much of the work may be classified under this system. 
The phases are (a) Warning, (b) Threat, (c) Impact, (d) Inventory, 
(e) Rescue, (f) Remedy and (g)' Recovery. Clearly all the stages may not 
apply to different types of disaster, and some of the divisions appear 
rather tenuous. For example, it must often be very difficult to 
distinguish between Imrning and threat. Lazarus (1966) considers threat 
to be the key intervening variable in all psychological stress experiences. 
It is defined as the process whereby a stimulus is perceived as being 
harmful. It would appear that the perceived characteristics of the threat 
are a determinant of the magnitude of the anxiety created by the threat 
within the individual, and this anxiety may be a critical determinant of 
the behavioural response adopted. Withey (1962), in his study of 
behaviour in disaster Situations, has established some of the essential 
characteristics for the perception of threat which, it is considered, 
influence the generation of stress for the individual within the threat 
situation. It is worthwhile considering these characteristics in terms 
of behaviour in fires. The perceived threat can be thought of as having 
a number of components which may influence the stress responses. 
(i) The Probability of occurrence 
The more probable the indivudal perceives the threatened stress to 
be, the more strenuous will be his attempts to avert it. As the 
probability of the threatened event increases, then the individual will 
be prepared to exert greater effort in his adaptive responses. In the 
case of a fire situation, the initial discovery of the fire will involve 
the perception of some "cues" that there is a fire, the smell of smoke 
perhaps, or the sound of burning. The question which is posed by these 
cues is "What is the probability that there is a fire?" If the cue is 
ambiguous and the threat perceived to be of low probability, then it will 
involve consideration by the individual of the "expense" or effort 
involved in his behavioural reaction. This is clearly one of the reasons 
for the apathy which is shown towards fire drills. The probability of 
there being a fire is perceived as very low, contrasted with the 
perception of the high "cost" of such action in terms of time, 
inconvenience and effort. 
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(ii) The Nature of the threat 
The second component ~s' the nature of the threat in terms of its 
severity. This is clearly related. in terms of fire. to the previous 
experience of the individual. The great majority of the population will 
have had no training. or experience in recognising the cues leading to 
the correct evaluation of the nature of the threat. Even if this were 
not so. the initial stages of a fire often produce cues which are 
ambiguous in nature. Often. only the appearance of flames seems to 
dispel any doubt as to the nature of the threat. It seems likely that 
the consideration of the severity of the threat is assessed by the 
individual in extremely personal terms. Thus the question is not only 
"If there is a fire how severe is it?'!. but also "To what degree does it 
threaten me personally?" Clearly the most severe threat is considered 
to be that to one's life. or the lives of one's family. It has been 
suggested that this ultimate threat is the determining variable in the 
production of a "panic"-type response. The concept of panic will be 
discussed in some detail later. 
(iii) The Imminence of the threat 
The third component of perceived threat is concerned with the time 
factor. the imminence of the threat. The question this time is "How 
soon will it threaten me." The closer in time the threat is perceived 
to be. the more likely that the stress response will be non-adaptive or 
non-rational. Published accounts of serious fires (National Fire 
Protection Association. 1967) usually report a condition of very rapid 
appearance and spread of fire and smoke. Conversely. when the threat is 
interpreted as being remote in time. the individual may postpone 
adaptive responses. 
(iv) Coping with the threat 
The fourth component is the possibility of adaptation to the threat. 
In this context. adaptation means "consideration of the power of the 
available actions to prevent harm". The most obvious cis the possibility 
of escape. The urge to escape is primitive. and is likely to occur very 
early in severe stress. However. adaptation may take place on several 
levels and may. in the case of fire. involve such learned behaviour as 
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attempting to extinguish the fire or contacting the Fire Brigade. In 
some cases of prolonged stress, such as a mine disaster in which men are 
trapped underground, it has been observed that the initial response is 
strenuous exploration of all the possibilities of escape. This often 
continues long after there is any "objective" possibility of escape. 
When eventually escape is perceived by the trapped men as impossible, 
the adaptive response becomes one of conserving the organism, or less 
frequently, withdrawal (Lucas, ,1969). Let us now consider the individual 
and hO\~ he deals with the particular stress of fire. The first process 
which is undergone by the individual is one of threat appraisal. 
Cv) Threat Appraisal 
This process implies that the person must both detect the cues 
present and recognise them as threatening. Due to the often ambiguous 
nature of cues in a fire situation, this may not occur immediately. It 
has been suggested (Dibner, 1958), that greater degrees of ambiguity of 
stimulus condi dons are associated with large stress reactions, even in a 
mildly stressful situation. However, in reported fire incidents, there 
frequently seems to be a predisposition to regard such initial cues 
optimistically. This would seem to be closely related to a conception 
noted in other hazardous situations which may be summed up by the 
aphorism "It can't happen to me!". This well-known factor has been 
reported in other fields of accident research and categorised as "The 
Personal Invulnerability Factor" (Fox, 1964). It has been suggested that 
this is a threat-reducing procedure, operating on a "denial" principle, 
which although giving a suitable name to it hardly serves to explain the 
phenomenon. 
______ Th~is identification of cues as threatening is of course a dynamic 
process. The initial cues may be so diffuse as to alert the individual 
that there is something wrong, without being able to specify exactly 
what it is. This uncertainty leads him to attempt to verify the nature 
of the cues. 
(vi) Attempts to validate the cues 
If the individual is alone he may make some attempt to discover the 
source of the fire cues, where the smoke or smell of burning originate. 
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If, however, he is a member of a group then his first attempts at 
evaluating the threat are likely to be to seek the opinions of other 
group members as to their assessment of the threat. Since in an untrained 
group the judgement of one member is unlikely to be any better than 
another, this process is unlikely to arrive at a true assessment of the 
threat. After the famous Orson Welles, "Invasion from Mars" broadcast in 
America (Cantrill, 1947) one of the most striking differences between 
those who exhibited rational and non-rational behaviour, was in their 
ability to check the validity of the threat cues. Individuals who 
showed non-rational behaviour tended to base their judgements on the very 
vague cues. For instance, an individual looking out of the window and 
seeing traffic in the street would interpret it as "everyone's fleeing". 
Seeing a traffic-free street he would interpret it as "everyone's fled". 
Similarly, Killian (1956) in a study concerned with an explosion at a 
fireworks factory found that more than half the sample had obtained their 
information at second or third-hand. 
(vii) Definition of the situation 
Having appraised and attempted to validate the threat cue, the 
individual will then attempt to structure the situation, not only in 
terms of the elements of the perceived threat, but also of his own 
personality, his previous training and experience. As mentioned earlier, 
fire cues are often ambiguous in nature, and as mo'st people have little 
or no experience with the threat of fire, attempts to structure the 
situation may well start a vicious circle which serves to increase the 
level of threat. It is clear. to the individual that some response is 
required; but because he cannot define the situation, he .cannot initiate 
any behavioural reaetion. This lack of action in a situation which 
-clearly-requires it further increases the level of threat, which makes 
it even more difficult to structure the situation. 
(viii) Evaluation of responses 
Concomitant with the structuring of the situation must go a decision-
making activity, concerned with the evaluation of available responses. 
The probabilities of certain courses of action having certain 
consequences must be estimated. Dependent upon this process will be the 
choice of action by the individual, to reduce the threat to himself. In 
-~----------------------
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a fire. these decisions may result in responses which can be interpreted 
as of the "flight or fight" type. Both escape from the immediate vicinity 
of the fire, and attempts to extinguish it will result in threat 
reduction for the individual. Calling for assistance, either from the 
Fire Brigade or elsewhere, would normally involve some retreat from the 
immediate area of the fire, with the added threat-reducing possibility 
of passing on responsibility for taking appropriate action. The success 
of such threat-reducing response is not necessarily related to the 
objective level of threat. which may well be increasing. The important 
element is the individual perception concerning the threat. Withey (op cit) 
conceives of a perceived balance between the harm-producing stimulus and 
the resources available to deal with it. When the balance is perceived 
to favour the harm-producing stimUlus, threat is increased up to the 
limits set by the strength of the motive threatened. When the balance 
favours the resources,. the threat is reduced. Thus he states: "It may 
well be that a simple ratio of threat to the means for meeting the threat 
defines the situation". In a fire situation the initial actions may only 
afford a temporary respite in the level of threat, for instance, if the 
individual has chosen to "fight" the fire, then as long as it continues 
to be reduced or contained, he will experience a reduction in threat level. 
l!owever, if he perceives the fire to be "gaining" on him then he will have 
to reassess his course of action to compensate for the increased 
"percei ved threat". Similarly in the case of "flight" behaviour, if the 
initial response is successful (i.e. the individual escapes from the 
environs of the fire. and leaves the building completely) he may then 
experience an immediate and drastic reduction in the level of threat. 
This is a particularly dangerous situation, for if he now reassesses his 
responses. in the absence of any threat cues, he may consider that he 
over-reacted to the fire threat, in-so-far as it threatened his life, and 
the perceived threat may be transferred to belongings or property, with 
the result that he may re-enter the building, perhaps to be overcome by 
the fire. 
If the initial behavioural response does not succeed in lowering 
the level of threat then, as in the case of inability to structure the 
situation, the stress on the individual will increase due to his failure 
to adapt. Greater effort will be invested in the adaptation responses, 
and as each is exhausted so will the choice of further action become 
less selective •. It is this situation, where the responses beome more 
-------
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"primitive", that rational behaviour may deteriorate into non-rational, 
and adaptive responses become non-adaptive, in other words what is often 
described as "panic response". 
2.2 PANIC RESEARCH 
As panic appears to occupy a central role in the literature of fire 
it is perhaps worth examining the concept in some detail. In this 
century, interest and concern were first expressed about its effects with 
regard to troops in World War I. Many papers were produced describing 
features of panic, this literature having been reviewed by Strauss (1944). 
Earlier accounts of fires (Benzaquin, op cit; Foy and Harlow, op cit), 
have described outbreaks of panic in lurid accounts. The topic has also 
been the subject of psychiatric concern (Diethe1m, 1932) and medical 
attention (Stalker, 1940), particularly with regard to the effect of 
bombing raids upon civilian popu1ations. A comparative evaluation of 
the reactions of Londoners in 1941 and civilians in the Spanish Civil 
War was reported by Schmideberg (1942). Inevitably the topic appears in 
relation to atomic warfare (Ca1dwe11 et aI, 1951). Quarante11i (1954 and 
1957), using the data collected by the NORC (Dill, op cit) , examined the 
nature and conditions leading to panic. He conceives that such 
behaviour arises in response to three determining conditions, a definition 
of possible entrapment, a perception of collective powerlessness and a 
feeling of individual isolation in.a crisis. The concept of entrapment 
has also been mooted by Foreman (1953), although he places the emphasis 
rather differently in stating that, "panic develops only when possible 
avenues of escape are evident", contrasting this with earlier notions 
that panic arises when a person is completely trapped in a dangerous 
-situation. A more analytical approach to the study of panic was under-
taken by Bryan (1958). In studying an actual incident involving a fire, 
he attempted to relate certain measured variables to manifest behaviour. 
Perhaps his major finding was that the behaviour of trained personnel 
appeared to be very similar to that of untrained personnel. This conflicts 
with the results of Hammerton and Tickner (1968) who found that training 
has a significant effect in reducing the decrement produced by anxiety in 
a skilled task. In their investigation, however, the skilled task was 
not related to the anxiety-producing agent. Other findings from Bryan's 
study throw doubt on the long-held belief that in threatening situations 
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people invariably attempt to leave the building by the doorway through 
which they entered. The effectiveness of exit lights in drawing 
attention to exits is also questioned. This particular feature does not 
appear to have received sufficient attention from human factors 
specialists, although two reports from the US Navy (Edmonds et aI, 1968 
and 1969) do set out specific recommendations for egress from ships. 
The first laboratory investigation of "panic" behaviour was performed 
in 1951 (Mintz, 1951). In this experiment a number of cones with strings 
attached were inserted into a narrow-necked bottle. Subjects had to pull 
the cones out of the bottle under a number of conditions involving a 
nominal fine and reward system for success and failure. Only one cone 
could be taken out at a time or the neck of the bottle became jammed. 
Thus subjects had to cooperate with each other to stand any chance of 
success. It was hypothesised that "panic" occurred due to the "reward" 
structure of the system. If cooperative behaviour is once perceived as 
non-rewarding, by an individual "at the ba'ck of the queue", then non-
adaptive, competitive behaviour will occur, as it is perceived as the 
least-disadvantageous response. You will note that on this hypothesis, 
violent emotional excitement; or fear, is not considered to be variable 
in determining panic behaviour. The results of the experiment supported 
the hypothesis, in that under the reward/fine conditions, there was 
signifi cantly more non-adaptive behaviour, than in the control conditions 
with no incentives. This experiment has subsequently been replicated 
with less clear-cut results, and in the light of our knowledge of threat, 
it would not seem to provide a meaningful analogue of a naturalistic 
panic situation. 
The most interesting attempt to study panic behaviour has been made 
by Schul tz (1966). He starts by offering a definition of the term "panic" 
making'the point that the word has been, and is, often misused in 
describing the behaviour of people fleeing from danger. In many cases, 
this flight is the only rational way in which to respond, the critical 
difference between rational escape behaviour and non-rational, panic, 
behaviour being in the manner in which we try to effect escape. He 
defines panic as "A fear-induced flight behaviour which is non-rational, 
non-adaptive and non-social, which serves to reduce the escape 
possibili ties of the group as a whole". This is a very useful definition 
although one might quibble with the rather general term, "fear-induced", 
14 
and also with the assumption that panic is always a group-oriented 
behaviour. In our earlier consideration of threat, we considered how an 
individual might reach a situation where his behavioural responses 
become non-adaptive due to his inability to control the level of threat. 
So we can conceive of an individual panicking alone, as well as in a group. 
In an extensive series of studies, Schultz investigated a number of 
variables concerned with panic. An experimental situation was used which 
he considered to approximate conceptually to a theatre fire, in which all 
the people try to escape through a narrow exit. Subjects were placed in 
a danger situation, and faced with threatened electric shocks,three times 
stronger than a sample shock of SO volts. actually given, if escape did 
not take place within a speficied time period. Escape occurred by 
operating a lever on the subject panel for 2 seconds. However, only one 
subject could operate the escape lever at a time. The instructions 
indicated that if more than one did so, the escape mechanism would jam 
and no-one would escape. 
The situation was so constructed that each subject received 
information that other members of the group were jamming the escape route 
in their own efforts to escape. Thus, the subject perceived that the 
escape route was blocked, at least temporarily. The subject had no way 
of knowing when the escape route would become unjammed; all the subject 
knew was whether the escape route was open or closed at the moment. 
An alternative method of escape was available to the subject by 
pressing an emergency button at any time. This released the subject 
immediately but closed the regular escape route permanently, preventing 
the escape of the others and assurinK" their exposure to the electric 
shock. The pressing of this emergency button was considered to represent 
behaviour that is non-adaptive from the standpoint of the other group 
members, in that it prevented their escape. The pressing of the button, 
then, sacrificed the other members of the group but enabled the· subject 
to escape. 
Hence pressing the emergency button in the laboratory and moving 
out-of-turn in the theatre fire were considered to be analogous behaviours. 
From the standpoint of total group survival these behaviours are non-
social and non-adaptive. Both involve attempts on the part of the 
individual to save himself at the expense of all others concerned. 
--------------------------
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The variables investigated included the effect of the following: 
group size, perceived rate of escape of other group members, knowledge of 
escape time remaining, reduced subject anonymity, and perceiving that 
other group members had panicked. None of these produced significant 
differences in the incidence of panic. Several variables, however, 
produced non-significant trends in the direction of increasing the panic 
response. These were: increasing the level of threatened ·penalty for 
failure to escape, increasing the degree of subject anonymity, and 
introducing intense visual and auditory stimulation. Using ~he Cattell 
l6-PF test it was found that panic responders were significantly more 
sensitive, effeminate, dependent, hypochondriacal and anxious than those 
who did not exhibit the panic response. A second series of experiments 
(Schultz, 1968) used similar apparatus, but altered the experimental 
situation slightly, in that, instead of being separated in the cubicles, 
subjects entered the laboratory in groups of five and were seated in a 
row separated by partitions. The incidence of the "panic" response was 
investigated as a function of group composition and personality variables. 
No significant differences in panic response were found between the 
following: male versus female groups, females from two different subject 
populations, and mixed-sex versus single-sex groups. Furthermore, there 
was no significant difference in responses between a group of Naval 
reservists and a group of male college students, although within the 
Naval group it was found that the older, longer-service men demonstrated 
a marked, though non-significant reduction in panic responses compared 
with the younger shorter-service men. Male subjects who panicked scored 
significantly closer towards the unstable dimension of the stable/unstable 
scale of the Maudsley Personality Inventory developed by Eysenck. 
The actual incidence of the "panic" response varied between 17% a.nd 
. 42%-over the groups, in other words between one-sixth and two-fifths of 
the subjects demonstrated a willingness to save themselves at the expense 
of their fellow group members. A second general finding of considerable 
interest is that some subjects exhibited the "panic response" very early 
in the experimental situation, for instance nearly 20% of one group 
pressed the "escape" button within the first 3 seconds. These individuals 
did not appear to try and use the regular escape route in cooperation with 
the other group members, but "panicked" almost inunediate ly. 
------- ----------------------------------------
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A very similar series of experiments was conducted by Kelly et al 
(1965). The main findings were that 
(a) As threatened penalty for failure to escape increases, the 
percentage of persons who succeed in doing so declines. 
(b) As group size increases, the percentage decreases. This may also 
be stated as an increase in the time required per escape with 
increasing size. 
(c) The availability of a distinctive response for the public 
expression of confidence greatly increases the percentage of 
persons who succeed in escaping. 
A criticism which could be levelled at these experiments is that 
they in no way took account of differences in social structure of the 
groups, which is considered to be a particularly important variable in 
real-life situations. The groups of subjects in these experiments would 
more correctly be described as "collectives" (Bryan, 1970). A further 
important point is that their opportunities for communication were 
either very low or non-existent. Let us examine these variables, social 
structure and communication. If we consider two groups of individuals, 
say a football crowd and a military unit, it is clear that we could much 
more easily describe the military unit in terms of relationship of the 
members to each other. The expectations, duties, obligations, 
responsibilities, courses of action in a given situation are very clearly 
defined by a set of rigid rules. In contrast, the football crowd has 
little or no established hierarchy and is only a temporary congregation 
of individuals who have gathered for one particular purpose. Between 
these extremes of "social structure", the casual, unorganised crowd and 
: the-formal organised unit, one can conceive of all groups having their 
own "structure", which if we had techniques sensitive enough, we could 
measure and quantify. As it is, we can compare in a general way the 
"struCturedness" of groups and identify some of the variables which affect 
this characteristic. Clearly such things as the training of a group, 
the number in it, the presence of family or friendship ties, the 
establishment of leadership figures, formal areas of responsibility and 
lines of communication between group members are all of importance in 
determining the structure of the group. Some experimental investigations 
with relevance to a fire situation have been conducted in this area and 
they will be briefly described. 
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2.3 FIRE SIMULATION RESEARCH 
The first study, which was carried out in 1941, was an attempt to 
study the differences between "organised" and "unorganised" groups in 
situations intended to produce "fear" (French, 1941). Eight organised 
groups composed of athletic teams were compared with eight unorganised 
groups of students who were not acquainted with each other. Each group 
contained 6 members. After a 45 minute session which was intended to 
produce frustration, by working on insoluble problems, each group was 
left alone in the experimental room to fill out a questionnaire. The 
doors to the experimental room were secretly locked and smoke was made to 
seep under one of the doors. After the group discovered the smoke, a 
fire siren was sounded in a distant room to increase the illusion of a 
realistic fire situation. The behaviour of the groups was recorded by 
observers behind one-way screens, descriptions written afterwards by the 
subjects and recordings made of verbal behaviour. 
The behaviour of the groups varied from apparently genuine fear to 
fairly complete scepticism or belief that the situation was a hoax. 
However, all the members of a group tended to react in the same way so 
that variability within the groups was significantly less than that 
bet\~een groups. The interaction of differing individuals within a group 
produced a "group atmosphere" which seemed, to largely determine the 
reaction of all members of that group. Interestingly, the organised 
groups were definitely more frightened than the unorganised groups; 
however the validity of this conclusion is somewhat reduced because the 
two sets of groups were not matched for other factors such as educational 
ability and socio-economic class. Nonetheless it seems that the organised 
groups were not inhibited in their expression of fear to the same extent 
~as_the unorganised ones. In a different context this aspect of 
inhibition is illustrated by a recent study which utilised a very similar 
experimental situation (Latane and Darley, 1968). 
Inevitably in this study, the subjects were once again college 
students. (It has been estimated that some 75 to 80% of the experiments 
conducted in psychology are conducted with college students - subjects 
who clearly do not represent the population at large.) The students were 
placed in an experimental room, ostensibly to complete a questionnaire. 
Smoke was then introduced into the room through a small vent in the wall. 
The smoke was injected into the room for the entire experimental period 
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until by the end of the experiment, the vision was totally obscured by 
the amount of smoke present. If the subject left the room and reported 
the smoke the experiment was terminated. However, if the subject had not 
reported the presence of the smoke after a 6 minute interval from the 
time he first noticed it, the experiment' was considered completed. The 
results of this experiment were extremely interesting. Subjects in the 
room alone reported the smoke in 7S% of the cases; however, when 2 
passive confederates were provided for each subject, only 10% of the 
groups reported the smoke. When the total experimental group consisted 
of 3 naive subjects, in only 38% of the groups did I subject report the 
smoke. Of the 24 persons involved in the eight naive groups, only I 
person reported the smoke within the first 4 minutes of the experiment. 
However, SS% of the lone subjects had reported the smoke within 2 minutes, 
and within 4 minutes, 7S% of the subjects had reported the smoke. 
It was reported that the perception of the smoke was apparently 
delayed by the presence of other persons, with the median time for 
noticing the smoke being 5 seconds when alone compared with a median 
time of 20 seconds for both of the group conditions. The delay in 
noticing the smoke undoubtedly reflects the constraints which persons 
accept as being imposed upon their behaviour in public places. These 
experimental results demonstrate quite clearly the influence of a small 
group on an individual's behaviour, since in the passive confederate 
group only I of the 9 subjects involved reported the smoke. The 
behaviour of the naive subjects in the passive confederate conditions 
was described in the following terms: "The other nine stayed in the 
waiting room as it filled up with smoke, doggedly working on their 
questionnaire, and waving the fumes away from their faces. They coughed, 
rubbed their eyes, and opened the window, but they did not report the 
~~smoke" • __ ~~ ~ 
The explanations given by the subjects who reported the smoke, and 
those who did not report the smoke, as Obtained in the post-experimental 
interview are reported below. 
Subjects who had reported the smoke were relatively consistent in 
later describing their reactions to it. They thought the smoke looked 
somewhat strange; they were not sure exactly what it was or whether it 
was dangerous, but they felt it was unusual enough to justify some 
examination, for' example, "I wasn't sure whether it was a fire but it 
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looked like something was wrong" and "I thought it might be steam but it 
seemed like a good idea to check it out". 
Subjects who had not reported the smoke also were unsure about 
exactly what it was, but they uniformly said they had rejected the idea 
that it was a fire. Instead, they hit upon an astonishing variety of 
alternative explanations, all sharing the common characteristics of 
interpreting the smoke as a non-dangerous event. Many thought the smoke 
was either steam or air-conditioning vapours; several thought it was smog, 
purposely introduced to simulate an urban environment! 
It is suggested that during the interpretation of the ambiguous 
threat cues, the individual is particularly susceptible to the behavioural 
reactions of other group members. If those around him remain passsive 
and appear to interpret the situation as being a non-emergency, the 
individual will tend to have his interpretation modified by this social-
inhibiting factor, and behave accordingly. There are three important 
points arising from this experiment. Firstly, the actual perception of 
cues may be delayed by the presence of strangers. Secondly, the 
responses of an individual are closely related to his perceptions of how 
others are responding. And thirdly, the mere presence of others seems 
to reduce the likelihood of responding to a threat cue, since if an 
individual is alone when an emergency arises then he is solely 
responsible for dealing with it. If others are present, particularly 
strangers, the individual may feel that his own responsibility for taking 
action is reduced. It is interesting to note that this "diffusion of 
responsibility" does not seem to be a function of group size. With 
regard to the second point mentioned, earlier experiments by Hudson (1965) 
had demonstrated the important nature of perception of the reactions of 
others in stress situations. In these experiments a group of college 
students attending a lecture were distracted by recorded sound of 
explosions, sirens, aeroplanes and shouting from outside. The results 
showed a wide range of emotional responses to such distracting and 
threatening stimuli. Individuals in the situation rapidly developed 
interpretive hypotheses concerning the stimuli. Where these hypotheses 
were in conflict anxiety was observed to increase. The more anxious 
subjects in the group, perceiving others around them as anxious, thus 
developed cognitive support for their apprehensions. 
--- .--_.--------------------------------------------.------.-
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Returning to our consideration of threat, Wherry and Curran (1966) 
propose an interesting model for the generation of what they choose to 
call "Anticipatory Physical Threat Stress" (APTS). This model has much 
in common with Withey's (op cit) conceptualisation of the mechanisms of 
stress generation. The APTS is conceived as being a function of three 
components, the perceived probability of the event, the perceived 
proximity of the event and the perceived unpleasantness of the event. An 
initial experiment controlling these three factors demonstrated the 
feasibility of the model and established that even when the amount of 
threat is carefully equated for all subjects, some will be more 
susceptible that others. This result is in accord with the findings of 
Glickstein et al (19S7) who have distinguished anxiety-prone subjects by 
analysis of heart-rate during a stressful situation. Such individuals 
were disposed to interpret any strange situation ,as threatening, and 
consequently exhibited high heart-rates throughout the experiment, 
without the characteristic peaks, displayed in response to the most 
threatening incidents, of the non anxiety-prone subjects. Other findings 
from the Wherry and Curran Study were that mild stress levels can improve 
performance whilst greater amounts cause deterioration, a result which is 
explicable by the concept of arousal (Welford, 1962), and that previous 
experience in the experimental stress situation had a significant effect 
upon subsequent test behaviour. The results suggested that confirmation 
of expectations about the occurrence of a threatening event will reduce 
performance deterioration in subsequent situations. They also indicate 
that less deterioration would be expected from individuals who had 
previously been exposed to high threat levels. The authors point out the 
crucial role of perception in threat appraisal. Earlier, Kilpatrick (1957) 
had hypothesised concerning perception in extreme situations drawing upon 
findings from basic laboratory research. His main thesis was that under 
-stress there is a tendency to isolate oneself from immediate input and 
to perceive and act in terms of a stable perceptual construct which has 
proved reliable in the past. Feedback of evidence that these perceptions 
are inappropriate fails to correct this tendency. If a dominant percept 
has been established, all happenings may be related to it, thus for 
instance, the sound of a tornado may be interpreted as that of a train. 
In the absence of reliable guides from past experience for perceiving or 
acting, suggestibility is high, and during a period of perceptual conflict 
extraneous cues are often seized upon as a means of resolving conflict. 
21 
Furthermore he argues that the most effective method of accomplishing 
perceptual reorganisation is through action by the perceiver, mere 
intellectual knowledge may be insufficient. 
2.4 DISCUSSION 
We have not attempted to review the whole field of stress research. 
An enormous volume of research has been performed within the overlapping 
areas of conflict, frustration, defence, emotion, anxiety and disaster. 
A continuing problem in the field is'that of terminology and definition. 
The subject matter of stress research has included such areas as 
(a) The ability of man to withstand changes in his normal environment, 
such as sleep deprivation, isolation, accelerative forces, changes 
in temperature, humidity and others. 
(b) The reaction of subjects to unpleasant social or ego-damaging events, 
such as failure in examinations, ridicule by authority and 
harrassment during tasks. 
(c) The capacity of man to meet unusually high demands on his ability, 
for instance, by setting tasks which demand very complex responses. 
(d) The effect on human behaviour of the threat of the occurrence of 
disturbing circumstances,such as unpleasant social or ego-damaging 
events. 
(e) The effect on human behaviour of the threat or anticipation of 
actual physical harm, such as exposure to some physical danger. 
The term "stress" in itself may be used to refer to behaviour itself, 
to the stimulus causing the behaviour, or to the situation in which it 
occurs. In many cases the stimulus is only defined as a "stressor" in 
terms of the individual response to it. In other words it is often not 
known to what degree an individual will find a stimUlus "stressful" , it 
is merely inferred that it will be so and an attempt made to confirm this 
inference by observing some behavioural or physiological reaction, which 
is thus defined as a "stress response". 
- -------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------~----- - . 
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With some exceptions the degrees of stress that are dealt with in 
most experimental situations may be considered mild (Lazarus, op cit), 
and therefore are not necessarily relevant to levels of stress which may 
be represented by a fire situation. We have seen that for a large 
percentage of people, fire represents the most fearful prospect of all 
(Sales Research Servi ces, op cit). 
2.5 A NOTE CONCERNING THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION 
In terms of the whole population, fires in which people are involved 
are comparatively rare events. Consequently any attempts at direct 
observation of behaviour seems likely to prove unproductive. Is it 
possible then, to simulate fire conditions? We have seen that there 
have been isolated attempts to simulate the threat conditions implicit in 
fires. However the implications of such studies have recently been 
appraised in terms of their ethics and methodology. We have instanced 
some studies in which the aim of the experiment was to induce high levels 
of stress in the subjects. If this aim was not achieved, then the 
experiment would have been considered unsuccessful. 
Other experiments have gone even further. In one, an experiment 
designed to study the establishment of a conditioned response in a 
situation that is traumatic, but not painful (Campbe11, 1964), a drug was 
used to induce a temporary interruption of respiration in the subjects. 
The experimenters emphasise that "This has no permanently harmful 
physical consequences, but is nonetheless a severe stress which is not in 
itself painful .•• " The subjects I reports confirmed that this was a 
"horrific" experience, and all the subjects in the standard series said 
. __ . that. they_ thought they "were dying". The subjects. who were volunteer 
male alcoholics, were not previously warned of the effect of the drug. 
In another study conducted by the American military (Berkun et aI, 1962), 
a number of experimental situations were used to convince the subject 
that his life was in danger. In one situation, the subjects were 
passengers aboard an apparently stricken plane which "was being forced to 
ditch or crash land". In another, the subject was led to believe that he 
was responsible for an explosion which "seriously injured another soldier". 
It is suggested that these, and other behavioural experiments 
involve potentially harmful psychological stress to subjects who are 
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rarely, if ever, informed of this possibility. This might be particularly 
so in the case of nervous, 
individuals. Yet subjects 
anxious or other sub-clinically unstable 
appear never to have been 
the experiment in an attempt to protect such people. 
examined prior to 
If a realistic 
attempt were made at simulating a fire situation, the dangers might not. 
only be psychologically damaging. One can envisage subjects suffering 
real physical harm in attempting escape activity. In one of the earlier-
cited studies (French, op cit), the experiment was abruptly terminated 
when subjects attempted to break down a door. The corollary of this, is 
that we cannot simulate the real-life threat of a fire situation for 
ethical reasons. If, however, we remove the element of threat implicit 
in real-life fires, then our simulation hardly justifies the term, since 
\1e have seen that threat is considered to be a key intervening variable. 
Having rejected direct observation and simulation as possible methods 
of study, we will now consider the techniques which are available and 
which were used in the Present Study. 
C H APT E R 3 
THE PRESENT STUDY 
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3.0 THE PRESENT STUDY 
As was stated in the Introduction, the aim of the research was to 
examine and interpret the behaviour of people involved in fires. Up to 
this point we have discussed the nature of this research problem only in 
general terms; however we will now turn our attention to the specific 
manner in which it will be approached. 
It is convenient to divide the overall strategy into five areas 
which must be clarified before research is initiated. Put in the form of 
very simple questions, these are as follows: 
(a) What is the problem? 
(b) When defined, can it be answered from existing information? 
(c) If not, what information is required? 
(d) How may we collect this information? 
(e) How may we analyse this information? 
Such a schedule is merely an explicit expression, in a particular 
form, of a general research strategy which could be reformulated in a 
variety of ways, although the overall principle would remain the same. 
It will be appreciated that the above list is a conceptual one, and the 
resolution of each point will bring in its train a series of practical 
difficulties which require solution. It is also clear that the questions 
cannot be examined in isolation, since for example, the selection of the 
most appropriate data collection technique will be dependent upon the 
nature of the data required, which in turn will be related to the chosen 
method of analysis. We will briefly examine the rationale of the Present 
Study under the first four of the above headings. Methods of analysis 
will be considered in Chapter 5. 
3.1 DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM 
The problem as expressed above is intelligible in a superficial 
sense; however the terminology is open to widely different interpretations. 
We must establish what we intend the terms to mean and re-examine the 
problem in this form. 
Our first difficulty must arise in considering how we wish to . 
interpret the term "behaviour". Behaviour has been defined as "The total 
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response. motor and glandular which an organism makes to any situation 
with which it is faced" (Drever. 1952). However for the purposes of study 
we have limited the term behaviour to mean "The reactions of human 
organisms which are manifest in covert or overt behaviour which are 
observable. and capable of being communicated to other individuals". * 
We have already defined "involved" in the Introduction as "occupying the 
building at some stage in a fire incident whilst aware of the fire". 
Whilst this is hardly a rigorous definition. since awareness of a fire is 
a somewhat indeterminable concept. we will continue to utilise it as a 
working definition. 
Finally we must decide what we mean by fires. Our first constraint 
is that we are concerned with fires in buildings rather than fires out-
doors. Secondly. although we are interested in a broad spectrum of fires. 
it was felt that the study would be of less value if it was based upon a 
preponderance of very minor incidents. It was decided therefore that 
fires would be defined as those which were sufficiently serious to require 
the attendance of the Fire Brigade. This decision was obviously 
influenced by considerations to be discussed in Section 3.4. 
We have now established a working definition of the research problem. 
based upon the discussions above. which serves as a starting point for 
examination of research strategy. 
3.2 EVALUATION OF EXISTING INFORMATION 
Our brief literature review suggested that there were two particular 
areas of previous work which might be of relevance to the research 
problem. namely disaster research and studies of stress. The studies 
discussed in Chapter 2 represent only a small percentage of these broad 
fields which was judged to provide useful data or concepts in the present 
case. Even so. it must be clear that the majority of this work is only 
peripherally related. This statement is considered to be justified for a 
number of reasons. Firstly. it is recognised that the nature of the 
threat imposed by fires in buildings is a very specific one. carrying with 
* It is accepted that any definition of the term "behaviour" will be open 
to argument when stated briefly. as here. The description presented was 
adopted as a working definition. 
------- ------
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it the hazards of reduced visibility, breathing difficulties, heat, 
noxious fumes, and perhaps most potent of all, the possibility of 
entrapment. Whilst on the one hand we have this specific threat, on the 
other, we must realise that most fire incidents are relatively minor in 
terms of the whole community, involving as they do, perhaps less than 10 
people. In contrast, the majority of disaster studies have concentrated 
on events which involve much larger numbers of people. The completely 
different scale of these studies must make us extremely cautious regarding 
the applicability of the findings. A third important point is that whilst 
fires often involve only small numbers of people, those involved are 
frequently members of a family. Plainly this may have some influence 
upon their behaviour, although it is a factor not reproduced in labaratory 
studies of stress behaviour. 
Before finalising the decision to collect data, one further area of 
knowledge was explored, that of official data on fires. Official 
statistics for fires in the United Kingdom are compiled from information 
supplied by Fire Brigades. Each fire incident attended by a Fire Brigade 
is the subject of an official form, Form K433 (see Appendix 3, p.323). 
Examination of this form reveals that little or no behavioural information 
is included in its content. It is clear therefore that the officially-
collected data has no value in terms of studying the reactions of people 
to fires. The decision was therefore confirmed that study of the research 
problem would require collection of data from fire incidents. 
3.3 NATURE OF THE INFORMATION REQUIRED 
Consideration of the problem suggests that information on behaviour 
in fires is potentially available from two sources, either from the 
"participants" in the fire, or from what we might class as "observers" of 
the fire. In this latter category would be included firemen, policemen, 
ambulance-men, newspaper reporters and bystanders. Clearly the nature of 
the information gained will be largely dependent upon which group provides 
it. One major difficulty which would arise from relying solely on 
observer reports would be that they will only see part of the events, 
either because they are not intimately inVOlved in the dangerous aspects 
of the situation (as would be the case with bystanders or newsmen), or 
because at the time of the fire, their primary responsibility is the 
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saving of lives, rather than the objective observation of behaviour 
(in the case of firemen, policemen and ambulancemen). 
In view of this, it was thus decided thatdn terms of collecting 
information on behaviour, reliance would be placed upon the reports of 
the participants themselves. Whilst the building occupants might be in . 
the best position to describe their actions, it is unlikely that they 
could adequately describe the characteristics of the fire situation. For 
this purpose the expertise of Fire Brigade personnel clearly has no 
substitute, and it was therefore intended that behavioural data from 
those involved would be supplemented by information concerning the nature 
of the fire, provided by the firemen present at the incident. 
There remains one further point to be established, namely the "level" 
of the information to be collected. Since all field research is 
constrained by the time and resources available, it is never possible to 
collect all the information about all the cases. There thus arises the 
problem of establishing a compromise between the level of detail 
cOllected about each case and the number of cases in the sample. In some 
instances the nature of the particular research problem will indicate how 
this compromise should be reached; however this is not the case for the 
present research problem. In view of the paucity of previous research it 
was not known how much detail it would be necessary to record concerning 
behaviour, nor, prior to undertaking data collection, was it known how 
large a sample would be possible. This question regarding intensivel 
extensive study was therefore deferred until a later stage, although in 
the planning phase, the resource constraints indicated a small scale, 
intensive study. 
3.4 POSSIBLE METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION 
Since fires are comparatively rare events it is necessary to 
separate the data collection system into two parts as follows: 
(i) A Notification system 
The purpose of this system is to provide information on the 
occurrence of the event to be studied, namely a fire in a building in 
\~hich people were involved. 
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(ii) A Data collection system 
The purpose of this system is to collect data on the nature of the 
building, the fire, the occupants and their behaviour. 
Since we have established that the five incidents to be studied 
should be those which required Fire Brigade attendance, it is clear that 
the Fire Brigade themselves would provide the most comprehensive 
notification system. Thus the initial plan for the method of data 
collection conformed to the following outline: 
(a) Establish contact with Fire Brigades, which were to act as a 
notification system for the occurrence of fire incidents. 
(b) Data collection concerning the building occupants and their 
behaviour to be undertaken by the investigator at the scene of the 
incident by means of interview. 
(c) Data collection concerning the nature of the fire and the building 
to be recorded by the Fire Brigade at the time of the fire. 
A Pre-pilot study was undertaken based upon the above schedule. 
3.4.1 THE PRE-PILOT STUDY 
Six Fire Brigades within a 40-mile radius of Loughborough were 
contacted and agreed to participate in the Pre-Pilot Study. The purpose 
and nature of the study were explained to senior officers. It was 
suggested by them that since dwelling fires are so numerous, including 
these whhin the study might overwhelm the capability of the Fire Brigade 
to act as a notification system. It was therefore agreed that in the 
initial stage the study would be restricted to fires which occurred in 
high-rise flats, and otherwise in non-dwelling occupancies. A system was 
arranged whereby when a "fire of interest"* occurred, the investigator 
would be notified as soon as possible. He would then travel to the scene 
of the incident and interview those involved. Details of the fire and 
building were to be recorded by the Fire Brigade officers at the time of 
the fire. 
* As defined by the investigator, "Fires in the types of building 
outlined previously which involve people, that is, people were present in 
the building at some stage of the incident". 
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This system was in operation for a period of 4 months; however it 
became clear that it was not operating as intended, and was eventually 
halted for a number of reasons. 
(i) Small numbers of incidents 
Within the geographical areas covered by the 6 participating Brigades, 
only a relatively small number of fires of interest occurred. Six 
incidents were visited. 
(ii) Administrative 
Whilst every effort was made to discuss the working of the system 
with the personnel concerned, it became clear that the difficulties 
associated with changing Fire Brigade shifts, the different times of 
incidents and establishing telephone contact, the investigator was only 
notified of a small proportion of the potential incidents. 
(iii) Time factors 
Due to the difficulties outlined in (ii) above, in practice the 
investigator arrived at the scene of the incident from a few hours after 
the fire to up to 5 days afterwards. Both periods were disadvantageous. 
Arriving at the scene of the incident soon after the fire occurred, in no 
obvious official capacity, caused difficulties with pOlice, firemen and 
participants. The police and fire-personnel were concerned that the 
investigator should not hinder the prime purpose of their presence at the 
incident, I~hilst the occupants often found it bizarre that someone should 
be interested in a detailed account of what they did. If the period of 
time was longer and fire itself extinguished, residents of high-rise 
flats often went to stay with relatives, whilst the occupants of other 
buildings had frequently dispersed. In both cases of course, tracing 
those involved then became extremely difficult. A further problem was 
that when the elapsed time between incident and interview was days rather 
than hours, the interviewee had time to integrate and rationalise the 
experience, and the impression was gained that they tended to describe 
their actions in the best possible light. This is a natural I. human 
tendency, however, in conjunction with the possible lapses in recall which 
would occur over this period, the validity of the resultant interview was 
therefore questionable. 
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(iv) Lack of cooperation 
An underlying assumption of this method of data collection is that 
those involved will be prepared to talk to the investigator. Unfortunately 
this assumption proved optimistic at several inCidents, particularly in 
the case of public buildings. In hotel, cinema and factory fires it proved 
impossible to interview staff members or trace guests due to the attitude 
of the management. In these cases, the occurrence of a fire was perceived 
by managers as reflecting badly on their own competence, and for which 
they would be held responsible. They therefore wished to play-down the 
incident and would not cooperate in anything which might appear to increase 
its importance. 
The net result of the Pre-Pilot Study indicated that both the 
notification system and the data collection system had failed to fulfill 
their intended purpose. Consideration of the failings of the study 
suggested that the major problem arose due to the investigator assuming 
data collector. However the intended nature of the data, the role 
that is, 
of prime 
detailed interviews of fire participants, was contingent upon 
this arrangement. It was clear therefore that both the form and method of 
data collection required revision. 
3.4.2 THE PILOT STUDY 
Following discussions with two Fire Brigades, it was decided that 
using Fire Brigade officers at the scene of the incident as initial 
gatherers of data should be explored. Clearly this strategy involved a 
fundamental change in the nature of the data collected. As Fire Officers 
have only a limited time at each incident, the level of detail capable of 
being collected would thus be constrained. Whilst this might be viewed 
as a disadvantage, there were a number of clear advantages which would . 
fOllow from this system. The necessity for a notification system would 
be erased, and the difficulties in administration, time factors and small 
numbers outlined in Section 3.4.1 would be minimised. In addition it was 
hoped that the involvement of Fire Service personnel would be· helpful 
wi th regard to the lack of cooperation mentioned, since they are expected 
to ask questions regarding the circumstances of the fire. 
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The two Brigades cooperating in the Pilot Study survey represented 
different types of property at risk. West Riding Fire Brigade has a large 
number of mills and general industrial property while Warley Fire Brigade 
(Birmingham) has one of the largest concentrations of tall flats in the 
country. 
The use of firemen as data gatherers indicated a simple questionnaire 
approach which could be administered in a short period of time. In fact, 
two questionnaires were developed, very similar in principle but 
differing slightly to cater for the different occupancies (see Appendices 
4 and 5, p.325 and 329). 
The two questionnaires each had 17 questions on them, which were 
broken down into 6 general areas as follows: 
Ca) How the person first became aware of the fire 
(b) Their position in the building at that time 
(c) What they did as soon as they realised there was a fire 
(d) I f or how they tried to leave the building 
(e) If they had any difficulty moving about due to smoke, flames, etc 
(f) Where they were when the Fire Brigade arrived. 
3.4.3 RESULTS OF THE PILOT STUDY 
The survey was conducted over a period of 4 to 5 months. In all, 
40 incidents were studied resulting in 92 completed questionnaires. We 
will only discuss the results briefly since the main purpose of the 
survey was a technique-proving exercise. 
With regard to first awareness of the fire, the most frequent 
methods by which a person became aware of a fire incident were as follows: 
Ca) IVas told 
Cb) Saw flames 
(c) Smelt smoke 
(35%) 
(21%) 
(18%) 
The large percentage of people in Cb) above tends to indicate that our 
sample is heavily weighted in favour of people who actually discovered 
the fire. This is further indicated by the fact that 41% of the 
interviewees judged themselves to be "close" to the fire. The first 
actions were then classified into seven categories as shown in Table 1 
overleaf. 
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TABLE 1. Percentage of individuals' 
first actions 
, 
Category .. ~ 
Went to investigate 33 
Prepared to leave 10 
Warned someone else 20 
Enquired if Fire Brigade called 10 
Attempted to call Fire Brigade 6 
Tried to extinguish fire 13 
Nothing 8 
Points of interest arising from the above table are the relatively 
high percentage of people who warn someone else,and the relatively low 
percentage who attempt to call the Fire Brigade. 
A methodological difficulty arose at this point in that it became 
clear that the action categories assigned on the questionnaire were too 
restrictive, that is, the range of actions was larger than had been 
allowed for. 
With regard to evacuation of the building, one of the mo~t 
interesting differences arose, in that in incidents in blocks of flats 
only 15% of those interviewed attempted to leave the building, while in 
other buildings 60% of those interviewed attempted to leave. 
58% of the interviewees stated that they had no difficulty moving 
about. As expected, smoke was the most frequent cause of difficulty 
(in 37% of the cases). Of the people who said they had experienced 
difficul ty moving through smoke, 65% stated that they moved 12 feet or more. 
When the Fire Brigade arrived only 8% of the interviewees from flats 
--were outside the building, in contrast to the 45% from other buildings. 
Finally, a rather surprising 24% of the people claimed to have been 
previously involved in a fire incident. 
The number of incidents and interviewees was too small to attempt to 
draw firm conclusions and this also precluded more detailed analysis on 
many of the questions. However, some interesting trends occurred. 
(a) In blocks of flats women were significantly more likely to attempt 
to leave the building than men (xz = 4.5 (1 df), which is significant 
at the O.OS·level). 
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(b) Men moved significantly further ~hrough smoke than women 
(X2 = 10.2 (3 df), which is significant at the 0.02 level). 
(c) The age of those interviewed appeared to have little effect upon 
their actions, whether or not they left the building, or the distance 
they moved through smoke. 
3.5 DISCUSSION 
The Pilot Study served to demonstrate the feasibility of this method 
of data collection. In no other way would it be possible to obtain 
information so close in time to the event. However it was clear from the 
responses of the Fire Brigades involved, that attempting to restrict the 
area of study to specific types of building led to much reduced response, 
since the officers at the scene of the fire had to make a decision 
regarding whether or not to use the questionnaire. In practice it was 
much easier to remember to use it at all building fires. 
It was also clear that the length of the questionnaires mitigated 
against their constant usage. Any extension of the technique would 
require changes in format to reduce the length. This of course placed 
limits upon the amount of detail in which any particular aspect might be 
examined; however it was felt that the clear advantages of the technique 
outweighed any restriction of this nature. 
In summary, we can see that due to the constraints imposed largely 
by the feasibility of the data collection methods, we have moved from an 
original research strategy which envisaged a small sample of incidents 
being considered in some depth, to the possibility of a much larger 
sample of incidents considered in somewhat less detail. Whilst the major 
part of the study would be based upon data from this large sample, it was 
also planned to examine a sub-sample of incidents in depth, namely those 
which involved rescues, injuries or fatalities. 
C H APT E R 4 
THE FULL-SCALE STUDY: METHOD 
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4.0 THE FULL-SCALE STUDY: METHOD 
The Pilot Study described in Section 3.3 served four main purposes. 
Firstly, it showed the viability of using Fire Brigade Officers as the 
primary agents for collection of data on fires and the people in them. 
Secondly, and as a function of the first point, it demonstrated that the 
format and perceived length of any questionnaire might have a profound 
effect upon the response rate. In other words, if the Officers saw the 
task as long and onerous they simply would not administer the 
questionnaire. Thirdly, it showed that to maximise response rate, the 
decision to be made by the Brigade Officer whether or not to use the 
questionnaire at any given incident must be as simple as possible. 
Fourthly, it indicated additional factors which should be included in 
the further studies. The decision was therefore taken to proceed with a 
full-scale study along the following lines: 
Ca) Data on fires, buildings, and the behaviour of those involved to be 
collected at the scene of fire incidents by Fire Brigade Officers. 
Cb) Questionnaires for this method of data collection to be designed to 
be as clear, well laid-out, and brief as possible, commensurate 
with collecting valid and reliable information on the selected 
variables. 
Cc) Final selection of variables to be included in the full-scale study 
to be based upon previous research, pilot-study findings, declared 
area of interest of the Fire Research Station, advice from the Fire 
Service Personnel, and practicability of data collection. 
Cd) The questionnaires to be administered at all building fires. 
Ce) The study to be conducted by as many Fire Brigades as possible, so 
as to maximise the number of incidents, and cover a wide range of 
buildings and fire types. 
The procedure adopted for conducting the Full-Scale Study is illustrated 
in Figure 1. We will briefly elaborate on the major operations summarised 
in the diagram. 
3S 
Decision to proceed with Full-scale Study 
/ t t 
Define parameters Select variables 
for Full-scale for Full-scale 
Study Study 
Write to Fire Brigades {- {-in Great Britain 
I 
, Design and draft Full-scale 
,. Study questionnaire 
Visit Fire Brigades 
. 
Discuss draft 
questionnaire 
-Persuade Fire Brigades 
to participate in Full-
scale Study Modify draft questionnaire 
+ 
Print revised questionnaire 
t 
Distribute questionnaire to 
participating Fire Brigades 
_. Instruct personnel in 
use of questionnaire 
'v 
Monitor returned questionnaires 
Data collection by 
, 
Queries about specific incidents 
Fire Brigades using Instructions to Fire Brigades Full-scale Study ~ 
questionnaire Visits to specific incidents 
Request additional information 
FIGURE 1. Procedure for the Full-scale Study 
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4.1 PARAMETERS FOR FULL-SCALE STUDY QUESTIONNAIRES 
The questionnaires utilised in the Pilot Studies (Appendices 4 and 5) 
were both duplicated, four-page booklets. Each was used for interviewing 
one person. The deficiencies associated with this format were numerous. 
The major ones are outlined below. 
(a) Due to their length it was unlikely that more than one person per 
incident would be interviewed. 
(b) They were unwieldy to handle and did not encourage ease of use. 
(c) They appeared of rather "amateur" appearance which probably also 
did not encourage their use. 
(d) The questionnaire responses were all "structured", thus not 
allowing a "picture" of an incident to be built up, nor permitting 
responses which fell outside the designed range to be entered. 
(e) They did not record any other than the barest details concerning 
the physical aspects of the building and the fire. 
In attempting to overcome these, and other deficiencies, various layouts 
for the Full-Scale Study questionnaires were evaluated. It was decided 
at a fairly early stage that the final format of the questionnaire 
should not exceed one page for the physical variables (relating to the 
fire and the bui lding), and one page-per-person for interviewing 
individuals involved in the fire. 
A further decision which was made was that the layout and typography 
of the Full-Scale Study questionnaire should appear more "professional", 
and to this end the advice of a Graphic Designer was sought at an early 
stage. 
4.2 SELECTION OF VARIABLES FOR THE FULL-SCALE STUDY 
As was outlined briefly in Section 4.0, the selection of Study 
Variables was based upon a number of considerations. Clearly the chosen 
study method precluded an in-depth examination of each incident. It was 
therefore of critical importance to select the most relevant factors to 
be included in the final format of the questionnaire. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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A preliminary list of variables was drawn up, from which a final 
selection was made in consultation with Fire Research Station and Fire 
Brigade personnel. Inevitably the final list reflects, to a certain 
extent, the particular interests of the researcher, and such a list 
produced by a research worker from another discipline, or with a 
different background would not necessarily include the same variables 
for study. 
It was found convenient to consider the study variables under four 
broad headings: Fire Variables, Bui lding Variables, Personal Variables 
and Behavioural Variables. There is, of course some overlap between 
these, and particular variables do not fall neatly into one category. 
For example, "how a person first becomes aware of a fire", which is a 
potentially very important factor. 
We have seen in surveying the literature that where cues are 
ambiguous, individuals will invariably make some efforts to verify them; 
and this will have an important bearing upon their behaviour, and possibly 
the outcome of the fire. 
The "first awareness" is clearly related to the fire, and thus 
could be classified as a Fire Variable. Alternatively it will vary 
between individuals and could thus equally well be classified as a 
Personal Variable. To be exact, it is a "fire-related personal variable". 
We have in fact included this particular factor under "Personal Variables".· 
The above discussion is not intended as an apologia, but merely to 
point out that the placing of certain variables under particular 
headings is to some extent arbitrary. 
The variables finally selected for study are shown below under their 
particular headings. 
4.2.1 FIRE VARIABLES 
(a) Severity of the fire as measured by the number of rooms, levels and 
buildings involved. 
(b) Severity of the fire as measured by the number of jets and hose reels 
used by the Brigade in extinguishing it. 
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(c) Severity of the fire as measured by the extent of smoke spread. 
(d) Severity of the fire as measured by the estimated density of smoke 
(Fire Brigade estimate). 
(e) Posi tion of the fire in the buildtng when it started. 
(f) Time of the fire (this was recorded as the time of the first call 
to the Fire Brigade). 
4.2.2 BUILDING VARIABLES 
(a) What category of building was involved, in terms of occupancy. 
Thus buildings would be classified as "Dwellings", "Factories", etc. 
(b) What provisions for fire-fighting and emergency escape were 
provided in the building. 
(c) The number of storeys. 
(d) The number of people present in the building prior to the start of 
the fire. 
(e) The number of people who left the building during the fire. 
(f) The number of people who were rescued by Fire Brigade personne 1. 
(g) The number of people who were injured in the incident. 
(h) The number of people who died in the incident. 
4.2.3 PERSONAL VARIABLES 
(a) Age and sex of the person interviewed. 
(b) How that person first became aware of the fire. 
(c) How serious they considered the fire to be immediately they were 
aware of it. 
(d) Their position (floor) in the building. 
(e) Whether they worked, or lived, in the building. 
(f) How familiar they were with the building layout. 
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(g) How frequently they had received instruction or training on what 
to do in case of fire. 
(h) Whether they knew a means of emergency escape from the building. 
(i) Who was present with them in the building. 
(j) Whether they had been involved in a fire incident previously. 
4.2.4 BEHAVIOURAL VARIABLES 
(a) What was the first, and subsequent actions they took when they 
realised there was a fire. 
Cb) Whether or not they left the building. 
(c) Whether or not they returned into the building. 
(d) Whether or not they attempted to move through the smoke. If they 
did, how far they moved and how far they could see ahead of them. 
(e) Whether or not they had to turn back because of the smoke. 
4.3 VISITS TO FIRE BRIGADES 
Whilst each Chief Officer of a Fire Brigade (or Fire Master in 
Scotland) is in the final event answerable to Her Majesties Inspector of 
Fires at the Home Office, they are in many respects autonomous. It was 
not possible therefore, to solicit blanket cooperation from Brigades 
through a Central Authority. (Although of course permission was sought 
from the Home Office to approach individual Brigades.) Once Home Office 
permission had been granted, the procedure in persuading the Fire 
Brigades to participate in the Full-Scale Study followed five major steps 
which are described below. 
(a) Write to the Chief Officer of every Fire Brigade in Great Britain, * 
explaining the purpose of the study, and asking permission to visit 
him and discuss the possibility of his Brigade taking part. in the 
proposed study. 
* At the time of· the research there were 123 City and County Fire Services 
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(b) Visit Chief Officers who responded positively to the initial 
letter. A draft copy of the Full-Scale Study questionnaire was 
taken for discussion and advice on possible modifications. 
Permission was sought for personnel under his command to take part 
in the study. 
(c) In some cases the Chief Officer agreed that his Brigade would 
participate on condition that the personnel who would be directly 
involved, the Divisional Officers, were prepared to undertake the 
additional work. This entailed a second visit to these Brigades 
to discuss the study with the Divisional Officers who were gathered 
together for the occasion. 
(d) Once it was clear that at least some Brigades were prepared to 
participate, discussions were held with the Fire Brigade Unions to 
obtain permission for the personnel to undertake the study. 
(e) The final visit to participating Brigades prior to the commencement 
of the study was undertaken to discuss the final form of the 
questionnaire, instruct personnel in its use, and to answer queries. 
The result of this activity was that twelve Fire Brigades agreed to take 
part in the Full-Scale Study. Fortunately, three of these were the 
largest Brigades in Great Britain. It was also fortunate that the areas 
of the participating Brigades were both geographically spread, thus 
allowing for regional differences, and also represented a'.,wide range of 
hazards and building types. The actual Brigades who eventually took part 
in the study are listed in the Acknowledgements. 
4.4 MODIFICATION AND FINALISING OF 'THE FULLcSCALE STUDY 'QUESTIONNAIRE 
In the light of the contact with Fire Brigades discussed in Section 
4.3, minor modifications to the draft questionnaire were made. One 
major point which was established related to the number of potential 
interviewees it would be possible to include at each incident. It will 
be recalled (see Section 4.1) that it had been decided that the final 
format should not exceed one page for the physical variables, and one 
page-per-person for interviewing those involved. What could not be 
previously decided was the maximum number of interview pages to be 
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included at each incident. Discussions with Brigade personnel suggested 
that this number be set at six. It appeared unlikely that Brigade 
Officers would be at the scene of a fire for sufficiently long to 
interview more than six people. It was agreed however that should this 
be the case, then more than one set of questionnaires would be used. 
Thus the final arrangement of the Full-Scale Study questionnaire was 
for six "interview" questionnaires labelled Part 2, recording Personal 
and Behavioural variables to be attached to a front page, labelled Part I, 
on which were to be recorded Fire and Building variables. The final 
format of the questionnaire is shown overleaf, and a copy of the completed 
booklet is illustrated in Appendix 6. The brief instructions for the use 
of the forms, which is incorporated in the heading, was supplemented by 
printed "Notes of Guidance" (Appendix 7). In addition, once the study 
had begun, all returned questionnaires were monitored to ensure correct 
completion, and where necessary, personal visits to the cooperating Fire 
Brigades were made to correct any errors or ommissions and to re-instruct 
the Divisional Officers. Where incidents of particular interest occurred, 
for example a fatality, visits to Brigades were also undertaken to obtain 
supplementary information. 
4.5 DISCUSSION 
To summarise this section, we had now developed a more comprehensive 
questionnaire which would investigate in considerable detail variables 
under the general headings of Fire, Building, Personal and Behavioural. 
These questionnaires were distributed to twelve Fire Brigades who would 
use them to interview people involved in fires at the scene of the 
incident. The questionnaires were handled by Fire Brigade Officers of at 
least Divisional Officer grade. All the questionnaires were completed 
within an hour of the incident having taken place, and in many cases 
within minutes of the fire having been extinguished. The questionnaires 
were returned to the investigator at weekly intervals for analysis. 
-------------------
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e are trying to find out if people react differently to fires 
different kinds of building. This set of questionnaires is' 
Incerned with one particular incident and is composed of 
10 parts. 
"t I, which is about the fire and the-building should be 
Iswered by the Fire Brigade Personnel. Part 11 comprises 
e six subsequent questionnaires, which are about people 
volved in the fire. The questionnaires in Part 11 are for use 
interviewing six separate individuals who were in the 
Jilding when the fire was discovered. We are interested in 
anyone who was in the building, not only the person who 
first discovered the fire. 
We would therefore like you to interview as many people as 
possible who were involved with the incident. Both Part I 
and Part II should be handled by Fire Brigade Personnel, not 
by the person being interviewed. Where a Question is 
followed by a list of suggested alternatives please tick the 
box opposite the most appropriate answer. Where a distance 
estimate is required please circle the relevant number. 
Part 1 Information on the Building and Type of Fire 
Mdre .. 
,fire fighting equipment provided in the building? B 
Yes 
- No -
, so, was it used? ......... : .............. :e:8 
; fire fighting equipment is not provided, was any-
ther attempt made to extinguish the fire before the 
ire Brigade arrived? ................... :. Yesn 
- No~ 
re there any recognised escape routes in the 
'ilding? .............................. :-:8 
, so, were they used? ......... .' .......... :e;8 
"No", please specify why not 
~hat category of building is it? In general terms, for 
~ample - school, block of flats, shop, cinema, 
"ivate dwelling house, multi~accupancy dwelling, 
'C. 
I Date K433 Report Sheet Number 
6 What is the maximum number of storeys in the 
building? .................................. D 
7 On which floor did the fire start? 
Basement;:; -1, ground;:; 0, first = 1, etc. ......... D 
8 Approximately how many people do you think were 
in the building when the fire was discovered? 
Please put the number in the box ............... 0 
Approximately how many lelt the building during theli 
course of the fire? If al!, write ALL ............. L-.l 
How many people were rescued by Fire Brigade :::o:~~: p~~~I'" ~~;~ i'n~~;;d' ~~~-'f~~a'I;;; : : : : : : : § 
How many people were injured fatally? ......... . 
How many people were injured (fatally or non-fataIlY)1i 
in escaping the building? ...................... L-----1 
9 How many 
rooms were involved in the fire ................. H 
levels were involved in the fire ................. U 
constructions were involved in the fire .......... . 
10 How many jets were utilised? ................. CJ 
11 What was the extent of the smoke spread? 
None .................................... . 
Confined to room of origin 
Confined to floor of origin ................... . 
Spread to floor above ....................... . 
Even more extensive ........................ . 
12 What was the density of the smoke at its worst? 
If, on the scale below, 7 represents the thickest 
smoke you have ever encountered, and 1 represents 
very thin smoke, put a cross in one of the spaces 
which represents the density of the smoke in this 
incident. 
1~1 __ ~~ __ ~~ __ L-~~17 
---- - ----------------------------
t 2 Information about the Person in the Fire 
MaleD Female 0 AgeD 
How did you first become aware there was a fire? 
Felt heat ............•................•... 
Saw flames ...........•.................... 
Saw or smelt smoke .. , .....•.•.............. 
Heard noises associated with the fire ........... . 
Heard shouts .............•.•.............. 
Was told .............................•.... 
Heard fire alarm or fire engines 
When you realised there was a fire, how serious did § 
you think it was? Extremely serious ..... . 
Quite serious ........ . 
Not at all serious ..... . 
Which floor were you on when you realised there was 
afire? .................................... D 
Do you either live or work in the building? yosD 
NoD 
'How familiar are you with the layout of the bUilding?~ 
IAre you ............. completely familiar with it 
I fairly familiar with it .... 
I slightly familiar with it .. 
I f '1' . h' I not amI lar WIt It ..... 
I What was the first thing you did when you realised 
I there was afire? 
What did you do next? 
and next? 
How often have you received training on what actions 
to take in a fire? 
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8 Did you know of any means of emergency escape in 
the building? .........................•.. y::B 
9 Did you leave the building during the fire? ..... yB 
If NO. please pass on to question 10 N 
I n leaving did you use 
The normal exits ............................ 0 
An emergency exit .......................... 0 rome other way please specify I 
Did you leave by Your own efforts ...... § 
With Fire Brigade help .. 
With the help of others .. 
Did you return into the building during the course of 
the fire? ......•........................ :8 
If you did, for what reason? 
10 What reason did you have for not leaving? Was it 
because 
You did not think the fire was serious enough ..... n 
You thought you would be safer where you were ... D 
Some other reason please specify 
11 Was there any smoke? ...................... yes§ 
If NO, omit the rest of this question No 
Did you try to move through it? '" .......... Y os 
If NO, omit the rest of this question No 
How far did you try to move through it? 
Yards .... 0 .... 2 .... 4 .... 10 .... 12 .... 15 .... 20 .... 20+ 
How far ahead could you see at the time? 
Yards .... 0 .... 2 .... 4 .... 10 .... 12 .... 15 .... 20 .... 20+§ 
Did the smoke become thicker? .........•... Yes 
No 
Did you have to turn back because of it? ...... Yes 
If NO, omit the next part of the question No 
How far ahead could you see when you turned back? 
Yards .... 0 .... 2 .... 4 .... 10 .... 12 .... 15 ...• 20 .... 20+ 
12 Were any of the following people with you in the 
building during the fire? Your children under 12 .. t----j 
Your children over 12 " .I-_~ 
Your wife/husband ..... \--_.., 
Your parents ...•..... 'I-_~ 
Some other relative ..... \--_.., 
Friends .............. I---j 
Acqua intances ......... t----j 
People unknown to you .. L-_-' 
At least once per month ...................... § 
At least once every six months ................. 13 Have you ever been involved in a fire incident beforeg? At least once every year ...................... Yes 
Less frequently than once a year or never .. . . . . . . . N 
---------------------
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5.0 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STUDY VARIABLES 
In this section it is intended to set out the results of the study 
in terms of descriptive statistics. This is intended as a scene-setting 
exercise, prior to the detailed examination of the relationship between 
the study variables conducted in subsequent chapters. In this 
preliminary analysis we are merely describing how many fires, buildings, 
people, etc., were involved. 
5.1 THE FIRES 
Data was collected from 952 fire incidents. Figure 2 shows how this 
sample is related to the overall population of "fire incidents". 
Unfortunately official Fire statistics are not capable of being 
broken down into an equivalent population of "fires in buildings in which 
people are involved". The nearest official breakdown is the much larger 
"Fires in Buildings". The present sample represents some 12% of this 
. population over an equivalent period of time for the Brigades taking 
part in the survey (Department of The Environment, 1974). 
The time of occurrence of the incident was recorded as the "time of 
the first call to the Fire Brigade". This was divided into four 
categories, as shown in Table 2 be10\~. 
TABLE 2. Incidents by time (Present Study) 
Category % of incidents 
Morning (6 am to noon) 22:4 (213) 
'J 
Afternoon (noon to 6 pm) 38.2 (364) 
Evening (6 pm to 11 pm) 25.4 (242) 
Night (11 pm to 6 am) 14.0 (133) 
Total , 100.0 (952) 
Again, comparing this with the official breakdown .is a little 
difficult as the neasrest tabulation is " •.• Time of Call in Relation to 
Hazard (in Buildings)". In this· tab16.· the buildings are categorised 
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ALL Fire incidents 
I1 
, 
NOT attended by 
Fire Brigade 
Attended by 
Fire Brigade 
I II' 
NOT in buildings 
In buildings 
\V , / 
People NOT 
involved 
People involved 
t 
t 
THE PRESENT STUDY 
FIGURE 2. Study sample in relation to the population of fire incidents 
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according to what type of trade or industry, etc., are conducted in 
them. However, by combining categories into the general headings 
utilised in this report, we find that the distribution of incidents is 
as shown in Table 2a below. 
TABLE 2a. Incidents by time (official statistics) 
.. 
Category % of incidents 
Morning (6 am to noon) 19.1 (17026) 
Afternoon (noon to 6 pm) . 37.5 (33466) 
Evening (6 pm to 11 pm) 28.8 (25675) 
Night (11 pm to 6 am) 14.6 (13007) 
Total 100.0 (89174) 
Source: United Kingdom Fire and Loss Statistics 
1971 (Dept of the Environment, op cit) 
The difference between the frequencies in Tables 2 and 2a are 
statistically significant (X2 = 9.35, 3df significant at 0.025 level). 
The source of this difference is apparent by inspection, the present 
study having a greater proportion of fires which occur in the morning, 
and a smaller proportion in the evening. 
In order to obtain some measure of how severe the fire was, the 
following questions were asked: 
9 Howmany 
rooms were involved in the fire .....•.•.•....... § 
levels were involved in the fire ................ . 
constructions were involved in the fire .......... . 
10 How many jet. were utilised? •...•....•....••. 0 
863 (more than 90%) of the incidents were confined to one room (or area) 
on one level in one building. 269 (28%) of the incidents were 
sufficiently serious to require at least 1 Jet to be used. 
As with Fire Severity, to obtain some measure of the smoke 
conditions in the building, the Fire Brigade were asked to judge how 
extensive and how dense the smoke was. 
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11 What was the extent of the smoke spread? 
None .•••••.......•... ·•·•··•·•·•·•··•··• . 
Confined to room of origin .•••••..•••...•••... 
Confined to floor of origin ..•••••.•...•.•..... 
Spread to floor above ...•••.....•.•....•..••. 
Even more extensive ...•..................... 
12 What was the density of the smoke at its worst? 
If, on the scale below, 7 repres,ents the thickest 
.smoke you have ever encountered, and 1 represents 
vervthin smoke, put a cross in one of the spaces 
.which represents the density of the smoke in this 
incident. 
lLI ~1 __ ~~~~~~~17 
The histograms in Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of these measures. 
5.2 THE BUILDINGS 
5 What category of building is it? In general terms. for 
example - school, block of flats. shop, cinema, 
private dwelling house, multi·occupancy dwelling, 
etc. 1<-----__ 
The incidents were categorised by occupancy as shown in Table 3. 
The categories are based upon a more detailed breakdown of the Standard 
Industrial Classification. By combining our sample categories it is 
possible to derive a comparable classification. Doing this, and again 
_ using the sample "Fires in Buildings" for comparison, it would seem that 
the present sample has proportionately more dwelling houses than the 
official statistics do, but in other categories it is fairly comparable. 
We will further discuss this point in Sections S.S and 17.1. 
48 
11-0. 
N = 952 
30-
t. 
inc;.ic:lerJs 
20· 
10· 
little Cl' ov\9 OV\!!, -Ro~v tno"'8 
none YeO", .(!lcoV' abovQ e~te",s. 
S"".~e sp,.,,,d 
FIGURE 3. Percentage distribution of Smoke Spread 
'30 • 
20· 
1 
least 
1.. s b 
N = 952 
7 
wOY~t 
I 
FIGURE Sea). Percentage distribution of Smoke Density 
49 
TABLE 3. Incidents by occupancy 
Category % of incidents 
Dwe lUng house 50.6 (482) 
Factory 16.7 ( 159) 
Block of flats 6.4 (61) 
Multi-occupancy 4.4 (43) 
School 0.7 (7) 
Hotel 0.7 (7) 
College 0.3 (3) 
Shop (unspecified) 6.0 (57) 
Public house 1.4 (13) 
Fish and chip shop 1.2 (11) 
Garage 1.9 (18) 
Warehouse/store 1.6 (15) 
Cafe/restaurant 1.2 (11) 
Launderette 0.5 (5) 
Hostel/home 1.1 (10) 
Office 0.6 (6) 
Flat over shop, etc. 1.3 (12) 
Hospital 1.3 (12) 
Boiler house 0.4 (4) 
Other 1.7 (16) 
Total 100.0 (952) 
Some relevant information concerning the building :was provided in 
the following questions: 
1 Is ~ f~re alarm (manual or automatic, provided in the B 
bUilding? "' •••• ,,"'.,.".""'.""'" Yes 
. . No 
If so, wa, it used? ,' .. ""' .. ,', ,., .. , , .. , , YesO 
. NoD 
2 Is fire fighting equipm~nt provided in the building? a· 
, Yes 
. No . 
I Iso, was it used? .. " .. , .. :,',.,',.,', .. , :;:8 
3 If fire fighting equipment is not provided, was any· 
other attempt made to extinguish the fire before the 
Fire Brigade arrived? , .. , ..• " •. " •• "".'. Y esO NoD 
4 Are there any recognised escape routes In the 
building? ,., •. ,., .• ,',.,", .• ,', .• "",::8 
. If so, were they used? ........ ' ............ YesO 
. NoD 
6 What is the maximum number of storeys In the 
building? , , , , • , , , , , , , •• , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 0 
Response Percentages 
22 (209) 
55 (115) 
38 (362) 
.... .68 (246) 
55 (324) 
47 (447) 
53 (237) 
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With blocks of flats representing only 6.4% (61) of the incidents, it is 
unsurprising that buildings with less than 5 storeys make up more than 
90% (857) of the sample. Two-storey buildings were the modal class. True 
high-rise flats (with 5 or more storeys) represent some 1.7% of the 
sample (16 incidents). 
7 On which floor did the tire start? . 
Basement = -7. ground = 0, first;:: 1, etc . .•.••.... D 
Almost 64% of the fires started on the ground floor, 22% on the first 
floor, 5% on the second, and 3% in the basement. All other values were 
of 2% or less. 
8 Approximately how many people do you think were 
in the building when the fire was discovered? 
Please put the number in the box ......•.•.•••. ; 0 
Approximately how many lett the building during the 
COurse of the fire? If all, write ALL •..•......••• 0 
How many people were rescued by Fire Brigade 
:::o:~~: p~~~;"~~;~ i'~j~;;~ ~~~"f:;~II'y'?' :: : :: :: R 
How many people were injured fatally? ••.•..•••• Ll 
How many people were injured (fatally or non.tatallYb 
in escaping the building? ....•.•..•......••••.• 
(a) The average number of people per building was 18, however the modal 
class was only 2 per building. 9% of the buildings were occupied 
by only 1 person, 53% by 3 people or less, 78% by 10 people or less 
and 85% by 20 people or less. 2% of the incidents involved buildings 
in which more than 250 people were present. 
Cb) In 31% of the incidents nobody left the building. Again the 
average value of 5 is not very meaningful, the modal class in this 
case being I person leaving (20% of the incidents). Also with high 
values were 2 people leaving, 16%; 3 people, 9%; and 4 people, 6%. 
In 95% of the incidents 20 people or less left the building. 
If we examine what percentage of people left the building we find 
that, as already stated, in 31% of the incidents no people left and 
in 49% everybody left; these two categories accounting therefore 
for 80% of the incidents. In 4% of the incidents, half the people 
left, the remainder being made up of groups wi th less than 2% in them. 
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(c) Over all the incidents studied, only 1.6% involved rescues by Fire 
Brigade personnel. The rescues involving I to 4 people accounted 
for most of this figure, only two incidents involved rescuing 10 or 
more people. 
(d) 6% of the incidents involved non-fatal injuries, 1 or 2 people 
injured being the largest category. 
(e) Seven incidents involved a fatality. In each case 1 person only died. 
(f) 1. 6% of the '.inaidents involved injury which occurred in escaping the 
building. Most of these involved only a single person. 
5.3 THE PEOPLE 
From the 952 fire incidents, 2193 people who were involved in them 
I,ere interviewed using Part 2 of the questionnaire, 1239 men (56.55%) 
and 954 women (43.45%). 
The distribution of ages of those interviewed approximates a normal 
distribution (Figure 4) although it is skewed to the younger end of the 
scale. The modal age group is 30 - 39 years. 
How a person first became aware of the fire was considered to be a 
possibly important variable. People close to the fire would receive 
very clear cues indicating the presence of fire. Those some distance 
away would receive cues of a more ambiguous nature. 
1 How did you first become aware there. was a fire? 
Felt heat .•.....••...•.......••..•••••..•. 
Saw flames .•..•...•...•••••..•.•••.••••.•• 
Saw or smelt smoke .... , .....•..........•.... 
Heard noises associated with the fire ........... . 
Heard shouts ............................ .. 
Wastold ................................. . 
Heard fire alarm or fire engines 
Something else please specify 
................ 
30 -
% 
10 -
10 -
52 
N 
'" 
2193 
I 
0-9 10-'9 'lo·Z' lo.~~ ""-4' So-" 6o-6~ 7o-'I'l 80-89 90-99 
A<;je j" ~eolrS 
FIGURE 4. Percentage age distribution of interviewee sample 
'30 -
2.0 -
10 -
, 
I I 
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A histogram illustrating percentages in each category is shown in 
Figure 5. The categories are ordered in a general way on a scale of 
"proximity" to the fire. The perception of smoke and "being told" are 
clearly the most frequent cues. 
Interviewees were asked for a "seriousness rating" of the fire. 
Response Percentages 
2 When you realised there was a firo, how serIous did § 
you think it was? Extremely serious ..... . 
. Quite serious ....•.... 
. Not at all serious ..••.. 
20.2 . (443) 
50.4 (1105) 
29.4 (645) 
Total 100.0 (2193) 
This question was included to obtain a crude measure of how subjectively 
threatened a person felt by the fire. 'From the discussion in Section 2.0, 
it would in general be considered that high levels of sUbjective threat 
are associated with very forceful threat-reducing behaviour, which might 
well be inappropriate in terms of a specific fire. Furthermore, it has 
been shown (Wherry & Curran, op cit) that people have individual 
thresholds for threat. It may be hypothesised that people with low 
thresholds are responsible for an initial "paniC" reaction, or at least 
for less appropriate behaviour patterns. Clearly, rating a fire as 
"extremely serious" may be associated with some obj ecti ve variable, such 
as high smoke density, or the presence of young children; however these 
aspects will be explored in a later section. For the present we will 
merely illustrate the distribution of scale values as shown. 
The floor on which the person was when he first became aware of the 
fire was then recorded. From this was then computed his position 
relative to the fire. Frequencies and percentages are shown in Table 4. 
TABLE 4. Position of fire relative to person 
Categoz:y % f 
3 or more floors below 1. 37 (30) 
2 floors below 2.74 (60) 
1 floor below 14.68 (322) 
same floor 64.11 (1406) 
1 floor above . 13.22 (290) 
2 floors above 1. 78 (39) 
3 or more floors above 2.10 (46) 
Total 100.0 (2193) 
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Clearly a large proportion of the people interviewed were on the same 
floor as the fire. 
The following two questions were intended to explore a possible key 
variable, a person's familiarity with the building. 
4 Do you either live or work in the building? yesD 
NoU 
5 How familiar are you with the layout of the bUilding?§ 
Are you •.....••...•• completely familiar with it 
. fairly familiar with it.. •.. 
slightly familiar with it •• 
not familiar with it •.••. 
Response Percentages 
· ... 
· ... 
90.0 
10.0 
84.9 
9.6 
2.7 
2.8 
(1974) 
(219) 
(1862) 
(211) 
(59) 
(61) 
Total 100.0 (2193) 
The first question was inserted as a lead-in to the familiarity 
scale. In fact only 10% of the people did not either live or work in the 
building. The potential importance of familiarity as a key variable was 
hypothesised on the basis of its likely effect upon such factors as use 
of escape routes, movement through smoke, and whether or not the person 
left the building. 
It will be seen that a very large proportion of the people were 
completely familiar with the building. The small proportions in the 
other categories are perhaps a little disappointing, however it is 
probably not unrepresentative of people in fires in general. 
Another possible key variable was investigated in the following 
question: 
7 How often have you received training on what actions 
to take in a fire? 
At least once per month ...................... ~ 
At least once every six months ••.....•..•...••. 
At least once every year ..................... . 
Less frequently than once a year or never .....•••. 
Response Percentages 
· ... 
· ... 
5.8 
6.5 
9.0 
78.7 
(127) 
(143) 
(197) 
(1726) 
Total 100.0 (2193) 
TIje possible effect of training frequency upon almost all the behavioural 
variables is too obvious to necessitate listing. 
An extension of this aspect, relating to a person's preparedness 
for fire, was pursued in the next question. 
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8 Did you know of any mean. of emergency escape in . 
the building? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000 00 0 YesO 
. NoD. 
Response Percentages 
.... 
, .... 
64.0 
36.0 
(1404) 
(789) 
Total 100.0 (2193) 
Since the earlier-cited definition of panic behaviour requires it 
to be non-social, the investigation of Personal Variables would be 
incon~lete without consideration of the presence of other people. This 
aspect was explored in the following question. 
12 Were any of the following people with you in the 
buildirig during the fire? Your children under 12 0 0 
Your children over 12 000 
Your wife/husband 0 0000 
Your parents . ...... '." . 
Some other relative . ... . 
Friend ............. .. 
Acquaintances ... ~ ..... . 
People unknown to you 0 0 
Response Percentages 
· ... 17.2 (377) 
8.0 (175) 
· ... 20.6 (452) 
7.0 (154) 
9.5 (208) 
· . " . 
24.7 (542) 
· ... 36.1 (792) 
· ... 9.7 (213) 
Total 100.0 (2193) 
Again the categories are ordered in a general way on a ".closeness of 
relationship" scale, although of course it is not a true scale as the 
categories are not mutually exclusive. This also explains why the 
percentages shown above sum to more than 100. 
The final Personal Variable considered was whether or not the person 
had been previously involved in a fire incident. The term "fire incident" 
was not defined, nor was the time scale indicated, which may account for 
the surprisingly high proportion of nearly 30% (656) of the interviewees 
claiming to have been previously involved. As the Pilot Survey reveals a 
figure of 24%, it may be hypothesised that the chances of being involved 
in a fire incident are quite unevenly distributed throughout the population. 
5.4 THE BEHAVIOUR 
The scrutiny· of the Behavioural Variables pOosed the most difficult 
problems of the investigation. It had been demonstrated in the second 
Pilot Survey that a format inVOlving pre-assigned response categories was 
too inflexible to· explore the wide variety of behaviour. Conversely, a 
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completely unstructured response is not only difficult to quantify, but 
may well omit areas of particular interest to the experimenter. In an 
attempt to obtain the best compromise, both types of questions were 
included. A series of general questions were asked concerning behaviour, 
followed by specific questions concentrating on two aspects, evacuation 
of the building and movement through smoke. 
The general questions were of the form shown below • 
. -----
-- _._----_._- .. _--
6 What was the first thing you did when you realised 
there was a fire? 
What did you do next? 
and next? 
After the questionnaires were returned to the investigator each 
"action" was coded for each of the above questions. The category into 
which each action was assigned was intended to be of a general 
descriptive nature, thus for instance, almost all attempts to verify the 
nature or seriousness of the fire would fall into the general category 
"Investigate". Using this method of coding, the responses for each of 
the above questions were reduced to the 29 categories shown in Table 5. 
The categories in Table 5 overleaf represent an exclusive list of 
the actions taken by the interviewees. It will be seen that the 
categories are not all of the same type, some being of a more general 
nature than others. It is possible to combine categories into more 
general classes, although of course much of the detail is lost in this 
process. Such combinations have been made in the analysis where it is 
necessary to illustrate specific points. 
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TABLE 5. General behaviour during incidents 
Category 
1. Investigate fire 
2. Contact Fire Brigade 
3. Move away from fire 
4. Move towards fire 
5. Warn other people 
6. Move towards exit 
7. Leave building 
8. Some fire-fighting action 
9. Something to minimise risk 
10. Save personal effects 
11. Raise general alarm 
12. Organise evacuation 
13. Request help from others 
14. Give help to others 
15. Await rescue by Fire Brigade 
16. Something which increases risk 
17. Attempt to rescue someone 
18. Return into the building· 
19. Switch off gas/electric services 
20. Contact someone in authority 
21. Shut door(s) 
22. Get family out of building 
23. Move the burning object 
24. Get dressed 
25. Assist Fire Brigade 
26. Enquire if Fire Brigade sent for 
27. Move to a safe place (wi thin b1dg) 
28. Cover face with wet towel etc 
29. Inaction (watch others et c) 
(N = 2193 in each case) Total 
. 
Percentage 
First Second Third 
action action action 
12.18 
10.12 
1. 82 
5.61 
8.07 
1.64 
7.98 
14.91 
2.96 
1.19 
2.74 
1. 78 
2.23 
1. 73 
0.00 
0.59 
0.18 
0.05 
4.10 
2.14 
3.10 
5.43 
1.23 
2.23 
0.05 
2.83 
0.78 
0.18 
2.14 
2.23 
11.13 
2.14 
3.15 . 
3.60 
1.37 
8.80 
18.33 
1.41 
0.96 
1.14 
1.69 
2.37 
2.74 
0.14 
1.05 
0.36 
2.23 
2.55 
2.10 
4.01 
3.56 
1.64 
0.64 
0.50 
3.33 
1. 46 
0.41 
14.96 
0.68 
8.48 
1.41 
1.23 
1. 14 
0.32 
8.39 
12.36 
1. 28 
0.96 
0.18 
1.00 
1.46 
1. 46 
0.50 
0.82 
0.27 
2.05 
1.60 
1. 30,1 
2.23 
1.50 
1.19 
0.18 
1. 23 
2.14 
1.32 
0.09 
43.14 
100.00 100.00 100.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -
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In this preliminary analysis there are two main ways in which the 
data on actions may be examined: 
(a) We can look at each individual column in Table 5, representing an 
ordered action separately. 
(b) We can consider the combinations of the first, second and third 
actions, each representing a course of action. 
We will discuss the data only very brieflY by the method in (a) above, 
since examining each separately is of only limited value. We will obtain 
a more meaningful description of behaviour when we take into consideration 
jlOW the actions re late to each other. 
Let us then look briefly at the individual columns. The five most 
popular first actions are 
(a) Some fire-fighting action 
(b) Investigate fire 
(c) Contact Fire Brigade 
(d) Warn other people 
Ce) Move towards fire 
The high position accorded to "Some fire-fighting action" may be 
partially due to the more general nature of. this category, which would 
include activities expressing the intention of fighting the fire .. 
However such distinctions seem rather debatable, and the essential point 
remains that nearly 15% of those interviewed were prepared to "attack" 
the fire as a first action. 
As an initial action we would expect many people to attempt to 
verify the nature of the fire, so the position of "Investigate" is 
unsurprising. 
The ordinal position of "Contact Fire Brigade" is gratifying although 
the lowly percentage is much less so. 
The same can be said for "Warn other people", which is of course a 
very socially responsible action, far removed from "Inappropriate 
behaviour" . 
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"Move towards fire" is a rather difficult category since it is like 
"fire-fight", a very general category, but one in which the intention 
is not clear. Such an action may be either investigative or the precursor 
of active fire-fighting. 
The picture changes somewhat if we combine categories. For instance 
combining categories 9, 19 and 21, all facets of a wish to minimise the 
danger, creates the third most popular action. 
Combining categories 2 and 26 raises the general category concerned 
with contacting the Fire Brigade to the second most frequent action. A 
revised list with other combinations is shown below. 
(a) Some fire-fighting action 
(b) Contact Fire Brigade (combining 2 + 26) 
(c) Investigate 
(d) Warn others (combining 5 + 11) 
(e) Something to minimise danger (combining 9, 19 + 21) 
These five rather more general categories account for more than 60% 
of first actions. Ifwe add a further two categories 
(f) Evacuate oneself from building (combining 6 + 7) 
(g) Evacuate others from building (combining 12 + 22) 
we have described nearly 80% of the first actions in these seven classes. 
A list of the five most popular second actions is shown below. 
(a) Some fire-fighting action 
(b) Inaction 
(c) Contact Fire Brigade 
(d) Leave building 
(e) Shut doors 
The three categories "Investigate", "Move towards fire", and "Warn 
other people" have dropped completely from this top five. We would have 
expected the former two categories to become the less frequent, but 
clearly warning other people, if it is not thought of to start with, is 
hardly thought of at all. The large numbers in "Inaction" are derived in 
large measures from these three initially popular categories, since other 
percentages in the column remain fairly stable. 
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In comparisons between first and second actions, it is interesting 
that the types of first actions taken seem to be more variable. For 
instance, the number of actions with more than 5% in them ( that is 100 
people) is 7 in column 1 and only 4 in column 2. Also the most popular 
four actions in column 1 account for 45%, whereas the most popular four 
in column 2 (although not the same four actions) account for 53%. 
From this it would seem that behaviour during a fire becomes more 
"stereotyped", certain actions being chosen by progressively more people. 
This trend is continued in column 3, in which the most popular four 
actions shown below account for 72% of the behaviour. 
(a) Inaction 
(b) Some fire-fighting action 
(c) Contact Fire Brigade 
(d) Leave building 
(e) Shut doors 
Apart from the reversal of the first two categories, this list is 
the same as that for the second column. The most striking thing about 
this column is the enormous increase in the numbers of people who adopt 
some form of "passive" behaviour, which is classed here as "Inaction". 
Aside from the actions in (b), (c) and (d) immediately above, this 
increase in passive behaviour appears to be at the expense of all other 
action categories. 
Let us now look at the results of how actions combine to form 
courses of action. Since the actions are not mutually eXClusive, then 
for our 29 categories in each group there are 29 3 , that is 24,389 
possible courses of action. On this basis one might be excused for 
-W-ortdering if any two people from our sample of 2193 would have the same 
combination of all three actions. However definite patterns do emerge, 
although our fine division of action categories is inapplicable at this 
stage. Inspection of the combinations of actions reveals that there are 
three underlying general types of reaction to fire: 
(a) Concern with evacuation of the building, either by oneself or 
wi th others. 
(b) Concern with fighting, or containing the fire. 
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(c) Concern with warning or alerting others, either individuals or the 
Fire Brigade. 
The majority of the behaviour falls either exclusively into one of 
these categories, or into some combination of them. The most frequent 
courses of action are in fact directed solely to one end, in this case 
either leaving the building or fighting the fire. Approximately 5% of 
the interviewees were effectively inactive during the course of the 
incident. 
In general terms, the majority of people appear to have behaved in 
what might be considered an appropriate fashion, although some 5% of the 
people did something which was judged to "increase the risk", 
the apocryphal "looking for a gas leak with a lighted match". 
including 
Perhaps 
the most common fault was opening windows 
similar percentage of people attempted to 
"to clear the smoke". A 
move the burning 
a chip-pan, and therefore sustained burns or in some cases 
fire to become more serious. 
object, often 
caused the 
We now turn to the specific behavioural questions concerned with the 
evacuation of the building and movement through smoke. Those concerned 
with the former are shown below. 
9 Did you leave the building during the fire? .••.. veB 
If NO, please pass on to question 10 No 
In leaving did you use 
The normal exits , ........................... 0 
An emergency exit .......................... D Isome other way please specify I 
Did you leave by ••.••. Your own efforts ...... § 
With Fire Brigade help •. 
With the help of others .. 
Did you return Into the building during the course of B 
the fire? ............................... Ves 
No 
If you did, for what reason? 
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to What re.son did you have for not leaving? Was it 
because B 
You did not think the fire was serious enough ••••. 
You thought you would be safer where you were ... 
Some other reason pleas. specify 
The results of these questions are illustrated in the question/ 
response chart sljown in Figure 6. Some interesting points arise from 
this analysis: 
(a) Although recognised escape routes were present in 46% of the 
buildings, only 3% of those who left did so using an emergency exit. 
(b) Of people who did not leave the building, in 70% of the cases their 
reason for not doing so reflected a low-threat assessment of the 
fire. Nearly 50% of these people had initially rated the fire as 
"not at all serious", so in those cases their judgement of the 
threat imposed by the fire remained stable during its course. 
(c) A startling 43% of those who left returned into the building. 
(d) The reasons for returning into the building accurately reflect the 
threat-reducing effect of leaving the building, which was discussed 
in Section 2 .0. Almost all the reasons demonstrate a "second 
thought" type of response. One can hypothesise that these people 
represent those whose immediate reaction was to leave the building. 
Once outside, a more "rational" atti tude prevails; they perhaps 
recall things they should have done, or question their initial 
assessment of the fire, and thus return in. 
Movement through smoke was explored in the questilons which appear 
overleaf. The results of these questions are shown in Figure 7. 
Histograms of distances are illustrated in Figure 8. Points of interest 
arising from the questions are: 
(a) For incidents in which smoke was present, 60% of the people 
interviewed were prepared to move into it. This is an extremely 
interesting result in view of the widespread belief that people 
will not enter smoke. 
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Did you leave the 
-, No: 45.5% building? (N = 2193) , 
If 
" Why didn't 
you leave? 
Yes: 54.5% 11 -, 
¥ It 
Fire Safer Fii'e- Other not where fight 
serious was lng 9% 
59% 11% 21% 
, 
Which exit Whose efforts Did you 
did you use? were involved? return in? 
r-
, It , >-
Normal Emerg- Window Own Fire Others Yes No ency Brigade 
95% 3% 2% 96.5% 2% 1.5% 43% 57% 
v 
Why did you return? 
I r 
'v v , 
-± v _t 
Rescue Save Shut Contact Fire- Await Fire not Observe 
pet effects doors FB fight FB severe fire 
2% 13% 10% 2% 36% 9!'-. . 5% 19% 
FIGURE 6. Response chart for whether or not people left the building 
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Was there any smoke? 
-' No: 12% CN = 2193) 
'¥ 
Yes: 88% 
Did you try and move through it? , No: 40% 
V 
Yes: 60% -, Did you have to turn back? 
J I 
1 f 
Yes: 26% No: 74% 
l 
t 
How far did you How far could How far could you see 
try and move? you see? when you turned back? 
, V It 
Distance % Distance % Distance % 
o yards 3 o yards 12 0 yards 29 
2 11 18 2 
" 25 2 " 37 4 " 30 4 11 27 4 " 25 10 11 19 10 11 11 10 " 6 12 11 5 12 11 3 12 " 1 15 11 4 15 11 3 15 
" 1 20 "" 5 20 11 3 20 " 1 :; 20+ 15 20+ 17 20+ 1 
FIGURE 7. Response chart for movement through smoke 
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la • 
'0 • 
I I I 
o 1'2. IS '20' 
FIGURE 8(a). Percentage distribution of distances moved through 
smoke by interviewees 
~. 
<.0 • 
to· 
I 
o 'lo + 
FIGURE 8Cb). Percentage distribution of interviewees' visibility 
estimates on moving through smoke 
30 • 
% 
20 • 
10 • 
I 
o :z. 12. IS" 
FIGURE BCc). Percentage distribution of visibility estimates for 
intervie\~ees who turned back 
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11 Was there any smoke? ......••....•.••..... Yes~ 
If NO, omit the rest of this question No 
Did you try to move through it? ..•.•........ Yes 
If NO. omit the rest of this question No 
How far did you try to move through it? 
yards .... 0 .... 2 .... 4 .... 10 .... 12 .... 15 .... 20 .... 20+ 
How far ahead could you see at the time? 
yards .... 0 .... 2 .... 4 .... 10 .... 12 .... 15 .... 20 .... 20+ 
Did the smoke become thicker? ..••.••....•• yes~ 
No 
Did you have to turn back because of it? ...... Yes 
If NO. omit the next part of the question No 
How far ahead could you see when you turned back? 
Yards .... O .... 2 .... 4 .... 10 .... 12 .... 15 .... 20 .... 20+ 
(b) The shapes of the histograms in Figures Ba and 8b are fairly 
similar which could indicate that people will move through smoke 
only as far as they can see ahead, although this relationship is 
explored in a later section. 
(c) As would be expected, visibility estimates of people who turned back 
are concentrated at the "low" end of the scale (Le. 4 yards or less). 
5.5 DISCUSSION 
This completes the descriptive analysis of the Full-Scale Study data. 
Notunnaturally, it is tempting to enquire how rep,esentative our sample 
of 952 fires is of such incidents. We must, however, be absolutely clear 
regarding the population from which the Present Study represents a sample. 
As was pointed out in Section 4.0, the sampling points for the Fire 
Brigade officers were kept deliberately simple, namely: 
(a) Fire incidents 
(b) In buildings 
(c) In which people were involved 
that is fires which occur in buildings occupied at the start of the fire. * 
Official statistics for fires are published annually (usually three 
years in arrears) by The Department of the Environment, under the title 
of " UK Fire and Loss Statistics". I~ithin these official statistics. the 
ini tial breakdown of fires is into two broad categories, "In Buildings" 
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and "Not In Buildings". The incidents covered by the Present Study 
clearly represent a sub-sample of the "In Buildings" group (see Figure 1). 
Thus any comparison between the Present Study data, and the nearest 
equivalent official statistics (the "In Buildings" fires), are of 
dubious validity since we are not comparing like with like. Not only do 
we have no information on what proportion of fires occur in buildings 
which are empty of people at the time (not derelict buildings), but 
neither do we know how these incidents are distributed across the 
population of building types (or occupancies). Whilst it is certainly 
known, for example, that the majority of fires which occur in schools do 
so when the buildings are empty, we have no definite information 
regarding other occupancies. We might speculate, however, that "empty 
building" fires are more frequent in schools, colleges, offices, shops, 
warehouses, stores, and to a certain extent other industrial premises, 
simply because these types of building are often only occupied for a part 
of each 24 hours. If this were the case, it might well go some way 
towards explaining the preponderance of dwelling fires, relative to the 
number of indidents for factories, schools, etc, recorded in the Present 
Study. This hypothesis is also supported by the difference in distribution 
of Incidents by Time between the Present Study sample and the In Building 
sample (Tables 2 and 2a, Section 5.1). In this we see that the present 
sample had proportionately more morning, and fewer evening fires, which 
are the times that we would expect non-dwelling buildings to respectively 
contain and not-contain people. In other words, the In Buildings group 
must contain an unknown proportion of incidents in which, by the 
definition of the present sample, people are not involved. 
Clearly a descriptive analysis of the data does no more than show 
how the variables are distributed. Any attempts at interpretation would 
be inappropriate at this stage. Subsequent chapters will examine how the 
variables .are inter-related, and analyse particular types of incident 
in detail. 
* It will be readily apparent that even these superficially simple 
parameters are not free from ambiguity. The definitions of all three 
could theoreti cally give rise to dispute, ("... is a garden shed a 
building for instance?, .,. is the presence of flame a prerequisite of 
fire?, ••• what exactly do we mean by involved?" •.• and so on). In the 
event, during the data collection, these somewhat pedantic issues did not 
arise for the practically oriented Firemen, who appeared to have little 
difficulty in correctly interpreting the requirements. 
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5.6 THE RELATION BETWEEN THE STUDY VARIABLES: A NOTE ON THE METHODS 
OF ANALYSIS 
The descriptive analysis conducted in the previous sections gives an 
outline of the broad range of the Study variables. Such a preliminary 
analysis is clearly necessary in defining the population of variables, 
however our primary interest lies in how these variables may be associated. 
In the subsequent chapters concerned with quantitative analysis of. the data 
(Chapters 6 to 13), this has been undertaken in the following ways: 
5.6.1 SIGNIFICANCE TESTING 
The major method of analysis has been to cross-tabulate the Study 
variables against each other in contingency tables, and to test for 
association between them using a standard method of significance testing, 
namely the X2 test. 
The X2 test is in such common usage that we will not describe its 
operation in detail here. Basically it tests the reality of any 
association by comparing the observed frequencies in the cells of the 
contingency table, with the frequencies which would be expected if the 
variables were independent. The test enables us to calculate the 
probability that the size of any discrepancy is as great, or greater than 
that which could be attributed by chance factors. 
Whilst the X2 test is a fairly powerful tool for this purpose it 
does have two drawbacks in the present instance. Firstly, it does not 
give an indication of the strength or intensity of any relationship. 
merely that one can or cannot reject a null hypothesis at the predetermined 
level of signifcance*. Secondly, whilst X2 is not limited to simple pairs 
of variables, it is of less value when considering a number of variables 
simultaneously. For this reason a second method of analysis was undertaken 
for selected variables only (Chapter 13). It is briefly described below. 
• A common error is to confuse statistical significance with substantive 
significance. By this it is meant treating large values of X2 with 
correspondingly small probability levels, as an indicator of the strength 
of any relationship. This procedure is not valid. 
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5.6.2 FACTORIAL ANALYSIS 
This method of analysis is essentially an analysis of variance for 
binary data. It is fully described in Yates (1960) and Armitage (1971), 
thus only a brief outline is provided here. Where a number of 
dichotomous variables are being analysed simultaneously they may be 
arranged in the form of a large contingency table. 
For example, suppose in the present investigation we wish to 
simul taneous1y investigate the effect of two Incident variables, the 
presence of smoke, and the time of the fire (in terms of day and night) 
and a ~ersonal variable, whether the individual had previously been 
involved in a fire, •.. upon a Behavioural variable, whether or not the 
person had left the building. The data may be laid out in the following way: 
Previously involved a l Not previously involved aO 
Smoke present b l Smoke absent bO Smoke present bl Smoke absent bO 
Night Cl Day CO Night cl Day CO Night cl Day CO Night I Day CO c 
ABC AB AC A BC B C 1 
The bottom row of cells in each case contains the proportion of people 
who leave. 
Such an arrangement is analogous to Factorial designs in the 
analysis of variance. The three binary variables may be regarded as 
being dichotomised into positive and negative levels, signifying the 
presence or absence of some attribute (or treatment). 'They are denoted 
in this case by al(positive) and aO(negative). Thus in cell a l would be 
the number of people who had previously been involved in a fire, whilst 
cell aO would contain the number who had not been previously involved. 
Similarly, cell b l contains those who had been previously involved, in 
incidents where smoke was present, and cell bO contains those who had 
previously been involved, in incidents where smoke was absent, and so on. 
The eight combinations of the three variables is shown in the bottom 
line of the table. Cell AB, for example, contains the interaction of A 
and B at the positive level, that is Previous involvement and Smoke 
present, and C at the negative level, that is in Daytime incidents. The 
single letters A, Band C represent the main effects, Previous involvement, 
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Smoke presence and Night-time incidents respectively. in each case the 
other variables being at the negative .level. 
The analysis postulates a linear model, involving transformation of 
the proportions onto an alternative scale, in this case the logit scale, 
arrangement of the data into a factorial layout as above, application of 
weighting coefficients (related to the value of n) to the transformed 
proportions and calculation of a standard error term. Estimates of main 
effects and linear contrasts are calculated. 
The advantages of applying this type of analysis to the data of the 
Present Study are as follows: 
(a) Where main effects are considered, they provide confirmation of the 
significance testing of pairs of variables. 
(b) The value of the Z-scores produced is a measure of the importance 
of the relationships. 
(c) The linear contrasts provide insight into the interaction of the 
Study Variables. 
(d) Comparison between Z-scores for main effects and interactions is a 
measure of their relative strength, or importance. 
It does, however, have a major drawback .. Although this method of analysiS 
may be applied to multiple classification variables, interpretation of 
results is much more difficult than when the variables are dichotomous. 
Therefore its application is usually restricted to binary variables. 
It will be appreciated that in the Present Study only a proportion 
. ·--or the variables are naturally dichotomous. Clearly, if one were 
prepared to reclassify all the variables into two categories the data 
could be examined by factorial analysis alone, since it provides 
information on both main effects and interactions. This has not been 
undertaken for two reasons. Firstly, many of the Study variables have 
no obvious distinct point at which they could be divided. For these 
variables therefore, the recategorisation would be essentially arbitrary 
and any associations spurious. Secondly, a preliminary analysis of the 
data indicated that the Study variables were, .in general, related in 
simple rather than comp±ex ways. In other words, the interactions between 
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the variables, which indicate that an association is conditional upon 
the level of another factor, were of much less importance .than the main 
effects. We have therefore concentrated the main analyses on variables 
considered in pairs, and deferred discussion of factorial analysis to 
Chapter 13, where its major value will be to indicate the strength of the 
relationships between those selected variables for which it is considered 
appropriate. 
In addition to these overall methods of analysis, we will, where 
comparisons between ranked or rated data are required, use a non-parametric 
correlation coefficient, Spearman1s rho for examining the relationship 
between variables, or alternatively where appropriate, the Kruskal-Wallis 
one-way analysis of variance by ranks. 
5.6.3 PRESENTATION OF THE DATA AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS 
Throughout the following chapters a standar,d format has been 
adopted for presenting the majority of the cross-tabulated data. 
(a) Each cell within the body of the table contains three sets 
of numbers. 
(b) The unbracketed numbers are cell frequencies. 
(c) The numbers in brackets to the right of the cell frequency 
represent row percentages. 
(d) The numbers in brackets underneath the cell frequency represent 
column percentages. 
This practice has only been abandoned where 
Ca) A large number of cells contain zero values. 
Cb) Where categories have been combined into a contingency table. 
The X2 statistic is of course calculated on cell frequencies. Before 
deciding whether to accept a value of X2 as indicating an association 
between the variables, the researcher must: determine what level of 
significance it must reach (that is, the pr~bability of ~Dt~ining a value 
of X2 '~~ large as the one calculated from the sample, by chance). The 
most common level used in social science research appears to be 0.05 
72 
(i.e. 5%); however it has been pointed out that decisions on significance 
level should be based in part on the number of cases. When a sample is 
very large, even small deviations will generate statistically significant 
X2 values (Nie, N H et aI, 1970). For this reason, as the sample in the 
Present Study is relatively large, a more rigorous probability level of 
0.01 (i.e.l%) was adopted throughout as the value which X2 must reach 
before the association was accepted as statistically significant. On this 
basis we are taking the risk that any significant association would occur 
by chance only 1 time in 100. 
Having briefly discussed the major means by which the data will be 
analysed, we will now move on to consider the relationship between the 
variables. 
C H APT E R 6 
BUILDING TYPES & FIRE VARIABLES 
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6.0 BUILDING TYPES AND FIRE VARIABLES 
In this chapter we will explore associations between the nature of 
the fire (and some of its effects), and the category of building in which 
it occurred. 
Since a number of the 20 separate categories of buildings identified 
in Section 5.2 contain very small frequencies, and as we are from this 
point more interested in the "occupancy" of the building (that is whether 
it was a building in which people lived, or one in which they worked, etc) , 
the 20 categories of building have been reduced to 5 for all further 
analyses. This has been done by combining similar types of building in 
the following manner. 
New category Old category 
1. Dwe lling house 
1- Dwelling 3. Block of flats 
4. Multi-occupancy 
2. Factory 
2. Industrial 11- Garage (not private) 12. Warehouse/Store 
19. Boiler house 
B. Shop (unspecified) 
9. Public house 
3. Retail 10. Fish and chip shop 
13. Cafe/Restaurant 
14. Laundrette 
5. School 
6. Hotel 
4. Institution 7. College 
15. Hostel/Home 
lB. Hospital 
5. Offi ce/Other 16. Office 20. Other 
Only one of these reclassifications is open to real argument and that is 
the placing of "Hotel" in the Institution category. However this 
approximation is unlikely to be of significance, representing as it does 
only 6 incidents (0.7%) of the total sample. 
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There is no single agreed measure of the "severity" of a fire. The 
organisations concerned with fire - Fire Brigades, The Home Office, 
Insurance companies, etc, - may each use a variety of measures. These 
may relate to the physical damage to the building, the equipment used to 
extinguish the fire, the monetary cost of the fire in terms of replacement 
damage, the number of casualties, and so on. Each of these, individually 
or in combination, may provide some metric for distinguishing and 
ordering the physical effects of fire. However, in relation to the 
method of data collection employed in the Present Study, a number of the 
above have the major disadvantage that they are not capable of being 
assessed at the actual time of occurrence of the fire. In the present 
case, therefore, we are constrained by the necessity to include only 
those measures which can be recorded at the time of the incident, or 
wi thin a short period afterwards. 
The following four basic categories of Fire Variables which satisfy 
the above constraint were included in the Present Study: 
(a) Measures which relate to the extent of Fire Spread. 
(b) Measures which relate to the Fire Brigade equipment used to 
extinguish the fire. 
( c) Measures which relate ·to the extent of Smoke Spread and Smoke 
Densi ty. 
(d) Measures which relate to the number of casualties or rescues. 
. 
We will examine the effect of the first three of these in the following 
sections and the fourth in Chapter 7. 
6.1 FIRE SPREAD AS A MEASURE OF FIRE SEVERITY 
The variables utilised to record fire spread in the Present Study 
were as follows: 
(a) The number of rooms involved in the fire 
(b) The number of levels (floors) involved in the fire 
(c) The number of constructions (i.e. separate buildings) which were 
involved in the fire. 
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6.1.1 NUMBER OF ROOMS INVOLVED IN THE FIRE 
The distribution of this variable across building categories is 
illustrated in Table 6 below. 
TABLE 6. Number of rooms involved in the fire by building category 
Building N\lmber of rooms involved Total 
category 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Dwelling 548 30 11 5 - 1 - 2 - 1 598 
Industrial 177 12 3 1 1 - - 1 - 1 196 
Retail 87 8 1 1 - - - - - - 97 
Institution 36 1 
-
1 
- -
1 
- - -
39 
Office/Other 24 1 - - - - - - - - 2 
Total 869 52 15 8 1 1 1 3 0 2 952 
It will be noted that for each category of building, by far the greatest 
proportion of incidents only involved one room. 
Since so many cells have low or zero values, we cannot" test 
~ . .,.. 
dire.ctly on Table 6 for an association between Fire Spread (as measured 
by the number of rooms involved), and building category. However we may 
overcome this difficulty by combining categories, which is a valid 
procedure when cell values are low or zero (see Maxwell, 1961). The most 
obvious division is between incidents in which one room only was 
involved, and incidents in which more than one room was involved. This 
has been done in Table 7 overleaf (which is presented in the opposite 
orientation for space-saving reasons). It can be seen that applying the 
X2 test to the frequencies given yields a non-significant result of 1.39 
(4 df). We can thus state with some certainty that the extent of Fire 
Spread (as measured by the number of rooms involved) does not differ 
between building categories. 
6.1.2 NUMBER OF LEVELS (FLOORS) INVOLVED IN THE FIRE 
The distribution of this variable across building categories is 
illustrated in Table 8 (p.77). Inspection of this table again reveals 
that the data are very positively skewed, and using the same rationale 
as in Section 6.1.1, we shall abandon our multiple classification of 
TABLE 7. Building category by number of rooms involved in the fire 
Number Building category 
of rooms Total 
involved Dwelling Industrial Retail Institution Office/Other 
1 room 546 (62.8) 177 (20.3) 87 (10.0) 36 ( 4.1) 21 (2.4) 869 (91. 3) 
involved (91. 3) (90.3) (89.7) (92.3) (95.4) 
More than 52 (62.7) 19 (22.9) 10 (12.0) 3 (3.6) 1 (1. 2) 83 (8.7) 
1 room (8.7) (9.7) (10.3) (7.7) (5.6) 
Total 598 (62.8) 196 (20.6) 97 (10.2) 39 ( 4.1) 22 (2.3) 952 (100.0) 
TABLE 9. Building category by number of levels involved in the fire 
Number Building category 
of levels Total 
involved Dwelling Industrial Retail Institution Office/Other 
1 level 571 (63.4) 179 (19.9) 93 (10.3) 37 (4.1) 21 (2.3) 901 (94.6) 
involved (95.5) (91. 3) (95.9) (94.9) (95.4) 
More than 27 (52.9) 17 (33.3) 4 (7.8) 2 (3.9) 1 (2.0) 51 (5.4) 
1 level (4.5) (8.7) (4.1) (5.1) (5.6) 
Total 598 (62.8) 196 (20.6) 97 (10.2) 39 (4.1) 22 (2.3) 952 (l00.0) 
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TABLE 8. Number of levels involved in the fire by 
building category 
Building Number of levels involved Total 
category 1 2 3 4 5 
Dwelling 571 24 3 
- -
598 
Industrial 179 13 1 1 2 196 
Retail 93 4 
- - -
97 
Insti tution 37 2 
- - -
39 
Office/Other 21 1 - - - 22 
Total 901 44 4 I 2 952 
levels, and simply use two categories, fires which involve only 1 level, 
and fires which involve more than 1 level. This is shown in Table 9 
on the previous page. Applying the X2 test to the frequencies in this 
table again gives a non-significant value of 5.53 (4df). Thus Fire 
Spread as measured by the number of levels involved does not differ 
between building categories. 
6.1.3 NUMBER OF CONSTRUCTIONS INVOLVED IN THE FIRE 
As in Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2, the overall tabulation of building 
category by the number of constructions contains a considerable number 
of low cell values. This table has therefore been omitted, and we have 
combined categories in the manner previously described in Table 10 
overleaf. Inspection of this table reveals that even our combined 
categories contain a number of low value cells. Any significance testing 
under these conditions would yield an unreliable result, and will not be 
undertaken. The buildings in the Industrial category appear to have a 
disproportionate number of incidents involving more than one construction. 
If we again combine categories, so as to compare Industrial and Non-
Industrial incidents, we have the following 2 x 2 contingency table to 
which we may apply a X2 test. 
Non-Industrial Industrial Total 
1 construction 751 187 938 
140re than 1 6 8 14 
Total 757 195 952 
X2 = 11. 72 (1 df), significant at 0.001 
------------------------- -------------------
TABLE 10. Building category by number of constructions involved in the fire 
Number of Building category 
constructions Total Dwelling Industrial Retail Institution Office/Other 
1 construction 594 (63.3) 188 (20.0) 96 (10 •. 2) 39 (4.2) 21 (2.2) 938 (98.5) 
involved (99.3) (95.9) (96.3) (100.0) (95.4) 
More than 4 (28.6) 8 (57:1) 1 (7.1) 0 (0.0) 1 (7.1) 14 (1. 5) 
1 construction (0.7) (4.1) (3.7) (0.0) (4.6) 
Total 598 (62.8) 196 (20.6) 97 (10.2) 39 ( 4.1) 22 (2.3) 952 (100.0) 
TABLE 12. Building category by the use or non-use of Jets 
Use of Building category 
Jets Total Dwelling Industrial Retail Institution Office/Other 
No Jets used 452 (66.2) 121 (17.7) 70 (10.2) 29 (4.2) 9 (1.3) . 683 (71.7) 
(75.6) (61. 7) (72.2) (74.4) (40.9) 
Jets used 146 (54.3) 75 (27.9) 27 (10.0) 10 (3.7) 13 (4.8) 269 (28.3) 
(24.4) (38.3) (27.8) (25.6) (59.1) 
Total 598 (62.8) 196 (20.6) 97 (10.2) 39 (4.1) 22 (2.3) 952 (100.0) 
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Thus Fire Spread, as measured by the number of constructions involved, 
is not independent of building category in the case of Industrial and 
Non-Industrial occupancies. Fire Spread is more extensive in Industrial 
rather than Non-Industrial buildings. 
Notwithstanding the significant value yielded in the above case 
(which may be open to dispute in terms of the combining of the 
categories), we must conclude that, in general, Fire Spread does not 
differ between building categories. 
We must also suggest from these analyses that Fire Spread is not a 
useful measure of Fire Severity on its own. The distribution of the 
variables is, in each case, so skewed that we cannot readily distinguish 
between degrees of Fire Severity, except in a very gross way. 
6.2 FIRE BRIGADE EQUIPMENT AS A MEASURE OF FIRE SEVERITY 
The variables in this section were included on the basis of advice 
from Fire Brigades. There are several such measures which could have 
been utilised; however the present ones were thought to be most realistic. 
These were 
(a) The number of Jets used to extinguish the fire 
(b) The number of Hose-reels used to extinguish the fire. 
6.2.1 NUMBER OF JETS 
The distribution of this variable across building categories is 
illustrated in Table 11 below. 
TABLE 11. Number of Jets used to extinguish the fire by building category 
Building Number of Jets Total 
category 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Dwelling 453 121 20 4 - - - -
- -
598 
Industrial 121 51 15 4 - 3 - - 1 1 195 
Retail 70 23 3 
- - - - -
1 - 97 
Institution 29 8 
-
1 - 1 - - - - 39 
Office/Other 10 8 2 1 1 
- - - - -
22 
Total 683 211 40 10 1 4 0 0 2 1 952 
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Whilst we again have many low value cells, it will be noted from Table 11 
(p.79) that all building categories, other than Dwellings, have one or 
more severe fires as measured by the number of Jets used. This. is 
particularly so in the case of Industrial occupancies. 
We may test for the reality of any relationship by combining our 
categories as previously, to overcome the problem of low cell frequencies. 
In this case we are distinguishing between incidents in which Jets are 
utilised and those in which they are not. The frequencies are illustrated 
in Table 12 ep. 78). 
The significant value of X2 (24.82,4 df) indicates that whether or 
not Jets were utilised is dependent upon building category. If we 
partition the contingency table to examine the source of this association, 
it is found that both the Industrial and Office/Other categories have a 
disproportionately high number of incidents in which Jets are used, 
whereas Dwellings have a disproportionately low number. 
If, therefore, we utilise the presence or absence of Jets as a 
measure of Fire Severity, we can state that in the Present Study, 
Industrial and Office/Other categories of building were more likely to be 
of High severity, whereas those in Dwellings were more likely to be of 
Low severity. 
6.2.2 NUMBER OF HOSE-REELS 
Again, tabulating the distribution of this variable across building 
categories yields a number of empty and low value cells. The multiple-
classification table has thus been omitted, and we will merely classify 
incidents by whether or not Hose-reels were used. This is illustrated in 
Table 13 overleaf. Testing the frequencies yields a non-significant·x2 
value of 3.86 (4 df). We can thus state that whether or no Hose-reels 
were utilised to extinguish the fire was independent of the category of 
the building involved. 
The use of Fire Brigade equipment as a measure of Fire Severity is 
clearly dependent upon which variable we choose. The use or non-use of 
Jets proved capable of distinguishing between categories of building, in 
terms of Low or High severity incidents, whereas the use or non-use of 
Hose-reels did not. 
Use of 
Hose-reels 
No Hose-reels 
used 
Hose-reels 
used 
Total 
- - - - - - -- - - -------------------- - -
TABLE 13. Building category by the use or non-use of Hose-reels 
Building category 
Total 
Dwelling Industrial Retail Institution Office/Other 
530 (62.2) 179 (21. 0) 85 (10.0) 37 (4.3) 22 (2.6) 852 (89.5) 
(88.6) (91.3) (87.6) (94.9) (100.0) 
68 (68.0) 17 (17.0) 12 (12.0) 2 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 100 (10.5) 
(11.4) (8.7) . (12.4) (5.1) (0.0) 
598 (62.8) 196 (20.6) 97 (l0.2) 39 (4.1) : 22 (2.3) 952 (100.0) 
co 
.... 
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6.3 SMOKE CHARACTERISTICS AS A MEASURE OF FIRE SEVERITY 
The smoke produced in fire incidents is·not simple in nature. It 
can vary in several ways, including colour, toxicity, distribution, 
particle size, density, and extent of spread. Clearly some of these 
attributes can only be measured under laboratory conditions. For the 
purposes of the Present Study, the variables which were selected to be of 
the most relevance were; 
Ca) The density of the smoke 
Cb) The extent of Smoke Spread in the building. 
Both of these measures were judged by experienced Fire Brigade personnel 
at the time of the fire. A seven-point scale was utilised for judgements 
of Smoke Density and a five-category division for the extent of Smoke 
Spread. 
6.3.1 EXTENT OF SMOKE SPREAD 
The five categories utilised for this measure were as follows: 
Ca) Little or no Smoke Spread 
Cb) Smoke confined to the room of origin 
Cc) Smoke confined to the floor of origin 
Cd) Smoke Spread to the floor above 
(e) Smoke Spread even more extensively. 
The distribution of Smoke Spread across building categories is 
shown in Table 14 overleaf and illustrated in Figure 9 *. The histograms 
illustrate the percentage of incidents in each particular building 
category which have Smoke Spread in that category, Le. column percentages, 
not overall percentages. Examination of Figure 9 shows that whilst the 
modal category for each of the three building types is the same, at 
"confined to the room of origin", there appear to be differences in the 
distribution of Smoke Spread categories between buildings. Thus Factory 
incidents have a substantially greater proportion of Low Smoke Spread 
* The histograms for building categories "Institution" and "Office/Other" 
are not included in Figure 9. It should be noted that they are derived 
from total samples of 39 and 22 respectively. Percentage calculations 
based upon such small numbers are subject to large standard errors, and 
we cannot be confident regarding the distribution of these two groups. 
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FIGURE 9. Extent of Smoke Spread by building category 
TABLE 14 Extent of Smoke Spread by building category . 
Extent of Building category 
Smoke Spread -Total Dwelling Industrial Retail Institution Office/Other 
Little 44 (40.0) 46 (41. 8) 14 (lZ.7) 5 (4.5) 3 (Z.7) 110 (11.6) 
or none (7.4) (23.5) (14.4) (IZ.8) (13.6) 
Confined to 189 (58.9) 75 (23.4) 31 (9.7) 15 (4.7) 11 (5.4) 321 (33.7) 
room of origin (31.6) (38.3) (3Z.0) (38.5) (50.0) 
Confined to 176 (68.2) 44 (17.1) 24 (9.3) 9 (3.5) 5 (1. 9) 258 (27.1) 
floor of origin (29.4) (2Z.4) (24.7) (23.1) (Z2.7) 
Spread to 150 (74.6) 18 (9.0) 22 (10.9) 8 (4.0) 3 (1.5) ZOl (Z1.1) 
floor above (Z5.1) (9.2) (2 Z .7) (ZO.5) (13.6) 
Even more 39 (67. Z) 13 (22.4) 5 (8.6) 1 (1. 7) . 0 (0.0) 58 (6.1) 
extensive (6.5) (6.6) (5.2) (Z.6) (0.0) 
Total 598 (6Z.8) 196 (20.6) 97 (10.2) 39 (4.1) 22 (2.3) 952 (100.0) 
. , , TABLE 15 Building category by Smoke Spread up to floor of origin and beyond floor of origin 
Extent of Bui lding category 
Smoke Spread Total Dwelling Industrial Retai 1 Insti tution Office/Other 
Up:to floor 409 (59.0) 165 (23.8) 70 (10.1) 30 (4.3) 19 (2.7) 693 (72.8) 
of origin (68.4) (84. Z) (72.2) (76.9) (86.4) 
Beyond floor 89 (73.0) 31 (1Z.0) Z7 (10.4) 9 (3.5) 3 (1. 2) 259 (Z7 . 2) 
of origin (31. 6) (lS.8) (Z7 • 8) (23.1) (13.6) 
Total 598 (62.8) 196 (ZO.6) 97 (10.2) 39 (4.1) 22 (2.3) 952 (100.0) 
85 
incidents and a smaller proportion of High Smoke Spread incidents, and 
are therefore more positively skewed than either the Dwelling or Retail 
category buildings, with the former having a rather smaller proportion of 
Low Smoke Spread incidents and a rather greater proportion of High Smoke 
Spread fires. 
Advice from Fire Service personnel, and indeed commonsense, suggests 
that in terms of threat to life, the order of severity of an incident 
changes radically at the point where smoke spreads beyond the floor of 
origin and to the floor above. With this point in mind, the Smoke Spread 
variable was dichotomised into the following two categories for the 
purpose of significance testing: 
(a) Incidents where smoke was confined to the floor of origin 
(b) Incidents where smoke spread beyond the floor of origin. 
The frequencies in each of these categories for the different building 
categories are illustrated in Table 15 (p.84). 
Partitioning the contingency table confirms the evidence of Figure 9, 
in that the Industrial category has a significantly smaller proportion of 
incidents with Smoke Spread beyond the floor of origin, while the Dwelling 
and Retail categories have a significantly greater proportion. 
Using Smoke Spread as a measure of Fire Severity, we can thus state 
that buildings in the Dwelling and Retail categories were more likely to 
be of High severity, whereas buildings in the Industrial category were 
more likely to be of Low severity. 
In addition, reference to Table 15 indicates that the extent of Smoke 
Spread in the incident is the first of the possible measures of Fire 
Severity, in which the distribution of values is such that we could identify 
diffferences in Fire Severity within a particular category of building. 
6.3.2 DENSITY OF THE SMOKE 
The density of the smoke, at its worst, was raterd on a 7-point scale 
Cl = 10west/7 = highest), by an experiences Fire Brigade Officer at the time 
of the fire. The distribution of these values is shown in Table 16 overleaf, 
and illustrated in Figure 10. (The histograms for the Institution and 
Office/Other categories have been omitted on the same basis as in Figure 9.) 
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TABLE 16. Scale-values of Smoke Density by building category 
Building Smoke Density scale-values Total 
categoI)' 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dwelling 153 (25.6) 101 (16.9) 116 (19.4) 92 (15.4) 79 (13.2) 35 (5.9) 22 (3.7) 598 (62.8) 
(51. 3) (66.4) (68.2) (63.9) (73.1) (71.4) (71.0) 
-Industrial 87 (44.4) 20 (10.2) 32 (16.3) 32 (16.3) 14 (7.1) 6 (3.1) 5 (2.6) 196 (20.6) 
(29.2) (13.2) (18.8) (22.2) ( 13.0) (12.2) (16.1) 
Retail 31 (31. 9) 17 (17.5) 16 (16.5) 14 (14.4) 11 (11. 3) 5 (5.2) .3 (3.1) 97 (10.2) 
(10.4) (11. 2) (9.4) (9.7) (10.2) (10.2) (9.7) 
Institution 18 (46.1) 8 (20.5) 5 (12.8) 4 (10.3) 2 (5.1) 2 (S .1) 0 (0.0) 39 ( 4.1) 
(6.0) (5.3) (2.9) (2.8) (1.9) ( 4.1) (0.0) 
Office/Other 9 (40.9) 6 (27.3) 1 (4.5) 2 (9.1) 2 (9.1) 1 (4.5) 1 (4.5) 22 (2.3) 
(3.0) (3.9) (0.6) (1. 4) (1.9) (2.0) (3.2) 
Total 298 (.31.3) 152 (16.0) 170 (17.9) 144 (15.1) 108 (11. 3) 49 (5.1) 31 (3.3) 952 (100.0) 
• 
88 
It will be noted from Figure 10 that, once again, incidents in the 
Industrial building category have a greater proportion of the lowest 
value of Smoke Density, and rather smaller proportions of the highest 
values. However, these differences are not as great as in the case of 
Smoke Spread, and furthermore, the Smoke Density values in the middle 
portions of the scale are very similar for all three classes of building. 
Although Smoke Density is only an ordinal scale, we can compute 
mean values to obtain some idea regarding the rank order of the buildings 
in terms of density of smoke. It should be noted that mean values are 
only statistically valid lihen computed on interval level (or better) data. 
The mean values of Smoke Density are shown in Table 17 below. 
TABLE 17. Building category by mean values of Smoke Density 
Building category 
Smoke Whole 
Densi ty Dwelling Industrial Retail Insti tution Office! sample Other 
N= 598 196 97 39 22 952 
mean 3.06 2.51 2.84 2.29 2.50 2.88 
value 
It can be seen from Table 17 above that the order of density of 
smoke indicated by the mean values tends to show the Dwelling and Retail 
categories with high values, and the Industrial, Institution and Office/ 
Other ones with rather lower ones. Il'hilst computing mean values may be 
a dubious practice, a completely acceptable alternative is to utilise a 
• 
non-parametric test for data of this kind, namely the Kruskal-Wallis one-
way analysis of variance by ranks (Siegel, 1956). The results of this 
test are shown in Table' 18 below. 
TABLE 18. Rank order and mean rank value of Smoke Density by building category 
mean rank 
value 
rank order 
Building category 
Dwelling Industrial Retail Institution Office/Other 
509.1 406.7 
1 4 
464.6 
2 
388.8 
5 
418.6 
3 
The Significance of the relationship can be tested bY.X 2 , which yields a 
value of 26.92 (corrected for ties), significant beyond the 0.0001 level. 
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We must conclude therefore that the Smoke Density in the incidents 
varied significantly between different categories of building. The rank 
order of the building'categories in terms of density of smoke, ranging 
from worst to least is as follows: Dwelling, Retail, Office/Other, 
Industrial, Institution. 
6.4 INTERMEDIATE SUMMARY 
Examination of Sections 6.1·to. 6.3 suggests that devising a 
satisfactory measure of Fire Severity is not completely straightforward. 
In essence, we require such a measure to exhibit three characteristics: 
(a) It must occur in each incident 
(b) Its distribution must vary between incidents 
(c) The dis tribution must be over a wide range. 
If these conditions are satisfied, then our measure will be capable of 
distinguishing Fire Severity, both within building categories and 
between building categories. 
The findings of Sections 6.1 to 6.3 have been summarised in tabular 
form, and they appear in Table 19 overleaf. It can be seen from this 
table that, not only are several of our chosen measures ineffective in 
discriminating between incidents or building categories, but also, those 
measures which are effective produce contradictory findings. This is not, 
entirely unexpected, in that each measure is assessing a different aspect 
of the nature of the fire. It may well be that there is a real 
difference between, for example, Industrial fires and Dwelling fires. 
The evidence of Table 19 would suggest that the former are characterised 
by severe flames and heat, thus requiring more Jets to extinguish them, 
whilst the latter are more likely (perhaps because of the combustion of 
soft furnishings) to have dense and extensive smoke. 
Notwithstanding the above comment, the fact remains that of all the 
measures, only the measures of smoke characteristics are sufficiently 
sensitive to distinguish between individual incidents. However, were we 
to adopt smoke characteristics as our sole measure of Fire Severity, 
this would clearly be inefficient, since we are not utilising all the 
information contained in the other observations. It was thus felt 
necessary to derive a single measure of Fire Severity which included all 
the data. 
------------------------------- _. - - - - -----_._------------- -
TABLE 19. Summary of discriminating power of Fire Severity measures 
Discrimination Distinction between 
Fire Severity measure wi thin building building categories? 
ca te gori es ? Low severity High severity 
Number of No No No 
rooms 
Extent of Number of No No No Fire Spread levels 
Number of No Industrial 
constructions -
Use of Number of No Dwelling Industrial 
Fire Brigade Jets 
equipment Number of 
Hose-reels No No No 
Smoke Yes Industrial Dwelling 
Smoke Spread Retail 
Characteristics Smoke Industrial Dwelling 
Density Yes Institution Retail 
<0 
o 
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6.5 A COMBINED INDEX OF FIRE SEVERITY 
It was considered that a simple additive index, i.e. simply adding 
together the number of rooms, levels, constructions, Hose-reels, Jets, 
Smoke Density and Smoke Spread values, would not be sufficiently 
sensitive to distinguish between severe and non-severe fires. We can 
illustrate this with an example. Suppose we were comparing two Dwelling 
fires: 
Number of rooms involved = 1 
Number of levels involved * 1 
Dwelling Number of constructions involved = 1 
Fire A Number of Jets = 0 Number of Hose-reels = 0 
Smoke Spread (little or none) = 1 
Smoke Density (scale value) = 2 
Total Index value = 6 
Number of rooms involved = 1 
Number of levels involved = 1 
Dwelling Number of constructions involved = 1 
Fire B Number of Jets = 1 Number of Hose-reels = 0 
Smoke Spread (little or none) = 1 
Smoke Density (scale values) = 1 
Total Index value = 6 
Superficially both incidents have the same severity; however it can 
be seen that a small difference in Smoke Density between the incidents 
masks the fact that one incident requires a Jet, whereas the other does 
not, which is a big difference especially for dwelling fires. In an 
attempt to overcome this difficulty, it was decided to give additional 
weight to those factors which are thought to mark the threshold between 
incidents of different character. This was done in the following way for 
the variables included in our assessment. 
(a) The number of Jets used at an incident was multiplied by 3. 
(b) The number of Hose-reels used at an incident was multiplied by 2. 
(c) The Smoke Spread had the following values attached to it: 
"Little or no Smoke Spread" = 1 
"Confined to the room of origin" = 2 
"Confined to the floor of origin" = 3 
"Spread to the floor above" = 6 
"Even more extensive" = 8 
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All other observations remained unchanged in value. It can thus be seen 
that we have given considerable extra weight in our calculation to any 
incident in which Fire Brigade equipment was used, and also any incident 
where the smoke spread further than the floor of origin. It is clear 
that this weighting process is essentially arbitrary, and its validity 
can be questioned; however the modifications were derived after much 
trial and error and the final metric appears to satisfy the criteria 
described in Section 6.4, whilst including all our recorded information 
on Fire Severity. 
To reiterate, our derived measure of severity, the Fire Severity 
Index (henceforth abbreviated to FSI) was calculated in the following 
manner: 
FSI = (number of rooms) + (number of levels) + (number of constructions) 
+ (3 x number of Jets) + (2 x number of Hose-reels) 
+ (Smoke Density scale value from 1 to 7) 
+ (Smoke Spread value from 1 to 8). 
The percentage distribution of FSI values is shown in Figure 11. The 
minimum value calculated was 4 and the maximum value was 48. It would 
thus appear that the range is sufficiently large to detect differences 
between incidents. It will be noted from Figure 11 that the distribution 
is very positively skewed, with the majority of incidents having FSI 
values in the range 6 to 16. It is encouraging that only one value 
contains more than 10% of incidents, suggesting that the FSI value is a 
sensitive measure, being (relatively) uniformly distributed compared 
wi th some of our earlier measures. 
We will now examine how FSI values are distributed between different 
categories of building. 
6.5.1 FSI VALUES IN RELATION TO BUILDING CATEGORY 
Whilst the wide range of FSI values illustrated in Figure 11 is 
clearly of value when comparing individual incidents, it would be 
extremely cumbersome to cross-tabulate these with the five categories of 
building. It is nonetheless of importance to examine whether there are 
differences in the FSI between our building categories. This difficulty 
has been handled in two ways. 
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(i) Categorisation of FSI values 
To achieve a more workable range of PSI values, the 44 categories 
illustrated in Figure 11 were divided into 5 "levels" of FSI value, and 
these were as follows: 
Level 1. "Very Low severity" incidents, with an PSI value of less 
than 7. 
Level 2. "Low severity" incidents, with FSI values between 7 and 
10 inclusive. 
Level 3. "Medium severity" incidents, with FSI values between 11 
and 14 inclusive. 
Level 4. "High severity" incidents, with FSI values between 15 and 
and 17 inclusive. 
Leve 1 S. "Very High severity" incidents, wi th an FSI value greater 
than 17. 
Reference to Figure· 11 shows that this reclassification of FSI values 
divides the distribution up fairlY evenly other than for the "Very High 
severi ty" incidents which, since they are comparatively rare, contains 
proportionately lower numbers. Table 20 overleaf shows this reclassified 
FSI level in relation, to building category. 
Examination of the column percentages in Table 20 suggests that 
there is very little consistent difference between the categories of 
building, in terms of the level of FSI. This suspidon is borne out if 
we apply theX2 test, which yields a non-significant value of 16.6 (16 df). 
We may thus state that there is not difference in Fire Severity between 
categories of building, as measured by our categorised Fire Severity Inde~ 
(ii) Mean values of FSI 
Since the Fire Severity Index is derived from the arithmetical 
manipulation of a series of ordinal scales, it cannot itself achieve 
higher than an ordinal level of measurement. Strictly speaking therefore, 
calculation of mean values is an invalid procedure. It has been 
suggested however that such a calculation is acceptable if the resulting 
values are only used for illustrating differences in order between 
variables, and n.ot the magnitude of these differences (see Stevens, 1951). 
--------------------------~---------------------------------------------------------
TABLE 20. Building category by level of FSI 
Building category 
FSI level Total 
Dwelling Industrial Retail Insti tution Office/Other 
Very Low 113 (56. 2) 53 (26.4) 22 (10.9) 11 (5.5) (1.0) 201 (21.1) 
(18.9) (27.0) (22.7) (28.2) (9.1) 
Low 205 (61. 6) 70 (2l. 0) 32 (9.6) 16 (4.8) 10 (3.0) 333 (35.0) 
(34.3) (35.7) (33.0) (41. 0) (45.5) 
Medium 154 (70.0) 36 (16.4) 18 (B.2) 6 (2.7) 6 (2.7) 220 (23.1) 
(25.8) (18.4) (18.6) (15.4) (27.3) 
High 67 (63.8) 19 (18.1) 14 (13.3) 3 (2.9) 2 (1. 9) 105 (11.0) 
(11.2) (9.7) (14.4) (7.7) (9.1) 
Very High 59 (63.4) 18 (19.4) 11 (11. 8) 3 (3.2) 2 (2.2) 93 (9.8) 
(9.9) (9.2) (11.3) (7.7) (9.1) 
Total 598 (62.8) 196 (20.6) 97 (10.2) 39 (4.1) 22 (2.3) 952 (100.0) 
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On this basis, therefore, we have calculated mean values of FSI for the 
five building categories which are shown in Table 21 below. 
TABLE 21. Mean value of FSI by building category 
Building category 
Whole 
Dwelling Industrial Retail Ins titution Office/ sample Other 
N= 598 196 97 39 22 952 
mean FSI 10.98 10.64 10.68 9.92 10.;91 10.83 
Examination of Table 21 shows that apart from the Institution category, 
which has a slightly lower mean FSI value, other differences between 
building categories are only marginal, and none differ very greatly from 
the overall population mean FSI. 
Therefore on this basis also we can state that there is no 
variation in the severity of fires between building categories based 
upon our combined Fire Severity Index. 
The possible conclusions we may draw from this finding are that, 
firstly, our computed index is insensitive to differences in Fire 
Severi ty, or secondly, there is in fact no difference between the 
buildings in Fire Severity. Since we have earlier seen that on some 
individual measures there is variation between building categories, it 
seems that the former hypothesis is more likely. 
It will be recalled that in deriving the combined FSI, extra weight 
was given to both Smoke Spread and Fire Brigade equipment. The failure 
of FSI to distinguish between categories of building probably arises out 
of the fact that the added weight to building categories with high Smoke 
Spread (Dwelling and Retail), is balanced in this case by the added 
weight to the building category with a greater proportion of fires 
involving Jets (Industrial). 
6.6 FIRE SEVERITY MEASURES AND TIME OF THE INCIDENT 
If we examine the frequency distribution of fires against time for 
the Present Sample (Figure 12), it can be seen that there are definite 
peaks in relation to the time of occurrence of the fire. These peaks 
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tend to be around mid-day and evening meal times (1200 to 1259 and 1700 
to 1759), which is perhaps unsurprising when we consider that dwellings 
make up more than 60% of the sample. It does perhaps emphasise that 
fires associated with cooking appliances are a large proportion of all 
fires, a point we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 14. 
With regard to Fire Severity, we would intuitively expect this to 
be closely related to any delay in discovering a fire, in other words, 
High severity fires would tend to be those which had been allowed chance 
to develop. On this basis, an immediate hypothesis is that fires which 
occur at night will be more severe than those which occur in the day. 
Before testing this hypothesis directly, we will first illustrate how 
Fire Severity is distributed with time over the 24 hour period. To do 
this we have used three of our severity measures, namely the number of 
Jets, the mean value of Smoke Density and the mean value of FSI. These 
distributions are illustrated in Figures 13, 14. and 15. 
Inspection of Figures 13, 14 and 15 shows that each of the histograms 
differ in shape. Each has a different modal value. In Figure 15 , the 
percentage of incidents involving Jets, the mode occurs between 0600 and 
0659, in Figure m , the mean FSI distribution, the mode is one hour 
earlier, 0500 to 0559, and in Figure 13, the mean Smoke Density 
distribution, the mode occurs between 0300 and 0359. 
It will be noted that all three distributions differ markedly from 
the frequency distribution of fires against time in Figure 12. Thus the 
fires which occur most frequently are probably of Low severity on all 
our measures. In fact there appears to be an inverse relationship in 
terms of severity/frequency. For example, the modal categories for Jets, 
mean FSI and mean Smoke Density discussed above are based upon 0.8%, 
1.1% and 1.6% respectively of the sample of 952 fires. 
One further point which emerges from the study of Figures 13, 14 and 15 
is that the overall levels do indeed appear to be rather higher during 
the night, and this is certainly the case between midnight and 0700. 
Let us therefore now look at any differences which occur between 
daytime and night-time incidents in terms of Fire Severity. For the 
purposes of these analyses we have defined "Day" as between 0600 and 2159, 
and IINight" as 2200 through to 0559. Again we will test four of our 
severity measures: FSI level, Jets, Smoke Spread and Smoke Density. 
,---------------------------------------------------------------------~------
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6.6.1 FSI LEVEL IN RELATION TO TIME OF THE INCIDENT 
The distribution of FSI level against day and night-time incidents 
is shown in Table 22 overleaf. Inspection of this table shows that up 
to High levels of FSI, daytime incidents have a progressively smaller 
proportion of incidents, as FSI levels increase. This trend reverses 
slightly at the Very High level; however the overwhelming impression is 
that night-time incidents have higher levels of FSI. Testing directly 
on Table 22 gives a X2 value of 25.3 (4 df), which is significant beyond 
0.0001. We may construct a 2 x 2 contingency table by dichotomising at 
the Medium level, and this is shown below. 
FSI level 
Time Very Low Medium to Total 
to Low Very High 
. Day 464 314 778 
I Night 70 104 174 
I Total 534 418 952 
x' = 21. 75 (1 df), significant beyond 0.001 . 
We may thus state that night-time incidents have a significantly 
higher level of Fire Severity as measured by the Fire Severity Index. 
6.6.2 USE OF JETS IN RELATION TO TIME OF THE INCIDENT 
As before when using Jets as a measure of Fire Severity, it is 
simplest to divide incidents by whether or not Jets were used. The 
contingency table is shown below. 
Time No Jets Jets Total 
Day 573 205 778 
Night 108 66 174 
Total 681 271 952 
x2 = 8.8 (1 df), significant beyond 0.01 
Thus again, incidents which occur at night are significantly more 
likely to be sufficiently severe to require a Jet to extinguish them. 
r------------------------ ----- --- - - - -- - - - - - - - --
TABLE 22. FSI level by night or day incidents 
FSI level 
. 
Time 
Very Low Low Medium High Very High 
Day 178 (22.9) 286 (36.8) 170 (21. 9) 73 (9.4) 71 (9.1) 
(88.6) (85.9) (77.3) (69.5) (76.3) 
Night 23 (13.2) 47 (27.0) 50 (28.1) 32 (18.4) 22 (12.6) 
(11. 4) (14.1) (22.7) (30.5) (23.7) 
Total 201 (21. 1) 333 (35.0) 220 (23.1) 105 (11. 0) 93 (9.8) 
Total 
778 
(81.7) 
174 
(18.3) 
952 (100.0) 
..... 
o 
..... 
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6.6.3 EXTENT OF SMOKE SPREAD IN RELATION TO TIME OF THE INCIDENT 
For the purpose of considering the interaction of Smoke Spread with 
time, we have again divided Smoke Spread into two categories at the point 
where it spreads beyond the floor of origin. The contingency table is 
shown be low. 
Smoke Spread I 
Time Up to floor Beyond floor Total 
of origin of origin 
. Day 582 196 778 
Night 111 63 174 
Total 693 259 952 
x2 . 8;7 (1 df), significant beyond 0.01 
It can be seen that incidents which occur at night are significantly 
more likely to have extensive Smoke Spread. 
6.6.4 DENSITY OF THE SMOKE IN RELATION TO TIME OF THE INCIDENT 
We have dichotomised Smoke Density at scale-value 3, as in earlier 
analyses. The contingency table is shown below. 
Smoke Density 
Time 
scale-values scale-values Total 
1 to 3 4 to 7 
. Day 520 258 778 
Night 100 74 174 
Total 620 332 952 
x2 = 6.69 (1 df), significant at 0.01 
Incidents which occur at night are significantly more likely to 
have high levels of Smoke Density. We can thus see that comparing day 
and night incidents on each of our measures of Fire Severity tends to 
support our original hypothesis, that night-time incidents are more 
severe than daytime incidents. 
- - - - - --------------------------------
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6.7 FIRE SEVERITY MEASURES AND NUMBER OF STOREYS IN THE BUILDING 
The majority of the buildings in the Present Study were of 2 or 3 
storeys, and 92% (876) were of 4 storeys or less. The highly skewed 
nature of the distribution means that a complete cross-tabulation of 
storeys with any other variable has large numbers of blank cells. 
Similarly, it renders 
extremely difficult. 
any decision regarding how to combine categories 
If is clear, for example, that a IS-storey building 
is completely different in nature from a S-storey building. We have 
thus chosen to divide storeys into four categories: 
(a) Buildings up to 4 storeys high 
(b) BUildings with 5 storeys 
(c) Buildings with 6 to 16 storeys 
(d) Buildings with more than 16 storeys. 
The logic for this decision is based upon the earlier-cited definition 
of high-rise buildings (most usually dwellings), which are buildings of 
S or more storeys, usually with a lift. Since we do not know whether our 
S storey buildings contained lifts we have treated these separately. It 
is likely that all buildings over S storeys do have lifts. Before 
considering the relationship between Fire Severity and the number of 
storeys, we will first illustrate how the categories of building fall 
into our four categories above, and this is shown in Table 23 (p.10S). 
It can be seen from Table 23 that the biggest differences appear to 
occur between the Dwelling and Industrial categories of building, with 
Dwellings having a very large proportion less than S storeys, whereas the 
Industrial category has a smaller proportion of these low-rise buildings, 
and a disproportionately large number with S storeys. (These S-storey 
Industrial category buildings were very often Cotton Mill buildings, and 
they occur in the sample so frequently due to the fact that both the 
Lancashire and West-Riding Fire Brigades were involved in data collection.) 
As before, we will now consider the effect of several severity 
measures in relation to the number of storeys in the affected building. 
Since the values in so many cells are low or zero, we will in each case 
use the dichotomised categories for the severity measures. 
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6.7.1 FSI LEVEL IN RELATION TO NUMBER OF STOREYS IN THE BUILDING 
The contingency table for FSI level against the number of storeys 
is shown below. 
Number of storeys 
FSI 1eve 1 Total 
1 to 4 5 6 to 16 16+ 
Very Low 393 23 15 3 534 to Low 
Medium to 383 22 10 3 418 Very High 
Total 876 45 25 6 952 
x2 = 0.85 (3 df), non-slgnlflcant 
It will be clear from inspection of the above table that there is 
little difference in the proportions. We can thus state that the level 
of the Fire Severity Index is not related to the number of storeys in the 
building. 
6.7.2 USE OF JETS IN RELATION TO NUMBER OF STOREYS IN THE BUILDING 
The contingency table showing the use or non-use of Jets against 
the number of storeys is shown below. 
Use of Number of storeys 
Jets Total 1 to 4 5 6 to 16 16+ 
No Jets 637 24 17 3 681 
Jets used 239 21 8 3 271 
I 
i Total 876 45 25 6 952 
x2 = 11.44 (3df), significant at 0.01 
If we examine the contingency table for the source of association, 
it is clear that this occurs largely due to the number of "Jets" 
incidents in buildings of 5 storeys. Reference to Table 23 shows that 
32 (71%) of the incidents in 5-storey buildings fall into our Industrial 
category whiCh, as was shown in Section 6.2.1, have a disproportionately 
high number of Jets. This finding is therefore not surprising. Thus, 
although we may state that 5-storey buildings are significantly more 
TABLE 23. Bui Iding category by number of storeys 
Number of Building category 
storeys Total Dwelling Industrial Retail Institution Office/Other 11 
1 to 4 570 (65.1 158 (18.0) 94 (lO.7) 35 (4.0) 19 (2.2) 'I 876 (92 .0) 
(95.3) (80.6) (96.9) (89.7) (86.4) J 
5 11 (24.4) 32 (71.1) 1 (2.2) 1 (2.2) 0 (0.0) : 45 (4.7) 
(1. 8) (16.3) (1.0) (2.6) (0.0) 
J 
6 to 16 12 (48.0) 6 (24.0) 2 ( 8.0) 3 (12.0) 2 ( 8.0) 25 (2.6) 
(2.0) (3.1) (2.6) (7.7) (9.1) 
16+ 5 (83.3) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (16.7) 6 (0.6) 
(0.8) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (4.5) 
..... 
o 
'" 
Total 598 (62.8) 196 (20.6) 97 (10.2) 39 (4.1) 22 (2.3) 952 (100.0) 
TABLE 24. Building category by number of people in the building 
Number of Building category 
people . Total Dwelling Industrial Retail Institution Office/Other 
less than 586 (65.6) 165 (18.5) 91 (10.2) 30 (3.4) 21 (2.4) 893 (93.8) 
100 (98.0) (84.2) (93.8) (76.9) (95.5) 
more than 12 (20.3) 31 (52.5) 6 (10.2) 9 (15.3) 1 (1. 7) 59 (6.2) 
100 (2.0) (15.8) (6.2) (23.1) (4.5) 
.-
Total 598 (62.8) 196 (20.6) 97 (10.2) 39 (4.1) 22 (2.3) 952 (100.0) 
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likely to require Jets, this is probably a result of the buildings in 
this category in our Present Sample, and the finding is not generalisable. 
6.7.3 EXTENT OF SMOKE SPREAD IN RELATION WO NUMBER OF STOREYS IN 
THE BUILDING 
The contingency table showing Smoke Spread up to and beyond the 
floor of origin against the number of storeys in the building is shown 
below. 
Number of storeys 
Smoke Spread Total 
1 to 4 5 6 to 16 16+ 
Up to floor 639 31 19 4 681 of origin 
Beyond floor 237 14 6 2 271 
of origin 
, 
Total 876 45 25 6 952 , I 
x2 " 0.6 (3 df), non-significant 
We may therefore state that the extent of Smoke Spread is not 
related to the number of storeys in the building. 
6.7.4 DENSITY OF SMOKE IN RELATION TO NUMBER OF" STOREYS IN TflE 
BUILDING 
The contingency table showing Smoke Density, dichotomised into scale-
values up to 3, and scale-values over 3, against the number of storeys in 
the building is shown below. 
Smoke Densi ty Number of storeys Total 
scale-values 1 to 4 5 6 to 16 16+ 
1 to 3 568 30 19 I 3 620 , 
i 4 to 7 308 15 6 3 332 
I Total 876 45 25 6 952 
x2 " 1.98 (3 df) • non-significant 
The density of the smoke is also not related to the number of storeys 
in the building. 
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Thus, with the exception of the number of Jets, all our measures 
of Fire Severity are not related to the number of storeys in the building. 
As was mentioned earlier, the fact that "Jets" reaches a significant 
level is probably due to the large number of S-storey Cotton Mills 
(which oft'en required Jets) in the sample of incidents in this category. 
6.8 FIRE SEVERITY MEASURES AND NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE BUILDING 
Many of the earlier-cited anecdotal accounts of building "panic" 
incidents occurre~ in buildings in which large numbers of people were 
present. Whilst the sample of incidents in the Present Study has a large 
proportion of incidents with only 2 or 3 people present, it was 
considered of interest to examine the effect of the presence of large' 
numbers of people on the other variables. For the purposes of these 
analyses, we have chosen to define "a large number of people" as more 
than lOO, and consequently have dichotomised our sample into incidents 
which have less than 100 people in the building, and those which have 
more than 100 people in the building. As before, we will illustrate how 
these categories are distributed across building categories, and this is 
shown in Table 24 ep .105). We wi 11 then examine the effects of the Fire 
Severity variables. 
It can be seen from Table 24 (p.lOS) that the frequency of incidents 
with more than 100 people is unevenly distributed between building 
categories (X~ = 68.4 (4 df), significant beyond 0.001), the source of this 
discrepancy being the relatively large number of Industrial buildings 
with more than 100 people involved. 
We will again use four measures of Fire Severity, namely: FSI level, 
Jets, Smoke Spread and Smoke Density. 
6.8.1 FSI LEVEL IN RELATION TO NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE BUILDING 
The contingency table of FSI level against the number of people in 
the building is shown overleaf. Examination of this table shows that 
incidents with more than 100 people in the building tend to have a 
significantly lower proportion of high FSI values. 
6.8.2 USE 0 
The con 
number of pe 
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Number of people 
FSI level Total 
less than 100 100 or more 
Very Low 489 45 534 to Low 
Medium to 404 14 418 Very High 
Total 893 59 952 
l = 10.3 (1 df), significant beyond 0.01 
F JETS IN RELATION TO NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE BUILDING 
tingency table for the use or non-use of Jets against the 
ople in the building is shown below. 
Use of Number of people 
Jets Total less than 100 100 or more 
,No Jets 637 44 681 
Jets used 256 15 271 
Total 893 59 952 
l = 0.28 (1 df), non-significant 
ether or not Jets were used is not related to the number of 
e building. Intuitively, this is rather surprising, as it 
ed from Table 24 that buildings in the Industrial category 
rge proportion of those with more than 100 people present, 
Thus wh 
people in th 
has been not 
make up a la 
and as we ha 
proportion 0 
ve seen, Industrial category buildings tend to have a greater 
I 
f Jets. 
6.8.3 EXTEN T OF SMOKE SPREAD IN RELATION 'TO NVMBER OF PEOPLE IN'THE BUILDING 
tingency table for Smoke Spread, up to and beyond the floor 
gainst the number of people in the building is shown 
t can be seen that the X2 value fails to reach the 0.01 
level, and we must conclude that the extent of Smoke Spread 
The con 
of origin, a 
overleaf. I 
probabili ty 
is independe nt of the number of people in the building. 
-
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Number of people 
Smoke Spread Total 
less than 100 100 or more 
Up to floor 643 50 693 
of origin 
Beyond floor 250 9 259 
of origin 
Total 893 59 952 
x2 = 4.53 (1 df), non-significant 
6.8.4 DENSITY OF SMOKE IN RELATION TO NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE BUI'LDING 
The contingency table for Smoke Density (dichotomised) against the 
number of peop le in the building is shown be low. 
Smoke Density Number of people 
scale-values 'Total less than 100 100 or more 
I 
1 to 3 573 50 623 
4 to 7 320 9 329 
I Total 893 59 952 I 
x2 = 6.85 (1 df), significant at 0.01 
Again, it can be seen that it is the buildings with less than 100 
people present in which Smoke Density values tend to be higher. 
6.9 DISCUSSION 
As was inferred at the beginning of this chapter, the problem of 
deriving a suitable measure for the severity of the fire is not a simple 
one. It is, at\least partially, a problem of definition. What do we 
mean when we talk of serious, or severe fires? Are we discussing the 
threat to life? If so, then measures of Smoke Spread, Smoke Density and 
perhaps the toxic constituents of smoke are by far the most relevant, 
since in fires, these variables are directly responsible in most cases 
for the death of a building occupant. People hardly ever die from burns 
alone; they are' overcome by smoke and die of carbon monoxide poisoning. 
HO 
If not threat to life, then perhaps some measure of the physical 
combustion process, the fierceness of the flames or intensity of heat, is 
implied. Clearly these aspects cannot be measured directly in real-life 
fire situations. In any case such factors are inextricably bound-up with 
the nature of the building, the materials from which it is constructed 
and the presence of inflammable objects. Differences in these will also 
alter the extent to which the fire spreads, how much of the structure is 
involved and whether other buildings are at risk. 
We have seen in Section 6.4 that our primary measures of severity, 
Fire Spread, use of Fire Brigade equipment and smoke characteristics 
give different answers in different categories of building. This may be 
for two possible, connected, reasons. Firstly, they are measuring 
different aspects of the fire, which are not necessarily related, and 
secondly, the nature of fires in different categories of building varies. 
Whilst we have no hard evidence to support them, it is felt that both of 
these explanations may be true. Thus Dwelling fires have a 
disproportionately low number of incidents requiring Jets, and also have 
disproportionately high levels of Smoke Spread and Smoke Density. The 
use of Jets is probably associated with high intensity fires in terms of 
heat, flames, and perhaps Fire Spread; these particular characteristics 
of the fire not necessarily being associated with dense or extensive 
smoke. The opposite characteristics are manifest in Industrial fires 
which have a disproportionately large number of Jets, and low values of 
the smoke variables. It is relatively easy to think of reasons why there 
should be this discrepancy, considering the different types of building. 
For example, the substances and equipment present in Industrial buildings 
must often present a greater hazard in terms of intense combustion, which 
- -would explain the high level of Jets. In addition, Industrial buildings 
are usually larger than Dwellings, so that any smoke present will become 
more diffuse, and thus have a lower estimated density. In contrast, 
dwellings have many different types of soft-furnishing present w~ich 
tend to smoulder and produce large volumes of smoke. Within the 
restricted confines of a house or flat this soon becomes very dense, and 
will spread rapidly through an open door to the upper storeys. 
It seems, therefore, that the measures utilised in the Present Study 
may well be providing accurate information on the seriousness of the 
fire. They cannot, however, be treated in isolation, since each is 
.---~ ----------
& 
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recDrding a specific aspect Df Fire Severity, rather than an Dverall 
measure. Following on from this we wDu1d suggest that fires in different 
building categDries differ intrinsically in their nature, some scoring 
high on Smoke variables and some high on fire intensity. Which category 
Df building has the most severe fires is an unanswerable question, unle~s 
we define what we mean, which brings us back to Dur original prDblem. 
As the measures are so specific, the need was felt to have a single. 
comprehensive metric fDr Fire Severity. This ratiDnale led to the 
derivatiDn Df the Fire Severity Index (FSI), which included all the known 
infDrmatiDn Dn the nature of the fire. The development of such a severity 
index is not, of course, a novel idea. Perhaps one of the most well 
known is the US CDnsumer PrDduct Hazard Index (US Consumer PrDduct Safety 
CDmmission, 1975). This index was established se that the hazard 
presented by any particular product could be quantified and ranked, in 
order that decisiDns on safety expenditure may be made on a defensible 
and rational basis. The development and method of calculation ef the 
index are of interest, and will be briefly described. 
The Hazard Index is based firmly upon the number and severity of 
injuries recDrded. Severity is evaluated in terms of injury diagnosis, 
body part affected, and whether hospitalisation was required. The 
severity ranking was developed by analysing more than 250 reasonable 
combinatiDns of diagnoses and affected body parts, and assigning each 
combination to. a severity category from 1 to 6. If the injury required 
hospitalisatien. the rating was increased by 1. Thus. an injury with a 
severity rating of 6 which required hospitalisation would be placed in 
category 7. Category 8 was used to. record a known fatality. 
However. the trauma associated with the increased categories of 
severity did not seem satisfactorily represented by a simple linear 
descriptiDn of severity (1.2 •••. 7). It was felt that the injuries in the 
higher categories (5, 6. and 7) by their very nature deserved a much more 
pronDunced weight. It was decided by the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission to relate the categories by using a geometric progression 
starting from an initial value of 10. The seven categories then relate 
to each Dther as fOllows: 10, 12, 17. 31, 81, 340, 2516 from category 1 
to 7 respectively. Category 8 was also assigned 2516. 
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Before ranking the product categories, the Commission included one 
additional factor, the age of the victim, to provide special consideration 
for the young due to the nature of the risks incurred by this group. 
Combining the number and severity of injuries, and including the age of 
the victim, produces a metric which is termed the Age Adjusted Frequenc~ 
Index (AFSI). 
AFSI was derived by multiplying the estimate of the numbers of 
injuries treated in emergency rooms for a product category by the mean 
severity of these injuries, and then multiplying this by 2.5 for the 
injuries occurring to children (0 - 14 years). The latter was done to 
arbitrarily increase the weighted severity for the age-14 and younger 
population in relation to the age-IS and older population. Finally all 
such weighted injury severity values were summed. This sum was then 
di vided by 1 million, and the last three digits of the resulting number 
were truncated to obtain the AFSI index number. The Age Adjusted 
Frequency Severity Index (AFSI) thus provides a means for ranking 
consumer products. 
Clearly this is a much more complex procedure than our calculation 
of the Fire Severity Index. However the underlying rationale is similar, 
in that both indices attempt to weight certain factors so that particular 
types of incident will be given prominence. 
Having invested considerable effort in deriving FSI, it regrettably 
fails to provide us with an answer to the question "which building 
category has the most severe fires?". Clearly our weighting process has 
neatly balanced high-Jets/low-smoke incidents with low-Jets/high-smoke 
incidents. We do not feel this renders the FSI as valueless, but rather 
that the question of building category and Fire Severity cannot be 
answered in a simple unitary way, as was pointed out earlier in this 
discussion. 
A very great advantage which accrues from calculating FSI is that it 
facilitates the scaling of fires on a much broader range of values, 44 in 
the case of raw PSI and 5 in the case of the level of FSI. We will 
therefore continue to use it in comparing incidents, but only in 
conjunction with other measures of severity such as the number of Jets 
and the measures of smoke characteristics. 
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With regard to the time of occurrence of the incident, we have seen 
that night-time fires tend to be more severe on all counts. This is not 
surprising if we consider that, ultimately, Fire Severity must be very 
closely related to the period of time for which the fire is allowed to 
develop undiscovered. This delay, between occurrence and discovery, is 
almost certain to be longer at night. 
Our comparisons with other Building variables were made essentially 
to explore particular hypotheses regarding tall buildings and buildings 
with large numbers of occupants. In the case of the number of storeys in 
the building, the significant relationship between the number of Jets and 
five-storey Industrial buildings is probably an artefact of this 
particular sample. On the basis of all our measures of Fire Severity, 
buildings with large numbers of people do not present a particularly 
grave hazard. Indeed on our chosen classifications, it is buildings with 
less than 100 people which have significantly higher levels of Smoke 
Density, this finding probably reflecting the association between Dwellings 
and high values of this variable. 
C H APT E R 7 
INCIDENTS INVOLVING RESCUES, 
INJURIES & FATALITIES 
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7.0 INCIDENTS INVOLVING RESCUES, INJURIES AND FATALITIES 
The variables considered in this section are rather different from 
those discussed in the preceding chapter. Those considered earlier all 
relate in a variety of ways to the physical nature of the fire, whereas 
the occurrence of rescues, injuries or fatalities are a consequence of 
the fire. Nonetheless, the extent to which these "consequences" occur 
may also be regarded as a measure of the seriousness of the fire, if only 
for pragmatic reasons. As was observed in the Introduction, many of the 
earlier, anecdotal accounts of fire are concerned with incidents in which 
large numbers of people were either rescued, injured or killed. It is 
such incidents, however rare, which are likely to bring into question the 
adequacy of current Codes of Practice in relation to fire. It is also 
likely that most people would regard any fatal fire, for example, as more 
"serious" than one which did not involve casualties, however highly the 
non-casualty incident scored on our earlier-discussed measures of Fire 
Severity. Whilst it is clear that in doing this they are using a 
different dimension for measuring severity, we must recognise that this 
is a completely valid standpoint and include this dimension in our 
assessment. 
In the Present Study there were 14 incidents involving rescues, 56 
incidents involving injuries, and 7 incidents involving fatalities. The 
breakdown of these incidents is illustrated in Figure 16. It will be 
noted from Figure 16 that 885 (92.9%) of the incidents involved neither a 
rescue, an injury or a fatality. It is also evident that the majority of 
Injury incidents were non-rescue incidents, and 4 of the 7 fatalities 
involved neither injuries nor rescues. 
Hereafter, where we are discussing incidents which involved either 
rescues, injuries or fatalities as a group, we will abbreviate the group 
title to "RIF" incidents. Similarly, the group of incidents which did 
not involve a rescue, injury or fatality will be abbreviated to "non-RIF" 
incidents. 
In the following sections we will analyse how RIF incidents are 
distributed across building categories, and examine their relationship to 
other measures of Fire Severity. Qualitative aspects of those incidents 
are examined in Chapters 14, 15 and 16. 
-------------------------------- - ----
FIGURE 16. Breakdown of incidents by the occurrence of Rescues, Injuries and Fatalities 
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N = 1 
Whole sample of incidents 
N = 952 
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7.1 RIF INCIDENTS IN RELATION TO BUILDING CATEGORY 
For the initial tabulation in this section only, we have chosen to 
revert to the original breakdown of building. categories into ,20 separate' 
types. This has been done so that we may identify specific occupancies 
in which these incidents occur. It will have been noted from Figure 16', 
that rescues, injuries and fatalities are not mutually-exclusive 
categories. Where an incident involved some combination of these it will 
thus be represented under each heading. Table 25 shows the distribution 
of RIF and Non-RIF fires across the various building categories. 
TABLE 25. RIF and non-RIF incidents by building category (using the 
original breakdown of building categories) 
,.Non-RIF RIF incidents Building category incidents Rescues Inuries Fatalities 
Owe lling house 446 5 30 5 
Factory 155 1 4 1 
Block of flats 50 3 8 1 
Mul ti-occupancy 35 2 7 -
School 7 
- - -
Hotel 6 1 1 -
College 3 - - -
Shop (unspecified) 54 2 2 -
Public house 13 
- - -
Fish and chip shop 11 - - -
Garage 16 - 2 -
Warehouse/store 14 
-
1 -
Cafe/restaurant 10 
-
1 -
Launderette 5 -
- -
Hostel/home 10 - - -
Office 6 - - -
Flat over shop, etc 12 
- - -
Hospital 12 - - -
Boi ler house 4 - - -
Other 16 
- - -
Total 885 14 56 7 
It can be seen that RIF fires are distributed very unevenly across 
the building categories. The most striking points which illustrate this 
are as follows: 
(a) Blocks of flats, which represent only 6.4% (6ll' of the total 952 
incidents, have 25.0% of the Injury fires. 
(b) Multi-occupancy dwellings, representing only 4.4% (42) of the total 
952 incidents, have 11.9% of the Injury fires. 
------------------------------.----.--------.-----------------------
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(c) Factories, which represent some 16.7% (159) of the total 952 
incidents, have only 3.8% of the injury fires. 
(d) Six of the seven fatal fires are in buildings which may be 
categorised as Dwellings. 
The increased hazard associated with Dwelling fires shown in (d) 
above is illustrated even more clearly if we combine our building 
categories as has been done earlier. This is shown in Table 26 below. 
TABLE 26. RIF and Non-RIF incidents by building category (using revised 
categories) 
I 
Non-RIF RIF incidents , Building category incidents Rescues Injuries ;Fatali ties 
Dwelling 543 10 45 6 
Industrial 189 1 7 1 
Retail 93 2 3 0 
Institution 38 1 1 0 
Office/Other 2 0 0 0 
Total 885 14 56 7 
Apart from the 6 out of 7 fatal fires already mentioned, inspection of 
Table 26 reveals that Dwelling fires have in addition, 86.5% of the 
Injury fires and 84.6% of the incidents which involved a Fire Brigade 
rescue. The combined Dwelling category shown in Table 26 represents 57.1% 
of the total incidents. Conversely, Industrial fires (20% of the overall 
incidents) have only 9.3% of the Injury fires. 
It can thus be seen that in the Present Study, Dwellings have a 
disproportionately high number of fires which involved Rescues, Injuries 
or Fatalities, whereas Industrial occupancies had a disproportionately low 
number of these incidents. If we regard the occurrence of a rescue, an 
injury or a fatality at an incident as a measure of Fire Severity, then 
Dwelling fires are more severe than other building categories, and 
Industrial fires are less severe than other building categories. 
7.2 RIF INCIDENTS IN RELATION TO OTHER MEASURES OF FIRE SEVERITY 
We have chosen to compare RIF and Non-RIF incidents on the basis of 
four other measures of Fire Severity, namely Jets, Smoke Spread, Smoke 
Density and FSI level. 
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7.2.1 FSI LEVEL IN RELATION TO RIF INCIDENTS 
Table 27 below shows the level of the Fire Severity Index in relation 
to RIF incidents. It can be seen that Non-RIF incidents have a 
progressively smaller proportion of each FSI level as this increases, 
whereas Rescues are concentrated between Medium and Very High FSI levels, 
and Fatalities between High and Very High levels. The Injuries category 
is somewhat more evenly distributed with nearly 36% of the Injury 
incidents occurring at Low or Very Low levels. 
TABLE 27. Non-RIF and RIF incidents by FSI level 
FSI Non-RIF RIF incidents 
level incidents Total Rescues Injuries Fatali ties 
Very 196 (97.5) 0 (0.0) 5 (2.5) 0 201 (21.1) 
Low (22.1) (0.0) (8.9) (0.0) 
Low 318 (95.5) 0 (0.0) IS 0 333 (35.0) 
(35.9) (0.0 (26.8) (0.0) 
Medium 205 (93.2) 2 (0.9) 13 (5.9) 0 220 (23.1) 
(23.2) (14.3) (23.2) (0.0) 
High 90 (85.7) 6 (5.7) 10 (9.5) 3 (2.9) 105 (11.0) 
(10.2) (42.9) (17.9) (42.9) 
Very 76 (81. 7) 6 (6.5) 13 (14.0 4 (4.3) 93 C9.8) 
High (8.6) (42.9) (23.2) (57.1) 
Total 885 (93.0) 14 (1. 5) 56 (5.9) 7 (0.7) 952 (100.0) 
Since as we have seen in Figure 16, Rescues, Injuries and Fatalities 
are not independent categories, we cannot test directly on the data in 
Table 27. We can however test the categories separately, and this is 
shown in the following contingency tables. 
FSI level 
Total 
Very Low Low Medium High Very High 
No Rescues 201 333 218 99 87 938 
Res <::ues 0 0 2 6 6 14 
Total 201 333 220 105 93 952 
X2 ~ 37.4 (4 df), signifcant beyond 0.0001 
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FSI level 
Total 
Very Low Low Medium High Very High 
No Injuries 196 318 207 95 80 896 
Injuries 5 15 13 10 13 56 
Total 201 333 220 105 93 952 
x2 = 18.8 (4df), significant beyond 0.001 
It is not possible to test the Fatalities category as it contains no 
values below High; however it is clear that the incidence of Fatalities 
is also associated with much higher levels of FSI. We can thus 
confidently state that incidents which involve Rescues, Injuries or 
Fatalities have significantly higher levels of Fire Severity. 
7.2.2 USE OF JETS IN RELATION TO RIF INCIDENTS 
We will now examine whether or not Jets were used at RIF incidents, 
and this is shown in Table 28 below. 
TABLE 28. RIF and Non-RIF incidents by use of Jets 
Use of Non-RIF RIF incidents 
Jets incidents Total Rescues Injuries Fatalities 
644 (94.6) 5 (0.7) 33 (4.8) 1 (0.1) 681 (71.5) 
Jets (72.8) (35.7) (58.9) (14.3) 
Jets 241 (88.9) 9 (3.3) 23 (8.5) 6 (2.2) 271 (28.5) 
used (27.2) (64.3) ( 41.1) (85.7) 
Total 885 (93.0) 14 (1.5) 56 (5.9) 7 (0.7) 952 (l00.0) 
Inspection of Table 28 shows again that it is the Rescues and 
Fatali ties categories which have high proportions of incidents where 
Jets were utilised. As before we will test each group separately. The 
contingency tables are set out overleaf. 
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, Use of Jets No Rescues Rescues Total 
No Jets 676 S 681 
Jets 262 9 271 
Total 938 14 9S2 
, 
x2 = 7.2 (l df), significant beyond 0.01 
Use of Jets No Injuries Injuries Total 
No Jets 648 33 681 
Jets 248 23 271 
Total 896 S6 952 
x2 = 4.00 (1 df), non-significant 
I Use of Jets No Fatalities Fatalities Total 
\ . No Jets 680 1 681 
Jets 265 6 271 
Total 945 7 952 
x2 (using Fishers exact test) = 8.69 (1 df), 
significant beyond 0.01 
I 
, 
, 
, 
We can see that in each case the RIF categories have a greater 
proportion of incidents involving Jets, although in the case of Injury 
incidents X2 fails to reach the 0.01 level. Thus, using Jets as our 
measure of Fire Severity, incidents involving Rescues.and'Fatalities are 
significantly more severe, whilst incidents involving Injuries are 
independent of Fire Severity. 
7.2.3 EXTENT OF SMOKE SPREAD IN RELATION TO RIF INCIDENTS 
We will now examine the extent of Smoke Spread in RIF incidents, and 
this is shown in Table 29 overleaf. Again it can be seen that the Non-
RIF category has a progressively smaller proportion of incidents as the 
Smoke Spread increases. As was stated earlier, it is considered that the 
critical point for Smoke Spread is where it spreads beyond the floor of 
origin, and we have selected this as the dividing point for the 
contingency tables. 
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TABLE 29. RIF and Non-RIF incidents by extent of Smoke Spread 
Smoke Non-RIF RIF incidents 
Spread incidents Total Rescues Injuries Fatalities 
Little 111 (97.4) 0 (0.0) 3 (2.6) 0 (0.0) 114 (12.0) 
or none (12.5) (0.0) (5.3) (0.0) 
Room of 310 (96.6) 0 (0.0) 11 (3.4) 0 (0.0) 321 (33.7) 
origin (35.0) (0.0) (19.6) (0.0) 
Floor of 240 (93.0) 3 (1. 2) 15 (5.S) 1 (0.4) 258 (27. 1) 
origin (27.0) (21. 4) (26.8) (14.3) 
Floor 178 (88.6) 6 (3.0) 19 (9.5) 3 (1. 5) 201 (21.1) 
above (20.1) (42.8) (33.9) (42.8) 
More 46 (79.3) 5 (S.6) 8 (13.8) 3 (5.2) 58 (6.1) 
extensi ve (5.2) (35. 7) (14.3) (42.8) 
Total 885 (93.0) 14 (1. 5) 56 (5.9) 7. (0.7) 952 (100.0) 
Smoke Spread No Rescues Rescues Total 
Up to floor 690 3 693 
of origin 
Beyond floor 248 11 259 
of origin 
Total 938 14 952 
l = 18.9 (1 df), significant beyond 0.001 
Smoke Spread No Injuries Injuries Total 
Up to floor 664 29 693 
of origin 
Beyond floor 232 27 259 
of origin 
Total 896 56 952 
Xl 
" 
13.2 (1 df), significant beyond 0.001 
Smoke Spread No Fatalities Fatali ties Total 
Up to floor 692 1 693 
of origin 
Beyond floor 253 6 259 
of origin 
Total 945 7 952 
l " 12.2 (1 df) , significant beyond 0.001 
122 
It can thus be seen that incidents which involve Rescues, Injuries 
or Fatalities have significantly more extensive Smoke Spread. 
7..2.4 DENSITY OF SMOKE IN RELATION TO RII' INCIDENTS 
Finally, we will examine Smoke Density in relation to RIF incidents, 
and this is illustrated in Table 30 overleaf. Again we note that the 
Non-RII' category has a progressively smaller proportion of incidents as 
Smoke Density increases, although the absolutely consistent fall noted 
in earlier tables is distributed by the reversal of the proportions at 
Smoke Density values 6 and 7. We have elected to construct our contingency 
tables around the mid-point of Smoke Density, at scale-value 3, and these 
are presented below. 
Smoke Density No Rescues Rescues Total scale-value 
1 to 3 618 2 620 
4 to 7 320 12 332 
Total 938 14 952 
x2 = 16.1 (1 df) , significant beyond 0.001 
Smoke Densi ty No Injuries Injuries Total scale-value 
1 to 3 597 23 620 
4 to 7 299 33 332 
Total 896 56 952 
x2 = 15.1 (1 df), significant beyond 0.001 
Smoke Density No Fatalities Fatali ties Total 
scale-value 
1 to 3 618 2 620 
4 to 7 327 5 332 
Total 945 7 952 
x2 = 4.14 (1 df), non-significant 
Incidents which involve Rescues or Injuries have significantly higher 
values of Smoke Density, whilst incidents which involve Fatalities do not. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -
TABLE 30. RIF and Non-RIF incidents by Smoke Density 
Smoke Density 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total 
scale-values 
Non-RIF 288 (32.6) 146 (16.5) 160 (18.1) 130 (14.7) 95 (10.7) 40 (4.5) 26 (2.9) 885 (93.0) 
incidents (96.6) (96. 1) (94.1) (90.3) (88.0) (81. 6) (83.9) 
Rescues 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (14.3) 3 (21.4) 5 (35.7) 2 (14.3) 2 (14.3 14 (1. 5) 
(0.0) (0.0) (1.2) (2.0) (4.6) (4.1) (6.5) 
Injuries 10 (17.6) 6 (0.0) 7 (12.5) 13 (23.2) 9 (16.1) 7 (12.5) 4 (7.1) 56 (5.9) 
(3.4) (3.9) (4.1) (8.9) (8.3) (14.3) (12.9) 
Fata1i ties 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (28.6) 0 (0.0) 1 (14.3) 3 (42.9) 1 (14.3) 7 (0.7) 
(0.0) (0.0) (1.2) (0.0) (0.9) (6.1) (3.2) 
Total 298 (31.3) 152 (16.0) 170 (17.9) 146 (15.1) 108 (11.3) 49 (5.1) 31 (3.3) 952 (100.0) 
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Although we have seen that RIF incidents have significantly more 
severe fires on all our measures of Fire Severity, we have not made 
comparisons within the RIF category. The simplest way of doing this is 
to compute the mean values of FSI, Jets and Smoke Density, and these 
are shown in Table 31. It should be remembered that these are ordinal 
scales and they may thus only be compared in terms of order. 
TABLE 31. 'Mean values of Fire Severity measures for RIF and Non-RIF 
incidents. 
Non-RIP RIF incidents 
incidents Rescues Injuries Fatalities 
Number of incidents 885 14 56 7 
Number of Jets 323 13 38 12 
Mean Jets/incidents 0.37 0.93 0.68 1.71 
Mean FSI value 10.6 19.1 14.0 23.0 
Mean Smoke Density 2.71 4.93 3.7 5.14 
On this basis it can be seen that incidents involving Fatalities 
have the most severe fires, Rescue incidents the next most severe, and 
Injury incidents the next. All are considerably more severe than Non-
RIF incidents. 
7.3 RIF INCIDENTS AND TIME OF THE INCIDENT 
As we cannot test directly on a cross-tabulation of RIF and Non-RIF 
incidents against time, we will treat each category separately. The 
contingency tables are appended below. 
Time No Rescues Rescues Total 
Day 770 8 778 
Night 168 6 174 
Total 938 14 952 
x2 (using Fishers exact test) = 4.19 (ldf), 
non-significant 
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Time No Injuries Injuries Total 
Day 736 42 778 
Night 160 14 174 
Total 896 56 952 
x2 (using Fishers exact test) = 1. 35 (1 df), 
non-significant 
Time No FataE ties FataE ties Total 
Day 775 3 778 
Night 170 4 174 
Total 945 7 952 
x2 (using Fishers exact test) = 4.85 (1 df) , 
non-significant 
I 
From the preceding three tables it can be seen that in each case 
the occurrence of RIF incidents is independent of the time at which the 
fire occurred in terms of night or day. 
7.4 RIF INCIDENTS AND NUMBER OF STOREYS IN THE BUI WING 
As in earlier sections, we will test RIF and Non-RIF incidents in 
each individual category. The contingency table for RIP incidents 
against the number of storeys in the affected building is shown belO\~. 
Number of 1 to 4 5 6 to 16 16+ Total storeys 
No Rescues 866 42 24 6 938 
Rescues 10 3 1 0 14 
Total 876 45 25 14 952 
Testing directly on this table would be unwise, as'a large number 
of the cells have expected values under 5. We have therefore combined 
categories in the manner shown overleaf. 
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Number of 
storeys 1 to 4 5 or more Total 
No Rescues 866 72 938 
Rescues 10 4 14 
Total 876 76 952 
x2 = 8.19 (1 df), significant beyond 0.001 
Unsurprising1y. the occurrence of Rescues is more likely to occur in 
buildings which are over 4 storeys high. 
As the number of Injury incidents is also small, we have omitted 
the full cross-tabulation and dichotomised storeys as above. The 
contingency table is shown be 101 •• 
I Number of I 
storeys 1 to 4 5 or more Total , , 
No Injuries 826 70 896 1 
Injuries 50 6 56 
Total 876 76 952 I' 
x2 = 0.60 (1 df), non-significant 
With only 7 Fatal incidents, significance testing is not feasible; 
however the tabulation for these incidents is shown below. 
Number of 
storeys 
Fatali ties 
2 3 5 
3 3 1 
Total 
7 
It can be seen that 6 of the 7 incidents occurred in two or three-storey 
buildings, the 1 five-storey building which involved a fatality being a 
Cotton mill. 
We find that the occurrence of Injury incidents is independent of 
the number ,of storeys, whereas Rescue incidents are more likely to occur 
in buildings over 4 storeys, and Fatal incidents more likely to occur in 
buildings of less than 4 storeys. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- --
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7.5 RIF INCIDENTS AND NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE BUILDING 
The contingency tables for Rescue and Injury incidents in relation 
to the number of people in the building are shown below. 
Number of less than 100 100 Total people or more 
No Rescues 881 57 938 
Rescues 12 2 14 
Total 893 59 952 
. 
x2 = 0.49 Cl df) , non-significant 
, 
Number of less than 100 100· or more Total people 
No Injuries 840 56 896 
Injuries 53 3 56 
Total 893 S9 9S2 
x2 = 0.00 Cl df) ,non-significant 
Thus both Rescue and Injury incidents are independent of the presence 
of large numbers of people in the building. 
As earlier, we will tabulate the Fatal incidertt·frequencies exactly, 
and these appear below. 
Number of people 
in building 
Fatali ties 
2 3 7 15 
2 2 1 1 
200 Total 
1 7 
The above tabulation reflects the finding that 6 of the Fatal 
incidents in the Present Study occurred in buildings which are 
categorised as Dwellings, the seventh (with 200 occupants), being, as 
already stated, in a Cotton mill. 
- ------------
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7.6 DISCUSSION 
It is possible to treat the findings of this chapter in two ways. 
We could, as was discussed at the beginning of the chapter, consider the 
occurrence of a rescue , an injury or fatality as yet a further measure of 
Fire Severity. On this basis we would examine and compare the re 1ati ve 
occurrence of RIF and Non-RIF incidents in relation to other variables 
and assign "levels of severity" based upon these. 
More realistically, we can treat Rescues, Injuries and Fatalities 
as a special category of incident,* and interpret their occurrence in 
terms of their association with other variables. In other words, RIF 
incidents may be treated as either the "dependent" or "independent" 
variable. In this discussion we have chosen the latter course. ,With 
regard to this decision, it should be noted that we have, in this Chapter, 
restricted our examination of the interaction of variables to those 
concerned with the Building and the Fire. The effect of Personal and 
Behavioural variables in RIF incidents will be discussed in detail in 
Chapters 14, 15 and 16. 
The first point of note is that RIF incidents are much more likely 
to occur in Dwellings than in other types of occupancy. This may simply 
be a function of the extent of exposure, since Dwellings tend to be 
occupied for longer periods of the day than other types of building. 
However, duration of exposure is unlikely to be a complete explanation, 
certainly in terms of Injury incidents where the level of hazard, that is 
the range of potential fire situations, is probably much greater in 
other occupancies. In this case it is likely that behavioural differences 
between the home environment and the work environment, for example, may 
be of importance. 
With regard to the time of the incident, it is interesting to note 
that in each case there are proportionately more RIF incidents at night, 
although the differences fail to reach the 1% level. Had we be'en" ".' ' 
prepared to accept the 5% level as indicating the reality of the 
relationship, then the occurrence of both Rescues and Fatalities would 
be seen to be associated wi th night-time incidents, whereas Injury 
incidents are clearly independent of time of day. 
• These incidents were of course examined in greater detail than Non-RIF 
incidents as an adjunct to the main study. 
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Similarly with the number of storeys in the building, Injury 
incidents are again not related to this variable. Since by definition a 
rescue will only occur when a person is unable to leave the building by 
their own efforts, we could have predicted wi"th some confidence that 
these are more likely to occur in buildings with more than 4 storeys. 
Our group of Fatal incidents tends to be clustered in the 3 to 4 storey 
category, reflecting their already-discussed association with dwellings. 
The occurrence of RIF incidents appears to be unrelated to the 
number of people in the building, although this may reflect the 
particular categorisation of the "number of people", which was chosen 
specifi caUy to examine whether or not inCidents Id th "large numbers" of 
people were associated with Rescues, Inuries or Fatalities. On the basis 
of these analyses, they clearly I~ere not. 
Finally we turn to the severity of fire in RIF incidents. In this 
case, although the findings are not completely unanimous, there are 
strong indications that Rescues, Injuries and Fatalities are all 
associated with High levels of severity. If we attempt to order them, we 
find that Fatal incidents tend to have the highest level of Fire Severity, 
Rescues the second highest, and Injuries the third highest. We may 
tentatively generalise from this, suggesting that in some ways Rescue and 
Fatal incidents are fairly similar, whereas Injury incidents have little 
in comon with the other two, either in their cause or aetiology. 
We might regard Fatal incidents as unattempted/unsuccessful "Rescue" 
incidents, or conversely Rescue incidents as successful "Fatal" incidents. 
Only in examining the effect of other variables can we attempt to discover 
the reasons for the differences in the final outcome. 
CHAPTER 8 
BUILDING CATEGORY & PERSONAL VARIABLES 
130 
8.0 BUILDING CATEGORY AND PERSONAL VARIABLES 
In some respects, the inter-relationships between the variables 
considered in this chapter have a certain degree of predictability. We 
would not, for example, expect to find many young children in buildings 
other than Dwellings. Similarly, we would be unsurprised if the 
frequency of fire-training was lower in Dwellings than in other types of 
occupancies. Hypotheses concerning the effect of other Personal variables 
are less easy to construct. How are sex, and age of those interviewed 
distributed across building categories? Do the cues which lead to a 
person first becoming aware of a>fire differ between occupancies? We 
will attempt to provide answers to both the obvious and less obvious 
associations in the following sections. 
8.1 BUILDING CATEGORY AND THE SEX AND AGE OF THE OCCUPANTS 
It should be recognised that the 2193 people interviewed in the 
Present Study represent only a sample of the occupants of the buildings 
in which the fires occurred. Where the number of people in the building 
was large this sample will in fact be only a small percentage of the 
occupants, since the largest number of people interviewed was 12, and the 
average number interviewed 2.3. In examining the relationship between sex 
and building category, for instance, we are not therefore attempting to 
draw general conclusions about the occupants of buildings in terms of 
their sex, but merely providing a fuller description of our sample. (A 
critical factor of course will be the time of the incident, since 
occupancy of Dwellings varies both in number and sex at different times 
of day. We will explore this relationship further in Chapter 9.) The 
cross-tabulation of sex of the occupant against building category is shown 
in Table 32 overleaf. 
Examination of Table 32 shows that the sexes are very far from evenly 
distributed between the building categories, and this is confirmed by X2 
testing cl = 355.2 C4 df), significant beyond the 0.001 level). 
Partitioning the table reveals that there are a dlsproportionate number 
of females in Dwellings and Institutions, whereas there are a dispro-
portionate number of males in the Industrial and Office/other categories. 
------------- -
TABLE 32. Sex of the occupant by building category 
Sex of Building category 
occupant Total D\~elling Industrial Retail Institution Office/Other 
Male 477 (38.5) 562 (45.3) 118 (9.5) 53 (4.3) 30 (2.4) 1240 (56.5) 
(4L3) (86.2) (53.6) (43.1) (69.8) 
Female 678 (71.2) 90 (9.5) 102 (10.7) 70 (7.4) 13 (1. 4) 953 (56.5) 
(58.7) (13.8) (46.4) (56.9) (30.2) 
Total 1155 (52.7) 652 (29.7) 220 (lO.O) 123 (5.6) 43 (2.0) 2193 (100.0) 
TABLE 33. First awareness of the fire by building category 
First Building category 
awareness Total 
of fire Dwelling Industrial Retail Institution Office/Other 
Unambiguous 145 (41. 3) 136 (38.7) 42 (12.0) 15 (4.3) 13 (3.7) 351 (16.0) 
cues (12.6) (20.9) (19.1) (12.2) (30.2) 
Ambiguous 429 (58.4) 172 (23.4) 29 (10.8) 41 (5.6) 13 (1. 8) 734 (33.5) 
cues (37.1) (26.4) (35.9) (33.3) (30.2) 
Verbal 437 (59.5) 177 (24.1) 68 (9.3) 41 (5.6) 12 (1. 6) 835 (33.5) 
cue (37.8) (27.1) (30.9) (33.3) (27.9) 
Alarm 9 (6.9) 100 (76.3) 2 (1. 5) 19 (14.5) 1 (0.8) 131 (6.0) 
cue (0.8) (15.3) (0.9) (I5.4) (2.3) 
Other 135 (55.8) 67 (27.7) 29 (12.0) 1 (2.9) 4 (1. 7) 242 (11.0) 
cue (11. 7) (10.3) (13.2) (5.7) (9.3) 
Total llSS (52.7) 652 (29.7) 220 (10.0) 123 (S.6) 43 (2.0) 2193 (l00.0) 
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For the purpose of analysing the age of occupants this variable was 
divided into 8 categories, the first seven being ID-year steps (0-10 years, 
11-20 years, etc) , and the eighth containing any person over 70 years of 
age. The distribution of these age categories against building category 
is illustrated in Figures 17 (a) to (e). 
Inspection of Figures l7(a)-(e) shows them generally to be shaped 
much as we would expect. Dwellings are the only category to have a 
substantial number of both young and old people, although the modal age 
category is below both Industrial and Retail. Whilst all other building 
categories have an approximately normal age distribution, that for 
Institutions is a very uneven shape. The large percentage in the 21-30 
year old age group probably represents nurses interviewed in Hospital 
fires. 
8.2 BUILDING CATEGORY AND FIRST AWARENESS OF THE FIRE' 
One difficulty which arises when attempting to analyse first 
awareness of the fire is that the categories utilised on the questionnaire 
were not mutually exclusive. Thus many of those interviewed claimed to 
have been simultaneously aware of a number of fire manifestations. We 
have already seen in Section s.S,that the most frequent cues were the 
perception of smoke and "being told"; however it was considered that more 
value would be gained by categorising these cues in a different way. 
This was done in the following manner: * 
(a) If a person was sufficiently close to a fire to be aware of heat or 
flames, these cues were considered "Unambiguous". 
(b) If a person became aware of the fire by seeing or smeUing smoke, 
hearing noises or shouts, these cues were classified as "Ambiguous". 
• This method of classification may be considered open to argument. It 
might well be thought that seeing or smelling smoke should be classified 
as an "Unambiguous" cue. Earlier-cited research however (Latane and 
Darley, op cit) suggests that the presence of smoke may be interpreted in 
a number of ways not necessarily related to fire, and we have thus 
classified it as an "Ambiguous" cue. It could similarly be convincingly 
argued that "Alarm" should be classed as an "Ambiguous" cue since it is a 
common observation of everyday life that the sounding of a fire-alarm may 
well be due to a fire-drill, a system fault, a system test, an inadvertent 
false alarm, a malicious false alarm or several other causes, but in most 
people's experience it is never due to a real fire. 
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(c) If a person was actually told there was a fire, this was classified 
as a "Verbal" cue. 
(d) If a person became aware of the fire through hearing an alarm or 
fire Engine, these cues were classified as "Alarm". 
(e) Any other means of becoming aware of the fire were classed as 
"Other" cues. 
The cross-tabulation of building category against how the person first 
became aware of the fire is shown in Table 33 (p.130). 
It can be seen from Table 33 that the means by which occupants first 
become aware of the fire varies widely between building categories (X2 = 
237.9 (16 df), significant beyond the 0.001 level). At least some of 
these differences arise from the already-discussed differences in the 
nature of fires in building categories (Chapter 6). Thus, for example, 
Dwellings tend to have high-smoke/low-Jet fires, and we would therefore 
expect the perception of smoke to be a common means of becoming aware of 
fire, accounting for the high proportion of Ambiguous cues in this building 
category. Since Industrial buildings have the opposite characteristics, 
namely low-smoke/high-Jets, there are correspondingly fewer Ambiguous 
cues and rather more Unambiguous ones. It is perhaps rather surprising 
that Alarm cues are responsible for alerting such comparatively small 
percentages of people in Industrial and Institution categories of building, 
whilst the high percentage of Verbal cues in all building categories, 
particularly Dwellings, emphasises the importance of communication/ 
warning/confirmation in fires. 
8.3 BUILDING CATEGORY AND PERCEPTION OF SERIOUSNESS OF THE FIRE 
The interviewees ranked how serious they thought the fire was (when 
they realised it ~ a fire) on a 3-category scale. The cross-tabulation 
of the subjective seriousness rating between building categories is shown 
in Table 34 overleaf. 
It can be seen from Table 34 that the occupants of buildings" tend to 
ascribe different degrees of seriousness to fires depending upon the 
category of building in which they are present (X2 = 76.8 (8 df), significant 
beyond the 0.001 level). Again the occupants of Dwellings tend to stand 
TABLE 34. Subjective seriousness rating of the fire by building category 
Seriousness Building category 
rating Total Dwelling Industrial Retail Insti tutiona1 Office/Other 
Not at 253 (39.0) 253 (39.0) 83 (12.8) 43 (6.7) 16 (2.5) 646 (29.5) 
all serious (21. 8) (38.7) (37.7) (35.0) (37.2) 
Quite 629 (57.0) 290 (26.3) 103 (9.3) 65 (5.9) 17 (1.5) 1104 (50.3) 
serious (54.5) (44.7) (46.8) (52.8) (39.5) 
Extremely 273 (61. 9) 109 (24.7) 34 (7.7) 15 (3.4) 10 (2.3) 441 (20.1) 
serious (23.6) (16.7) (15 .5) (12.2) (23.3) 
Total 1155 (52.7) 652 (29.7) 220 (10.0) 123 (5.6) 43 (2.0) 2193 (100.0) 
TABLE 35. Familiarity with the building by building category 
Familiari ty Building category 
with the Total 
building Dwelling Industrial Retail Institutional Office/Other 
-
Completely 1044. (56.0) 544 (29.2) 153 (8.2) 85 (4.6) 37 (2.0) 1863 (85.0) 
(90.4) (83.4) (69.5) (69.1) (86.0) 
Less than 111 (33.6) 108 (32.7) 67 (20.3) 38 (11.5) 6 (1. 8) 330 (15.0) 
completely (9.6) (16.6) (30.5) (30.9) (14.0) 
Total 1155 (52.7) 652 (29.7) 220 (10.0) 123 (5.6) 43 (2.0) 2193 (100.0) 
~ 
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out as a particular case (although the low percentage of extremely 
serious ratings in Institutions is surprising considering the potential 
hazard in these types of buildings, i.e. Hospitals, Geriatric Homes, 
Hostels, Hotels, etc). It is clear that Dwelling occupants tend to rank 
fires as more serious, having disproportionately small numbers in "Not lit 
all serious", and disproportionately large numbers in "Quite" and 
"Extremely serious". 
8.4 BUILDING CATEGORY AND FAMILIARITY OF THE OCCUPANTS WITH THE BUILDING 
As was pointed out in Section 5.3, 85% of those interviewed were 
completely familiar with the building in which the fire occurred. This 
being the case, a 4-category scale of familiarity as inCluded on the 
questionnaire appears redundant, and the variable was dichotomised into 
the following two classes: 
(a) Completely familiar with the building 
(b) Less than completely familiar with the building. 
The cross-tabulation of this revised variable across building categories 
is shown in Table 35 (p.134). 
Inspection of Table 35 indicates that familiarity with the building 
is clearly associated with the type of building (X2 = 92.9 (4 df), 
significant beyond 0.001). This is hardly a surprising finding, as we 
would be astonished if the majority of Dwelling occupants did not claim 
complete familiarity with the building, (although it should be remembered 
that this class of building contains multi-occupancy buildings and flats, 
both low and high-rise, with which the occupants of anyone flat may be 
less than familiar). Compared with Dwellings, the Industrial, Retail 
and Institution categories have a disproportionately large number of 
people who are less than completely familiar with the building, although 
we are to some extent surprised that these numbers are not even larger, 
particularly for Institutions. This perhaps reflects the relatively 
large number OD staff who were interviewed at these incidents. 
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8.5 BUILDING CATEGORY AND FREQUENCY OF FIRE-TRAINING RECEIVED BY THE 
OCCUPANTS 
As in the case of "Familiarity with the building", the majority of 
those interviewed (79.2%) had never received any form of fire-training, 
and for the same reason as applied earlier, this variable was divided 
into the following two classes: 
(a) Never received training 
(b) Received some training. 
The distribution of these two categories of training frequency across 
building categories is shown in Table 36 overleaf. 
The X2 value calculated from the frequencies in Table 36 is 349.2 (4df), 
significant beyond the 0.001 level. We may thus state with some certainty 
that the frequency of training of the building occupants is associated 
with the category of building in which the incident occurred. Again this 
finding is not unexpected, nor the way in which the values in the table 
are distributed. The large proportion of people who had received some 
training in Institutions adds further weight to the previous suggestion 
that many of those interviewed in this category were staff. Furthermore, 
the relatively small proportion of people who had received training in 
the Retail category indicates that many of these premises were small shops, 
rather than department stores which invariably give their staff fire-
training. It seems unlikely that the alternative hypothesis, that many of 
those interviewed were customers, is true. 
8.6 BUILDING CATEGORY AND PRESENCE OF OTHER PEOPLE IN THE BUILDING 
It will be recalled from Section 5.3 that the other people present 
in the building were categorised under 8 headings, the first 5 of which 
were explicit family relationships and the last 3 being "Friends", 
"Acquaintances" and"People unknown to you". Whilst this detailed 
classification is of value when studying incidents in some depth, as in 
Chapters 14, 15 and 16, it was felt that quantitative analyses would be 
facilitated by a simpler categorisation. The relationships expressed 
were therefore re-classified into the following two classes: 
(a) Family 
(b) Not Family. 
------------------ --- - - - - - - - - - - - --- - --------------~---
TABLE 36. Frequency of training by building category 
Training Building category 
frequency Total Dwelling Industrial Retail Insti tution, Office/Other 
Some 87 (19.0) 258 (56.5) 38 (8.3) 67 (14.7) 7 (1.5) 457 (20.8) 
training (7.5) (39.6) (17.3) (54.5) (16.3) 
No 1068 (61.5) 394 (22.7) 182 (10.5) 56 (3.2) 36 (2.1) 1736 (79.2) 
training (92.5) (60.4) (82.7) (45.5) (83.7) 
Total 1155 (52.7) 652 (29,.7) 220 (10.0) 123 (5.6) 43 (2.0) 2193 (100.0) 
TABLE 37. Presence' of other people in the building by building category 
Others B~ilding category 
present Total Dwelling Industrial Retail lnsti tution Office/Other 
Family 776 (85.7) 24 (2.6) 71 (7.8) 27 (3.0) 8 (0.9) 1040 (47.4) 
(67.2) (3.7) (32.3) (22.0) (18.6) 
Not 211 (20.3) 579 (55.7) 135 (13.0) 89 (8.6) 26 (2.5) 906 (41. 3) 
Family (18.3) (88.8) (61. 4) (72.4) (60.5) 
No others 168 (68:0) 49 (19.8) 14 (5.7) 7 (2.8) 9 (3.6) 247 (11.3) 
(14.5) (7.5) (6.4) (5.7) (20.9) 
Total 1155 (52.7) 652 (29.7) 220 (10.0) 123 (5.6) 43 (2.0) 2193 (100.0) 
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There was of course a further category, that in which there was no-one 
else present in the building other than the interviewee, and this was 
named "No others". The cross-tabulation of these categories across 
building categories is shown in Table 37 (p.137) 
Inspection of Table 37 indicates the expected discrepancy which is 
confirmed by X2 (X2 = 931.4 (8df), significant beyond the 0.001 level). 
The majority of people in DI~ellings tend to be members of a family, 
whilst the majority of people in other types of building are not related, 
hardly an unanticipated finding. It is of interest, however, that some 
14.5% of the Dwelling fires occurred whilst there was only a single 
person present in the building. 
8.7 BUILDING CATEGORY AND WHETHER OCCUPANTS HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY INVOLVED 
IN A FIRE INCIDENT 
The cross-tabulation of previous inVOlvement of the occupant across 
building categories is shown in 1;able 38 overleaf. Again we note that 
the values are very unevenly distributed between building categories, the 
presence of association being associated with a significant value of X2 
(X2 = 323.7 (4 df), significant beyond the 0.001 level). 
The single most interesting result which emerges from examination of 
Table 38 is the startlingly high percentage of people in Industrial 
buildings who claim to have been previously involved in a fire. 
8.8 DISCUSSION 
Although the associations demonstrated in this chapter are in 
themselves unremarkable, they serve two main purposes. Firstly, they 
define our sample more closely, in terms of the buildings and their 
occupants, rather than considering each separately. Secondly, the 
relationships established here may assist in interpreting what people do 
in fire incidents when we come to consider Behavioural variables. 
Overall perhaps the most forceful impression one gains in reviewing 
this chap)Jer is the anomalous nature of the Dwelling sample in relation 
to the other categories. On each of the variables considered, Dwellings 
tend to differ. They contain a large proportion of women, the occupants 
TABLE 38. Previous involvement of the occupant by building category 
Previously Building category 
involved Dwelling Industrial Retail Institution Office/Other 
Yes 195 (29.9) 368 (56.4) 51 (7.8) 33 (5.1) 6 (0.9) 
(16.9) (56.4) (23.2) (26.8) (14.0) 
No 960 (62.3) 284 (18.4) 169 (11.0) 90 (5.8) 37 (2.4) 
(83.1) (43.6) (76.8) (73.2) (86.0) 
Total 1155 (52.7) 652 (29.7) 220 (10.0) 123 (5.6) 43 (2.0) 
Total 
653 (29.8) 
1540 (70.2) 
2193 (100.0) 
.... 
... 
o 
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tend to become aware of the fire by Ambiguous cues, the fires tend to be 
considered serious, the occupants are largely completely familiar with 
the building and to rarely have received training, they contain family 
members, and the occupants are unlikely to have been previously involved 
in a fire. Each of the above points could have been predicted with some 
confidence, and it is perhaps only in comparison with other building 
categories that these factors appear to stand out. We should, therefore, 
note the peculiar nature of the Dwelling sample when considering 
Behavioural variables. 
C H APT E R 9 
FIRE VARIABLES & PERSONAL VARIABLES 
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9.0 FIRE VARIABLES AND PERSONAL VARIABLES 
The major Fire variables with which we are concerned in this chapter 
are the time of the incident and its severity. As we have seen in 
Chapter 6, there is no single measure which accurately reflects Fire 
Severity, and we have therefore selected three specific aspects, namely 
the number of Jets used, the extent of Smoke Spread and Smoke Density. 
In addition to these particular measures, we will include our derived, 
overall measure, the level of FSI, and also explore some further aspects 
of incidents which involved Rescues, Injuries and Fatalities (known as 
RIF incidents). 
We feel it would be of little value to examine the relationship 
between the above-mentioned measures and the full range of Personal 
variables. It is, for example, of small consequence to know that the use 
or non-use of Jets at an incident was unrelated to the sex of the building 
occupants. Such peripheral associations will only be explored in the 
context of examining a specific hypothesis, concerning more meaningful 
associations. between variables. We have, therefore, restricted our 
examination of Personal variables to those which are considered to be 
.' 
directly related to the characteristics of the incident, namely the means 
by which an individual first becomes aware of the fire, how serious they 
consider the fire to be, and the level of fire-training of the individual. 
9.1 FSI LEVEL AND SELECTED PERSONAL VARIABLES 
It will be recalled that the Fire Severity Index (FSI) was derived 
·by adding all our measures of severity in a formula which gives added 
weight to incidents involving Jets or Hose-reels, and those having 
extensive Smoke Spread. It therefore is the nearest we can approximate 
to an overall measure of Fire Severity. The index values were 
subsequently categorised into 5 levels of severity. 
9.1.1 FSI LEVEL AND FREQUENCY OF TRAINING OF THE BUILDING OCCUPANTS 
It is usual for people to receive fire-training in buildings which 
are thought to have a particular risk attached to them. This risk may 
simply be related to the number of people who occupy the building, or 
else be related to a specific hazard within the building, such as the 
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unavoidable presence of dangerous equipment. In such buildings we may 
therefore have a high potential for a severe fire, which is offset 
perhaps by the presence of personnel who are trained to prevent it from 
becoming severe. These conjectures suggest opposing hypotheses of course, 
in the former case, that incidents involving trained people will have 
high levels of FSI, and in the latter that they will have low levels of 
·FSI. The cross-tabulation of training frequency against FSI level is 
shown in Table 39 overleaf. 
Inspection of Table 39 suggests that there is in fact very little 
difference in the proportions. The X2 calculation from the frequencies 
in this table gives a value of 12.4 (4 df), which is not significant at 
the 0.01 level. Although there is a suggestion from examining the 
percentages that incidents with Very Low FSI tend to have a greater 
proportion of trained people this discrepancy is not significant, and we 
must therefore conclude that there is no association between the FSI 
level and the frequency of training of the building occupants. 
9.1.2 FSI LEVEL AND PERCEPTION OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE FIRE 
If individuals involved in a fire make accurate judgements regarding 
it, we would obviously 
higher levels of FSI. 
expect fires to be rated as more serious at the 
The cross-tabulation of FSI level against the 
subjective judgement of the seriousness of the fire is shown in Table 
overleaf. 
It is readily apparent from Table 40 that the seriousness rating and 
FSI level are closely associated (l = 262.7 (12 df), significant beyond 
the 0.001 level). Whilst the relationship is imperfect, the tendency is 
for individuals to be relatively accurate in their judgements of the 
seriousness of the fire. Examination of the percentages in Table 40 suggests 
that they are much more likely to make valid judgements at Very Low and 
Very High levels of FSI, than at intermediate levels. 
--------------------------------------
TABLE 39. FSI level by frequency of training 
Training FSI level Total frequency Very Low Low Medium High Very High 
Some 110 (24.1) 152 (33.3) 84 (18.4) 61 (13.3) 50 (10.9) 457 (20.8) 
training (26.6) (20.3) (17.4) (21. 3) (19.1) 
No 303 (17.5) 597 (34.4) 398 (22.9) 226 (13.0) 212 (12.2) 1736 (79.2) 
training (73.4) (79.7) (82.6) (78.7) (80.9) 
Total 413 (18.8) 749 (34.2) 482 (22.0) 287 (13.1) 262 (11.9) 2193 (100.0) 
TABLE 40. FSI level by subjective seriousness rating 
Seriousness FSI level 
rating Total Very Low Low Medium High Very High 
Not at all 204 (31.6) 233 (36.1) 118 (18.3) 55 (8.5) 36 (5.6) 648 (29.5) 
serious (49.4) (31.1) (24.5) (19.2) (13.7) 
Quite. 172 (15.6) 415 (37.6) 267 (24.2) 146 (13.2) 104 (9.4) 1104 (50.3) 
serious (41.6) (55.4) (55.4) (50.9) (39.7) 
Extremely 36 (8.2) 101 (22.9) 97 (22.0) 85 (19.3) 122 (27.7) 441 (20.1) 
serious (8.7) (13.5) (20.1) (29.6) (46.6) 
Total 413 (18.8) 749 (34.2) 482 (22.0) 287 (13.1) 262 (11.9) 2193 (l00.0) 
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9.1.3 FSI LEVEL AND FIRST AWARENESS OF THE FIRE 
The cross-tabulation of these variables is shown in Table 41 
overleaf. With such a large table it is initially difficult to establish 
any specific trends; however the variables are clearly associated 
(X2 ; 62.3 (16 df), significant beyond the 0.001 level) for the values in 
the table. Some points emerge from close study of this table. For 
example, almost 65% of the Alarm cues and almost 60% of the Unambiguous 
cues occur in Very Low or Low FSI level incidents. In contrast, values 
in the Verbal cues category appear to be concentrated at the Medium to 
Very High levels of FSI. There does not appear to be a consistent trend 
however, and other than the points mentioned above we must simply conclude 
that the FSI level and "First awareness" are associated, although in a 
rather complex way. 
9.2 USE OF JETS AND SELECTED PERSONAL VARIABLES 
It has been hypothesised earlier (Chapter 6) that the use of Jets 
may be·taken, to a certain extent, as a measure of both the intensity of 
the fire, in terms of heat and flames, and of Fire Spread. 
9.2.1 USE OF JETS AND FREQUENCY OF TRAINING OF THE BUILDING OCCUPANTS 
The cross-tabulation of these variables is shown in Table 42 below. 
TABLE 42. Use of Jets by frequency of training 
Training Use of Jets Total frequency Not used Used 
No 1150 (66.2) 586 (33.8) 1736 (79.2) 
training (80.1) (77.4) 
Some 286 (62.6) 171 (37.4) 457 (20.8) 
training (19.9) (22.6) 
Total 1436 (65.5) 757 (34.5) 2193 (100.0) 
It is clear that there is little difference between the groups, this 
being borne out by a X2 value of 1.9 (1 df) which is non-significant. We 
must conclude therefore that there is no association between the use or 
non-use of Jets at an incident and how frequently the building occupants 
receive training. 
----------------- - - - -- - - -
TABLE 41. FSI level' by first awareness of the fire 
First FSI level 
awareness Total 
of fire Very Low Low Medium High Very High 
Unambiguous 87 (24.8) 129 (36.8) 71 . (20.2) 24 (6.8) 40 (11.4) 351 (16.0) 
cues (21.1) (17.2) (14.7) (8.4) (15 .3) 
Ambiguous 156 (21. 3) 253 (34.5) 153 (20.8) 93 (12.7) 29 (10.8) 734 (33.5) 
cues' (37.8) (33.8) (31. 7) (32.4) (11.1) 
Verbal 110 (15.0) 238 (32.4) 168 (22.9) 126 (17.1) 93 (12. 7) 735 (33.5) 
cues (26.6) (31.8) (34.9) (43.9) (35.5) 
Alarm 28 (21.4) 57 (43.5) 20 (15.3) 16 (12.2) la (7.6) 131 (6.0) 
cues (6.8) (7.6) (4.1) (5.6) (3.8) 
Other 32 (13.2) 72 (29.8) 70 (28.9) 28 (11. 6) 40 (16.5) 242 (11.0) 
cues (7.7) (9.6) (14.5) (9.8) (15.3) 
Total 413 (18.8) 749 (34.2) 482 (22.0) 287 (13.1) 262 (11.9) 2193 (100.0) 
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9.2.2 USE OF JETS AND PERCEPTION OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE FIRE 
We have already established that when Fire Severity is measured by 
the level of FSI, individuals tend to correctly assess how serious the 
fire is. We will examine if this relationship holds true when the use 
or non-use of Jets is the measure in Table 43 below. 
TABLE 43. Use of Jets by subjective seriousness rating 
Seriousness Use of Jets Total 
rating Not used Used 
Not at all 467 (72 .1) 181 (27.9) 648 (29.6) 
serious (32.5) (23.9) 
Quite 755 (68.4) 349 (31.6) 1104 (50.3) 
serious (52.6) (46~ 1) 
Extremely 214 (48.5) 227 (51.5) 441 (20.1) 
serious (14.9) (30.0) 
Total 1436 (65.5) 757 (34.5) 2193 (100.0) 
Inspection of the values in the table above suggests a clear association, 
which is confirmed as significant (X2 = 72.6 (2 df), significant beyond the 
0.001 level). Incidents in which Jets are used tend to be rated as more 
serious than those in which they are not used. 
9.2.3 USE OF JETS AND FIRST AWARENESS OF THE FIRE 
The cross-tabulation of these variables is shown in Table 44 
overleaf. The X2 value obtained from the frequencies in this table is 
20.4 (4 df), which is significant beyond the 0.001 level, thus indicating 
that the two variables are associated. Again, Alarm cues are more 
frequently associated with Low severity (Le. non-Jet) 'fires. It is also 
interesting to note that in non-Jet fires, Ambiguous cues are the modal 
category, whereas in Jet fires Verbal cues are the most frequent. 
TABLE 44. First awareness of fire by use of Jets 
First awareness of fire 
Use of 
Jets Unambiguous Ambiguous Verbal Alarm Other Total 
. cues cues cues cues cues 
No Jets 243 (16.9) 517 (36.0) 444 (30.9) BO (5.6) 152 (10.6) 1436 (65.5) 
(69.2) (70.4) (60.4) (61.1) (62.8) 
Jets used 108 . (1i1.3) 217 (28.7) 291 (38.4) 51 (6.7) 90 (11.9) 757 (34.5) 
(30.8) (29.6) (39.6) (38.9) (37.2) 
Total 351 (16.0), 734 (33.5) 735 (33.5) 131 (6.0) 242 (11.0) 2193 (100.0) 
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9.3 EXTENT OF SMOKE SPREAD AND SELECTED PERSONAL VARIABLES* 
Since extensive Smoke Spread is closely associated with Dwellings, 
we would, if there was simple transitivity between variables, expect 
those Personal variables which are also associated with Dwellings to be 
related; These simple relationships, however, do not necessarily follow. 
9.3.1 EXTENT OF SMOKE SPREAD AND FREQUENCY OF TRAINING OF THE BUILDING 
OCCUPANTS 
The cross-tabulation of these variables is presented in Table 45 
overleaf. Examination of this table reveals that there is a virtually 
consistent trend in the proportions, the number of people with no 
training increasing as smoke spreads more extensively. The relationship 
is statistically significant (X2 = 34.3 (4 df), which is significant beyond 
the 0.001 level). Increasing levels of Smoke Spread are clearly 
associated with a decreasing proportion of people who have received fire-
training. 
9.3.2 EXTENT OF SMOKE SPREAD AND PERCEPTION OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE FIRE 
Intuitively it would be predicted that these two variables would be 
very closely associated. The cross-tabulation of them is presented in 
Table 46 overleaf. It can be seen from this table that there is a close, 
but imperfect correlation between the increasing perception of the fire'S 
seriousness and the increasing level of Smoke Spread (X2 = 183.9 (8 df), 
significant beyond the 0.001 level). 
9.4 DENSITY OF SMOKE AND SELECTED PERSONAL VARIABLES 
Earlier analyses suggest that Smoke Spread and Smoke Density act in 
a similar fashion as measures of Fire Severity. 
* For both Smoke Spread and Smoke Density we have omitted the cross-
tabulation with "First awareness of the fire". It would be merely re-
stating the obvious to suggest that in incidents with dense or extensive 
Smoke Spread, building occupants tended to become first aware of the fire 
by Ambiguous(i.e. smoke) cues. 
--- - - --- - -
---- - - ----------------------------
TABLE 45. Smoke Spread by frequency of training 
Extent of Smoke Spread 
Training Total frequency Little Room of Floor of Floor More 
or none origin origin above extensive 
Some 78 (17.0) 171 (37.4) 105 . (23.0) 69 (15.5) 34 (7.4) 457 (20.8) 
training (30.3) (24.8) (17.0) (15.5) (18.6) 
No 179 (10.3) 519 (29.9) 513 (29.6) 376 (21. 7) 149 ( 8.6) 1736 (79.2) 
training (69.7) (75.2) (83.0) (84.5) (81.4) 
Total 257 (11. 7) 690 (31.5) 618 (28.2) 445 (20.3) 183 (8.3) 2193 (100.0) 
TABLE 46. Extent of Smoke Spread by subjective seriousness rating 
Extent of Smoke Spread 
Seriousness Total 
rating Li tt1e Room of Floor of Floor More 
or none origin origin above extensive 
Not at all 132 (20.3) 240 (37.0) 143 (22.1) 103 (15.9) 30 (4.6) 648 (29.6) 
serious (51. 4) (34.8) (23.1) (23.1) (16.4) 
Quite 102 (9.2) 351 (31. 8) 355 (32.2) 226 (20.5) 70 (6.3) 1104 (50.3) 
serious (59.7) (50.9) (57.4) (50.8) (38.3) 
Extremely 23 (5.2) 99 (22.4) 120 (27.2) 116 (26.3) 83 (18.8) 441 (20.1) 
serious (8.9) ( 14.3) (19.4) (26.1) (45.4) 
Total 257 690 618 445 183 2193 (lOO. 0) 
- - - -----------------------------------~----------------------------------
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9.4.1 DENSITY OF SMOKE AND FREQUENCY OF TRAINING OF THE BUILDING 
OCCUPANTS 
The cross-tabulation of these variables is shown in Table 47 
overleaf. As with Smoke Spread, we have a close but not completely 
consistent relationship, the proportion of people with "No training" 
tending to increase with increasing Smoke Density (X2 = 32.0 (6 df), which 
is significant beyond the 0.001 level}. 
9.4.2 DENSITY OF SMOKE AND PERCEPTION OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE FIRE 
We would expect a similar result for these variables as with that 
for Smoke Spread. The cross-tabulation is presented in Table 48 overleaf. 
As was predicted, the resulting association in Table 48 closely matches 
that already demonstrated IYith Smoke Spread (X2 = 217.8 (12 df), which is 
significant beyond the 0.001 level). Thus, as Smoke Density increases, 
so do peoples' perceptions of the seriousness of the fire, although this 
association is not completely consistent. 
9.5. TIME OF THE INCIDENT AND SELECTED PERSONAL VARIABLES 
As in earlier analyses in which we considered the effect of time, 
we have reclassified this into "Day" (0600 to 2159) and !~Night" (2200 to 
0559). The only two Personal variables which are of interest are "First 
aIYareness of the fire" and "Subjective seriousness". 
9.5.1 TIME OF THE INCIDENT AND FIRST AWARENESS OF THE FIRE 
The cross-tabulation of the time of the incident against first 
awareness of the fire is shown in Table 49 (p.153). We would perhaps 
have tentatively hypothesised that Ambiguous cues were more likely in 
night-time incidents; hOIYever inspection of this table shows that whilst 
the expected frequency is lower than the observed frequency, there is 
not a large difference. The largest single discrepancy is, of course, 
the uneven distribution in the Alarm category, which we might also have 
predicted since this wi 11 be associated with "work" environments, 
incidents IYhich tend to happen in the daytime. This accounts for the 
largest part of the significant differences in Table 49 (X2 = 14.1 (4df), 
which is significant beyond the 0.01 level). 
---------------------------------------------------- -- ------------------------------------------
TABLE 47. Smoke Density by frequency of training 
Training Smoke Density-scale-values 
frequency Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Some 178 (38.9) 74 (16.2) 73 (16.0) 58 (12.7) 38 (8.3) 18 ( 8;9) 18 (3.9) 457 (20.8) 
training (27.1) (23.6) (16.9) (16.3) (15.4) (15.9) (23.7) 
No 478 (27.5) 240 (13.8) 359 (20.7) 298 (17.2) 208 (12.0) 95 (5.5) 58 (3.3) 1736 (79.2) 
training (72.9) (76.4) (83.1) (83.7) (84.6) (84.1) (76.3) 
Total 656 (29.9) 314 (14.3) 432 (19.7) 356 (16.2) 246 (11.2) 113 (5.2) 76 (3.5) 2193 (100.0) 
TABLE 48. Smoke Density by subjective seriousness rating 
Seriousness Smoke Density sca1e-va1ues-
- rating 
Total 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 314 (48.5) 79 (12.2) 97 (15.0) 84 (13.0) 45 (6.9) 15 (2.3) 14 (2.2) 648 (29.5) 
serious (47.9) (25.2) (22.5) (23.6) (18.3) (13.3) (18.4) 
Quite 283 (25.6) 190 (17.2) 235 (21.3 179 (16.2) 123 (11.1) 58 (5.3) 36 (3.3) 1104 (50.3) 
serious (43.1) (60.5) (54.4) (50.3) (50.0) (51. 3) (47.4) 
Extremely 59 (13.4) 45 (10.2) 100 (22 :7) 93 _ (21.1) .78 (17.7) 40 (9.1) 26 (5.9) 441 (20.1) 
serious (13.4) (14.3) (23.1) (26.1) (31. 7) (35.4) (34.2) 
Total 656 (29.9) 314 (14.3) 432 (19.7) 356 (16.2) 246 (11.2) 113 (5.2) 76 (3.5) 2193 (100.0) 
---------------------------------------
TABLE 49. First awareness of fire by time of the incident 
First awareness of fire 
Time' Unambiguous Ambiguous Verbal Alarm Other 
cues cues cues cues cues 
Day 292 (16.5) 584 (33.0) 587 (33.2) 120 (6.8) 187 (10.6) 
(83.2) (79.6) (79.9) (91.6) (77.3) 
Night 59 (13.9) 150 (35.5) 148 (35.0) 11 (2.6) 55 (13.0) 
(16. 8) (20.4) (20.1) (8.4) (22.7) 
Total 351 (16.0) 734 (33,S) 735 (33.5) 131 (6.0) 242 (11.0) 
Total 
1770 (80.7) 
423 (19.3) 
2193 (100.0) 
..... 
V1 
lN 
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9.5.2 TIME OF THE INCIDENT AND PERCEPTION OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE FIRE 
Intuitively, we would suppose that incidents which occur at night-
time would be perceived as more serious than those which occur in the 
daytime, as in fact we have shown they are on all our measures of Fire 
Severity (see Sections 9.1.2, 9.2.2, 9.3.2, 9.4.2). The cross-tabulation 
of time against seriousness is shown in Table SO below. 
TABLE SO. Subjective seriousness rating by time of the incident 
Seriousness' rating 
Time Total 
Not at 'all Quite Extremely 
serious serious serious 
Day 527 (29.8) 908 (51.3) 335 (18.9) 1770 (BO.7) 
(81. 3) (82.2) (76.0) 
Night 121 (28.6) 196 (46.3) 103 (25.1 ) 423 (19.3) 
(18.7) (I 7.8) (24.0) 
Total 648 (29.5) 1104 (50.3) 441 (20.1) 2193 (100.0) 
It can be seen from Table 50 that night-time incidents do appear to 
be perceived as being more serious, although the differences are not 
large •. In fact, X2 calculated from the values above gives a value of 
8.2 (2 df), which fails to reach our pre-set rejection level of 0.01. We 
must therefore conclude that there is not significant association between 
night-time and daytime incidents in terms of their subjective seriousness. 
9.6 OCCURRENCE OF RESCUE, INJURY AND FATAL (RIF) INCIDENTS AND PERSONAL 
VARIABLES 
We have previously explored the effect of Building and Fire variables 
upon RIF incidents in Chapter 7. In this section we will concern 
ourselves with the effect of relevant Personal variables. It is probably 
worth reiterating that, with only a few exceptions, information collected 
from RIF incidents relates to building occupants who were not the victim. 
We have merely chosen to treat these incidents as a separate category on 
the basis that they represent an unsuccessful response to' fires. It is 
of interest, therefore, to establish whether the level of training, 
familiarity, previous involvement and seriousness rating of people in 
such incidents differs from that of people involved in Non-RIF incidents. 
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As has already been pointed out, Rescue, Injuries and Fatalities are 
not independent categories. We cannot therefore test our variables against 
the whole RIF group. but must treat each category separately. Before 
moving on to construct contingency tables for each class, we will first 
present a frequency table for the two groups, Non-RIF and RIF incidents. 
TABLE 51. Number of people in Non-RIF and RIF incidents 
Non-RIF RIF incidents 
incidents Rescues Injuries Fatilli ties 
Number 
of people 2019 50 146 17 
involved 
9.6.1 RIF INCIDENTS AND FREQUENCY OF TRAINING 
The contingency tables and X2 values for Rescues, Injuries and 
Fatalities are shown below. 
Training 
Rescues frequency Total 
None Some 
No Rescues 1691 452 2143 
Rescues 45 5 50 
Total 1736 457 2193 
l = 3.64 (1 df), non-significant 
Training 
Injuries frequency Total 
None Some 
No Injuries 1612 435 2047 
Injuries 124 22 146 
Total 1736 457 2193 
X2 = 3.15 (1 df), non-significant 
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I Training : 1 
, 
frequency Fatalities Total 
None Some 
No Fatali ti es 1725 451 2176 
Fatalities 11 6 17 
, Total 1736 457 2193 
x2 " 2.17 (l df), non-significant 
We can therefore see from the evidence of the above three tables 
that there is no significant difference between Non-RIF and RIF incidents 
in terms of the frequency of training of the building occupants. 
9.6.2 RIF INCIDENTS AND FAMILIARITY WITH THE BUILDING 
The contingency tables and X2 values for Rescues, Injuries and 
Fatalities are shown below. 
Familiarity with building : I 
Rescues Less than Total 
" Completely 
completely 
No Rescues 1832 311 2143 
Rescues 31 19 SO 
Total 1863 330 2193 
X2 " 21. 0 (1 df), significant beyond 0.001 
Familiarity with building 
Injuries Less than Total Completely 
completely 
No Injuries 1754 293 2047 
InJuries 109 37 146 
Total 1863 330 2193 
X2 " 12.9 (1 df), significant beyond 0.001 
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Familiarity with building 
Fatali ties Less than Total Completely 
completely 
No Fatali ties 1849 327 2176 
Fatalities 14 3 17 
Total 1863 330 2193 
x2 = 0.9 (ldf), non-significant 
There is a clear association between "Familiarity with the building" 
and the occurrence of Rescues and Injuries. In both cases, the 
occupants are more likely to be "Less than completely familiar with the 
building". This is not the case for incidents involving Fatalities, in 
which there is no association between "Familiarity with the building" and 
their occurrence. 
9.6.3 RIF INCIDENTS AND PREVIOUS INVOLVEMENT IN A FIRE INCIDENT 
The contingency tables and X2 values for Rescues, Injuries and 
Fatalities are shown below. 
-
Previous 
Rescues involvement Total' 
No Yes 
No Rescues 1496 647 2143 
Rescues 44 6 SO 
Total 1540 653 2193 
x2 = 7.7 Cl df), significant beyond 0.01 
Previous I 
Injuries involvement Total. 
No Yes I 
No Injuries 1411 636 2047 
,Injuries 129 17 146 
Total 1540 653 2193 
x2 = 24.5 (1 df), significant beyond 0.001 
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Previous 
Fatali ties invo 1 yemen t Total 
No Yes 
No Fatali ties 1527 649 2176 
Fatali ties 13 4 17 
Total 1540 653 2193 
x2 = 0.3 (1 df), non-significant 
Yet again, it is the Fatal incidents in which there is no association 
between the Personal variable and their occurrence. In contrast, for 
buildings in which either Rescues or Injuries occur, the occupants are 
significantly less likely to have been previously involved in a fire 
incident. 
9.6.4 RIF INCIDENTS AND SUBJECTIVE SERIOUSNESS RATING OF THE FIRE 
The contingency tables and·x2 values for Rescues, Injuries and 
Fatalities are shown below. 
Seriousness rating 
Rescues Not at all Quite Extremely Total 
serious serious serious 
No Rescues 641 1085 417 2143 
Rescues 7 19 24 50 
Total 648 1104 441 2193 
x2 = 25.5 (2 df), significant beyond 0.001 
Seriousness rating 
Injuries Not at all Quite Extremely Total 
serious serious serious 
. 
No Injuries 616 1043 388 2047 
, 
, 
Injuries 32 61 53 146 
, Total 648 1104 441 2193 
l = 25.7 (2 df), significant beyond 0.001 
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Seriousness rating 
Fatalities Not at all Quite Extremely Total 
serious serious serious 
No Fatali ties 646 1098 432 2176 
Fatalities 2 . 6 9 17 
Total 648 1104 441 2193 
XZ = 11..7 (2 df), significant beyond 0.01 
In this case we can see that ·each of the three categories of RIF 
incident is associated with high seriousness rating. We may thus state 
that for incidents in which Rescues, Injuries or Fatalities occur, the 
occupants of the building are significantly more likely to perceive the 
incident as being serious. 
9.7 DISCUSSION 
It is plain from the evidence of this chapter that our selected 
Personal variables do not inevitably act in the way in which we would 
have intuitively predicted. The frequency of training, for example, 
which might be considered to have powerful effects, is associated only 
with smoke characteristics, of the variables considered here. In this 
case the correlation is between increasing values of Smoke Spread and 
Smoke Density, and decreasing proportions of people who have received 
training. Since we have already seen that Dwellings are associated 
individually with,high levels of smoke and low levels of training, this 
finding may simply be a significant interaction of these two effects, an 
aspect we \~ill explore in Chapter 13. 
With reference to the means by which individuals first become aware 
of the fire, it is difficult to draw any clear ,conclusions. It is 
possible that our reclassification, although necessary, may have 
disguised some important connection, however this seems unlikely. One 
, aspect which is of some interest is the implication that Low FSI fires 
are associated with Unambiguous cues. This seems inherently plausible, 
in the sense that if a person becomes first aware of a 'fire by seeing 
flames or feeling heat, it is likely that the fire is in an early stage 
160 
of development. In this event, the time available to take preventative 
action is correspondingly greater, which may preclude the fire from 
becoming more severe. 
Perhaps the single most interesting finding is the relatively close 
association between subjective judgements of the fire's seriousness, and 
our objective measure of Fire Severity. Further evidence is provided by 
a study of the Spearman correlation ooefficients calculated for these 
scales •. They are shown in Table 52 below. 
TABLE 52. Spearman correlation coefficient values for 
subjective seriousness by FSI, Smoke Density, 
Smoke Spread and the number of Jets. 
Fire Severity measures 
FSI Smoke Smoke Number of 
Density Spread Jets 
Subjective rs. 0.306 0.288 0.248 0.173 
seriousness signif. 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
It can be seen that positive and significant correlations are obtained in 
each case, although the relatively low values indicate that the 
associations are imperfect. 
Attempting to study RIP incidents by analysing the attributes of 
the other people in the incident may appear a rather circuitous procedure; 
however in the absence of evidence from those directly affected, it is 
the only course available. Irrespective of this constraint, we feel that 
it is in itself a valid procedure if we assume, as we must, that the 
characteristics and behaviour of all those involved in RIF incidents may 
have had a bearing upon the eventual outcome. 
Regarding these incidents, it is surprising to find that, again, the 
• frequency of training is unrelated to their occurrence. Furthermore, 
although we find a disproportionately large number of people who have not 
had previous experience of fire, and a disproportionately large number 
who are unfamiliar with the layout of the building in both Rescue and 
Injury incidents, these associations are not manifest in Fatal incidents, 
a finding we would not have anticipated, and one which is resistant to 
explanation. For seriousness, individuals in all categories of RIF 
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incident tend to rate them towards the higher end of the subjective 
seriousness scale, which again correlates well with the objective Fire 
Severity measures attached to this type of incident. 
CHAPTER 10 
BUILDING VARIABLES AND BEHAVIOUR 
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10.0 BUILDING VARIABLES AND BEHAVIOUR 
As was outlined in Chapter 5, the behaviour of people in the 
incidents studied was examined in two ways. Firstly, by a broad, 
unstructured enquiry into the actions which they undertook when they 
realised there was a fire, and secondly, by an examination of three 
specific aspects: whether people left the building during the course of 
the fire, whether they returned into the building, and whether they 
moved through smoke. 
In our original classification of general behaviour, actions were 
broken down into 29 separate categories. As was discussed earlier, the 
distinction between several of these categories is rather subtle, and it 
would appear that little information is lost if categories which have the 
same implicit meaning, or express similar intention are combined. After 
careful study of our multiple classification, it was found possible to 
reduce the 29 discrete actions to 12 broader groups. The precise manner 
in which this reclassification was undertaken is illustrated in Appendix 
8, (p.339).· The 12 revised types of behaviour are shown below. 
1. Investigate 
2. Contact Fire Brigade 
3. Alert others 
4. Evacuate self 
S. Evacuate others 
6. Fire-fighting 
7. Minimise risk 
8. Increase risk 
9. Request assistance 
10. Render assistance 
11. Retreat from fire 
12. Something else 
These reclassified actions will be utilised in all subsequent discussions 
of general behaviour, unless otherwise specified. 
Whilst in Chapter 5 we briefly discussed first, second and third 
actions separately, this is clearly of only limited value, and in 
examining the effect of other variables upon general behaviour we will 
adopt a more meaningful type of analysis. In this we have not cross-
tabulated each action by another variable (which in any case would be 
extremely unwieldy and difficult to interpret), but instead we have 
analysed the data so as to uncover "sequences of actions". Utilising 
this form of analysis we can examine the occurrence of certain patterns 
of behaviour across each of our chosen independent variables. 
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Before moving on to consider the analyses, we will first illustrate 
how the data will be presented. For convenience, the behaviour patterns 
are set out under the headings of First, Second and Third Actions. So, 
for example, in Dwellings we find the following series of action 
sequences occur: 
First Action % Second Action 
(a) Fire-fight (10.2) -->- Contact FB 
% Third Action % 
(31.3) <Min~m~se r~sk (18.9) MaximIse rIsk (16.2) 
This means that 10.2% of the occupants of Dwellings undertooK fire-
fighting asa First Action. Of this 10.2%, 31. 3% then contacted the Fire 
Brigade, and of this group, 18.9% did something to minimise the risk, and 
16.2% did something to maximise the risk. 
In some cases, individuals only undertook one basic course of action 
throughout the incident, and this will be presented as below: 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
(a) Request (2.8) _ (95.2) 
assistance 
In each case, sequences of action will be presented in descending 
order of frequency of First Action, and only those actions which were 
undertaken by at least 5% of the group will be illustrated. 
10.1 BEHAVIOUR IN RELATION TO BUILDING CATEGORY 
For each variable we will consider four aspects of behaviour, namely 
sequences of action, evacuation of the building, re-entry into the 
~building and movement through smoke. 
10.1.1 SEQUENCES OF ACTION IN RELATION TO BUILDING CATEGORY 
The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 1155 occupants 
of Dwellings who were interviewed are presented below: 
First Action % 
(a) Investigate (18.1) 
Second Action 
Contact FB 
Minimise risk 
Fire-fight 
% Third Action 
(19.6) --.,.. 
(16.7) --.,.. Contact FB 
(15.3) -->-
% 
(39.0) 
(34.3) 
(43.8) 
First Action 
(b) Contact FB 
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% Second Action 
Fire-fight 
(13.2) 4Minimise risk 
Evacuate self 
Contact FB 
(c) Minimise risk (11.3) < 
Alert others 
Contact FB 
(d) Evacuate others (11. 2) ~ Minimise risk 
. Evacuate self 
(e) Alert others. (10.7) -+Evacuate self 
% Third Action 
(16.4)~ 
(15.l)~ 
(10.5)~ 
% 
(64.0) 
(50.0) 
(86.7) 
(35.l)~Fire-fight (16.2) 
\'Minimise risk (16.2) 
Increase risk (16.2) 
(13. O)~Contact FB .( 41. 2) 
(25.6)--.Fire-fight 
(16.3)--'Contact FB 
(10.9)--. 
(17.7)~ 
(30.3) 
(47.6) 
(64.3) 
Contact FB (34.7)~--
(10. 2) ~ Evacuate others (9. 7)~Contact FB 
Minimise risk (9.7)--'Contact FB 
(63.6) 
(32.4) 
(54.5) 
(60.0) 
(f) Fire-fight 
(g) Evacuate self (9 5) /'" --
. ~Contact FB 
--. 
(18.2) --. 
(54.5) 
(55.0) 
Examination of the above action sequences in Dwellings shows that 
the range is quite diverse, only a relatively small number choosing to 
undertake each particular course of behaviour. One recurrent theme is 
the way in which the Fire Brigade is often contacted as a Second or 
Third Action, as is the action of minimiSing risk, which in Dwellings was 
often either shutting doors or switching-off electric or gas mains. 
The most frequent action sequ~nces undertaken by the 652 occupants of 
Industrial category buildings who were interviewed are presented below: 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
(22 .1) ~ Contact FB --. (38.1) (a) Fire-fight (13.2) --. (31. 6) 
Evacuate self (10.4) ~ (60.0) 
(b) Investigate (19.2) --. Fire- fight (47.2) ~ (69.5) 
( c) Alert others (19.0) - Fire-fight (49.1) ~ (70.2) 
(d) Contact FB (10.6) <Fire-f~ght (30.4) --. (61. 9) Investlgate (21. 7) --.Fire-fight (40.0) 
(e) Evacuate self (9.8) --. 
--+- (73.4) 
(f) Minimise risk (9.0) -+ Fire-fight (30.5) -+ (77.8) 
It is obvious that in Industrial buildings the range of action 
sequences is much less wide, and the popularity of fire-fighting as a 
course of action is noticeable. Not only is it the most frequent First 
Action, but it also tends to dominate the Second and Third Actions. 
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The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 220 occupants 
of Retail category buildings who were interviewed are presented below: 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
(a) Contact FB (20.0) -0- Fire-fight (29.5)_ (76.9) 
(b) Fire-fight (19.5).-0- Contact FB (62.8) -0- (40.0) 
(c) Investigate (11. 4) - Fire-fight (24.0) -0- (25.0) 
(d) Minimise risk (10.9) -o-Fire-fight (33.3) --+ Contact FB (62.5) 
(e) Alert othEirs (IQ.O) <: Contact FB (31. 8) --+ (28.6) Evacuate self (18.2) --+ (75.0) 
In Retail category buildings the actions which predominate are fire-
fighting and contacting the Fire Brigade, nearly 40% of those interviewed 
undertaking these actions either in one order or the other. 
The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 123 occupants of 
Institution category buildings who were interviewed are presented below: 
First Action 
(a) Alert others 
(b) Fire-fight 
% Second Action 
(17.1) --+ Investigate 
(11.4) --+ Contact FB 
% 
(23.8) --+ 
(35.7) -
Third Action % 
(20.0) 
(40.0) 
It, is interesting that in the case of Institution buildings, a 
relatively large percentage of people warn other occupants before they 
investigate, a course of action which will obviously aid any subsequent 
evacuation. The fact that warning others is the most popular First Action, 
whereas in other occupancies it is often the third, fourth or fifth most 
popular, may also be considered significant. 
The most frequent action sequences by the 43 occupants of the Office/ 
Other category buildings who were interviewed are presented below: 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
(a) Contact FB (25.6) ->- Fire-fight (27.2) --+ (66.6) 
(b) Fire-fight (20.9) --+ -0- (22.2) 
Wi th such small frequencies, we cannot reach any firm conclusions; 
however it is plain that fire-fighting and contacting the Fire Brigade' 
predominate in the Office/Other category when a fire incident occurs. 
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10.1.2 EVACUATION IN RELATION TO BUILDING CATEGORY 
Unlike our other behavioural variables, evacuation of the building' 
can be examined in two alternative ways. Firstly, each of the 2193 
occupants who were interviewed were asked if they left the building 
during the fire. Secondly, the Fire Brigade officers who attended the 
incident were asked to record the number of people who left the building 
during the course of the fire, and also the number of people who were in, 
,. 
the building when the fire was discovered. Where there were large 
numbers of occupants, the officer could obviously not be expected to make 
an exact count, and an estimate I~as considered acceptable. From this 
latter method it is therefore possible to calculate the proportion of 
occupants who left the building in each of the 952 incidents. 
We will first examine our sample of respondants, and the cross-
tabulation of building category against whether an individual left the 
building during the course of the fire is shown in Table 53 overleaf. 
Study of this table shows there are conspicuous differences in the 
proportion of individuals leaving different categories of building. 
This is verified by the X2 value of 110.0 (4 df), which is significant 
beyond the 0.001 level. It is clear that the largest component of this 
number' is the difference between Dwellings and other categories, and we 
may thus state that the occupants of Dwellings are significantly more 
likely to leave the building than the occupants of other building types. 
It is convenient to divide the proportion of people who left the 
building into 5 categories. This has therefore been done in Table 
overleaf which shows the proportion leaving in different categories of 
building. Again we can see that Dwellings tend to differ from other 
types of building, having a substantially smaller percentage of incidents 
in which no-one left the building, and a substantially larger percentage 
of incidents in which everyone left. The differences within Table 54 
are statistically significant (X2 ;; 64.6 (16 df), significant beyond the 
0.001 level). It is also of note that nearly 80% of the incidents overall 
are accounted for by the two categories, 0% and 100%. 
* In common usage, the term "evacuation" is usually applied to a more-
or-less orderly leaving of the building by its occupants. In this and 
subsequent chapters, the term is used in the rather more general sense 
to simply mean "leaving the building". No connotation of pre-planning or 
orderliness is implied. 
TABLE 53. Building category by evacuation behaviour 
Leave the Building category 
building Total Dwelling Industrial Retail 
-
Institution Office/Other 
Not leave 412 (41. 0) 393 (39.1) 113 (11.2) 68 (6.8) 19 (1.9) 1005 (45.8) 
(35.7) (60.3) (51. 4) (55.4) (44.2) 
Leave 743 (62.5) 259 (21. 8) 107 (9.0) 55 (4.6) 24 (2.0) 1188 (54.2) 
(64.3) (39.7) (48.6) (44.6) (55.8) 
Total 1155 (52.7) 652 (29.7) 220 (10.0) 123 (5.6) 43 (2.0) 2193 (100.0) 
TABLE 54. Building category by proportion of people leaving the building 
Proportion Building cateogry 
leaving each Total 
incident Dwelling Industrial Retail Insti tution Office/Other 
0% 147 (49.8) 80 (27.1) 41 (13.9) 16 (5.4) 11 (3.7) 295 (31.0) 
(24.6) (40.8) (42.3) (41.0) (50.0) 
1% to 30% 33 (57.9) 16 (28.1) 1 (1. 8) 5 (8.8) 2 (3.5) 57 (6.0) 
(5.5) (8.2) ( 1.0) (12.8) (9.1) 
31% to 70% 63 (67.0) 22 (23.4) 9 (9.6) . 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 94 (9.9) 
(l0.5) (11. 2) (9.3) (0.0) (0.0) 
71% to 99% 19 (45.2) 14 (33.3) 7 (16.7) 1 (2.4) 1 (2.4 ) 42 (4.4) 
(3.2) (7.1) (7.2) (2.6) (4.5) 
100% 336 (72.4) 64 (13.8) 39 (8.4) 17 (3.7) 8 (1. 7) 464 (48.7) 
(56.2) (32.7) (40.2) (43.6) (36.4) 
Total 598 (62.8) 196 (20.6) 97 (10.2) 39 (4.1) 22 (2.3) 952 (100.0) 
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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We cannot. know how Table 53 relates to Table 54, in the sense that 
if an individual stated that they did not leave the building we only know 
they cannot have been in the 48.7% of incidents in which everyone left. 
Similarly if they said they did leave, they could be in any category 
except the 31.0% of incidents in which no-one left. We can, however, 
attempt to estimate how the Tables relate to one another using Dwellings 
as an examp le. 
Thus referring to Table 53, we know that 412 people stated they did 
not leave Dwellings during the course of the fire. These 412 persons 
must have come from the 147 Dwelling incidents in which no-one left, plus 
some proportion of the Dwelling incidents in which less than 100% of the 
people left. Let us assume that half of the incidents 'in the categories 
1% to 99% (Table 54) contributed interviewees. We can then calculate the 
average number of people per incident who did not leave the building and 
were interviewed. We can perform a similar calculation for those who 
stated they left Dwellings, knowing that the 743 people who stated they 
left must have come from the 336 incidents in which everyone left, again 
assuming that half the incidents in categories 1% to 99% contributed 
intervIewees. The calculations for Dwellings are shown below. 
(a) Number of interviewees who did not leave = 412 
Number of incidents in which no-one left = 147 
Number of incidents in categories 1% to 99% = 115 
Average number of people interviewed per incident who did not leave 
= 412/(147 + [115/2]) " 412 = 2.0 people/incident 
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(b) Number of interviewees who did leave = 743 
Number of incidents in which everyone left = 336 
Number of incidents in categories 1% to 99% = 115 
Average number of people interviewed per incident who did leave 
= 743/(336+ [115/2]) " 743 " 1.9 people/incident 
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On this basis therefore, it would seem that approximately equal numbers 
of people were interviewed in both the leave,and not leave categories. 
10.1.3 RETURNING INTO THE BUILDING IN RELATION TO BUILDING CATEGORY 
Those interviewed were asked if they returned into the building 
during the course of the fire. The cross-tabulation of their responses 
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against building category is shown in Table 55 overleaf. It can be seen 
that the proportions are remarkably homogeneous, the absence of association 
being confirmed by the X2 test (X2 = 2.1 (4df), non-significant). We can 
thus state that whether or not an individual returned into the building 
was independent of the building category. 
10.1.4 MOVEMENT THROUGH SMOKE IN RELATION TO BUILDING CATEGORY 
We have already seen in Chapter 6 that Dwelling fires tend to be 
characterised by extensive and dense smoke. We would therefore expect a 
greater proportion of the occupants to move through it. The cross-
tabulation of whether or not an individual moved through smoke* indifferent 
building categories is shown in Table 56 overleaf. It is clear that, as 
predicted, Dwellings have the highest proportion of individuals moving 
through smoke; however this value is not substantially different from that 
in other categories except Industrial (X2 = 22.2 (4 df), significant beyond 
the 0.001 level) where the largest component of the statistic is accounted 
for by the disproportionately low number moving through smoke in this 
category. 
10.2 BEHAVIOUR IN RELATION TO NUMBER OF BUILDING OCCUPANTS 
As in earlier analyses, we are interested in examining the effect of 
large numbers of occupants upon the variables. We have subsequently 
divided our sample into two categories, incidents involving buildings with 
less than 100 occupants and incidents inVOlving buildings containing more 
than 100 occupants. 
10.2.1 SEQUENCES OF ACTION IN RELATION TO NUMBER OF BUILDING OCCUPANTS 
The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 1979 occupants 
of buildings with less than 100 people are presented below. 
First Action 
(a) Investigate 
.% Second Action 
Fire-fight 
(17.0) (coo,"" Fe 
Minimise risk 
% Third Action 
(22.9) <:: Con~ FB 
(16.4) <:: Fire-fight 
Minimise risk 
(14.0) < C?ntac~ FB 
Fne-flght 
% 
(57.1) 
(14.3) 
(29.1) 
(16.4) 
(14.5) 
(25.5) 
(21. 3) 
* In all tabulations of movement through smoke, only those incidents at 
which smoke was present are included. Thus, the category "Not move" means 
there was smoke which the individual did not attempt to move through, not 
that there was no smoke. 
TABLE 55. Building category by returning into the building 
Return into Building category 
building Dwelling Industrial Retail Institution Office/Other 
Not return in 412 (62.0) 153 (23.0) 56 (8.4) 32 (4.8) 12 (1. 8) 
(55.5) (59.0) (52.3) (58.2) (50.0) 
Return in 331 (63.3) 106 (20.3) 51 (9.8) 23 (4.4) 12 (2.3) 
(44.5) (41. 0) (47.7) (41. 8) (50.0) 
Total 743 (62.5) 259 (21. 8) 107 (9.0) 55 (4.6) 24 (2.0) 
TABLE 56. Building category by movement through smoke 
Movement Building category 
through 
smoke Dwelling Industrial Retail Institution Office/Other 
.: Not move 388 (50.5) 252 (32.8) 77 (10.0) 37 (4.8) IS (2.0) 
(36.5) (48.8) (38.9) (40.7) (42.9) 
Move 675 (59.5) 264 (23.3) 121 (10.7) 54 (4.8) 20 (1. 8) . 
(63.5) (51.2) (61.1) (59.3) (57.1) 
Total 1063 (55. 8) 516 (27.1) 198 (10.4) 91 (4.8) 35 (1. 8) 
Total 
665 (56.0) 
523 (44.0) 
1188 (100.0) 
Total 
769 (40.4) 
1134 (59.6) 
1903 (100.0) 
..... 
'-I 
o 
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First Action Second Action 
(b) Fire-fight (15.1) < 
Contact FB (25.4) <E:f 
(c) Contact FB (13 6) ....... Fire-fight (22.6)-.. 
. • ......... Evacuate self (9.6) -.. 
(d) Alert others (12.8)-Fire-fight (20.4)_ 
(e) Minimise risk. (10. 4) <C?ntac~ FB Fue-flght 
( f) Evacuate self (9.7) -C --FB 
....... ontact 
(g) Evacuate others (7.4)_Contact FB 
(21.5) _ 
(16.6) ~ 
-.. (14.5) _ 
(24.5) <: 
Third Action 
Fire-fight 
Minimise risk 
Firefight 
Contact FB 
Fire-fight 
(30.4) 
(31.5) 
(19.7) 
(19.7) 
(65.6) 
(80.8) 
(61.5) 
(27.2) 
( 41.1) 
(38.2) 
(54.7) 
(53.6) 
(27.8) 
(27.8) 
Similarly, the most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 214 
occupants of buildings with more than 100 people are presented below for 
comparison. 
First Action 
(a) Investigate 
(b) Fire-fight 
(c) Alert others 
(d) Evacuate self 
(e) Minimise risk 
(f) Contact FB 
(g) Evacuate others 
% Second Action % 
(25.7)_Fire-fight (38.2)_ 
(13.6)_ _ 
(13.1)<I~vest~gate 
Fue-flght 
(8.9)_ ~ 
(8.4)_ 
(7.0)_Investigate 
(5.1)-
(28.6) _ 
(35.7) -
(33.3) _ 
Third Action 
'Fire-fight 
% 
(58.3) 
(41. 3) 
(24.2) 
(21.9) 
(63.2) 
(25.4) 
(60.0) 
(20.6) 
Since the number of people in the two samples is so different we 
must be~rather cautious about drawing firm conclusions. However it is 
apparent that the range of actions taken in buildings with less than 100 
people present is much greater. We are also struck by the differences in 
First Actions taken. For example, almost twice as many individuals 
undertake contacting of the Fire Brigade as a First Action in the first 
group. The proportion of people investigating in the large number of 
occupants sample is, in contrast, very much greater. One further point 
is that where less than 100 people are present, individuals tend to 
investigate first, and then do something else. In buildings with more 
than 100 people present, individuals tend to warn others or contact the 
Fire Brigade before investigating, an action sequence which is frequent 
in Institution category buildings, suggesting that they make up a 
substantial part of this sample. 
172 
10.2.2 EVACUATION IN RELATION TO LARGE NUMBER OF BUILDING OCCUPANTS 
We will again examine evacuation in two ways. Firstly, in terms of 
individual respondants and, secondly, the proportion of people leaving 
each incident. The cross-tabulation of the number of people in the 
building against whether an individual left the building is shOl~n in 
Table 57 below. 
TABLE 57. Number of building occupants by evacuation behaviour 
Leave the Number of people in building 
building Total Up to 99 100 or more 
Not leave 862 (85.8) 143 (14.2) 1005 (45.8) 
(43.6) (66.8) 
Leave 1117 (94.0) 71 (6.0) 1188 (54.2) 
(56.4) (33.2) 
Total 1979 (90.2) 214 (9.8) 2193 (100.0) 
The values in Table 57 indicate than in buildings containing large 
numbers of people, individuals were much less likely to leave the 
building (x2 =42.1 (ldf), significant beyond the 0.0011eve1). We might, 
however, speculate that this conclusion may be spurious simply due to 
bias in our sample of interviewees. Obviously a much smaller proportion 
of the building occupants were interviewed at incidents when there were 
large numbers, and it might be suggested that the Fire Brigade officers 
tended to select occupants who left. We can examine this hypothesis by 
looking at the proportion of people who left each incident, as shown in 
Table 58 overleaf. 
The X2 calculation based upon the proportions in Table 58 gives a 
value of 53.9 (4 df), which is significant beyond the 0.001 level. 
Buildings with less than 100 people have less than the expected frequency 
of incidents where no-one left, and more than the expected frequency of 
incidents where everyone left. The converse applies to buildings with 
more than 100 people. We can therefore see that this analysis supports 
our earlier one, in that people were less likely to leave buildings with 
large numbers of people present, and that there does not appear to be an 
obvious bias in the interviewing. 
TABLE 58. Proportion of people leaving by number of building occupants 
Number of Proportion of people leaving building -
people in Total 
building 0% 1% to 30% 31% to 70% 71% to 99% 100% 
Up to 99 . 259 (29.0) 46 (5.2) 92 (10.3) 40 (4.5) 456 (51.1) 893 (93.8) 
(87. 8) (80.7) (97.9) (95.2) (98.3) 
More than 100 36 (61.0) 11 (18.6) 2 (3.4) 2 (3.4) 8 (13.6) 59 (6.2) 
(12.2) (19.3) (2.1) (4.8) (1. 7) 
Total 295 (31. 0) 57 (6.0) 94 (9.9) 42 (4.4) 464 (48.7) 952 (100.0) 
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One further way we can examine the data for any association between 
the number of occupants and the proportion of people" leaving is by 
calculating a correlation coefficient for the two variables. In this 
case both variables are uncategorised (i.e. in raw form). Calculating R 
for these two variables gives a value of -.216 (significant at the 0.001 
level), suggesting that as the number of occupants increases, the 
proportion of people leaving decreases, which lends further support to 
our earlier findings. 
10.2.3 RETURNING INTO THE BUILDING IN RELATION TO NUMBER OF BUILDING 
OCCUPANTS 
The cross-tabulation of the above two variables is shown in Table 59 
below. 
TABLE 59. Number of occupants by return into the building 
Return into Number of people in building 
the building Total Up to 99 100 or. more 
Not return 607 (91. 3) SS (S.7) 665 (56.0) 
(54.3) (81. 7) 
Return 510 (97.5) 13 (2.5) 523 (44.0) 
(45.7) (1S.3) 
Total 1117 (94.0) 71 (6.0) 1188 (100.0) 
The proportions clearly show that people are much less likely to return 
into buildings with large numbers of occupants (/ = 20.2 (1 df), which is 
significant beyond the 0.001 level). 
10.2.4 MOVEMENT TIlROUGH SMOKE IN RELATION TO NUMBER OF BUILDING OCCUPANTS 
The cross-tabulation of the number of people in the building against 
whether or not individuals moved through smoke is shown in Table 60 
overleaf. The X2 calculation from frequencies in this table gives a 
value of 5.65 (1 df), which fails to reach the 0.01 level of probabili ty. 
We can therefore state that there is no association between movement 
through smoke and the number of people in the building. 
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TABLE 60. Number of occupants by movement through smoke 
Move Number of people in building 
through Total 
smoke Up to 99 100 or more 
Not move 692 (90.0) 77 (10.0) 769 (40.4) 
(39.6) (49,3) 
Move 1055 (93.0) 79 (7.0) 1134 (59.6) 
(60.4) (50.7) 
Total 1747 (91.8) 156 (8.2) 1903 (100.0) 
10.3 BEHAVIOUR IN HIGH-RISE FLATS 
The concept of high-rise flats has received considerable criticism 
in recent years, and in fact this type of building is no longer being 
constructed. The criticisms levelled at them have ranged from faults in 
design and construction, to their socially isolating and psychologically 
depressing effects. Informal discussion with the occupants of these 
flats often uncovers a long list of complaints, frequently including 
some reference to the fact that Fire Brigade appliances could not reach 
above a certain level. It would seem therefore that these people may be 
particularly aware of fire dangers, and in view of this awareness and the 
specific nature of the building, we must be specially interested in the 
behaviour which is manifest in them. 
Of the 598 Dwellings in our sample, some 17 (2.8%) fall into the 
category of high-rise flats, that,is, having more than 6 storeys. From 
the 17 incidents, 35 occupants were interviewed. 
10.3.1 SEQUENCES OF ACTION IN HIGH-RISE FLATS 
With such a small sample of respondents in this group and a 
proportionately large sample in low-rise dwellings, comparisons between 
the two are not 
frequent action 
First Action 
(a) Investigate 
(b) Contact FB 
very meaningful. We will, 
sequences in the high-rise 
% Second Action 
(31.4) ~ 
(17.1) ~ 
however, illustrate the most 
flats. 
% Third Action % 
(54.5 ) 
(33.3) 
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As can be seen, the tendency in high-rise flats seems to be to simply 
undertake one course of action. 
people at some stage, and almost 
First, Second or Third Actions. 
Some 25% of the occupants warned other 
23% undertook fire-fighting, as either 
It appears that the perceived need to 
investigate a fire may be rather stronger in high-rise flats, representing 
as it does 31.4% of the First Actions, as opposed to the 17.7% of the 
First Actions in low-rise dwellings. However the small sample must make 
us treat any conclusion of this nature with great caution. 
10.3.2 EVACUATION BEHAVIOUR IN HIGH-RISE FLATS 
High-rise flats are not deSigned on the premise that the whole 
building will be evacuated of all occupants when there is a fire. In the 
event of a fire in one flat (or on one floor), it is assumed that the 
occupants of the other flats will remain behind their front doors (which 
are half-hour fire-resistant), safe within their flats which are 
constructed as fire-resistant compartments. The fact that. this behaviour 
is contrary to what people often do in non-high-rise dwellings is, to a 
certain extent, recognised by the Local Authorities who are usually 
responsible for the buildings. In some cases a card .is issued to new 
tenants' telling them what they shOUld do in the event of fire. In others, 
instructions are printed in Rent Books. The extent to which these 
messages "get across" is largely unknown. 
As before, we can examine evacuation in two ways, at the individual 
interviewee level, and also in terms of the proportion of people leaving 
each incident. The cross-tabulation of whether or not people left the 
building in relation to low and high-rise dwellings is shown in Table 61 
below. 
TABLE 61. Number of storeys by evacuation behaviour in Dwellings 
Leave the 
building 
Not 
leave 
Leave 
Total 
Number of storeys 
4 or less 5 6 or more 
373 (90.5) 
(34.2) 
717 (96.5) 
(65.8) 
1090 (94.4) 
12 (2.9) 
(40.0) 
18 (2.4) 
(60.0) 
30 (2.6) 
27 (6.6) 
(77 .1) 
8 (1. 1) 
(22.9) 
35 (3.0) 
Total 
412 (35.7) 
743 (64.3) 
1155 (100.0) 
• In some areas these cards are only issued to the first tenants of the 
flats. Since there is often quite a high turnover in tenants, subsequent 
occupants presumably remain ignorant of these instructions. 
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It can be seen from Table 61 that, for the categories chosen, a 
progressively smaller percentage of people leave the building as the 
number of $toreys increases. This is especially noticeable once the 
number of storeys is greater than 5, which is regarded as the point where 
high-rise starts. This trend is confirmed by the X2 test (X2 = 27.4 (2 dn, 
significant beyond the 0.001 level). 
Again, we will divide the proportion of people leaving the building 
into 5 categories, and the cross-tabulation of this against low and high-
rise dwellings is shown in Table 62 below. 
TABLE 62. Number of storeys by proportion of-people leaving dwellings 
Proportion Number of storeys 
leaving Total 
building 4 or less 5 6 or more 
0% 158 (91. 4)' 0 (0.0) 13 (8.6) 151 (25.3) 
(24.2) (0.0) (76.5) 
1% to 30% - 23 (79.3) 3 (10.3) 3 (10.3) 29 (4.8) 
( 4.0) (27.3) (17.6) 
31% to 70% 61 (96.8) 2 (3.2) 0 (0.0) 63 (10.5) 
(10.7) (18.2) (0.0) 
71% to 99% 19 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 19 (3.2) 
(3.3) (0.0) (0.0) 
100% 329. (97.9) 6. (1. 8) 1. (0.3) 336 (56.2) 
(57. 7) (54.5) (5.9) 
Total 570 (95.3) 11 (1. 8) 17 (2.8) 598 (100.0) 
The expected values in a large proportion of the cells in the above 
table are very low, which prevents us from testing directly. However, 
inspection of the table confirms our earlier finding that occupants are 
~-----_____ much less likely to leave high-rise dwellings than they are to leave low-
rise dwellings. 
One further way in which we can explore this association is to 
compute the correlation between the number of storeys (in dwellings) and 
the proportion of people who leave. Calculating Pearson's R for the two 
variables yields a value of -.233 (significant beyond 0.001), which 
suggests that as the number of storeys increases, the proportion of 
occupants who leave decreases. 
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10.3.3 RETURNING INTO HIGH-RISE FLATS 
It is clear that a much smaller proportion 
high-rise flats than other types of dwellings. 
of people tend to leave 
We will now examine the 
re-entry behaviour of these people. The cross-tabulation of return into 
the building against the number of storeys is shown in Table 63 below. 
TABLE 63. Number of storeys by return into dwellings 
Return Number of storeys 
into Total 
building 4 or less 5 6 or more 
Not return 396 (96. 1) 14 (3.4) 2 (0.5) 412 (35.7) 
(55.2) (77 .8) (25.0) 
Return 321 (97.0) 4 (1.2) 6 (1.8) 331 (64.3) 
(44.8) (22.2) (75.6) 
Total 717 (96.5) 18 (2.4) 8 (1.1) 743 (100.0) 
The expected values in half the cells of Table 63 are below 5 and we 
cannot therefore undertake meaningful significance testing. Inspection 
of the table, however, indicates that individuals seem more likely to 
return into high-rise flats than other types of dwelling. We must treat 
such an interpretation with some caution however. Firstly, it is based 
upon such small frequencies, and secondly the question, "Did you return 
into the building during the course of the fire?" may well have had a 
different meaning for occupants of high-rise flats. The "building" in 
this question is a very large construction in which the majority of the 
occupants may in fact be unaware of a fire. Leaving a building which has 
a fire on the seventh floor, for example, then re-entering on the ground 
floor and remaining there, is clearly not comparable to leaving/re-entering 
a two-storey dwelling during the course of the fire. We are suggesting 
therefore that whilst the behaviour in both cases may be superficially 
similar, due to the entirely different nature of the buildings, they are 
not comparable in any real sense in te,rms of the hazard involved. 
10.3.4 MOVEMENT THROUGH SMOKE IN HIGH-RISE FLATS 
Dwellings in general tend to have a large proportion of people 
moving through smoke. We will examine high-rise flats to see if this 
behaviour is also manifest in this type of occupancy, in Table 64 overleaf. 
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TABLE 64. Number of storeys by movement through smoke iil dwellings 
Move Number of storeys 
through , Total 
smoke 4 or less 5 6 or more 
Not move 367 (94.6) 6 (1.5) 15 (3.9) 388 (36.5) 
(36.6) (22.2) (46.9) 
Move 637 (94.4) 21 (3.1) 17 (2.5) 675 (63.5) 
(63.4) (77.8) (53.1) 
Total 1004 (94.4) 27 (2.5) 32 (3.1) 1063 (100.0) 
There is no significant difference between the categories in 
Table 64 (x' = 3.8 (2 df), non-significant). We therefore conclude that 
individuals in high-rise flats are no more nor less likely to move 
through smoke than people in other types of dwelling. 
10.4 DISCUSSION 
The evidence of this chapter suggests that the behaviour of 
building occupants in fires is associated with the characteristics of 
the building. The most diverse patterns of behaviour occur in Dwellings, 
although these often include some action to minimise the risk and 
contacting the Fire Brigade. In contrast, behaviour in Industrial 
category buildings falls into a smaller number of categories, for example 
the three most popular First Actions in Dwellings account for 42.6% of 
all the First Actions, whereas the three most popular First Actions in 
Industrial buildings account for 60.3% of the First Actions. Much of 
the behaviour in Industrial buildings is directed towards fire-fighting. 
In Retail category buildings fire-fighting is also a frequent response, 
although in this case it is often associated with contacting the Fire 
Brigade. In the Institution category a much smaller percentage undertake 
fire-fighting, but often warn others before investigating the nature of 
the fire, a reaction which is peculiar to this building category. 
The number of building occupants also affects the action sequences, 
although as we have pointed-out earlier, our division into two categories 
may be considered somewhat arbitrary. Certainly there exist differences 
between these categories, the major ones being that the range of actions 
is broader in buildings containing few occupants. The large proportion 
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who investigate as a First Action in buildings with large numbers of 
occupants may result from the inclusion of high-rise flats in this 
category, since this behaviour is a notable feature in these bui·1dings. 
Similarly, the relatively large percentage of individuals who warn 
others and then investigate are probably the same ones about whom we have 
commented in the Institutional category. 
With regard to evacuation, that is, whether people left the building 
at all during the course of the fire, Dwellings stand out as having a 
disproportionately large number of occupants who leave, as do buildings 
with less than 100 occupants. It is interesting, however, that 
occupants are ~ likely to leave high-rise flats than other types of 
dwelling, a finding which must be of encouragement to those who administer 
these buildings. The finding that people also seem more likely to return 
into high-rise flats during the course of the fire must be treated with 
some caution as has already been discussed, since re-entry into a low-
rise building in which there is a fire has a completely different 
connotation to re-entry into a high-rise building in the same circumstances. 
Otherwise re-entry behaviour is independent of building category, although 
it is more likely in b~ildings with few occupants than with those with 
many occupants. 
Movement through smoke is the one Behavioural variable which appears 
to be relatively independent of the Building variables, the only 
significant association being that disproportionately fewer people under-
take this action in Industrial category buildings. We may speculate that 
this reflects the higher level of training in this category of building 
which was demonstrated in Chapter 9; however we will directly explore the 
association between these two variables in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 11 
PERSONAL VARIABLES & BEHAVIOUR 
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11.0 PERSONAL VARIABLES AND BEHAVIOUR 
. 
In the previous chapter is has been demonstrated that certain of 
our Building variables are associated with particular behaviour in fires. 
We now turn our attention to the effect which Personal variables may 
have upon such behaviour. As in Chapter 10, we will examine in order, 
four aspects of behaviour, namely the sequences of action which 
individuals undertook, whether they left or re-entered the building 
during the course of the fire, and whether they moved through smoke. 
11.1 EFFECT OF PERSONAL VARIABLES ON SEQUENCES OF ACTION 
We will consider the effect of seven Personal variables upon 
behaviour patterns. As before, First Actions are presented in descending 
order of frequency in each case. 
11. 1. 1 SEQUENCES OF ACTION IN RELATION TO SEX OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 953 women who 
were interviewed are presented below. 
First Action 
(a) Alert others 
(b) Investigate 
(c) Contact FB 
% Second Action 
(13.2) ........ Contact FB 
........ Evacuate self 
Contact FB 
(13.2)<:Minimise risk 
Fire-fight 
% Third Action 
(20.6) ~ Fire-fight 
(17.5) __ 
(16.7) __ 
(15.1) _ Contact FB 
(13.5)~ Contact FB 
Sarething else * (19.2)_ (13.l)~Fire-fight (16.0)--
'" _. -
% 
(38.5) 
(19.2) 
(72.7) 
(42.6) 
(36.8) 
(35.3) 
(35.3) 
(62.5) 
(45.0) 
(50.0) Evacuate others(12.8)~ E t vacua e self (31. 3) 
(d) Evacuate self (11.6) <Contac~ FB - (48.6) (16.2)- (77.8) 
(e) Minimise risk (10,9)~C?ntac~ FB (18.3) __ Evacuate self (21.1) Fue-f1ght (12.4) - Contact FB (69.2) 
(f) ~Contact FB (23.3) _ (41.6) Evacuate others (10. 8) Evacuate self (13.6) - (57.1) 
(g) Fire-fight (7.9)_Contact FB (34.6)~ Minimise (26.9) risk (26.9) 
* Most commonly,.saving personal effects. 
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The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 1240 men who 
were interviewed are presented below. 
First Action 
(a) Investigate 
(b) Fire-fight 
(c) Contact FB 
(d) Alert others 
(e) Minimise risk 
% Second Action 
(21. 3) <:: Fire-fight 
Contact FB 
(20.4).<: 
(12.9) <: 
(12.7) -4 
Contact FB 
Fire-fight 
Investigate 
Fire-fight 
Evacuate se If 
Investigate 
(9.5) < Fire-fight 
Contact FB 
(f) Evacuate self (8.1) ~ 
(g) Evacuate others (4.4) ~ Contact FB 
% Third Action % 
(65.4) 
(28.6) 
(30.6) -.. 
(13.2)< Fire-fight (25.7) 
(20;6)-. F' f' h 
--.. lre- 19 t 
(28.5) 
(34.6) 
(25.0) 
(27 .5) ~ (75.0) 
(16.9) -- Fire-fight (40.1) 
(31.8)_ 
(12.1)-
(1l.5)~ 
(25. 2) <: Con tact FB 
(21. 8) ~ Fire-fight 
(68.0) 
(73.7) 
(33.3) 
(46.7) 
(26.7) 
(34.6) 
-- (62.0) 
(23.6) -+ Fire-fight (38.5) 
Inspection of the two sets of action sequences shows immediately 
that the behaviour patterns of men and women differ. If we look first 
at the relative order and percentages of the First Actions taken, we 
find that for women, ·a1erting others is the most popular action with 
investigating, closely followed by contacting the Fire Brigade. Contrast 
this with men, where fire-fighting is almost as frequent as investigating, 
and contacting the Fire Brigade is considerably less frequent. It is 
also obvious that womens' First Actions are much more evenly distributed, 
the difference in percentage between the most popular First Action and 
the least popular being only 5.3%, whereas a similar comparison for men 
shows a difference of nearly 17%. One final notable point concerning 
First Actions is the fact that evacuating others is undertaken more than 
twice as frequently by women as by men. 
If we look now at the sequences of actions we see that women are 
largely concerned with warning others and evacuation, whilst in contrast 
the action sequences of the men are dominated by the Fire-fight or Fire-
fight/contact Fire Brigade type of sequence. 
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11.1.2 SEQUENCES OF ACTION IN RELATION TO AGE OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
We have earlier divided the age of those interviewed into eight 
categories for the purpose of analysis. However, providing complete 
action sequences for each age group would be exhaustive in more than one 
sense of the word, and we have therefore in this case restricted the 
presentation to a summary of the salient points. 
(i) Age range 0 to 10 years 
The two most frequent action sequences for the 32 individuals 
interviewed were: 
(a) To evacuate 'oneself from the building immediately ~ 
(b) To first alert others and then leave the building ~ 
(ii) Age range 11 to 20 years 
(28.1) 
(25.0) 
The three most frequent action sequences for the 254 individuals 
interviewed were: 
% Second Action Third Action 
(20.1) ~ Fire-fight (21.6)->-
First Action 
(a) Investigate 
(b) Alert others 
(c) Evacuate self 
(16.5) ->- Evacuate self (21. 4)->-
(15.0) -
(iii) Age range 21 to 30 years 
The most frequent action sequences for the 582 individuals 
interviewed were: 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action 
Fire-fight (22.7)->-
(a) Investigate (17.4) < Minimise risk (14.9)< Fire-fight 
-
(b) Fire-fight (14.9) <: 
... _----- Contact FB (24.l)~ Minimise risk 
( c) Alert others (13 6) ~ Fire-fight (24.0)->-
• Evacuate self (15.2)-
(d) Contact FB (12.5) ->-Fire-fight (20.5) -+-
(e) Evacuate others (11.9) <:: Contac~ FB -+-(18.8) -+ 
(72.2) 
(100.0) 
(60.S) 
% 
(60.9) 
(33.3) 
(33.3) 
(35.6) 
(28.6) 
(23.8) 
(63.2) 
(50.0) 
(66.7) 
(50.7) 
(61.5) 
1B4 
(iv) Age range 31 to 40 years 
The most frequent action sequences for the 550 individuals 
interviewed were: 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
(a) Fire-fight (16. 4) <: -->- (44.-4) Contact FB (17.B) <:F~r~-~ight. (31. 3) MInImIse rIsk (31.3) 
Cb) Investigate (16.4) <: Fire-fight (27 .B)-+ (68.0) Contact FB (lB.9) -+ Fire-fight (29.4) 
( c) Contact FB (IS.3) < Fire-fight (20.2) -- (64.7) Evacuate self (11.9) -+ 
-
(80.0) 
(v) Age range 41 to 50 years 
The most frequent action sequences for the 384 individuals 
interviewed were\: 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
(a) Investigate (1B.5) <: 
Fire-fight (23.9)_ (70.6) 
Contact Fll (23.9) <:. F~r~-~ight. (17.6) MInImIse rIsk (11. 8) 
-
(20.0) 
(b) Fire-fight (17.0) <: (27.7) <l Increase risk (33.3) Contact FB (27.2) 
Fire-fight (16.7) 
Contact Fll (14.3) -< Investigate 
(25.0) 
( c) Alert others (14.6) < 
(25.0) 
Fire-fight (14.3) -+ (100.0) 
(d) Contact FB (l4.1) <:. Fire-fight 
(24.1) _ (61.5) 
Investigate (16.7) - Fire-fight (33.3) 
(vi) Age range 51 to 60 years 
The most frequent action sequences for the 241 individuals 
interviewed were; 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
Fire-fight (28.3) <: Con~ FB (46.2) (a) Investigate (19.1) .--'" (30.8) 
---.... Contact FS (17.4) -- (37.5) 
(b) Fire-fight (18.7) <: -.. (35.6) Contact FS (28.9) -+ (53.8) 
Alert others (23.5) _Contact FB (37.5) 
(c) Minimise risk (14.1) <Et Contact FB (17.6 ) -Fire-fight (50.0) Fire-fight (17.6) -+ (50.0) 
(d) Contact FB (13.7) ...... Fire-fight (36.4) -+ (66.7) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
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(v) Age range 61 to 70 years 
The most frequent action sequences for the 95 individuals 
interviewed were: 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
Investigate (21.1) ~ Fire-fight (25.0) -->- (40.0) 
Fire-fight (14.7) ~ 
-----
........ (42.9) 
Contact FB (12.6) -->- Alert others (25.0) -'-+ (66.7) 
(vi) Alle range over 70 rears 
The most frequent action sequences for the 55 individuals 
interviewed were: 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
Investigate (16.4) < 
Fire-fight (33.3)_ 
Incre ase risk (22.2) -
Fire-fight (12.7) -'-+ Contact FB (28.6) ........ (100.0) 
Contact FB (10.9) 
-
Evacuate self (33.3) ........ (100.0) 
Although there are clear differences in the percentages and order 
of First Actions between the age groups, which we will discuss more fully 
in a moment, perhaps the most striking aspect of the action sequences is 
their relative uniformity across all age groups. Behaviour patterns 
such as 
Investigate ........ Fire-fight 
Investigate ........ Contact FB 
Contact FB -->- Fire-fight 
all tend to occur with some fairly high frequency in each category, 
whilst single basic courses of action such as 
---- -----------
Fire-fight -+ - ........ --
Evacuate self - -_-
also occur quite frequently. 
In the yoUnger age ranges, the action sequence 
Alert others -+ Evacuate self 
is fairly common, whereas in the only other category in which alerting 
others is a frequent First Action, age range 41 to 50 years, it is 
followed by either fire-fighting or contacting the Fire Brigade. A 
further peculiarity of this age group is that only in this group does 
investigating appear as an action other than as a First Action, in one 
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case after first alerting others and contacting the Fire Brigade, and in 
another after first contacting the Fire Brigade. 
Turning now to First Actions, a number of points are of interest 
which are perhaps best illustrated in Figure 18 (a,b,c,d). It will. be 
seen in Figure 18 (a) that as a First Action, evacuating others is 
strongly concentrated in the age range 21 to 40 years, when we would 
expect young children to be present in the building. In Figure 18 (b) 
it can be seen that the proportion of individuals who choose fire-fighting 
as a First Action increases progressively up to the age of 60. 
Figure 18 (c) illustrates that contacting the Fire Brigade increases 
sharply in frequency up to the age range 31 to 40 years, which is the 
mode, and then falls gradually away in popularity as a First Action. 
Finally, we can see that immediately leaving the building is very much 
associated with the younger age groups, once above age 30 it remains at 
a fairly constant 6% to 8% (Figure l8(d). 
11.1.3 SEQUENCES OF ACTION IN RELATION TO SUBJECTIVE SERIOUSNESS RATING 
OF THE FIRE 
We will illustrate the most common action sequences for the three 
levels of seriousness. The most frequent action sequences for the 648 
individuals who judged the fire to be "not at all" serious are shown below. 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
(a) Investigate (20.8) <:: Fire-fight (25.5) -+ (68.6) Contact FB (11.7) -+ (50.0) 
-+ (41. 4) 
(b) Fire-fight (17.9) <Contact FB (22.4) <:: (34.6) Fire-fight (23.1) 
( c) Alert others (11.6) < Fire-fight (29.3) -->- (68.1) Contact FB (13.3) -->-
(d) Minimise risk (11.0) <:: Fire-fight (18.3) -->- (61.5) .. Alert others (16.9) -->- (41. 6) 
(e) Contact FB (9.6) -+ Fire-fight (29.3) -->- (75.0) 
(f) Evacuate self (8.5) -->- --+ (67.3) 
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The most frequent action sequences for the 1104 individuals who 
judged the fire to be "quite" serious are presented below. 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
(a) Investigate 
Fire-fight (25 9) <:: -- (59.2) 
(17.1)~contact FB . Contact FS (14.3) (16.4) ->- Fire-fight (25. 8) 
Minimise risk (14.3) ->- Contact FB (25.9) 
(b) Contact FS (14 .6)<::F~r~-~ight. (23.5) ->- (65.8) MInImIse nsk (8.0) ->- (62.5) 
(c) Fire-fight (14.2k:: - ->- (16.6) (27.4) <:: Fire-fight (25.6) Contact FB (25.6) 
(d) Alert others 
Fire-fight (22.0) ->- (61. 3) (12.8)~Contact FB (13.5) -+ Fire-fight (31.6) 
->- (17.0) 
Contact FS (26.1) <:. Fire-fight (30.0) 
(e) Minimise risk (1O.4)"EM· .. . k Evacuate self (20.0) InImIse rIS (13.9) ->- Contact FS (62.5) 
Fire-fight (13.0) ->- Contact FB (69.2) 
(f) Evacuate self (9.l) -+ 
->- (64.0) 
The most frequent action sequences for the 441 individuals who 
judged the fire to be "extremely" serious are presented below. 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
Evacuate se If (17.9)-.. - (66.7) 
(a) Alert others (15.2)~Retreatfromfire(14.9) ->- Request assist (30.0) 
Fire-fight (13.4)- -- (77.8) 
(b) Investigate (14.7)_Fire-fight (21.5) ->- (42.9) 
( c) Contact FS (13.8)<::A~ert ?thers (16.4)_ ( 40.0) Fue-fIght (16.4) "-+ (50.9) 
(d) Evacuate self (12.6)~Cont~B -+- (42.9) (23.3) ->- (61.5) 
(e) Fire-fight (12.5)<Contact FS ->-
(23.6) 
(16.4) ->- (55.6) 
(f) Evacuate others 9 5 Contact FB (23.8) - Minimise risk (20.0) ( • )<Evacuate self (19.0) -+ 
Study of the breakdown of actions at the three levels of seriousness 
shows considerable differences. If we look first at the percentages of 
First Actions, we see that in 6 of the 7 action categories there are 
consistent changes. We find that as the seriousness of the fire is 
judged to increase, ·the percentage of people who investigate, fire-fight 
and minimise risk consistently falls, whilst the percentage of people who 
alert others, evacuate others and evacuate themselves consistently rises. 
I 
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The only First Action which departs from the trend is contacting the 
Fire Brigade, which rises sharply once the fire is rated "quite" serious 
and then falls very slightly at "extremely" serious. 
Wi th regard to the action sequences, as before, the patterns 
Investigate'" Fire-fight and Contact FB .... Fire-fight (or vice-versa) appear 
in each group; however it is when the fire is rated "qui te" serious that 
this type of sequence is most common. It is also at the "quite" level 
that efforts to minimise the risk appear in the behaviour patterns. At 
other levels it appears only as a First Action, or, in the case of fires 
ranked "extremely" serious, does not appear at all in the sequences of 
actions. 
In summary it would seem that the general behaviour of the individual 
differs depending upon how serious they consider the fire to be. At the 
low levels of seriousness the concern is mainly with fire-fighting and 
contacting the Fire Brigade, at the medium level it is these actions plUS 
minimising the risk, and at the high level it shifts to alerting others 
and evacuating oneself and others from the building. 
11.1.4 ACTION SEQUENCES IN RELATION TO FAMILIARITY WITH THE BUILDING 
Our categorisation of familiarity is that which we have used in 
earlier analyses, "completely familiar with the building" and "less than 
completely familiar with the building". Unfortunately the latter group 
represents only 15% of the total sample, and we are therefore comparing 
two groups of very disparate size. 
The action sequences for the 330 occupants interviewed who were less 
than completely familiar with the layout of the building are shown below. 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
(a) Investigate --'" - -->- (18.6) (21. 2) --"Fire-fight (15. 7) ---+- (72 .7) 
Cb) Alert others (14 5)<Fire-fight (27.1) _ (53.8) 
• Contact FB (16.7)-->- (50.0) 
(c) Fire-fight (12.7)- -->- (26.2) 
(d) Evacuate se If (12.4) ---+-
-
(75.6) 
(e) Contact FB (10.9)_Fire-fight (19.4) -->- (71.4) 
(f) Minimise risk (6.1)~ 
-
(30.0) 
(g) Evacuate others (3.0)_ -+ (20.0) 
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The action sequences for the 1863 occupants interviewed who were 
completely familiar with the layout of the building are shown below. 
First Action % Second Acti on % Third Action 
Fire-fight (271)<C -
(17.2)(contact FB 
. ontact FB 
(a) Inves tigate (16.2K!:p' 7ht lre- 19 
Minimise risk (13. 4~?ntac~ FB 
ue-flght 
-+ 
(b) Fire-fight (15.4)( . (24.8)<fF~r~-~ight. Contact FS 
Mln1m1se nsk 
Fire-fight (22.9)-
(c) Contact FB {13.4)~Investigate {11.6}-+Fire-fight 
Evacuate self (9.6)---... 
Evacuate others (9.2~Ale~hers 
Fire-fight (20.9~ 
(d) Alert others (12.6)~EVacuate self {l4.5~ 
Contact FB (12 3~Fire-fight 
. Evacuate others 
Contact FS (2l.2~ire-fight 
(1O.9)lFire-fight (IS. 7J.<Con~ FB (e) Minimise risk 
'\ Alert others {14.3~on~FB 
Minimise risk {11.3}-+Contact FB 
(f) Evacuate self (9.l)-
-
---. 
Contact FB (23.6~. 7ht 
(7.9) /,Fire-fight 
1re- 19 
(g) Evacuate others (14.9)<f0n~ FB 
'\.M· " . k ln1mlse rlS (14.9}-+Contact FB 
Comparing our two' samples, "completely familiar" and "less than 
completely familiar" is a little difficult in terms of sequences of 
actions due to the differences in numbers. However one point 
% 
(58.6) 
(14'.9) 
(25.0) 
(19.2) 
(27.9) 
(18.6) 
(21. 7) 
(32 .4) 
(21.1) 
(16.9) 
(64.9) 
(31. 0) 
(79.2) 
(30.4) 
(26.1) 
(67.3) 
(70.6) 
(20.7) 
(17.2) 
(25.6) 
(18.6) 
(43.8) 
(34.4) 
(37.9) 
(20.9) 
(47.8) 
(56.5) 
(28.6) 
(20.7) 
(22.7) 
(22.7) 
(45.S) 
emerges is that the sequence "do something" + Contact FB. which is very 
frequent in the "comp lete ly familiar" group, on ly occurs when individuals 
alert others in the "less than completely familiar" group. In fact 
contacting the Fire Brigade is relatively rare in this group. both as a 
First Action and as a pattern of actions. in contrast to the "completely 
familiar" group. 
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It can be seen when considering first actions that there are some 
interesting differences between the two samples. For example, a relatively 
large percentage of individuals who are unfamiliar with the building 
appear to leave immediately and investigate, whilst fire-fighting is very 
common if people are familiar with the building. It is also interesting 
that although evacuating others is the least popular of the first actions 
for both groups, more than twice as many individuals do this who are 
familiar with the building as who are unfamiliar. 
11.1.5 ACTION SEQUENCES IN RELATION TO FREQUENCY OF TRAINING 
As with familiarity, our division of training frequency gives us two 
samples of rather disparate size, with those who have never received 
training making up nearly 80% of the sample. 
The action sequences for the 457 occupants interviewed who had 
received some training are presented below. 
First Action Second Action Third Action 
(a) Investigate (20.8) <:: Fire-fight -+ (34.7)_ 
(b) Alert others (17.7) <:: Fire-f~ght (38.3) ........ Invesngate (17.3) -+ Fire-fight 
---.. 
(c) Fire-fight (16.0) <: Contact FB (22.0) < Fire-fight 
Fire-fight (24.6) -.. 
(d) Con tact FB (14.2) 4 Investigate (18.5) ........ 
Alert others (16.9) ........ 
(e) Minimise risk (8 3 <Fire-fight (15.8) ........ 
.) Evacuate others (13.2) -+ 
(f) Evacuate self (8.1) -+ - -->-
(20.0) -->-
% 
(12.6) 
(63.6) 
(71. 0) 
(35.7) 
(23.3) 
(37.5) 
(25.0) 
(62.5) 
(25.0) 
(54.5) 
(50.0) 
(40.0) 
(70.3) 
(40.0) (g) Evacuate others(5.5) <Fire-fight Retreat from fire (16.0) -+ 
--t-- (100.0) 
The action sequences for the 1736 occupants interviewed who had 
never received training are presented below. 
First Action 
(a) Investigate 
% Second Action 
(17 .1) ~Fire-fight 
,~ontact FB 
Minimise risk 
% Third Action 
........ 
(22.0) -H-
(16.2) -.. 
(lO.O)<Con~FB 
% 
(7.8) 
(58.5) 
(31.3) 
(27.9) 
(25.6) 
First Action 
(b) Fire-fight . 
(c) Contact FS 
(d) Alert others 
(e) Minimise risk 
(f) Evacuate self 
(g) Evacuate others 
192 
% Second Action 
(14.7)<,* -
"'contact FB 
Fire-fight (12.7~vacuate self 
Minimise risk 
Evacuate self 
(11.6)<;contact FB 
Fire-fight 
Contact FS (10.7~Fire_fight 
1, ," ' 
(7.7)<contact FB 
Minimise risk 
% Third Action 
(16.2)<M· -. -. - r'sk 1n1JU1Se • 
(21.8) __ 
(9.5) __ 
(10.0)--
(17.3)---
(16.3)< Fire-fight 
(15~3j--
(2l.6) __ Fire-fight 
(168)- - -
. --.. Con tact FS 
--(16.1) -
(24.3)~Fire-fight 
(15.8)-- Contact Fll 
% 
(22.0) 
(33.9) 
(17.7) 
(66.7) 
( 81.0) 
(50.0) 
(68.6) 
(21. 2) 
(24.2) 
(58.1) 
(25.0) 
(41. 9) 
(35.5) 
(57.5) 
(50.0) 
(27.8) 
(25.0) 
(47.6) 
Perhaps the over-riding impression we gain from studying the above 
patterns of behaviour of our trained and untrained groups, is how much 
more focussed is the behaviour of the trained sample, in the sense that 
a greater percentage choose to undertake a smaller number of actions. 
As an example of this, the four most frequent First Actions of the trained 
group account for 69% of the First Actions, whilst the four most frequent 
of the untrained group account for only 56% of the First Actions. A 
further example is provided by study of fire-fighting, which as can be 
seen appears fairly frequently in the action sequences of both groups, 
however in each case a greater percentage of trained individuals elect to 
undertake it. 
Whilst there are some similarities between the actions of the groups 
there are also several areas of difference. For instance, whilst a 
greater percentage of trained individuals contact the Fire Brigade as a 
First Action, after that it appears very infrequently as an action in 
their behaviour patterns, whilst it is a very common component of the 
action sequences of the untrained group. Similarly, attempts to minimise 
the risk appear exclusively in the action sequences of the untrained, 
other than as a First Action. In contrast, both as a First Action and an 
element of an action sequence, alerting others is much more likely to be 
associated with the trained group. One final point of interest is that 
in our trained sample we see the sequence "Do something" and then 
Investigate occurring on two occasions, a very unusual pattern, only 
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previously noted when examining the effect of building category on 
behaviour. It is likely that these individuals, who were the occupants 
of Institution category buildings, are re-appearing in our trained group. 
11.1.6 ACTION SEQUENCES IN RELATION TO PREVIOUS INVOLVEMENT IN A FIRE 
INCIDENT 
The disparity between the sample sizes is less for previous 
involvement than for the immediately preceding two variables. In this 
case, our sample of individuals who claim to have had previous experience 
of fire account for almost 30% of the total sample. 
The action sequences for the 653 occupants interviewed who had been 
previously involved in a fire incident are presented below. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
Inves tigate (22.1) _F~r~-~ight. (31.9)-+ 
-M1n1m1se r1sk (12.5)-+ 
(41. 3) 
(33.3) 
--.. (33.6) 
Fire-fight (19.1) < Contact FB --" - (34.4) (25.6)~Fire-fight (28.1) 
Minimise risk(2S.0) 
Alert others (13.5) <Fire-fight (39.8)_ (74.3) Investigate (12.5)->-Fire-fight (36.4) 
Contact FB (12. 1) <Fire-fight (30.4)-+ (62.5) Investigate (16.4)->-Fire-fight (38.5) 
Fire-fight (22.2)_ (62.5~ 
Minimise risk (11. 8) <: Evacuate self (18.1)_ (38.5) 
Contact FB ,(16.7)-+Fire-fight (33.3) 
Evacuate self (6.1) 
- -
(60.0) 
The action sequences for the 1540 interviewed who had not been 
previously involved in a fire incident are presented below. 
First Action 
(a) Investigate 
(b) Contact FB 
% Second Action 
Fire-fight 
(16'O)~C'"'"" FB 
Minimise risk 
(13. 4) <:Fire-fight 
Evacuate self 
% Third Action % 
- (55.8) (21.l)<Contact FB (17.3) 
(22.5) 
(l6.2)~ Fire-fight (17.5) 
Minimise risk(15.0) 
(13 4)<contact FB (24.2) 
. Fire-fight (24.2) 
(19.4)-0- (67.5) 
(13.1)-+ (74.1) 
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First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
( c) Fire-fight (13.2)< - ~ (17.7) (30.1) 
Contact FB (22.7)~Fire-fight (15.2) 
Minimise risk (15.2) 
Evacuate self (17.4)~ (67.6), 
(d) Alert others (12.7)~Contact FB (16.9)~Fire-fight (21.2) 
Fire-fight (13.8)-- (51. 9) 
(e) Evacuate self (ll.l)~Contact FB -+ (59.1) (13.4) -+ (52.2) 
Contact FB (22.6)~Fire-=ight (24.2) (9.5)~Fire-fight (15.2) (f) Minimise risk (14.4)-+Contact FB (57.1) 
'\ Minimise risk (73.0)-+Contact FB (52.6) 
Alert others (ll.O)-Contact FB (43.8) 
Contact FB (24.0)<:tFire_fight (29.0) (22.6) 
(g) Evacuate others (8.4)~'i.i" ri" (17.l)-+Contact FB (40.9) 
Fire-fight (13.8)~Con~FB (23.5) (17.6) 
, vacuate se If (9.3) -- (50.0) 
As with the trained sample discussed in the previous section, the 
actions of those with previous experience of fire appear to be more 
concentrated. 
fight as First 
Fire-fighting 
both in terms 
In this case more than 40% choose to Investigate or Fire-
Actions (29% for those with no previous experience). 
seems generally more prevalent for the experienced 
of First Action and as part of an action sequence. 
samp le, 
Whilst 
fire-fighting is also a frequent component of action sequences of the 
inexperienced, in each case a smaller percentage of individuals under-
take it. 
It is of interest that evacuating others does not appear in the list 
of First Actions of those with previous experience of fire, occurring as 
it does in less than 5% of the cases (4.4% to be exact). Evacuating 
oneself is also less frequent for this sample, the percentage of 
individuals choosing it as a First Action being almost half that of the 
inexperienced sample,for whom it also forms a component of an action 
sequence in several cases. 
Whilst fire-fighting is more common for the experienced, contacting 
the Fire Brigade seems to be an over-riding concern of the inexperienced, 
comprising as it does the second most frequent First Action , with a 
larger percentage choosing it, and appearing very frequently in the action 
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sequences. One point of similarity between the samples is that when 
fire-fighting is undertaken as the First Action, the subsequent action 
sequences are the same for both groups although the percentages differ. 
We should further note that our previously experienced sample 
contains, as did the trained sample discussed earlier, action sequences' 
in which investigating is undertaken subsequent to contacting the Fire 
Brigade and alerting others. 
11.1.7 ACTION SEQUENCES IN RELATION TO THE PRESENCE OF OTHER PEOPLE 
It will be recalled that we have separated our sample into three 
categories, one in which the person was alone in the building, a second 
in which family members were present, and a third category in which 
family members were not present. Whilst the latter two samples are 
large, the number of incidents in which only one person was in the 
building is relatively small, the number of interviewees comprising 11.1% 
of the total sample. 
The action sequences for the 247 occupants interviewed who were 
alone in the building are presented below. 
First Action % Second Action Third Action 
Evacuate se If (15.7) __ (87.5) 
(a) Contact FB (20.6) .s::Investigate (13.7)-->- (28.6) 
,,=Increase risk (I3.7)-->-Fire-fight (42.9) 
Fire-fight (11. 8)-+- (66.7) 
Contact FB (48.9)-+- (40.9) 
(b) Fire-fight (18.2) ~ Fire-fight (20.0)~Contact FB (55.6) 
Minimise risk (ll.I)~Contact FB (80.0) 
( c) Minimise risk (15.8) ~Minimise risk (25.6)~Contact FB (90.0) Contact F8 (20.5)-+-Evacuate self (31.0) 
(d) Investigate (9.5) <Fire-fight (26.9)-+-Contact FB (57.1) Minimise risk (23.1)-->-Contact FB (33.3) 
-+ 
-
(23.8) 
(e) Evacuate self (8.5) oEfContact FB (33.3)-+- - (57.1) 
Request assist(I9.0)-+Contact FB (50.0) 
(f) Request assis;t (5.8) ........ -+- (75.0) 
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The action sequences for the 906 occupants interviewed who had 
members of their family present are presented below. 
First Action 
(a) Investigate 
% Second Action 
/' Contact FS 
(17.2) -- Fire-figlit 
~ 
Minimise risk 
(b) Evacuate others(14.1) /' --Contact FB 
'" Minimise risk 
% Third Action 
(19.0) _ 
(15.2) <:: Con~ FS 
(13.9) <: C?ntac~ FS 
Fue-fl.ght 
(25.8) <F' -f-'-ht l.re- l.g 
(17.2) --Contact FS 
% 
(33.3) 
(41. 7) 
(25.0) 
(27.2) 
(22.7) 
(9.4) 
(30.3) 
(26.7) 
(45.5) 
(70.4) (c) Contact FB (12 4) <: Fire-fight (24.1) -
• Evacuate others(14.3) -Evacuate self(31. 3) 
(d) Alert others 
(e) Minimise risk 
(f) Fire-fight 
Contact FB (18.9) _ 
(12.3) ::::: Evacuate others (16.2) -+ 
Evacuate self (16.2)-
/Contact FB (28.9) - Fire-fight 
(10.7) ,=Alert others (13.4) -Contact FB 
Evacuate others(11.3) ->- Contact FS 
(10.1) <: Cont-;;;-FB ->-(29.3) --
(28.6) 
(22.2) 
(61.1) 
(25.0) 
(46.2) 
(36.4) 
(14.1) 
(37.0) 
(g) Evacuate self (9 7) - -
. --'Contact FB -(19.5)-
(56.1) 
(50.0) 
The action sequences for the 1040 occupants interviewed who did not 
have members of their familY present are presented below. 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
/' Fire-fight (32.4) __ (68.7) 
(a) Investigate (19.9) ~Contact FB (11. 1) ->- Fire-fight (30.4) ~Minimise risk (11.1) _ Fire-fight (21. 7) 
(b) Fire-fight (18.4) 
<cont:;;B -
(28.8) 
(15 2) <: Fire-fight 
. Minimise risk (27.6) 
Fire-fight (31.5) -+ (70.6) 
(c) Alert others (15.6) ~Evacuate self (13.0)-- (81.0) 
'..::;, Investigate (11. 7) - Fire-fight (36,8) 
-+ (10,0) 
Fire-fight (25.4) __ (61. 3) 
(d) Contact FS (11. 7) <: Alert others (13.1) -- (25.0) 
Evacuate self (10.0) 
--
(83.3) 
(e) Evacuate self (10.4) 
--
->- (68.5) 
(8.4)~Fire-fight -- (11. 5) (f) Minimise risk (23.0) .:::::: con~ FB (40.0) (35.0) 
Alert others (13.8) -- (33.3) 
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We can see large differences between these three samples, especially 
in terms of the First'.Actions. For the group alone in the building, we 
have the very unusual occurrence of investigating the fire being 
considerably less attractive than other actions, whilst contacting the 
Fire Brigade is a very frequent First Action. In contrast, where famil~ 
members are present, fire-fighting is relatively infrequent as a First 
Action, whereas evacuating others assumes high importance. Exactly the 
reverse ·situation occurs when family members are not present, fire-fighting 
taking precedence whilst evacuating others is very infrequent (only 2.8% 
of the First Actions). 
The case of people alone in the building is characterised by two 
further unusual actions, firstly we see that increasing the risk forms 
part of an action sequence, and secondly requesting assistance from others 
enters the behaviour patterns. 
Having considered the effect which the selected Personal variables 
have upon the sequence of actions, we will now turn our attention to 
examining their influence upon three specific aspects of behaviour, 
namely evacuation of the building, returning into the building and move-
ment through smoke. 
11.2 EFFECT OF PERSONAL VARIABLES ON EVACUATION 
More than 54% of the individuals interviewed in the Present Study 
left the building during the course of the fire. We have already seen 
that this type of behaviour was more prevalent in Dwellings than in other 
occupancies, and we now turn our attention to how these people differed 
--------___ fromthe 46% who did not leave. 
11.2.1 EFFECT·OF SEX AND AGE ON EVACUATION 
The cross-tabulation of the sex of the person interviewed and whether 
or not they left the building is shown in Table 65 overleaf. It can be 
seen from the proportions in the table that women appear more likely to 
leave the building than men, and this is confirmed by the X2 test value 
(l" 31. 8 (1 df),. significant beyond the 0.001 level). We may thus 
confidently state that in the Present Study, women were more likely to 
leave the building during the course of the fire. 
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TABLE 65. Sex of interviewee by evacuation behaviour 
Sex of interviewee Leave the 
bui 1ding Total Female Male 
Not leave 371 (36.9) 634 (63.1) 1005 (45.8) 
(38.9) (51.1) 
Leave 582 (49.0) 606 (51.0) 1188 (54.2) 
(61.1) (48.9) 
Total 953 (43.5) 1240 (56.5) 2193 (100.0) 
As in earlier analyses of age, this has been broken down into eight 
categories. The percentage of people who left in each age group is 
shown in Figure 19. As might be expected, the under-ID year old age 
group has the modal value. The other striking feature is the apparent 
consistent decrease in the percentage of people leaving within each age 
rrulge, right up to age 60. Thereafter the percentage again rises. These 
differences are statistically significant (X2 = 27.0 (7 df), significant 
beyond the 0.001 level). 
11.2.2 EFFECT OF SUBJECTIVE SERIOUSNESS RATING ON EVACUATION 
It would seem intuitively reasonable that the more serious an 
individual considers a fire to be, the more likely that they will be to 
leave the building. This relationship is examined in Table 66 below. 
TABLE 66. Seriousness rating by evacuation behaviour 
Leave the Subjective seri ousness rating 
building Total Not at all Quite Extremely 
serious serious serious 
Not leave 407 (40.5) 475 (47.3) 123 (12.2) 1005 (45. 8) 
(62.8) (43.0) (27.9) 
Leave 241 (20.3) 629 (52.9) 318 (26.8) 1188 (54.2) 
(37.2) (57.0) (72.1) 
Total 648 (29.5) 1104 (50.3) 441 (20.1) 2193 (lOO. 0) 
Plainly, as the seriousness of the fire is subjectively judged to 
increase, the proportion of people who leave the building also increases. 
This clear relationship is confirmed by the X2 test (X2 = 135,9 (2 df), 
significant beyond 0.001). 
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FIGURE 19. Percentage of respondants who left the building by age 
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11.2.3 EFFECT OF FAMILIARITY WITH THE BUILDING ON EVACUATION 
It might be argued that individuals who are completely familiar with 
the building would be more likely to leave, simply because they will be 
aware of all the possible ways out. Alternatively it could be envisaged 
that unfamiliarity would act as a threat-increasing factor, which would' 
lead to more frequent evacuation by this group. The cross-tabulation of 
familiarity· with the building layout and evacuation is shown in Table 
67 below. 
TABLE 67. Familiarity with the building by evacuation behaviour 
Leave the Familiarity with the building 
building Total Completely Less than 
·familiar completely 
Not Leave 835 (83.1) 170 (16.9) 1005 (45.8) 
(44.8) (51. 5) 
Leave 1028 (86.5) 160 (13 .5) 1188 (54.2) 
(55.2) (48.5) 
Total 1863 (85.0) 330 (15.0) 2193 (100.0) 
The X2 value based upon the frequencies in Table 67 is 4.7 d df), 
\;hich fails to reach the 0.01 level of probability. Thus both our 
hypotheses must be rejected, and we conclude that familiarity with the 
building has no effect upon whether or not people leave it. 
11.2.4 EFFECT OF FREQUENCY OF TRAINING ON EVACUATION 
Again we could postulate equally attractive alternative hypotheses. 
Firstly we might expect individuals who had received some training to be 
___ aware_of the .dangers, and thus to leave the building. On the other hand, 
those who are trained may be concerned with taking other actions, such 
as warning others and fire-fighting. The cross-tabulation of training 
frequency and whether or not an individual left the building is shown in 
Table 68 overleaf. Inspection of this table shows that a smaller 
proportion of people with training leave the building, an impression 
confirmed by the X2 test (X2 = 14.4 (I df), significant beyond 0.001). 
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TABLE 68. Frequency of training by evacuation behaviour 
Leave the Training frequency 
building Total Never Some training 
Not leave 759 (75.5) 246 (24.5) 1005 (45.8) 
(43.7) (53.8) 
Leave 977 (82.2) 211 (17.8) 1188 (54.2) 
(56.3) (46.2) 
Total 1736 (79.2) 457 (20.8) 2193 (100.0) 
11.2.5 EFFECT OF PREVIOUS INVOLVEMENT IN A FIRE INCIDENT ON EVACUATION 
Previous experience of fire might be considered to be a form of 
"onc-trial" learning, in which case the same hypotheses as applied to 
the level of training would be relevant. We may see which is more likely 
from Table 69 below. 
TABLE 69. Previous involvement in fire by evacuation behaviour 
Leave the Previous involvement 
building Total No Yes 
Not Leave 621 (61. 8) 384 (38.2) 1005 (45.8) 
(40.3) (58.8) 
Leave 919 (77.4) 269 (22.6) 1188 (54.2) 
(59.7) (41. 2) 
. 
Total 1540 (70.2) 653 (29.8) 2193 (100.0) 
As with the level of training, it appears from Table 69 that 
previous experience of fire reduces the likelihood of the individual 
leaving the building, as association confirmed ·by the X2 value of 62.3 
(1 df), which is significant beyond the 0.001 level. 
, ~ " 
11. 2.6 EFFECT OF THE PRESENCE OF OTHER PEOPLE IN THE BUILDING ON EVACUATION 
As in earlier analyses we have categorised the presence of others 
under three headings, incidents where there was no-one else present in the 
building, incidents where family members were present, and incidents 
where there were no family members present. The cross-tabulation of these 
three against whether or not the individual left the building is shown in 
Table 70 overleaf. 
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TABLE 70. Presence of other 'people by evacuation behaviour 
Leave the Others present Total building None Family Not family 
tJot Leave 96 (9.6 ) 335 (33.3) 574 (57.1) 1005 (45 .. 8) 
(38.9 (37.0) (55.2) 
Leave 151 (12. 7) 571 (48.1) 466 (39.2) 1188 (54.2) 
(61. 1) (63.0) (44.8) 
Total 247 (11.3) 906 (41. 3) 1040 (47.4) 2193 (100.0) 
It can be seen that individuals who are alone in the building tend 
to leave just about as frequently as those in which family members are 
present, whereas when no family members are present, they leave less 
X2 calculation confirm this frequently. The 
(l = 70.1 (2 df), 
expected values in 
significant beyond 
the 
the 0.001 level). 
11.3 EFFECT OF PERSONAL VARIABLES ON RE-ENTRY BEHAVIOUR 
Some 44% of those who left the building stated that they returned 
into it during the course of the fire. This behaviour is not related to 
the category of the building, although it is less common in buildings 
with large numbers of people. We will now examine the effect of our 
selected Personal variables upon its occurrence. 
11.3.1 EFFECT OF SEX AND AGE ON RETURNING INTO THE BUILDING 
The cross-tabulation of the sex of the person interviewed,against 
whether or not they returned into the building is shown in Table 71 
which appears below. 
TABLE 71. Sex of inte~viewee by r~-entry behaviour 
Return into Sex of interviewee 
the building Total Female Male 
Not return 381 (57.3) 284 (42 .7) 665 (56.0) 
(65.5) (46.9) 
Return 201 (38.4) 322 (61.6) 523 (44.0) 
(34.5) (53.1) 
Total 582 (49.0) 606 (51.0) 1188 (100.0) 
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On the evidence of Table 71, men appear to be more likely to 
return into the building than women, this observation being confirmed by 
the X2 test (X2 = 41.6 (ldf), significant beyond the 0.001 level). 
The percentage of people who returned into the building in each age 
group is illustrated in Figure 20. It will be noted that in the age 
range 21 to SO years, there is a uniformly high percentage of people 
returning into the building. Leaving aside the youngest age group, there 
is however remarkably 1i ttledifference between the groups. Overall 
there is no significant difference between the age groups in terms of 
re-entry behaviour (X2 = 14.9 (7 df), non-significant). 
11.3.2 EFFECT OF SUBJECTIVE SERIOUSNESS RATING ON RE-ENTRY BEHAVIOUR 
It would seem reasonable that the level of seriousness would be 
inversely related to re-entry behaviour. The cross-tabulation of how 
serious a person judged the fire to be and whether they returned into the 
bui lding is shown in Tab le 72 be low. 
TABLE 72. Seriousness rating by re-entry behaviour 
Return into Subjective seriousness rating 
the building Total Not at all Quite Extremely 
serious serious serious 
Not return 121 (18.2) 356 (53.5) 188 (28.3) 665 (56.0) 
(50.2) (56.6) (59.1) 
Return 120 (22.9) 273 (52.2) 130 (24.9) 523 (44.0) 
(49.8) (43.4) (40.9) 
Total 241 (20.3) 629 (52.9) 318 (26.8) 1188 (100.0) 
It can be seen that indeed, as was predicted, the percentage of 
people who return into the building falls consistently as the seriousness 
of the fire is judged to increase. However the differences between the 
categories are relatively small, and in fact overall the X2 value fbr 
Table 72 is non-significant (X2 = 4.6 (2 df». We must therefore conclude 
that the two variables are not associated. People return into the 
building irrespective of how serious they judge the fire, to be. 
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11.3.3 EFFECT OF FAMILIARITY WITH THE BUILDING ON RE-ENTRY BEHAVIOUR 
We have seen that familiarity with the building does not affect 
whether or not an individual leaves the building. We would certainly 
predict that re-entry behaviour would be closely associated with complete 
familiarity with the building layout. The two variables are cross-
tabulated in Table 73 below. 
TABLE 73. Familiarity with the building by re-entry behaviour 
Return into Familiarity with the building 
the bui Iding Total Completely Less than 
familiar completely 
Not return 564 (84.8) 101 (15.2) 665 (56.0) 
(54.9) (63.1) 
Return 464 . (88.7) 59 (1l. 3) 523 (44.0) 
(45.1) (36.9) 
Total 1028 (86.5) 160 (13.5) 1188- (100.0) 
Inspection of Table 73 shows that a smaller percentage of 
individuals who are less than completely familiar with the building, 
re-enter it, however analysis reveals that this difference is not 
statistically significant (X2 = 3.8 (1 df), non-significant). Thus people 
return into the building irrespective of how familiar they are with its 
layout. 
11.3.4 EFFECT OF FREQUENCY OF TRAINING ON RE-ENTRY BEHAVIOUR 
People who have received some training are less likely to leave the 
building as we have demonstrated. Since re-entering a building during a 
fire incident is generally not recommended, we would expect that people 
who had received some training would be less likely to undertake this 
behaviour. This relationship is illustrated in Table 74 overleaf. It 
can be seen from this table that the percentages for the two levels of 
training match exactly, implying absolutely no association, an impression 
borne out by a zero value of X2 • We may thus state that the frequency of 
training for an individual does not affect whether or not they return 
into the building. 
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TABLE 74. Frequency of training by re-entry behaviour 
Return into Frequency of training 
the building Total Never Some 
Not return 547 (82.2) 118 (17.8) 665 (56.0) 
(56.0) (55.9) 
Return 430 (82.2) 93 (17.8) 523 (44.0) 
(44.0) (44.1) 
Total 977 (82.2) 211 (17.8) 1188 (100.0) 
11.3.S EFFECT OF PREVIOUS INVOLVEMENT IN A FIRE INCIDENT ON RE-ENTRY 
BEHAVIOUR 
In considering evacuation behaviour we likened previous experience 
of fire to a form of training, and in this respect it was shown to have 
the same effect in reducing the number of people who leave. Were. this 
similarity to be continued to re-entry behaviour we would expect, as in 
Section 11.3.4, re-entry behaviour to be independent of previous 
experience. The cross-tabulation of the two variables is shown in Table 
75 below. 
TABLE 75. Previous involvement in fire by re-entry behaviour 
Return into Previous involvement 
the building Total No Yes 
Not return 529 (79.5) 136 (20.5) 665 (56.0) 
(57.6) (50.6) 
Return 390 (74.6) 133 (25.4) 523 (44.0) 
(42.4) (49.4) 
Total 919 (77.4) 269 (22.6) 1188 (IOO.O) 
It can be seen that a rather greater percentage of people with 
previous experience· of fire return into the building, however the 
difference is not sufficiently large to make the relationship statistically 
significant cx' = 4.1 Cl df), non-significant). Previous experience of fire 
does not therefore appear to affect re-entry behaviour. 
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11.3.6 EFFECT OF THE PRESENCE OF OTHER PEOPLE ON RE-ENTRY BEHAVIOUR 
Earlier analysis indicated that both people alone in the building 
and people with other family members present, are more likely to leave 
the building. For both these groups we would intuitively expect a lower 
level of returning into the building. The cross-tabulation is presented 
in Table 76 below. 
TABLE 76. Presence of other people by re-entry behaviour 
Other present Return into 
the buirrding Total None Family Not family 
Not return 80 (12.0) 317 (47.7) 268 (40.3) 665 (56.0) 
(53.0) (55.5) (57.5) 
Return 71 (13.6) 254 (48.6) 198 (37.9) 523 (44.0) 
(47.0) (44.5) (42.5) 
Total 151 (12.7) 571 (48. 1) 466 (39.2) 1188 (100.0) 
Contrary to our prediction, it is in fact the people alone and with 
other family members who show a greater percentage of re-entry behaviour, 
however the differences are small, and the association is not significant 
(X2 " 1.0 (2 df), non-significant). Returning into the building is 
therefore not associated with the presence or absence of other people. 
11.4 EFFECT OF PERSONAL VARIABLES ON MOVEMENT THROUGH SMOKE 
Of the incidents in which smoke was present, almost 60% of the 
occupants interviewed stated that they attempted to move through it. We 
have seen that this type of behaviour appears to be less frequent in 
Indus,trial category buildings, although it is independent of the other 
building characteristics considered. 
11.4.1 EFFECT OF SEX AND AGE ON MOVEMENT THROUGH SMOKE 
The cross-tabulation of the sex of the person interviewed against 
whether or not they moved through smoke is shown in Table 77 overleaf. 
Inspection of this table suggests that men move more frequently through 
smoke than do women, this being confirmed by the X2 value of 21.5 (1 df), 
which is significant beyond the 0.001 level. 
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TABLE 77. Sex of interviewee by movement through smoke 
Move Sex of interviewee 
through Total 
smoke Female Male 
Not move 388 (50.5) 381 (49.5) 769 (40.4) 
(46.3) (35.8) 
Move 450 (39.7) 684 (60.3) 1134 (59.6) 
(53.7) (64.2) 
: 
Total 838 (44.0) 1065 (56.0) 1903 (lOO. 0) 
The percentage of people who moved through smoke in each age group 
is shown in Figure 21. Inspection of the figure shows that the 
percentages are remarkably similar overall, with only the under-lO and 
over-70 year old age groups departing at all substantially from other 
groups. Testing the frequencies on which these percentages are based 
gives a non-significant X2 value of 5.54 (7 df), It therefore appears 
that whether or not a person moved through smoke was unaffected by the 
age of the person. 
11.4.2 EFFECT OF SUBJECTIVE SERIOUSNESS RATING ON MOVEMENT THROUGH SMOKE 
11e would expect that the more serious a person perceived a fire to 
be, the less likely that they would attempt to move through smoke. The 
cross-tabulation of these two variables is shown in Table 78 below. 
TABLE 78. Seriousness rating by movement through smoke 
Move Subjective seriousness rating 
through Total 
smoke Not at all Quite Extremely 
serious serious serious 
Not move 231 (30.0) 399 (51.9) 139 (18.1) 769 (40.4) 
(43.1) ( 41.0) (35.2) 
Move 305 (26.9) 573 (50.5) 256 (22.6) 1134 (59.6) 
(56.9) (59.0) (64.8) 
Total 536 (28.2) 972 (51.1) 395 (20.8) 1903 (100.0) 
Inspection of Table 78 indicates in fact that the opposite effect 
to that predicted, in that the proportion of people moving through smoke 
appears to increase with increased subjective seriousness. However this 
association is not statistically significant (X2 = 6.2 (2 df». Therefore 
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Numbers above each column are the total number of people in each 
age range who were present in incidents at which there was smoke. 
Numbers within each column are the number of people who moved 
through smoke. 
FIGURE 21. Percentage of people who moved through smoke by age 
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movement through smoke is independent of the subjective seriousness rating 
of the fire. 
11.4.3 EFFECT OF FAMILIARITY WITH THE BUILDING ON MOVEMENT THROUGH SMOKE 
There are two potential hypotheses which could be generated 
concerning familiarity with the building. 
that unfamiliarity with the building will 
Firstly, it could be suggested 
be associated with increased 
threat, and therefore increased likelihood of movement through smoke. 
Alternatively, it might be argued that unfamiliarity with the building 
will be a potent reason for not moving through smoke. The cross-
tabulation of the variables is presented in Table 79 below. 
TABLE 79. Familiarity with the building by movement through smoke 
Move Familiarity with the building 
through Total 
smoke Completely Less than 
familiar completely 
Not move 632 (82. 2) 137 (17.8) 769 (40.4) 
(39.0) (46.6) 
Move 989 (87.2) 145 (12.8) 1134 (59.6) 
(61.0) (51.4) 
Total 1621 (85.2) 282 (14.8) 1903 (100.0) 
It can thus be seen from Table 79 that the proportions indicate 
that the latter hypothesis may be more likely, the association being 
substantiated by the X2 value of 9.2 (1 df), which is significant beyond 
the 0.01 level. People who are completely familiar with the building are 
more likely to move through smoke. 
11. 4.4 EFFECT OF FREQUENCY OF TRAINING ON MOVEMENT THROUGH SMOKE 
It will be recalled from Chapter 10 that movement through smoke was 
shown to be less likely in Industrial category buildings. It was 
tentatively suggested that this association might reflect the generally 
higher levels of training frequency in this category of building, which 
would perhaps discourage this action. We many now directly test this 
hypothesis by cross-tabulating training frequency against movement through 
smoke in Table 80 overleaf. 
I 
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TABLE 80. Frequency of training by movement through smoke 
Move Training frequency 
through Total 
smoke Never Some 
Not move 619 (80.5) 150 (19.5) 769 (40.4) 
(40.2) (41. 1) 
Move 919 (81. 0) 215 (19.6) 1134 (59.6) 
(59.8) (58.9) 
Total 1538 (80.8) 365 (19.2) 1903 (100.0) 
The percentages in Table 80 show a remarkab le homogeni ty, indicating 
that the variables are not associated. Testing reveals the expected low 
Xl value of 0.1 (1 df), which is non-significant. It is clear that 
movement through smoke is independent of training frequency. and furthermore 
differences in training frequency are therefore unlikely to be the reason 
for the low proportion of people moving through smoke in Industrial 
buildings. 
11.4.5 EFFECT OF PREVIOUS INVOLVEMENT IN A FIRE INCIDENT ON MOVEMENT 
THROUGH SMOKE 
In all our earlier analyses, previous involvement in a fire 
incident was shown to act exactly in the same manner as training 
frequency. On this basis we would expect that movement through smoke 
would be independent of previous involvement in a fire incident. The 
cross-tabulation is presented in Table 81 below. 
TABLE 81. 
Move 
- through 
smoke 
Not move 
Move 
Total 
Prev,tous involvement in a fire incident by move-
ment through smoke 
Previous involvement 
Total 
No Yes 
559 (72 .7) 210 (27.3) 769 (40.4) 
(41. 1) (38.6) 
800 (70.5) 334 (29.5) 1134 (59.6) 
(58.9) (61. 4) 
1359 (71.4) 544 (28.6) 1903 (100.0) 
Again the percentages are very similar. suggesting that as predicted, 
previous involvement and movement through smoke are not associated, this 
lack of associati'on being confirmed by the X2 value of 1.0 (1 df) which is 
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non-significant. 
to affect whether 
Previous experience of fire does not therefore appear 
or not an individual moves through smoke. 
11.4.6 EFFECT OF THE PRESENCE OF OTHER PEOPLE IN THE BUILDING ON 
MOVEMENT THROUGH SMOKE 
In respect of leaving and returning into the building, people alone 
appear to behave in a similar fashion to people who have family members 
present, and differences which emerge being between these two groups and 
the group where family members are not present. We will examine to see 
if this trend continues regarding movement through smoke by means of 
Table 82 below. 
TABLE 82. Presence of other people by movement through smoke 
Move Others present 
through Total 
smoke None Family Not family 
Not move 81 (10.6) 311 (40.4) 377 (49.0) 769 (40.4) 
(36.3) (37.7) (44.1) 
Move 142 (12.5) 515 (4S.4) 477 (42.1 ) 1134 (59.6) 
(63.7) (62.3) (55.9) 
Total 223 (11.7) 826 (43.4) 854 (44.9) 1903 (100.0) 
As before, the percentage of people moving through smoke in the 
"None" and "Family" groups are very similar, whereas the "Not family" 
group has a somewhat lower percentage. Pe forming the X2 test using the 
frequencies in Table 82 gives a value of 9.1 (2 df), which just fails to 
achieve the 0.01 level of significance. However since prior to 
commencing the analysis we had suggested that the "Not family" group 
might in fact behave differently to the others, we may validly partition 
the table to examine this relationship. Calculating X2 on this basis 
gives a value of 8.9 (1 dfl, which is significant beyond the 0.01 level. 
We may thus state that movement through smoke tends to be less likely 
whon family members are not present, and more likely when individuals are 
alone or with other family members. 
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11.5 DISCUSSION 
If we examine the action sequences across the range of Personal 
variables, we cannot fail to be struck by the seeming regularity with 
which certain patterns of behaviour recur. In almost every instance we 
have a limited series of initial actions which may be undertaken by a 
greater or lesser proportion of individuals, and which in turn are the 
precursors of a similarly limited range of behaviour patterns. It is 
only when we examine these sequences and the associated percentages in 
detail that we can see how they differ. One aspect which is not brought 
out explicitly in the analysis is the occasional absence of obvious 
behaviour patterns. Thus for example, where in the action sequences 
presented, a particular First Action is followed by other actions which 
are only pursued by relatively small percentages of people, then the 
actions of the remainder are, by implication, spread over such a wide 
range and at such low frequencies that no clear pattern emerges. As was 
indicated at the beginning of Chapter 9, the breakdowns only illustrate 
the most frequent action sequences. It would clearly be impractical to 
delineate the sequences exhaustively; however an indication" of the 
variability of behaviour in any specific case is provided by the residual 
percentage for each successive combination of actions. Inspection suggests 
that this diversity of behaviour may be associated with particular First 
Actions, notably contacting the Fire Brigade and alerting others. 
The differences which emerge from close study of the action sequences 
tend to suggest that some factors act consistently to increase the 
likelihood of particular courses of action. Thus fire-fighting is more 
common for men as opposed to women, trained as opposed to untrained, 
those with previous experience of fire as opposed to those without such 
experience, and the absence of family members. Similarly, concern with 
contacting the Fire Brigade appears to be more strongly associated with 
complete familiarity with the building, lack of training, inexperience of 
fire and the absence of other people in the building. One of the most 
revealing analyses concerns the effect of how serious the individual 
considers the fire to be, which clearly acts as a potent factor in 
determining what initial actions are undertaken. Perception of increased" 
seriousness tends to increase the proportion of people who .immediately 
evacuate themselves, evacuate others and alert others, and decrease the 
proportion l'Iho minimise the risk, fire-fight and investigate the fire. 
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Due to the often-ambiguous nature of the cues associated with fires, 
we would of course expect many people to investigate as a First Action. 
This is particularly the case for those who have received training, those 
wi th previous experience and in fires which are perceived as being "not 
at all serious". We are perhaps more interested when investigating the 
fire is not the most frequent First Action, or when it occurs subsequent 
to another action. The former event occurs when fires are judged to be 
"extremely" serious, and even more strikingly, when there are no other 
people present in the building. The latter behaviour pattern occurs in 
two basic forms. The action sequence 
Contact FS --7 Investigate 
is notable in building occupants aged 41 to SO years, in those who are 
complete 1y familiar with the building, those who have received some 
training, those with previous experience of fire and incidents in which 
the person is alone in the building. On the other hand, the sequence 
Alert others--+- Investigate --+- Fire-fight 
is restricted to trained people and those with previous experience, 
although a variation 
Alert others --+- Contact FB ---+ Investigate 
can be noted in the sample of those aged 41 to 50 years. Plainly, 
behaviour patterns which incorporate such sequences must minimise the 
risk of casualties ensuing from the fire, although this comment would be 
even more valid, were the sequence 
Evacuate others --7 Investigate 
to be a common one. 
Whi 1st similar sequences tend to reappear throughout the analyses, a 
number of unusual ones also occur in specific instances. Incidents in 
which no other people are present in the building appear to be rather 
special in this respect. We have already noted how investigating the 
fire occupies an unusual position in the hierarchy of actions for this 
group, and it is in addition remarkable in containing two other actions, 
requesting assistance and increasing the risk, which are uncommon. Other 
than in this sample, actions which increase the risk only appear in our 
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illustrated sequences for two other groups, those aged 41 to 50 years, 
and where family members are present, whilst requesting assistance is 
otherwise only associated wi th fires judged to be "extremely serious". 
Finally, we will consider how the Personal variables affect our 
three specific measures of behaviour. In terms of evacuation behaviour' 
a number of clear associations emerge, factors which tend to increase the 
proportion leaving being absence of training, lack of previous experience 
and the absence of family members, as do increasing age up to 60 years 
and perception of increasing fire seriousness. In addition, women are 
more likely to leave the building than men. 
Although a relatively large proportion of those who leave, return 
into the building during the course of the fire, this type of behaviour 
does not seem to be associated generally with differences in our Personal 
variables. Only in the case of sex, with men being more likely to re-enter 
than women, can we see an association. 
Men were also more likely to move through smoke than women, as were 
people completely familiar with the building, and surprisingly, people 
alone in the building or where other family members were present. The 
first two associations seem intuitively plausible, and one can conceive 
the necessity for moving through smoke, to perhaps alert others, when, 
family members are present; however undertaking this action when alone 
in the building appears to be most unwise. 
• 
• 
CHAPTER 12 
FIRE VARIABLES & BEHAVIOUR 
-- -- -- -- -- --------~----------------------------------------------------
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12.0 FIRE VARIABLES AND BEHAVIOUR 
It has been demonstrated earlier that there is no single measure 
which provides us with an adequate picture of the severity of the fire. 
When considering the effects of fire, we have in consequence utilised a 
number of measures, and we will continue with this practice in this 
chapter. The variables which will be examined are, the level of the 
Fire Severity Index (which it will be recalled, is a derived measure 
including all our Fire variables), the use or non-use of Jets, the 
extent of Smoke Spread, the density of the smoke and the time of the 
incident. For the analysis of behaviour-patterns only, we have altered 
the classification of one of our variables, namely Smoke Density. This 
was originally categorised on a 7-point scale. However, when considering 
the breakdown of action sequences into such a relatively large number of 
categories, the frequencies in several categories are quite low. We have 
therefore dichotomised Smoke Density into "Low" and "High" levels at 
point 4 on the scale. Low density therefore includes scale-values 1 to 3, 
High density scale-values 4 to 7. 
12.1 EFFECT OF FIRE VARIABLES ON PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOUR 
As in earlier analyses, we have broken down the behaviour which 
individuals undertook into a series of action sequences. In each case, 
we illustrate the order and percentage of First Actions taken, the 
percentages for the Second and Third Actions representing the proportion 
of people who undertook this action, conditional upon the preceding 
action. As before, unless to illustrate a particular point, only the 
most frequent actions (i.e. those pursued by at least 5% of individuals) 
will be shown. 
12.1.1 SEQUENCES OF ACTION IN RELATION TO LEVEL OF FIRE SEVERITY INDEX 
Our original computation of the Fire Severity Index derived a scale 
with 44 points. This was subsequently revised to a 5-point scale, the 
categories being Very Low, Low, Medium, High and Very High FSI. The S-
point scale will be used for studying action sequences. 
The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 413 occupants 
interviewed in incidents classed as being "Very Low FSI" are shown overleaf. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Pi rs t Acti on % Second Action % Third Action 
(a) Minimise risk (16.7\/Alert others (20.2)-+-
~ontact FB (18./i)-+-
(b) Investigate 
(c) Contact FB 
(d) Fire-fight 
(e) Alert others 
Fire-fight (16.5~ontact FB 
Minimise risk 
(16.2~ire-fight 
(13.6V --
. "'con tact FB 
(13.1~ire-fight 
(22.1)-0-
(16.2)-->-
(16.2)-->-
(32.8)->-
-(30. 3)---"" F~r~-~ight. 
........ M1n1m1Se r1sk 
(30.8) 
(35. 7) 
(46.7) 
(27.3) 
(36.4) 
(68.2) 
(37.5) 
(35.3) 
(68.2) 
(68.2) 
The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 749 occupants 
interviewed in incidents classed as being "Low FSI" are shown below. 
First Action 
(a) Fire-fight 
(b) Inves tigate 
(c) Contact FB 
% Second Action 
(19.0)/ -
"-con tact FB 
(18.0,~ire-fight 
"'--..con tact FB 
(11.2~ire-fight 
% Third Action 
(23.2)< Fire-fight 
(31. l}->-
(14.1)-->-
(22.6}->-
(d) Alert others (10 8' .,..fire-fight (32.1}->-
. ~vacuate self (13.6)-
(e) Minimise risk (10.8\/Fire-fight 
r--....con tact FB 
(f) Evacuate self (9.3)-->-
(g) Evacuate others(6.9}-+Contact FB 
(19.8)->-
(18.5)-+-
(21. 2)--
% 
(31. 7) 
(36.4) 
(21. 2) 
(61. 9) 
(47.4) 
(68.4) 
(73.1) 
(72. 7) 
(50.0) 
(20.0) 
(52.8) 
(36.3) 
The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 482 occupants 
interviewed in incidents classed as being "Medium FSI" are shown below. 
First Action 
(a) Investigate 
(b) Contact FB 
(c) Fire-fight 
(d) Alert others 
% Second Action 
Fire-fight (19.5~ontact FB 
Minimise ri sk 
(13.7}-+pire-fight 
(13.5~ontact FB 
(12 g\/Evacuate self 
. .r-..".con tact FB 
(e) Evacuate self (10.4)~ 
Fire-fight 
(f) Evacuate others(8.7)~Minimise risk ~ontact FB 
% 
(19.1)_ 
(14.9)--
(14.9)-
(22.7)-->-
-(21.5)-
(1'7.7)-
(16.1)-
Third Action 
(23.8)_ Evacuate self 
(21. 4)_Contact FB 
(21. 4)-
,~ontact FB (31.7)_ Fire-fight 
(g) Minimise risk (8.5~vacuate self (17.1)-->-
% 
(72.2) 
(28.6) 
(35.7) 
(66.7) 
(12.3) 
(42.8) 
(91. 0) 
(22.7) 
(66.0) 
(30.0) 
(66.7) 
(44.4) 
(46.2) 
(57.1) 
I 
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The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 287 occupants 
interviewed in incidents classed as being "High FSI" are shown below. 
Fi rs t Acti on % Second Acti on % Third Action % 
(a) Investigate . (20.9) <F~r7-~ight. (28.3)_ ( 41.2) Mlnlmlse rlsk (13.3)--Contact FB (37.5,) 
(b) Alert others (16.7)~ire-fight (18.8J- (33.3) ontact FB (14.6)-Evacuate self (23.8) 
(c) Contact FB (13.2)--Fire-fight (18.4)- (57.1) 
(d) Evacuate self (12.9)- --->- (62.2) 
(e) Fire-fight (ll.l)<cont~B (21.9)- (28.6) 
-
(15.6) 
(f) Evacuate others (7.3)_Contact FB (23.8)- (40.0) 
The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 262 occupants 
interviewed in incidents classed as being "Very High FSI" are shown below. 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
(a) Alert others 14 5 <Evacuate self (21.1)_ -- (62.5) ( .) Retreat from fire (15. 8)-Request assist (50.0) 
(b) Investigate (13 O)~Fire-fight (17.6)- (50.0) 
. Contact FB (15.6)- (20.0) 
( c) Evacuate self (13.4)-
-
(54.3) 
(d) Fire-fight (12.6)<::Evac~self (18.2)_ (25.0) 
-
(27.2) 
, ' (11.5)<::Evac~self (20.0)- (50.0) (e) Contact FB 
-
(16.6) 
Contact FB (28.0)_Evacuate self (28.6) 
(f) Evacuate others (9.5)~Evacuate self (16.0)- (50.0) 
Minimise risk (16.0)- (50.0) 
(g) Minimise risk (8.8)_Fire-fight (27.2)- (60.0) 
We have noted in earlier analyses of behaviour patterns that a 
number of action sequences appear to be common to all breakdowns, and this 
is equally true with regard to the FSI level. Indeed we must be struck 
by how unaffected, with one or two notable exceptions, the action 
sequences are by differences in FSI level. The most obvious exception 
is the way in which evacuating oneself becomes an increasing component of 
the sequences as the fire becomes more severe. Another, though less clear-
cut change relates to fire-fighting, which appears to reach a peak, in 
terms of both First Action and as an element of the action sequences, at 
Low levels of FSI. 
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If instead of action sequences we look at First Actions, a number 
of interesting points emerge. The first point is that the relative 
order of frequency is different for each level of FSI. Examining the 
order in which the First Actions are placed reveals that minimising the 
risk moves very rapidly down from being the most frequent First Action 
at Low FSI, to less than 5% at High FSI, although it recovers somewhat 
at Very High levels. In contrast, alerting others moves from a lowly 
fifth most frequent First Action at Low levels, to being the most frequent 
First Action at Very High levels, and similarly, evacuating oneself mpves 
from seventh to third most frequent over the same range. 
Examining the relative percentages rather than the order of First 
Actions is also of ' value. On this basis we find that contacting the Fire 
Brigade has its highest value at Very Low levels of FSI, whilst evacuating 
others has its lowest value at this level. The percentage undertaking 
fire-fighting as a First Action is substantially greater at Low FSI than 
any other level. High levels of FSI are characterised by. the largest 
percentages investigating and alerting others, and the smallest percentages 
fire-fighting and minimising the risk. Finally the percentage who 
evacuate themselves increases consistently from Very Low to Very High levels 
of FSI. It thus appears that, except in the cases quoted, changes in fire 
severity as measured by FSI level may have more effect upon the frequency 
with which First Actions are chosen than the action sequences themselves. 
12.1.2 SEQUENCES OF ACTION IN RELATION TO USE OF JETS 
Of the 952 incidents, 269 required the use of one or more Jets to 
extinguish them, and 757 people were interviewed at such incidents, 34.5% 
of our total sample of respondants. 
The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 757 occupants 
interviewed at incidents which required one or more Jets are shown below. 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
(a) Investigate (18.8) <:: Fire-fight (29.5) --->- (59.5) Contact FB (12.7) --->- Fire-fight (44.4) 
Fire-fight (20.0)---+ (50.0) 
(b) Alert others (lS.9) ~ Evacuate self (19.2) -->- (65.2) 
Contact FE (15.0) --->- (33.3) 
-+ (2l. 4) 
(c) Fire-fight (12.9) 4 Contact FB (18.3) --+- (27.S) 
Evacuate self (10.2) ->- ~ (SO.O) 
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First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
(d) Evacuate se If (12.7)~Cont~B -- (60.4) (11.5) - (63.6) 
(e) Contact FB (11. 8) <:Fire-f~ght (21. 3) __ (52.6) Invest~gate (ll.2)--Fire-fight (40.0) 
Contact FB (28".2) __ (33.3) 
(f) Evacuate others (7.0)~EVacuate self (13.2) __ (71.4) 
Minimise risk (13.2) __ Contact FB (28.5) 
(g) Minimise risk (5 9)~Fire-fight (26.7) __ (66.7) 
. Contact FB (17.8)--Fire-fight (37.5) 
The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 1436 occupants 
interviewed. at incidents which did not require Jets are shown below. 
First Action 
(a) Investigate 
(b) Fire-fight 
(c) Contact FB 
(d) Minimise risk 
(e) Alert others 
(f) Evacuate self 
(g) Evacuate others 
% Second Action 
Fire-fight 
(17 '3)~COO'~' FE 
Minimise risk 
(16.0) ( --
Contact FB 
(13.6) __ Fire-fight 
Contact FB (li.4)~Alert others 
\Fire-fight 
Minimise risk 
Fire-fight (11.4)~Contact FB 
Evacuate self 
" 0 
'0 Third Action 
(22.5)~Con~FB 
(15.3)<Minimise risk 
(14.1)~Fire-fight 
Contact FB 
(26.1)~Fire-fight 
Minimise risk 
(22.9)--
(20.8)~Fire-fight 
(15.2)~con~FB 
(14.0)~Con~FB 
(11.8)--Contact FB 
(23.3) __ 
(11.7)--
(11.0)--
--(16.5) 
~ontact FB (2l.0)<:Fire-fight 7 3 Fire-fight (17.1)__--( .) Minimise risk (16.2)--Contact FB Retreat fromfire (9.5)-- -
% 
(60.7) 
(16.7) 
(36.8) 
(18.4) 
(25.7) 
(20.0) 
(20.0) 
(29.1) 
(33.3) 
(20.0) 
(18.3) 
(71.1) 
(24.3) 
(21.6) 
(40.7) 
(22.2) 
(44.0) 
(32.0) 
(47,6) 
(73.6) 
(36.8) 
(77 • 8) 
(56.5) 
(42.1) 
(36.4) 
(22.7) 
(27.8) 
(47.1) 
(90.0) 
Inspection of the two sets of action sequences leads us to much the 
same conclusions as applied to the FSI level, namely that within the 
sequences the biggest differences are that evacuating oneself become much 
more frequent in "severe incidents (i.e. when Jets are used) and minimising 
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the risk also becomes a much less frequent element. In terms of First 
Actions, alerting others and evacuating oneself have substantially 
higher percentages in severe incidents, whereas minimising the risk has 
a substantially lower percentage. 
12.1.3 SEQUENCES OF ACTION IN RELATION TO EXTENT OF SMOKE SPREAD 
Smoke Spread was divided into five categories, Little or none, 
Confined to the room of origin, Confined to the floor of origin, Spread 
beyond the floor of origin, and Spread even more extensively. 
The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 257 occupants 
interviewed at incidents in which the Smoke Spread was little or none 
are shown below. 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
(a) Fire-fight (19.4) <. Contact FB --->- (42.0) (28.0)--+ Minimise risk (35.7) 
Fire-fight (36.4) --->- (87.5) 
(b) Contact FB (17 .1) ~ Evacuate se lf (13.6)-- (83.3) 
Minimise risk (13.6)- (50.0) 
( c) Investigate (16 3) <. Fire-fight (28.6)--->- (91. 7) 
• Contact FB (14.3)- (50.0) 
Cd) Alert others (16.3) <. Fire-f~ght (28.6)->- (50.0) Invesugate (14.3)--+ (50.0) 
Contact FB (22.5)->- Fire-fight (33.3) 
(e) Minimise risk (15.6) ~A1ert others (15.0)- (33.3) 
Fire-fight (15.0)->- (50.0) 
(f) Evacuate self (5.1) _ 
-
(46.2) 
The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 690 occupants 
interviewed at incidents in which the Smoke Spread was confined to the 
room of origin are shown below. 
Fi rs t Acti on % Second Action % Third Action % 
Fire-fight (31.0) _ (61.1) 
(a) Investigate (16.8) /. Con tact FB (15.5) <:. Minimise risk 
(33.3) 
"-... Minimise risk 
(22.2) 
(19.7) ->- Con tact FB (29.4) 
(b) Fire-fight (15.3) -< Cont~B ->- (27.1) (25.2) ->- (40. J) 
-- (43.8) 
(18.6) <:. Contact FB (43.8) 
(17.4) --+ Contact FB (40.0) 
(16.3) -Evacuate others (21. 4) 
(c) Minimise risk 
. Fire-fight 
(12 5) /" 
. ~ Alert others 
Contact FB 
I 
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First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
(d) Contact FB (12 0) <Fire-f~ght (22.9) ---+- (57.9) 
. Investlgate (13.3)---+-Fire-fight (45.5) 
Fire-fight (32.0)-->- (91. 7) 
(e) Al@rt others (10.9)ce:Contact FB (10. 7)-->-Evacuate others (37.5) 
-
(10 . .0) 
(f) Evacuate se If (lO.O)~Cont~B - (58.0) (18.8) --- (58.0) 
Contact FS (22.2) ---+- (40.0) 
(g) Evacuate others (6.5)~Minimise risk (22.2)-Contact FB (50.0) 
Fire-fight (15.6)---+- (42.9) 
, The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 618 occupants 
interviewed at incidents in which Smoke Spread was confined to the floor 
of origin are shown below. 
First Action ~ Second Action % Third Action % 
Fire-fight (25. 2)<con~ FB (50.0) (20.S)~Contact FB (18.8) (a) Investigate (13.4) ---+- (41.2) 
Minimise risk (12.6)---+- (31. 3) 
(b) Fire-fight (14.7)<Contact FB ---+-
(22.0) 
(24.2)---+- (31. 8) 
Fire-fight (23.3) -+ ' (57.1) 
(c) Contact FB (13.3)/'Minimise risk (11.0)--+ -- (44.4) 
......,. Evacuate others (11.0) -Evacuate self (44.4) 
/Fire-fight (23.3) -->- (58.8) 
(d) Alert others (1l.8)~Evacuate self (21.9)---+- -- (87.5) 
"'-,.,Evacuate others (12.3) -->'Evacuate self (22.2) 
(e) Evacuate self (10. 2) <Cont~B - (58.7) (11.1)- (57.1) 
(f) Evacuate others (8 3)<Contact FB (25.5)- (30.8) 
. Fire-fight (21.6)- (36.4) 
Contact FB (20.0)_ (40.0) 
(g) Minimise risk (8.l)~Alert others (l4.0)---Contact FB (42.9) 
Fire-fight (l2.0)-Contact FB (33.3) 
The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 445 occupants 
interviewed in which Smoke Spread went beyond the floor of origin are 
shown below. 
First Action 
(a) Investigate 
% Se cond Acti on 
Contact FB 
/":Fire-fight 
(18.4)~Minimise risk 
~ -
% Third Action 
(14.6) ___ Fire-fight 
(14.6)-->-
(l4.6)_Contact FB 
_ Fire-fight 
---
% 
(33.3) 
(50.0) 
(25.0) 
(25.0) 
(11.0) 
, I 
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First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
Contact FB (19.4}-+Fire-fight (30.8) 
(b) Alert others (15.l)-(Evacuate self (13.4)--.-
-
(77.8) 
Evacuate others (13.4~vacuate self (33.3) 
(c) Fire-fight (12.4~ont~B -+ (18.2) (20.0~inimise risk (32.5) 
(d) Contact FS (12. I)--.-Investi gate (16.7}-+Fire-fight (44.4) 
(e) Evacuate self (11.0)-+ -+ (61.2) 
(f) Evacuate others (9.0~inimise risk (22.5}-+Contact FS (55.6) ontact FS (20.0)-+- (37.5) 
(g) Minimise risk (8.3~?ntac~ FS (27.0}-+Fire-fight (40.0) 
. ue-flght (21.6)- (75.0) 
The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 183 occupants 
interviewed at incidents in which Smoke Spread was even more extensive 
are shown below. 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
Evacuate self (19 .2)........ ~ (40.0) 
(a) Alert others (l4.2)~Minimise risk (15.4)_ -- (50.0) 
Retreat from fire (IS. 4}-+Request assist (75.0) 
-->- (16.0) 
(b) Fire-fight (13.7~vacuate self (20.0)- (40.0) 
Contact FS (16.0)- (50.0) 
( c) Investigate (13.l}-+Fire-fight (25.0)---- (66.7) 
(d) Retreat from fire (l2.6~vacuate self (69.6) ____ (87.5) 
(e) Contact FS (12.0~nvestigate (18.2)_ (50.0) vacuate self (18.2)---- (75.0) 
(f) Evacuate others 9 8~ontact FB (27.8~vacuate self (40.0) (. Evacuate self (27.8)->- (40.0) 
(g) Evacuate self (9.3) __ -+ (58.8) 
(h) Minimise risk (5.5~vacuate self (20.0)-+ (l00.0) 
Again it is largely in the order and percentage of the First Actions 
that \;e can see differences in behaviour associated wi th the extent of 
Smoke Spread. The exceptions mainly relate to the highest level, when 
smoke spreads very extensively. In this case it is clear that evacuating 
oneself becomes a very frequent component of the action sequences, and in 
addition we have for the first time, sequences which incorporate a 
substantial proportion of peop,le who retreat from the fire. 
Otherwise we should note that the biggest percentages for fire-
fighting, contacting the Fire Brigade, alerting others and minimising the 
risk, as First Actions, all occur at the lowest level of Smoke Spread. 
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Both fire-fighting and minimising the risk show a virtually consistent 
decline in percentage as the extent of Smoke Spread increases, and whilst 
alerting others also declines in frequency, if we instead examine the 
order of First Actions, we find it moves to become the most frequent 
First Action when smoke spreads very extensively. In addition it can be 
seen that the percentage of individuals who elect to evacuate themselves, 
and evacuate others, rises as smoke spreads more extensively. 
12.1.4 SEQUENCES OF ACTION IN RELATION TO DENSITY OF TIlE SMOKEI, 
As was discussed in Section 12.0, we have re categorised Smoke Density 
in to two leve Is, "Low" and "High". 
The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 1402 occupants 
interviewed at incidents in which Smoke Density was Low are shown below. 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
Fire-fight (24.9)<Con~ FB (68.8) (".3~C""'"" FB (14.4) (13.6)<Minimise risk (37.1) (a) Investigate (17.1) 
~Minimise risk (13.2)<F· -f-' ht (29.4) 1re- 19 (20.6) 
-->- (9.7) 
-->- (31. 5) 
(b) Fire-fight (15.8) 
<contact FB (24.3) ~Fir~ht (33.3) (22.2) 
Minimise risk (20.4) 
Fire-fight (25.3) -+ (69.6 ) 
(c) Contact FB (13.0) ~ I~v~s~igat~ (12.6)-+ (34.8) 
';;. M1n1m1se rlsk (10.4)-+ (47.4) 
Something else * (21.6) - (60.9) 
Fire-fight (23.1) <con~ FB (64.3) (16.6) 
(d) Alert others (13.0) ~Evacuate self (13.7) -+ (76.0) 
Contact FS (12.1) -->- (60.9) 
Investigate (10.4)- (31.5) 
(9.9) 
Contact FS (21.2)~Fire-fight (30.3) 
(e) Minimise risk (11. 1) ~Fire-fight (15.4)--+-Contact FB (41. 7) 
,:Alert others (14.l)~Contact FB (36.4) 
Minimise risk (11.5)~Contact FS (44.4) 
(f) Evacuate self (9.1) <Cont~B ---7 (51. 2) (14.2)- (33.3) 
* Most often saving personal effects 
(g) 
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First Action % Second Action 
. Contact FB 
Evacuate others (5.9) ~Fire-fight 
"'- Minimise risk 
% Third Action 
(22.9)~Fire-fight 
(19.3)~Con~FB 
(12.0)~Contact FB 
% 
(42.1) 
(25.0) 
(25.0) 
(30.0) 
The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 791 occupants' 
interviewed at incidents in which Smoke Density was High are shown below. 
First Action 
(a) Investigate 
(b) Fire~fight 
(c) Contact FB 
(d) Alert others 
% Second Action % Third Action 
Fire-fight (2S.4)~ 
(16 9) ~Contact FB (15.7)->-Fire-fight 
. ~Minimise risk (12.7)~Contact FB 
"'-Evacuate others (10.4)->-Fire-fight 
(13. 4) ~ Con tact FB 
. Evacuate self 
->-
(22.6) -+-
(12.3) ->-
(13.0) 
(12.8) 
Fire-fight ~Evacuate self 
~Investigate 
Render assist 
(17.5)-
(12.6)-+ 
(9.7)->-Fire-fight 
(9.7)---
Fire-fight (19.8)-~Evacuate self (15.8)-
,\:Contact FB (14.9)--
Evacuate others {l1.9)'-'Contact FB 
(e) Evacuate self (10.6) «EContac~ FB 
Request assist 
~ 
(14.3)-
(9.5)->-
Contact FB 
(f) Evacuate others (9.5) <:,Minimise risk 
Evacuate se lf 
Fire-fight 
(g) Minimise risk (8.5) ~contact FB 
Evacuate self 
(24.0) ......... 
{18.7)~Contact FB 
(12.0)-
(19.4)---
{17.9)->-Evacuate self 
(11. 9)->-
% 
(50.0) 
(28.6) 
(35.3) 
(28.6) 
(16.0) 
(29.2) 
(46.2) 
(55.5) 
(76.9 
(40.0) 
(40.0) 
(65.0) 
(62.5) 
(26.7) 
(33.3) 
(58.3) 
(75.0) 
(50.0) 
(27.8) 
(50.0) 
(44.4) 
(53.8) 
(41. 7) 
(75.0) 
Inspecting the two sets of action sequences reveals that, in this 
case, the percentages and orders of the majority of First Actions are 
remarkably similar. The only exception to this is the very much larger 
proportion who evacuate others when Smoke Density is High. 
With respect tb the action sequences, it can be seen that contacting 
the Fire Brigade is a very frequent component at Low Smoke Density, 
whereas evacuating oneself is a relatively common element at High density. 
12.1.5 SEQUENCES OF ACTION IN RELATION TO TIME OF THE INCIDENT 
Our sample of incidents was classified into those which occurred 
during the Day (0600 to 1959), and those which occurred at Night (2000 to 0559). 
• 
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The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 1770 occupants 
interviewed at incidents which occurred in the day are shown below. 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
Fire-fight (26.9)_ (62.7) 
(17 .5)'~contact FB (139)< - (25:6) (a) Investigate . Contact FB (23.3) ~Minimise risk (126)< - (30.8) 
. Contact PB (21.6) 
(15.6) < - (23.2) (b) Fire-fight 
(23.6 )<!: Minimise risk (33.8) Contact PB (21. 5) 
Fire-fight (20.0) 
Fire-fight (22.7) __ (63.2) 
(c) Centact FB (14.2)~Investigate (12.4)--Fire-fight (35.4) 
Evacuate self (9.2)- (78.3) 
Fire-fight (23.0) __ (62.5) 
(d) Alert others (11.8)~EVacuate self (16.3) __ (75.5) 
Contact FB (13.0)-- (22.2) 
Contact FB (21.2) __ Fire-fight (25.6) 
(e) Minimise risk (10.4)~Alert others (13.6) __ Contact FB (36.0) 
Fire-fight (l3.6)--Contact PB (44.0) 
(f) Evacuate self (9.5)<contact FB -
(55.6) 
(17.2) __ (51. 7) 
(7.0)~contact FB (24.2)~Fir~ht (30.0) (g) Evacuate others (26.7) 
Minimise risk (16.9)--Contact FB (42.9) 
The most frequent action sequences undertaken by the 423 occupants 
interviewed at incidents which occurred in the night are shown below. 
First Action % Second Action % Third Action % 
~Fire-fight (18.3) __ (46.7) 
(a) Investigate (19. 4) Son tact FB (15.6)- (38.5) 
Minimise risk (14.6)<C?ntac~ FB (33.3) Fne-hght (33.3) 
/Fire-fight (18.6)- (71. 4) 
(b) Alert others (17.7)'~Contact FB (13.3) __ (30.0) 
Evacuate others (10.7)- (57.1) 
( c) Fire-fight (12.3)~Cont~B - (25.0) (25.0) 
--
(23.1) 
(d) Evacuate self (9.9) __ 
--
(69.0) 
(e) Minimise risk (9.2)-- Fire-fight (30.8) 
--
(58.3) 
(f) Contact FB (8.0)--Fire-fight (20.6) -->- (85. 7) 
Contact FB (20.6) -->- (28.5) 
(g) Evacuate others (8.0)~Fire-fight (20.6) -->- (42.9) 
---+ 
--------------------------------------------
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The most important differences in behaviour related to the time of 
the incident are that in night"time incidents individuals are much less 
likely to contact the Fire Brigade and much ~ likely to alert others. 
They also appear to be rather less likely to fire"fight at night"time. 
Surprisingly there is very little difference in percentages for those 
who evacuate themselves, or others, although evacuating oneself does 
appear within the action sequences of daytime incidents. It is interesting 
that in the daytime incidents we have an example of the 
Contact FB ~ Investigate 
type sequence, but not at night, although we would have thought it more 
appropriate under night"time circumstances. 
lie will now move from considering overall behaviour patterns to the 
specific actions of leaving the building, re "entering the building and 
moving through smoke. 
12.2 EFFECT OF FIRE VARIABLES ON EVACUATION BEHAVIOUR 
With the exception of the time of the incident, each of our variables 
is related in some respect to the severity of the fire. It would seem 
natural that as these variables increased (i.e. as the fire became more 
severe), we would expect more people to leave the building during the 
course of the fire, since increased severity must be perceived as 
increased threat. With respect to the time of the incident our hypothesis 
is less obvious, as although a night"time fire must be a more stressful 
experience, the practical aspects would favour more people leaving during 
the day. We will consider the effects of each of our Fire variables on 
-- evacuation behaviour in turn. 
12.2.1 EFFECT OF LEVEL OF FIRE SEVERITY INDEX ON EVACUATION BEHAVIOUR 
As in earlier analyses, we will consider evacuation behaviour in two 
ways. Firstly, by eXamining the number of individuals who left the 
building from our sample of 2193 interviewees, and secondly, by analysing 
the proportion of people who left each building from our sample of 952 
incidents (see Section 10.1.2 (p.166) for a fuller explanation). 
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The cross-tabulation of whether or not an individual left the 
building during the course of the fire against the level of FSI is shown 
in Table 83 overleaf. It is obvious from study of this table that an 
increasing percentage of individuals leave the building as the level of 
FSI increases. 
significant X2 
0.001 level. 
The reality of this association is confirmed by the 
value of 251.4 (4 df), which is significant beyond the 
As in almost 80% of the 952 incidents either all the occupants left 
the building or ~ of them left, we have broken the proportion of 
people who left into five categories, as in earlier analyses of this 
type. The cross-tabulation of the proportion leaving each incident 
against PSI level is shown in Table 84 overleaf. 
The evidence from the incidents presented in Table 84 reinforces 
our earlier finding when considering the behaviour of individuals: In 
this case we can see that there is a consistent fall in the percentage of 
incidents in which no-one left, and a corresponding rise in the 
percentage of incidents in which everyone left, as the FSI. level 
increases. The X2 value based on the frequencies given in Table 84 
is 134.5 (16 df), which is significant beyond the 0.001 level. We may 
thus state that the more severe the fire, the more likely it is that 
people will leave the building. 
12.2.2 EFFECT OF USE OR NON-USE OP JETS ON EVACUATION BEHAVIOUR 
As the use of Jets to extinguish a fire indicates a more severe 
incident, we would predict that a greater proportion of people would 
leave the building under these increased threat conditions. The cross- . 
tabulation of the use of Jets against whether or not an individual left 
the building during the course of the incident is shown in Table 85 
(p.230). Inspection of this table shows that a considerably greater 
percentage of people left incidents in which Jets were used, and the 
statistical significance of this relationship is confirmed by the X2 test 
(X2 = 56.5 (ldf), significant beyond the 0.001 level). Individuals are 
therefore more likely to leave the building if Jets are used. 
---------------------------------------- --. -- ----------------------------------------------------
TABLE 83 Level of FSI by evacuation behaviour 
Leave the FSI level 
building Total Very Low Low Medium High Very High 
Not Leave 288 (28.7) 410 (40.8) 168 (16.7) 96 (9.6) 43 (4.3) 1005 (45.8) 
(69.7) (54.7) (34.9) (33.4) (16.4) 
Leave 125 (10.5) 339. (28.5) 314 (26.4) 191 (16.1) 219 (18.4) 1188 (54.2) 
(30.3) (45.3) (65.1) (66.6) (83.6) 
Total 413 (18.8) 749 (34.2) 482 (22.0) 287 (13.1) 262 (11. 9) 2193 (100.0) 
TABLE 84 Level of FSI by proportion of people leaving the building 
Proportion FSI level Total leaving Very Low Low Medium High Very High 
0% 112 (38.0) 112 (38.0) 46 (15.6) 22 (7.5) 3 (1.0) 295 (31. 0) 
(56.6) (33.5) (20.7) (21.0) (3.2) 
1% to 30% 8 (14.0) 24 (42.1) 19 (33.3) 3 (5.3) 3 (5.3) 57 (6.0) 
(4.6) (7.2) (8.6) (2.9) (3.2) 
31% to 70% 19 (20.2) 38 (40.4) 18 (19.1) 9 (9.6) 10 (10.6) 94 (9.9) 
(9.6) (11.4) (8.1) (8.6) (10.8) 
71% to 99% 4 (9.5) 18 (42.9) 10 (23.8) 6 (14.3) 4 (9.S) 42 (4.4) 
(2.0) (5.4) (4.5) (5.7) (4.3) 
100% 55 (11.9) 142 (30.6) 129 (27.8) 65 (14.0) 73 (15.7) 464 (48.7) 
(27.8) (42.5) (58.1) (61. 9) (78.5) 
Total 198 (20.8) 334 (35.1) 222 (23.3) 105 (11.0) 93 (9.8) 952 (100.0) 
- -- ----------
N 
N 
<D 
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TABLE 85. Use of Jets by evacuation behaviour 
Leave the Use of Jets 
building Total Not Used Used 
Not leave 742 (73.8) 263 (26.2) 1005 (45.8) 
(51. 7) (34.7) 
Leave 694 (58.4) 494 (41. 6) 1188 (54.2) 
(48.3) (65.3) 
Total 1436 (65.5) 757 (34.S) 2193 (100.0) 
The cross-tabulation of the proportion of people who left the 
building against the use of Jets is shown in Table 86 overleaf. Again 
is is in the 0% and 100% categories where we see the most obvious 
discrepancies, it being clear that when Jets are used there are, 
respectively, disproportionately fewer and disproportionately more people 
in those groups (X 2 = 26.8 (4 df), signifi cant beyond 0.001). 
12.2.3 EFFECT OF SMOKE SPREAD ON EVACUATION BEHAVIOUR 
The cross-tabulation of the extent of Smoke Spread against whether 
or not individuals left the building during the course of the fire is 
shown in Table 87 (p.232). Examination of this table shows clearly that 
the percentage of individuals leaving the building increases consistently 
with increasing Smoke Spread. This trend is confirmed by the X2 value of 
161. 7 (4 df), which is significant beyond 0.001. The more exte'nsive the Smoke 
Spread, the more likely it is that an individual will leave the building. 
Since it is obvious from the previous two analyses of evacuation -
from incidents that the' biggest differences are manifest in the 0% and 
100% groups, ~~ have, when considering Smoke Spread and Smoke Density, 
reduced our categories of "proportion leaving" to three, namely 0%, 1% to 
99% and 100%. The cross-tabulation of the proportion of people who left, 
categorised in the above way, against the extent of Smoke Spread is shown 
in Table 88 (p.232). The consistent trends readily observable in this 
table, and the X2 value of 80.6 (8 cif), Ivhich is significant beyond the 
0.001 'level, confirm our earlier finding of individual evacuation 
behaviour, namely that the proportion leaving will increase with 
increasing Smoke Spread. 
Use of 
Jets 
Not used 
Used 
Total 
-------------------------~----------------------------------
TABLE 86. Use of Jets by proportion of people leaving the building 
Proportion leaving each incident 
Total 
0% 1% to 30% 3'1% to 70% 71% to 99% 100% 
244 (35.8) 39 (5.7) 65 (9.5) 28 (4.1) 305 (44.8) 681 (71. 5) 
(82.7) (68.4) (69. 1) (66.7) (65.7) 
51 (18.8) 18 (6.6) 29 (l0.7) 14 (5.2) 159 (58.7) 271 (28.5) 
(17.3) (31.6) (30.9) (33.3) (34.3) 
295 (31. 0) 57 (6.0) 94 (9.9) 42 (4.4) 464 (48.7) 952 (100.0) 
N 
'" 
,... 
----------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE 87 Extent of Smoke Spread by evacuation behaviour 
Extent of Smoke Spread 
Leave the Little Confined Confined Spread Even Total building 
or to room to floor to floor more 
none of origin of origin above extensive 
Not leave 177 (17.6) 392 (39.0) 236 (23.5) 159 (15.8) 41 (4.1) 1005 ( 45.8) 
(68.9) (56.8) (38.2) (35.7) (22.4) 
Leave 80 (6.7) 298 (25.1) 382 (32.2) 286 (24.1) 142 (12.0) 1188 (54.2) 
(31.1) (43.2) (61. 8) (64.3) (77.6) 
Total 257 (11. 7) 690 (31.5) 618 (28.2) 445 (20.3) 183 (8.3) 2193 (100.0) 
TABLE 88. Extent of Smoke Spread by proportion of people leaving 
Proportion Extent of Smoke Spread 
leaving Little Confined Confined Spread Even Total 
each 
incident or to room to floor to floor more 
none of origin of origin above extensive 
0% 66 (22.4) 120 (40.7) 66 (22.4) 39 (13.2) 4 Cl. 4) 295 (31. 0) 
(57.9) (37.4) (25.6) (19.4) (6.9) 
1% to 99% 16 (8.3) 67 (34.7) 56 (29.0) 40 (20.7) 14 (7.3) 193 (20.3) 
(14.0) (20.9) (21. 7) (19.9) (24.1) 
100% 32 (6.9) 134 (28.9) 136 (29.3) 122 (26.3) 40 (8.6) 464 (48.7) 
(28.1) (41. 7) (52.7) (60.7) (69.0) 
Total 114 (12.0) 321 (33.7) 258 (27.1) 201 (21. 1) 58 (6.1) 952 (100.0) 
N 
'" N 
---- ---------- ------------
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12.2.4 EFFECT OF SMOKE DENSITY ON EVACUATION BEHAVIOUR 
The cross-tabulation of the density of the smoke against whether or 
not individuals left the building during the course of the fire is shown 
in Table 89 overleaf. Although the consistency is not absolute, as it 
was in the case of Smoke Spread, it can be seen from this table that up 
to scale-value 5 there is a steady increase in the percentage of 
individuals leaving, at which point the relative frequency of leaving 
evens out. This association is established by the / value of 239.9 (6 df), 
which is significant beyond the 0.001 level. 
The cross-tabulation of the proportion of people leaving each 
incident against the density of the smoke is shown in Table 90 overleaf. 
Examination of this table indicates that the general trend is for an 
increasing number of incidents to have a greater proportion of people 
leave as Smoke Density increases. This association is confirmed by the 
X2 value of 114.9 (12 df), which is significant beyond the 0.001 level. 
12.2.5 EFFECT OF TIME OF DAY ON EVACUATION BEHAVIOUR 
The time at which the incident occurred was categorised as fOllows: 
daytime (0600 to 2159), night-time (2150 to 0559). The cross-tabulation 
of the time of the incident against whether or not individuals left the 
building during the course of the fire is shown in Table 91 below. 
TABLE 91 . Time of the incident by evacuation behaviour 
Leave the Time of incident 
building Total Day Night 
Not Leave 848 (84.4) 157 (15.6) 1005 (45.8) 
(47:9) (37: 1) 
~-teave~~ 922 (77.6) 266 (22.4) 1188 (54.2) 
(52 .1) (62.9) 
Total 1770 (80.7) 423 (19.3) 2193 (100.0) 
It can be seen from Table. 91 above that a considerably greater 
percentage of individuals appear to leave the building during night-time 
incidents. This relationship is confirmed by the X2 value of 15.5 (1df), 
which is significant beyond the 0.001 level. 
TABLE 89 Smoke Density by evacuation behaviour 
Leave the Smoke Density scale-values 
building Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not leave 442 (44.0) 161 (16.0) 171 (17.0) 134 (13. 3) 54 (5.4) 26 (2.6) 17 (1. 7) 1005 (45.8) 
(67.4) (51. 3) (39.6) (37.6) (22.0) (23.0) (22.4) 
Leave 214 (18.0) 153 (12.9) 261 (22.0) 222 (18.7) 192 (16.2) 87 (7.3) 59 (5.0) 1188 (54.2) 
(32.6) (48.7) (60.4) (62.4) (78.0) (77.0) (77.6) 
Total 656 (29.9) 314 (14.3) 432 (19.7) 356 (16.2) 246 (11.2) 113 (5.2) 76 (3.5) 2193 (100.0) 
TABLE 90 Smoke Density by proportion of people leaving 
Proportion 'Smoke Density scale-values Total leaving 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0% 153 (51. 9) 48 (16.3) 32 (10.8) 33 (11. 2) 17 (5.8) 7 (2.4) 5 (1. 7) 295 (31.0) 
(51.3) (31.6) (18.8) (22.9) (15.7) (14.3) (16.1) 
1% to 99% 57 (29.5) 32 (16.6) 47 (24.4) 28 (14.5) 16 (8.3) 9 (4.7) 4 (2.1) 193 (20.3) 
(19.1) (21. 0) (27.6) (19.4) (14.8) (18.4) (12.9) 
100% 88 (19.0) 72 (15.5) 91 (19.6) 83 (17.9) 75 (16.2) 33 (7.1) 22 (4.7) 464 (48.7) 
(29.5) (47.4) (53.5) (57.6) (69.4) (67.3) (71.0) 
Total 298 (31. 3) 152 (16.0) 170 (17.9) 144 (15. 1) 108 (11. 3) .49 (5.1) 31 (3.3) 952 (100.0) 
- - - - --------------------
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The cross-tabulation of the proportion of people leaving each 
incident against the time of the incident is shown in Table 92 overleaf. 
Inspection of this table suggests that there is little difference in the 
proportions leaving between night-time and daytime incidents, and this 
impression is confirmed by the X2 value of 1. 5 (4 df), which is non-
significant. Therefore the proportion of people who leave at each 
incident is unaffected by the time it takes place. 
12.3 EFFECT OF FIRE VARIARLES ON RETURNING INTO THE BUILDING 
As a general hypothesis, it would seem reasonable that individuals 
would be less likely to return into buildings if the fire was more severe. 
We would also suggest that people would be less inClined to re-enter the 
building if the incident occurred at night. 
12.3.1 EFFECT OF LEVEL OF FIRE SEVERITY INDEX ON RE-ENTRY BEHAVIOUR 
The cross-tabulation of whether or not an individual returned into 
the building during the course of the incident against the level of PSI 
is shown in Table 93 overleaf. It can be seen from this table that 
progressively fewer people re-enter the building as the level of FSI 
increases. This trend is confirmed by the X2 test (X2 = 16.56 (4 df), 
significant beyond 0.001). Thus using FSI as our measure, the more 
severe the fire proves to be, the less likely it is that people will 
return into the building. 
12.3.2 EFFECT OF USE OR NON-USE OF JETS ON RE-ENTRY BEHAVIOUR 
The cross-tabulation of whether or not an individual returned into 
the building_during the course of the incident against whether Jets were 
used is' shown in Table 94 below. 
TABLE 94. Use of Jets by re-entry behaviour 
Return Use of Jets 
into the Total 
building Not Used Used 
Not used 374 (56.2) 291 (43.8) 665 (56.0) 
(53.9) (58.9) 
Used 320 (61.2) 203 (38.8) 523 (44.0) 
(46. 1) ( 41.1) 
Total 694 (58.4) 494 (41.6) 1188 (100.0) 
--------------------------------
TABLE 92. Time by proportion of people leaving 
Proportion leaving each incident 
Time Total 
0% 1% to 30% 31% to 70% 71% to 99% 100% 
Day 237 (30.5) 48 (6.2) 74 (9.5) 35 (4.5) 385 (49.4) 778 (81. 7) 
(80.3) (84.2) (78.7) (83.3) (82.8) 
Night 58 (33.3) 9 (5.2) 20 (11.5) 7 (4.0) 80 (46.0) 174 (18.3) 
(19.7) (15.8) (21. 3) (16.7) (17.2) 
Total 295 (31. 0) 57 (6.0) 94 (9.9) 42 (4.4) 464 (48.7) 952 (100.0) 
TABLE 93. Level of PSI by re-entry behaviour 
Retum FSI level 
into the Total 
building Very Low Low Medium High Very High 
Not return 54 (8.1) 178 (26.8) 178 (26.8) 117 (17.6) 138 (20.8) 665 (56.0) 
(43.2) (52.5) (56.7) (61. 3) (63.0) 
Return 71 (13.6) 161 (30.8) 136 (26.0) 74 (14.1) 81 (15.5) 523 (44.0) 
(56.8) (47.5) (43.3) (38.7) (37.0) 
Total 125 (10.5) 339 (28.5) 314 (26. 4) 191 (16. 1) 219 (18.4) 1188 (100.0) 
- - - ______ 1 
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Inspection of Table 94 shows that although the percentage of 
people returning into the building is less at incidents when Jets are 
used, the difference in this case is relatively small, and is statistically 
non-significant (X2 = 2.9 (1 df). Therefore using Jets as our measure, we 
can state that re-entry behaviour is independent of fire· severi ty. 
12.3.3 EFFECT OF SMOKE SPREAD ON RE-ENTRY BEf~VIOUR 
The cross-tabulation of the extent of Smoke Spread against whether 
or not an individual returned into the building during the course of the 
incident is shown in Table 95 overleaf. Examination of this table 
reveals that the general trend is for the percentage of people returning 
into the building to reduce as the smoke spreads more extensively, 
although not with absolute consistency. The X2 value calculated from the 
frequencies in Table 95 gives a value which exceeds the 1% level of 
probability (l = 17.1 (4df), significant beyond 0.001). 
12.3.4 EFFECT OF SMOKE DENSITY ON RE-ENTRY BEHAVIOUR 
The cross-tabulation of the density of the smoke against whether or 
not an individual returned into the building during the course of the 
incident is shown in Table 96 overleaf. Performing the X2 test on the 
frequencies given in this table yields a value of 23.0 (6 df), which is 
significant beyond the 0.001 level. It will be noted that the percentage 
of individuals re-entering the building falls steadily up to scale-value 
5, at which point it increases again. There is no obvious explanation 
for this sudden reversal. 
12.3.5 EFFECT OF TIME OF DAY ON RE-ENTRY BEHAVIOUR 
-- ---Since--we-would hypothesise that the stressful effects of a fire 
incident would be exacerbated during a night-time incident, we would 
predict that people would be less likely to re-enter the building at 
night. The cross-tabulation of the time of the incident against whether 
or not individuals returned into the building is shown in Table 97 
(p.239). It is clear from the evidence of this table that there is very 
little difference in re-entry behaviour during day and night incidents. 
This impression is confirmed the non-significant X2 value of 0.3 (ldf). 
Thus our hypothesis must be rejected, and we conclude that re-entry 
behaviour is independent of the time of the incident. 
TABLE 95. Extent of Smoke Spread by re-entry behaviour 
Extent of Smoke Spread 
Return 
into the Little Confined Confined Spread Even Total 
bui 1ding or to room to floor to floor more 
none of origin of origin above extensive 
Not return 34 (5.1) 159 (23.9) 203 (30.5) 175 (26.3) 94 (14.1) 665 (56.0) 
(42.5) (53.4) (53.1) (61. 2) (66.2) 
Return 46 (8.8) 139 (26.6) 179 (34.2) III (21. 2) 48 (9.2) 523 (44.0) 
(57.5) (46.6) (46.9) (38.8) (33.8) 
Total 80 (6.7) 298 (25.1) 382 (32.2) 286 (24.1) 142 (12.0) 1188 (100.0) 
TABLE 96. Smoke Density by re-entry behaviour 
Return Smoke Density scale-values 
into the Total 
building 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not return 94 (14.1) 75 (11.3) 156 (23: 5) 134 (20.2) 121 (18.2) 50 (7.5) 35 (5.3) 665 (56.0) 
(43.9) (49.0) (59.8) (60.4) (63.0) (57.5) (59.3) 
Return 120 (22.9) 78 (14.9) 105 (20.1) 88 (16.8) 71 (13.6) 37 (7.1) 24 (4.6) 523 (44.0) 
(56.1) (51.0) (40.2) (39.6) (37.0) (42.5) (40.7) 
Total 214 (18.0) 153 (12.9) 261 (22.0) 222 (18.7) 192 (16.2) 87 (7.3) 59 (5.0) 1188 (100.0) 
N 
'" 00 
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TABLE 97 . Time of the incident by re-entry behaviour 
Return Time of incident 
into the Total 
building Day Night 
Not return 512 (77.0) 153 (23.0) 665 (56.0) 
(55.5) (57.5) 
Return 410 (78.4) 113 (21.6) 523 (44.0) 
(44.5) (42.5) 
Total 922 (77 .6) 266 (22.4) 1188 (100.0) 
12.4 EFFECT OF FIRE VARIABLES ON MOVEMENT THROUGH SMOKE 
It is rather difficult to construct a priori hypothesis concerning 
movemen t through smoke, without the knowledge of what motivates people. 
to undertake this action. It is possible that in many incidents, any 
movement during the course of the fire will entail movement through 
·smoke. Alternatively, there is a body of anecdotal evidence which 
suggests that people are in fact very reluctant to move into smoke. We 
will explore the effects of the Fire variables on the occurrence of this 
action in the same order as in preceding analyses. 
12.4.1 EFFECT OF LEVEL OF FIRE SEVERITY INDEX ON MOVEMENT THROUGH SMOKE 
The cross-tabulation of whether or not an individual moved through 
smoke against the level of FSI is shown in Tab le· 98 overleaf. It· wi 11 
be noted that although there is considerable variation in the percentage 
of people moving through smoke at different levelS of FSI, there does 
not appear to be a consistent trend (X2 = 16.7 (4 df), significant beyond 
the 0.01 level). 
12.4.2 EFFECT OF USE OR NON-USE OF JETS ON MOVEMENT THROUGH SMOKE 
The cross-tabulation of whether 'or not an individual moved through 
smoke against whether Jets were used is shown in Table 99 (p.241). It· 
appears that a rather smaller percentage of people move through smoke in 
incidents in which Jets are used; however testing on the frequencies in 
Table 99 yields a X2 value. of 4.3 (1 df), which fails to reach our pre-
set 1% rejection level and is thus non-significant. We therefore conclude 
that movement through smoke is independent of the time of the incident. 
TABLE 98. Level of FSI by movement through smoke 
Move FSI level 
through Total 
smoke Very Low Low Hedium High Very High 
Not move 129 (16. 8) 270 (35.1) 155 (20.2) 127 (16.5) 88 (11.4) 769 (40.4) 
(44.3) (40.8) (34.6) (48.5) (36.5) 
Move 162 (14.3) 391 (34.5) 293 (25.8) 135 (11. 9) 153 (13.5) 1134 (59.6) 
(55.7) (59.2) (65. 4) (51.5) (63.5) 
Total 291 (15.3) 661 (34.7) 448 (23.5) 262 (13.8) 241 (12.7) 1903 (100.0) 
-- -----------
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TABLE 99. Use of Jets by movement through smoke 
Move Use of Jets 
through Total 
smoke Not used Used 
Not move 477 (62.0) 292 (38.0) 769 (40.4) 
(38.7) (43.6) 
Move 756 (66.7) 378 (33.3) 1134 (59.6) 
(61. 3) (56. 4) 
Total 1233 (64.8) 670 (35 .2) 1903 (100.0) 
12.4.3 EFFECT OF EXTENT OF SMOKE SPREAD ON MOVEMENT THROUGH SMOKE 
The cross-tabulation of whether an individual moved through smoke 
against the extent of Smoke Spread is shown in Table 100 overleaf. It 
can be seen from this table that there is a steady increase in the 
percentage of people moving through smoke up to our highest category, at 
which point there is a decline in the percentage. This association is 
confirmed by the X2 value of 26.9 (4 df), which is significant beyond the 
0.001 level. 
12.4.4 EFFECT OF SMOKE DENSITY ON MOVEMENT THROUGH SMOKE 
The cross-tabulation of whether or not an individual moved through 
smoke against the density of the smoke is shown in Table 101 overleaf. 
Again we have considerable variation in percentages moving through smoke 
at different values of Smoke Density, although there is no consistent 
trend. The anomalous percentages appear to occur at the extremes of 
Smoke Density, since there is otherwise a consistent decrease in movement 
through smoke between scale-values 2 and 6. The frequencies in this 
-t~ble yield a X2 value of 30.3 (6 df), which is significant beyond the 
0.001 level. It is interesting that, if we analyse this X2 value, we 
find that for the highest level of Smoke Density (i.e. scale-value 7), 
the observed and expected frequencies are very similar, whereas the 
observed frequency of people moving through smoke in scale-value 1 is 
considerably less than the expected frequency. (There are of course 
other differences between observed and expected frequencies in the table.) 
It would seem therefore that there is a tendency for increased Smoke 
Density to be associated with decreased likelihood of movement through 
smoke, although· the relationship is imperfect. 
TABLE 100. Extent of Smoke Spread by movement through smoke 
Extent of Smoke Spread 
Move 
through Little Confined Confined Spread Even Total 
smoke or to room to floor to floor more 
none of origin of origin above extensive 
Not move 75 (9.8) 275 (35.8) 214 (27.8) 143 (18.6) 62 (8.1) 769 (40.4) 
(54.4) (45. 2) (37.6) (33.9) (37.3) 
Move 63 (5.6) 333 (29.4) 355 (31. 3) 279 (24.6) 104 (9.2) 1134 (59.6) 
(45.6) (54.8) (62.4) (66.1) (62.7) 
Total 138 (7.3) 608 (31. 9) 569 (29.9) 422 (22.2) 166 (8.7) 1903 (100.0) 
TABLE 101. Smoke Density. by movement through smoke 
Move Smoke Density scale-values 
through Total 
smoke 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not move 224 (29.1) 92 (12.0) 133 (17.3) 133 (17.3) 109 (14.2) 51 (6.6) 27 (3.5) 769 (40.4) 
(46.4) (31.6) (33.6) (41. 4) (45.4) (49.5) (39.1) 
~Iove 259 (22.8) 199 (17.5) 263 (23.2) 188 (16.6) 131 (11.6) 52 (4.6) 42 (3.7) 1134 (59.6) 
(53.6) (68.4) (66.4) (58.6) (54.6) (50.5) (60.9) 
Total 483 (25.4) 291 (15. 3) 396 (20.8) 321 (16.9) 240 (12.6) 103 (5.4) 69 (3.6) 1903 (100.0) 
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12.4.5 EFFECT OF TIME OF THE INCIDENT ON MOVEMENT THROUGH SMOKE 
The cross-tabulation of the time of the incident against whether or 
not an individual moved through smoke is shown in Table 102 below. 
TABLE 102 . Time of the incident by movement through smoke 
Move Time of incident 
through Total 
smoke Day Night 
Not move 650 (84.5) 119 (15.5) 769 (40.4) 
(42.4) (31. 6) 
Move 876 (77.2) 258 (22.8) 1134 (59.6) 
(57.4) (68.4) 
Total 1526 (80.2) 377 (19.8) 1903 (100.0) 
Inspection of Tab le 102 shows that, surprisingly, a greater 
percentage of people move through smoke in night-time incidents. This 
re lationship is statistically significant (X2 = 15.2 Cl df); significant 
beyond 0.001). Thus, people are more likely to move through smoke in 
night-time incidents. 
12.5 DISCUSSION 
The evidence presented in Chapter 12 indicates that, like the 
Building and Personal variables considered in the immediately preceding 
chapters, the nature of the fire incident itself, as characterised in 
the Fire variables, can have an important influence upon behaviour. We 
have, however, seen that several of these effects act in directions which 
we would not have predicted. In discussing the interaction of these 
variables, it is convenient to consider them under specific headings. 
12.5.1 PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOUR 
Four of the measures used in this chapter relate to the severity of 
the fire, and it is encouraging that there are many similarities in the 
way in which these variables affect patterns of behaviour. A continuing 
theme is the very predictable finding that evacuating oneself, either as 
a single course of behaviour, or as part of a behaviour pattern, tends 
to increase markedly in frequency as the fire becomes more severe. Much 
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more surprising is the relationship bet\~een contacting the Fire Brigade 
and Fire Severity, for we find that in each case this behaviour pattern 
is considerably more common in Low severity 
the reverse of what we might have expected. 
fires than High severity ones, 
Fire-fighting also tends to 
predominate in Low rather than High severity fires, which suggests that 
many individuals perceive fairly accurately those fires which' they are 
capable of tackling unaided. It is interesting that attempts to minimise 
the risk, such as shutting doors and switching-off gas or electricity 
supplies, are additionally more frequent in Low severity incidents, since 
these actions might be classed as "negative fire-fighting". Behaviour 
patterns whi ch incorporate minimising the risk more often appear to ' 
contain other "responsible" actions, such as contacting the Fire Brigade, 
evacuating others or alerting others, and less often to contain such 
actions as evacuating oneself and fire-fighting. 
If we hypothesise that High severity fires are associated with high 
levels of threat to the individual then it would seem reasonable that 
night-time incidents, which must also be more threatening, would exhibit 
similar behaviour patterns, a hypothesis which is in this case supported 
to some extent. Certainly contacting the Fire Brigade is less frequent 
at night, whilst alerting others is more frequent, as it also is in High 
FSI value fires. We are, however, constrained from drawing firm 
conclusions about this due to the fact that less than 20% of the incidents 
occurred at night. 
12.5.2 EVACUATION BDlIAVIOUR 
In looking at whether or not people left the building at all during 
the course of the incident, we cannot fail to be impressed by the uniform 
'----way-in,which the variables act. Each of our Fire Severity measures acts 
to increase the likelihood of individuals leaving, as does the absence of 
daylight. These findings are of course based upon the responses of the 
2193 interviewees. As we also have data on evacuation from the Fire 
Brigade personnel present at the incident, it is possible to analyse 
this in terms of the proportion of people who left the building at each 
of the 952 incidents. In four of the five cases this additional data 
tends to support the primary analysis, the one variable for ,which this 
does not happen being the time of the incident. This suggests that in 
night-time incidents there may have been a bias towards interviewing those 
who left the building rather than those who did not. Other than this 
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contradictory finding, it would seem clear that increases in Fire 
Severity are very directly related to increased likelihood of people 
leaving the building. 
12.5.3 RE-ENTRY BEHAVIOUR 
We would naturally predict that as Fire Severity increased, so the 
proportion of people who returned into the building would decrease. In 
fact this inverse relationship is demonstrated for three of our Fire 
Severity measures but not the fourth, the use of Jets. It would seem 
from this that re-entry behaviour may be determined more by smoke 
characteristics than other aspects of the fire. 
Rather surprisingly we find that re-entry behaviour is independent 
of the time of the incident, since we would have expected fewer people to 
return into the building during night-time incidents, although it is 
likely that under these circumstances many people would re-enter to obtain 
warm clothing, etc. 
12.5.4 MOVEMENT THROUGH SMOKE 
The effect of the Fire variables on movement through smoke is less 
straightforward than their influence upon evacuation or re-entry 
behaviour. An obvious hypothesis is that people will be less inclined to 
move through smoke as the severity of the fire increases. This simple 
relationship is, however, not demonstrated. Our overall measure of Fire 
Severity, the FSI level, is associated with movement through smoke in. the 
sense that there is an overall significant x< value, although there is no 
consistent trend, whilst the use or non-use of Jets has no effect. 
Increased Smoke Spread appears to have the effect of increasing the 
proportion of people moving through smoke which is not unreasonable; 
however we also find that the absence of daylight has this effect, an 
association which is resistent to explanation. 
Only in the case of Smoke Density does the association appear 
intuitively reasonable, with a decreasing percentage of individuals 
moving through smoke as its density increases. The variable, Smoke Density, 
is, of course, based upon a Fire Brigade estimate, and it is interesting 
to compare this with the estimates made by the interviewees of how far 
they could see when they moved through the smoke. Using Spearman's rank 
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correlation coefficient we obtain a value of 0.61 (significant beyond 
the 0.001 level). indicating a close relationship. Examination of the 
data suggests that the interviewees' estimates achieve their highest 
values at a point somewhat below the top of the Fire Brigade scale. 
Specifically. we find that estimates of "zero" visibility made by the 
occupant often correspond with scale-values of 4 or 5 on the 7-point Fire 
Brigade scale. A further aspect of smoke visibility estimates is the 
relationship between them and the distances which individuals will move 
through smoke. In this case the Spearman correlation coefficient for 
"distance see/distance move" is a rather lower value of 0.43 (significant 
beyond the 0.001 level). We may again examine the data for the source of 
inconsistency and we find. for example, that half the people who moved 
10 yards through smoke stated they could only see 4 yards in front of 
them. implying that at least in some conditions, people are prepared to 
move further through smoke than their range of visibility. 
CHAPTER 13 
FACTORIAL ANALYSIS OF 
SELECTED STUDY VARIABLES 
247 
13.0 FACTORIAL ANALYSIS OF SELECTED STUDY VARIABLES 
In the preceding seven chapters we have examined the relationship 
between pairs of variables by means of significance testing. There is 
little doubt that for this purpose, theX2 test is the most appropriate 
statistical tool. There remains, however, the problem of investigating' 
firstly the strength of any associations which have been demonstrated, 
and secondly the existence of interactions between the variables. These 
two aspects will be examined within this chapter. 
The statistical technique utilised, weighted factorial logistic 
analysis, is briefly described in Section 5.6.2. As was discussed 
therein, this method of analysis is most commonly applied to dichotomous 
variables, and it is therefore only appropriate in the present case for 
selected variables. 
13.1 VARIABLES ANALYSED 
Twelve variables were considered suitable for analysis. These 
comprised 5 Personal variables, 3.Fire variables, 1 Building variable 
and 3 Behavioural variables. The selection of the variables was based 
upon two considerations. The major factor was of course whether the 
variable was dichotomous, or could be recatcgorised as such in a 
reasonable way. The other factor considered was the findings. from the' 
earlier analyses, obviously those variables which had been shown to be' 
involved in several associations, or which were of particular,interest,' 
being given preference over those which were not. 
The variables selected for analysis were as follows: 
Personal variables 
1. Sex of the person involved 
2. Training of the person involved 
3. Familiarity of the person with the building 
4. Previous involvement of the person in a fire incident 
5, Age of the person involved 
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Fire variab les 
6. Presence of smoke in the incident 
7. Extent of Smoke Spread in the incident 
8. Time of day of the incident 
Building variable 
9 •. Category of building in which the incident occurred 
Behavioural variables 
10. Whether the person left the building during the course of the 
incident 
11. Whether the person returned into the building during the course 
the incident 
12. Whether the person moved through smoke during the course of the 
incident. 
The variables numbered I, 4, 6, 10, 11 and 13 are dichotomous by 
nature, the two levels for each being 
1. Male ••• Female 
4. Previously involved Not previously involved 
6. Smoke present ... Smoke absent 
10. Leave the building ... Not leave the building 
11. Return into thebuUding ... Not return into the building 
12. Move through smoke .,. Not move through smoke. 
In addition to the above, variables numbered 2, 3, 7 and 8 have 
already been used in dichotomous form in earlier analyses, and we will 
utilise the same reclassifications here. The two levels of these are 
2. Some training '" No training 
3. Completely familiar •.. Less than completely familiar 
7. Smoke Spread confined to the floor of origin .•. Smoke Spread 
beyond the floor of origin 
8. Daytime (0600 to 2159) ... Night-time (2200 to 0559). 
of 
This leaves us with two variables, Age and Building category, to 
consider. Reference to Figure 4 (p.52 ) shows that the age of those 
interviewed is approximately normally distributed and we may therefore 
divide it at the mode. TIle two levels are therefore 
5. Young (under 40 years) Old (40 years or over) 
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With regard to category of building, reference to earlier analyses 
suggests that incidents which occur in Dwellings may be substantially 
different, both in nature and in manifest behaviour. Since they also 
represent the "home" environment, whereas all the other categories are 
to some degree "working" environments, we have chosen to recategorise 
our building types into "Dwe.lling" and "Non-Dwelling". The two levels 
are therefore 
9. Home. •• Work 
Having defined our selected variables in binary form they were then 
subjected to factorial analysis. The largest number of combinations of 
variables which could be analysed simultaneously was found to be 5. 
Larger numbers than this produced zero values in some cells. Note that 
combinations which included both "Presence of smoke" and "Smoke Spread" 
variables, and also those including "Presence of smoke" and "Whether 
moved through smoke" were obviously not considered. In total, 121 
analyses of Personal/Fire/Building variables against a Behavioural 
variable were examined. 'In each case estimates of main effects, first, 
second and third order interactions, were produced. As in earlier 
analyses, only those which attained the 0.01 level of probability were 
considered significant. 
13.2 MAIN EFFECTS 
We would expect the main effects to offer confirmation of our 
earlier significance testing and to indicate the strength of any 
associations. 
13.2.1 EVACUATION BEHAVIOUR 
The results of the analysis in terms of the main effects of the 
variables upon whether or not an individual left the building are 
summarised in Table 103 overleaf. The value of the Z-score indicates 
the strength of the relationship, and it will be noted from this table 
that the first four variables have an extremely powerful effect on 
increasing evacuation. It is of interest that the two most powerful 
variables are not related to differences between people, but to 
differences in the nature of the fire and the building in which it occurs. 
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TABLE 103. Main effects of variables on evacuation behaviour 
Variable Level Z-score Significance level 
Smoke Spread Extensive 11. 85 0.00001 
Building category Home 10.42 0.00001 
Previous invol vement Not 7.89 0.00001 
Sex Women 5.83 0.00001 
Age Young 4.27 0.001 
Training No 3.77 0.01 
Familiarity 2.38 n.s. 
Presence of smoke 2.26 n. s. 
Time 0.89 n.s. 
13.2.2 RE-ENTRY BEHAVIOUR 
The results of the analysis in terms of the main effects of the 
variables upon whether or not an individual returned into the building 
are summarised in Tab le 104 be low. 
TABLE 104. Main effects of variables on re-entry behaviour 
Variable Level Z-score Significance level 
Sex Men 6.22 0.00001 
Smoke Spread Les s extens i ve 4.55 0.0001 
Presence of smoke Present 2.71 0.01 
Previous involvement 1.97 n.s. 
Familiarity 1.92 n. s. 
Time 1.92 n .s. 
Building category 1. 80 n.s. 
Age 0.71 n. s. 
Training 0.31 n.s. 
It will be noted that the values of the Z-scores for re-entry 
behaviour do not reach such extreme levels as for evacuation, nor do so. 
many of the variables have a significant effect. 
13.2.3 MOVEMENT THROUGH SMOKE 
The results of the analysis in terms of the main effects of the 
variables upon whether or not an individual moved through smoke are 
summarised in Table 105 overleaf. 
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TABLE 105. Main effects of variables on movement through smoke 
Variable Level Z-score Significance level 
Sex Men 4.67 0.0001 
Smoke Spread Extensive 4.56 0.0001 
Building category Home 4.37 0.0001 
Time 4.37 0.0001 
Farni li ari ty Completely 3.05 0.01 
Previous involvement 0.96 n.s. 
Age 0.66 n.s. 
Training 0.37 n.s . 
.In the case of movemen t through smoke, we appear to have a number 
of variables which act with similar strength. Again it is of interest 
that the Non-Personal variables generally seem to be of either equal or 
greater importance than many Personal variables, in determin~ng this 
type of behaviour. 
We wi 11 now turn our attention to considering the significant 
interactions between the variables. 
13.3 INTERACTIONS INVOLVING EVACUATION BEHAVIOUR 
Three first order interactions were significant, no lower order 
interactions attaining the 0.01 level of probability .. The significant 
interactions will be discussed in descending order of Z-score value. ' 
Ct) training and Smoke Spread CZ-score = 3.06, significance level 0.01) 
The findings for this analysis were as follows: 
Ca) Differences in training only affect evacuation behaviour under 
conditions of less extensive Smoke Spread. Under these conditions, 
people who have received training tend to leave less frequently 
than those who have not. 
Cb) The proportion of people leaving the building is much greater when 
the smoke spreads extensively than when it does not. 
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(H) Building category and Familiari ty (Z-score" 2.83, signif level 0.01) 
The findings for this analysis were as follows: 
(a) Differences in familiarity only affect evacuation behaviour in the 
home environment, increasing familiari ty tending to increase the' 
proportion of people leaving. 
(b) The proportion of people leaving the home environment is greater 
than in the work environment, irrespective of familiarity. 
(iii) Building category and Presence of Smoke (Z-score" 2. 74,signif leveIO.OI) 
The findings for this analysis were as follows: 
(a) The presence or absence of smoke only affects evacuation behaviour 
in the work environment. In these category buildings, the presence 
of smoke acts to increase the proportion of people leaving. 
(b) The proportion of people leaving the home environment is greater 
than in the work environment, irrespective of whether smoke is 
present or absent. 
13.4 INTERACTIONS INVOLVING RE-ENTRY BEHAVIOUR 
Orily one first order interaction was significant, no lower order 
interactions attaining the 0.01 level of probability. 
(i) Age and Presence of smoke (Z-score = 2.59, signif level 0.01) 
The findings for this analysis were as follows: 
(a) The presence or absence of smoke only affects the re-entry behaviour 
of young people. For these people, the presence of smoke acts to 
increase the proportion who return into the building. 
(b) When smoke is present, the proportion of people who return into the 
building is independent of age. 
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13.5 INTERACTIONS INVOLVING MOVEMENT THROUGH SMOKE 
Again, only one first order interaction was significant, no lower 
order interactions attaining the 0.01 level of probability. 
Ci) Time and Smoke Spread CZ-score= 2.62, signif level 0.01) 
The findings for this analysis were as follows: 
Ca) The extent of Smoke Spread only affects whether or not individuals 
move through smoke in night-time incidents. Under these conditions, 
the proportion of people who move through smoke increases as the 
smoke spreads more extensively. 
Cb) Under conditions of extensive Smoke Spread, the proportion of people 
who move through smoke is independent of whether it is night-time 
or daytime. 
13.6 DISCUSSION 
The major point concerning the factorial analysis is that in most 
cases the main effects are clearly much more important than the 
interactions. This is particularly true in the case of evacuation 
behaviour, where the action of increased Smoke Spread, home environment, 
non-previous involvement, women rather than men, and young rather than 
old, are up to four times more powerful than the interaction effects. 
Thus whilst the interactions are of interest, we should not lose sight 
of their relative position. 
Examining all the significant main effects which act to increase 
evacuation behaviour, it would appear that three factors may be operating. 
Firstly there is a component associated with increased threat level, 
secondly one associated with increased susceptibility to be threatened, 
and thirdly an element concerned with the practical, ease-of-ability in 
leaving. The first of these .is illustrated by the presence of smoke and 
extensive Smoke Spread, the second by lack of training or previous 
! 
experience of fire and "femaleness", and the third by home environment, 
youth and complete familiarity with thebuildiilg'.,. 
Of the significant main effects which act to increase re-entry 
behaviour, we might well have predicted that less extensive Smoke Spread 
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would act in this way, and perhaps also that men would be more likely to 
undertake this behaviour; however the fact that it is more common in 
incidents where smoke is present than where it is absent is resistent to 
reasonable explanation. 
A similar predicament arises when considering the main effects which 
act to increase the proportion of people moving through smoke. Four of 
the five significant main effects act in a predictable direction, a 
greater proportion of men, in the home who are completely familiar with 
the building, during daylight attempting this behaviour. However the 
association of high levels of Smoke Spread with more frequent movement 
through smoke seem less reasonable. Extensive Smoke Spread has been 
characterised earlier as a potent threat cue, and yet it does not appear 
to act in this way in discouraging movement through smoke. The simple 
explanation may be that in incidents where smoke spreads extensively, any 
movement in the building will involve movement through smoke. 
Ni th regard to the interactions which increase evacuation, it is 
instructive that two of these show strongly the main effect of the home 
environment. Individuals appear to leave the home environment much more 
frequently, despite changes in other variables. These differences 
between the working environment and home environment may reflect the 
fact that at work individuals may be "evacuated", that is, ordered to 
leave the building. Obviously the presence of smoke is likely to make 
such an instructed evacuation more likely, and also accounts for the fact 
that evacuation at work is independent of familiarity. If we consider 
why familiarity with the building should only act on people in the home, 
we should first give thought to with which category of "home" building· 
people are less than completely familiar. The ans\~er in the present case 
is high-rise flats. We are therefore seeing an interaction which reflects 
one category of dwellings only. The third interaction relating to 
evacuation, that between Smoke Spread and training, is of some interest. 
It would seem from this interaction that the increased threat of 
extensive Smoke Spread largely obscures any differences in training. We 
might suggest that extensive Smoke Spread is a much more powerful agent 
for increasing threat than training is for reducing it. 
The interaction of the presence of smoke and age in relation to re-
entry behaviour is again difficult to interpret. It would certainly 
seem that young people perceive much less threat in the presence of smoke 
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than do older people, although whether this reflects over-confidence on 
the part of the young or superior knowledge on the part of the old, we 
can only conjecture. 
The variables which act differentially on movement through smoke 
are also probably not explicable in terms of threat level. In this case, 
night-time and extensive Smoke Spread both serve to increase the 
proportion of people who move through smoke. It is likely that the 
previously-offered explanation that, under such conditions, any movement 
whatsoever is likely to be through smoke, applies. 
This chapter concludes the quantitative examination of data. In the 
following three chapters we will example a sub-sample of incidents, those 
including rescues, injuries and fatalities, in a qualitative manner. 
C H A P TE R 14 
QUALITATIVE EXAMINATION OF INCIDENTS 
INVOLVING NON-FATAL INJURIES 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- -
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14.0 A QUALITATIVE EXAMINATION OF INCIDENTS INVOLVING NON-FATAL INJURIES 
Of the 952 fire incidents covered in the Full-Scale Study, 52 (55%) 
involved non-fatal injuries to one or more people. In this section we 
will examine a selection of these particular incidents in some detail. 
Of the 52 incidents involving non-fatal injuries, 44 were Dwelling 
fires, 2 were in Garages and 1 each in a Hotel, Warehouse, Factory and 
Shop·. 
14.1 NON-DWELLING INCIDENTS INVOLVING INJURIES 
Ci) Incident 66 - Hotel 
This fire, which was perhaps among the potentially most serious of 
the sample, occurred at 2136 in an eight-storey hotel in Central London. 
(It has the distinction of being the fire with the largest. number of 
people interviewed at a single incident in the Present Study, 12.) It 
was a 3 Jet fire with a calculated Fire Severity Index of 25. All 300 
occupants of the building were evacuated, 2 received non-fatal injuries. 
and 12 were rescued by Fire Brigade personnel (one of whom was interviewed). 
This is clearly one of a relatively small percentage of incidents 
where the occupants were either completely unfamiliar with the building 
or only slightly familiar with it, and it is interesting to observe that 
the 12 people interviewed either immediately left the building, or began 
, some preparations to do so. This applied not only to those on the same 
floor as the fire (the sixth), but also those on'floors below it. 
The person who was rescued by turntable ladder, a woman aged 23, was 
on thc_sixth_floor. She smelt smoke and thought the fire was "extremely 
serious". She actually tried to leave the building by going down the 
• Of the total 52 fires which included non-fatal injuries, 1 Factory fire 
and 1 Dwelling fire also involved fatalities. Similarly, of the 13 
incidents involving rescues, 1 Factory and 1 Dwelling fire also involved. 
fatalities. These incidents have been excluded from the analyses in this 
section. The total number of incidents which involved injury but not a 
fatality is thus 50. The total number of incidents which involved rescue 
but not a fatality is 11. Discussion of incidents which involve 
fatalities will be deferred until Chapter 15. 
257 
corridor, but the smoke became too thick and she had to turn back to her 
room. She then went to the bathroom to get a wet flannel for her face, 
climbed onto a ledge outside the building and waited to be rescued. It 
is interesting that another occupant on the sixth floor in trying to 
leave was also turned back by the thickness of the smoke. She also 
returned to her room, and put a wet towel over her face. She was then 
able to leave by using an emergency exit. 
A further interesting point from that fire is that all of the 12 
people interviewed spontaneously mentioned saving some personal effects, 
not an action which is common in other types of incident. 
The two individuals who were injured were attempting to leave the 
building at the time, and collapsed in the dense smoke. They were 
rescued by Fire Brigade personnel wearing breathing apparatus. Their 
injuries amounted to no more than the effects of smoke inhalation. 
One thing is clear from this incident, that the first reaction of 
'individuals in an unfamiliar building is to attempt to leave immediately, 
and they will pursue this course of action even in the face of quite 
dense smoke. In this case the people injured received their injuries 
whilst actually trying to do this, and in some ways were fortunate to be 
alive. The 23 year old woman interviewee who was rescued may be 
considered to have behaved more sensibly. 
(ii) Incident 60 - Factory 
This fire occurred at 0918 in a single-storey engineering factory 
in Glasgow. Thirty of the forty people in the building were evacuated, 
one of whom received injuries in trying to escape. It was a single Jet 
fire with a calculated Fire Severity Index of 12. 
Of the 6 people interviewed, 5 were very close to the fire, and 
their first awareness of it was seeing the flames. Not a single one of 
the interviewees mentions warning other people, (or indeed fighting the 
fire). All seemed concerned only with getting themselves out of the 
building, for example, the First Actions of four of them (all men) were 
..• "Hurried to Fire Exit" •.• and ... "Ran away from it" .,. and 
"Ran for Exit" ... and "Grabbed jacket and ran for an Exit door". This 
is really quite unusual, in that if six people were interviewed, at least 
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one would usually have been concerned with warning other people, raising 
a general alarm, or perhaps contacting the Fire Brigade. In this case 
we do not know how the injured person received his injuries, nor their 
extent. None of those interviewed had to move through smoke and it is 
likely that the injuries were received in an over-hasty attempt at 
evacuation, rather than as a direct result of the fire. 
In view of the fact that this was a single-storey building, and that 
therefore no-one could possibly be trapped above the fire, .•• that there 
was a fire alarm in the building, but it was not used, •.. that there was 
fire-fighting equipment in the building, but this also was not used, .. , 
that five of the six interviewees had received some training, but all 
left the building immediately, this seems a most untypicalrfactory fire. 
(iii) Incident 531. - Garage 
This fire started when a 40 year old mechanic was welding a car •. 
The car caught fire, as did the man's clothing. His actions make 
interesting, and rather horrifying reading. He said that he 
"Ran from the garage and beat out the burning clothing on his person" 
"Attempted to get the car out of the garage, but the heat and flames 
developed too rapidly" 
"Ran out of the garage and asked someone to call the Fire Brigade". 
Astoundingly he then returned'in and tried to move the car out of the 
garage again. He was obviously concerned about the quantities of oil, 
petrol, etc, which were present. However, his actions seem either 
fOOlhardy or brave for someone who was subsequently treated for burns, 
albeit minor ones. The fire was eventually extinguished by the Fire 
-------------- .. 
Brigade using 2 hose-reels, and the Fire Severi ty Index was calculated to 
be 14. 
The reason for the injury in this case is simple, the man was 
welding without taking proper precautions. He also compounded this by 
not having an extinguisher close to hand whilst welding, and the combination. 
of these errors together with his rather ill-considered actions could have 
resulted in his injuries being much more serious. 
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(i v) Incident 886 - Warehouse 
This fire occurred at 2213 in a large single-storey warehouse 
adjacent to a textiles factory. Two people were injured by inhaling 
smoke whilst fighting the fire. It was a most severe fire, requiring 8 
Jets, and the Fire Severity Index was calculated to be 36. The actions 
of the six interviewees make an interesting contrast with those in the 
earlier-discussed factory incident (number 60). A sample of their 
stated actions is given below. 
"Dialled emergency code for factory and informed security of the fire" 
"Helped to evacuate other Departments" 
"Operated internal fire alarm" 
"Closed fire door to other Department" 
"Tried to help as best I could". 
All the comments were of this nature, and ranged through fighting or 
containing the fire to warning others or helping evacuation. All of those 
interviewed moved through smoke at some stage of the incident. 
As will be realised, the general level of cooperation, concern with 
containing the fire and for the safety of others is completely different 
from the behaviour manifested in Incident 60. 
Perhaps the explanation lies in the level of training of the two 
groups. In Incident 60, 4 of those involved had received training "at 
least once per year", whereas in Incident 886, only 1 of those interviewed 
recei ved training as infrequently as this, the others having received 
training either at least every six months (2) or at least every month (3). 
It would seem_therefore that this difference in frequency, and perhaps 
quality of training, makes an enormous difference to the behaviour which 
occurs when there is a fire.· 
One other difference between the incidents, which may be .. complete ly 
irrelevant, is that Incident 886 occurred in Liverpool while Incident 60 
occurred in Glasgow. At the anecdotal level, Liverpudlians are said to 
be particularly close-knit as a group. However this is merely a 
speculative thought. 
-----.-----
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l4.2~ DWELLING INCIDENTS INVOLVING INJURIES 
With the greater number of fires in this group, it is feasible to 
inspect the incidents for both commonality of cause and ways in which 
injuries occur. It is not possible to identify the cause of fire in 
every case, but the 24 identifiable cases are shown in Table 106 below. 
TABLE 106. Causes of D\~elling fires 
involving Injuries 
Cause of fire Frequency 
Chip pan catching fire 15 
Smoking in bed 5 
TV fire 2 
Gas oven"explosion 2 
Paraffin heater fire 2 
Cause unknown 18 
Total 26 
,I 
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It can be seen that chip pan fires far outnumber any other single cause 
of fire involving injury. 
If instead of looking at the cause of fire we examine how the injury 
was caused, we can see again that one particular category stands out and 
this is illustrated in Table 107 below. 
: 
TABLE 107. Cause of Injury in Dwelling 
fires 
Cause of fire Frequency 
Attempt to move 17 burning object 
- Blast from explosion 2 
Smoke inhalation whilst 4 trying to rescue pets 
Children being dropped 1 from window 
In attempting to rescue 1 
a child 
Cause unknown 19 
Total 44 
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The simple breakdowns shown in Tables 106 and 107 give us some framework 
for qualitatively examining injury-producing dwelling fires. 
14.2.1 CHIP PAN FIRES 
With 15 identified cases, this group is the largest of those where 
we know the cause of fire. Not only does it figure large in causes of 
fire, but 13 of the 17 cases where injury was caused by attempting to 
move the burning object are attributable to chip pan fires. Since they 
are clearly such a common type of fire we will consider them in a more 
general way in Section 14.3. Meanwhile, we will examine some examples 
of incidents which occurred in the Present Study. 
(i) Incident 227 
This fire started at lunchtime, the 25 year old wife discovered the 
fire, and attempted to remove the chip pan from the cooker. In doing 
this she fell with the burning pan, which she then abandoned and dragged 
her young child from the kitchen. She was burned in dropping the pan. 
Her 29 year old husband heard shouts from his wife and arrived at the 
kitchen in time to see his wife drop the pan. He helped her out, went 
to the living room and removed the other child. He then re-entered the 
kitchen, switched-off the cooker and left the house to dial 999. 
(ii) Incident 442 
This fire occurred in the mid-afternoon. A 32 year old \~oman was 
alone in the house when she smelt smoke. On discovering the chip pan was 
on fire she removed the hot pan from the cooker, burning herself in the 
process, and threw it out of the door. She then dialled 999 and fainted. 
(Hi) Incident 516 
This fire occurred on the first floor of a three-storey block of 
flats at 1730. The 60 
the ki tchen. 
year old wife 
She went back 
discovered the chip pan ablaze on 
to the living room and told her entering 
husband. He directed her to switch-off the electricity supply at the 
mains which she did. Meanwhile he went into the kitchen, picked up the 
chip pan and carried it through the living room onto the verandah of the 
flat; while doing this he received burns. He then threw the pan onto 
the ground. 
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(iv) Incident 642 
This fire also occurred in a first floor maisonette of a three-
storey block of flats. The 30 year old wife saw the smoke from the 
burning chip pan and shouted to her husband. He entered the kitchen, 
picked up the pan and carried it to the outside door, which he told his 
wife to open for him. As she did this, the fire flared-up with the 
draught from the open door, and flames and burning fat went over the wife. 
The husband threw the pan outside. 
(v) Incident 838 
. This fire occurred at 1818 in a dwelling. The 72 year old woman, 
who lived alone, first discovered the fire by seeing smoke. She went into 
the kitchen and discovered the burning chip pan. She turned the gas off 
at the cooker, opened the back door, removed the pan from the cooker and 
took it outside, receiving burns as she did so. She finally threw a pan 
of water over the still-burning pan. 
(vi) Incident 478 
This fire occurred at midday in the ground floor flat of a three-
storey block of flats. The 89 year old wife discovered the fire and told 
her 92 year old husband. He went into the kitchen, removed the chip pan 
from the cooker and threw it outside onto the steps, receiving burns as 
he did so. His wife meanwhile removed the rug from the kitchen floor 
lest burning fat should drop on it. 
These six incidents clearly illustrate the course of events in many 
chip pan fires. The circumstances and behaviour of those involved is 
amazingly similar. They are examples of the main way in which injuries 
occur in these incidents. A slight variation on this theme is provided 
by the further examples given below. 
(vii) Incident 457 
This fire occurred in a dwelling at lunchtime. The two male 
occupants became aware of the fire roughly at the same time. One dashed 
into the kitchen and covered the burning pan with a towel. and then went 
and switched-off the electricity at the mains. Meanwhile his companion 
ran up to the bathroom to fetch more towels, which the first man put over 
263 
the pan. Unfortunately the towels failed to extinguish the fire, so the 
man picked up the pan and threw it out, being burned as he did so. The 
other man then rang for the Fire Brigade. 
(viii) Incident 509 
This fire also occurred in a dwelling at lunchtime. The 57 year old 
wife discovered the fire and shouted to her 58 year old husband that the 
chip pan was on fire. He ran into the kitchen and put a wet cloth over 
the chip pan. He then attempted to take the chip pan outside, whereupon 
burning fat splashed onto him. 
(ix) Incident 779 
This fire occurred in a dwelling occupied by a 23 year old man, his 
wife and young child, at lunchtime. The man first became of the fire by 
seeing smoke and he went to investigate the cause. When he saw the chip 
pan was on fire he looked for an old coat which he threw over it. He then 
attempted to move the pan out of the building, and received burns to 
his arms. 
(x) Incident 346 
This fire occurred in the evening on the second floor of a three-
storey block of flats. The 37 year old wife discovered the fire and 
shouted to her 50 year old husband. He grabbed an extinguisher and tried 
to put the fire out. He was unsuccessful in quenching the fire so he 
tried to carry the pan outside. He was burned whilst attempting to do this. 
We can see in these four examples that although the final outcome is 
the same~as in the previous six fires, the events which led up to the 
injury are Slightly different. In these cases an attempt was made to 
extinguish the chip pan fire in the approved manner (except for Incident 346), 
and only when the approved fire-fighting technique appeared to fail, did 
someone try to move the pan and thus receive injuries. In the case of 
Incident 346, this would seem to illustrate the ineffectiveness of many 
small fire extinguishers sold for household use. The Fire Services do 
not generally approve of them, suggesting that they may impart a false 
sense of security, whilst at the same time not having the capacity to 
deal with something like a chip pan fire, as was the case in this incident. 
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Before moving on to discuss other types of injury-producing dwelling 
fires, we should note that one particular chip pan fire contained the 
ingredients for a horrifying multiple-fatality incident. It is described 
below. 
(xi) Incident 413 
This fire occurred at 2245 in a first floor flat over a ground floor 
shop. Two young girls, aged 10 and 13 years, had been left in the house 
to look after a young baby whilst their parents were out. When the 13 
year old girl smelt smoke she went to investigate. On discovering the 
chip pan (which had been left on the cooker over a low light) ablaze, she 
telephoned an aunt. She then took the pan from the cooker and put it in 
the sink, receiving burns to her arms whilst doing this. She then left 
the building. Her 10 year old sister had meanwhile picked up the baby, 
come downstairs and gone outside. 
It is clear that had the fire been allowed to develop for only a 
little longer, all three children might easily have perished. 
14.2.2 ATTEMPTS TO MOVE THE BURNING OBJECT 
We have seen that almost all the chip pan fires involved injuries 
recei ved whilst carrying the burning chip pan. However this type of 
reaction is not confined to chip pan incidents alone. Two examples from 
other types of incident are given below. 
(i) Incident 80 
This fire occurred at 0936 in a dwelling. A 30 year old man, his 
26 year old wife and young child were present in the building. The 
woman was smoking in bed, with her small son in a cot in the same second 
floor bedroom. She must have dozed-off to sleep because when she awoke 
she realised the bed was on fire. She called out to her husband and 
removed her small son from his cot. The husband ran upstairs to help her, 
and they then tried to push the burning bed through the bedroom window, 
breaking the glass in the process, while at the same time shouting to the 
neighbours to phone the Fire Brigade. When they realised the bed would 
not go through the window, they then tried to take the bed downstairs; 
however the still-burning bed became lodged halfway down, scorching the 
---------~~---.. -
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side of the stairs. At this stage the woman sustained burns to· her leg 
and foot. The husband eventually pulled the bed clear and got it outside. 
He then returned into the building to remove clothes and other material 
which had set fire during the passage of the bed. 
(ii) Incident 832 
This fire occurred at 2215 on the second floor of a three-storey 
mUlti-occupancy dwelling. It developed into quite a severe fire, needing 
2 hose-reels to extinguish it, and the Fire Severity Index was calculated 
at 18. Four people were rescued by Fire Brigade personnel and three 
sustained injuries. What appears to have happened is that a paraffin 
heater caught fire in the room of a 60 year old man. He then tried to 
remove the burning heater (to the bedroom); however he "accidentally 
dropped it downstairs" in transit. He thereupon shouted to the other 
occupants to get out and made his own exit through the bathroom window 
onto a roof, from whence he was subsequently rescued by the Fire Brigade. 
It is clear from the evidence of Incidents 80 and 832 that the act of 
moving the burning object not only led to the person involved getting 
burned, but also endangered the lives of other occupants of the building, 
and probably substantially contributed to the eventual severity of the fire. 
14.2.3 INJURIES SUSTAINED ON RETURNING INTO THE BUILDING 
Although not as numerous as chip pan fires, ~ith 5 cases this is the 
second largest group. Four of these are strikingly similar in that the 
individual returned into the building to attempt to rescue a pet. These 
four incidents are briefly discussed below. 
(i) Ii!ciaent362 
This fire occurred at 0039 on the ground floor of a two-storey 
dwelling house. The fire \;as very severe for a domestic one. It needed 
2 Jets to extinguish it, the Fire Severity Index was calculated at 21, 
and was charaCterised by very dense smoke ("7" on the Fire Brigade scale). 
The sole occupant of the building, a man of aged 21, first became aware 
of the fire by smelling smoke. He then attempted to put the fire out, 
but when this was unsuccessful he ran into the hallway and dialled 999. 
He then decided to return into the building" ••. to rescue (the) bird and 
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hamster in cages". In doing this he inhaled a lot of smoke and fumes, 
for which he had to be treated at hospital. 
(ii) Incident 357 
This fire started at 1220 on the first floor of a three-storey multi-
occupancy building. It was a single Jet fire and the Fire Severity Index 
was calculated at 16. Two of the occupants remained in the building, 
however the third, a man aged 23 years who was on the ground floor, 
believing the fire to be "extremely serious", immediately made his exit 
via a ground floor window. On arriving outside he then re-entered the 
building in an attempt to rescue the dog, and this caused his injuries 
due to inhalation of smoke. 
(iii) Incident 31 
TIlis fire occurred at 1931 on the ground floor of a two-storey 
dwelling. It was not a very severe fire, and the Fire Severity Index was 
calculated at 9; however there was extensive Smoke Spread throughout the 
building. The two occupants of the building were a man and his wife, 
both in their late forties. The wife smelt smoke, and she and her husband 
tried to smother the fire. They both left the building, the wife phoning 
the Fire Brigade. She then returned into the building to find the dog, 
and had to subsequently be treated for smoke inhalation. 
(iv) Incident 547 
This fire occurred at 0841 on the ground floor of a two-storey 
dwelling. One hose-reel was used in extinguishing it, the Fire Severity 
Index was calculated at 17 and there was fairly extensive spread of 
dense smoke. The sole occupant of the building, a man aged 40 years, 
first realised there was a fire by smelling smoke. He then investigated, 
dashed to the phone to ring the Fire Brigade, and then retreated out of 
the building. He subsequently returned into the building " .•. to rescue 
animals", and suffered injury due to inhalation of smoke. 
The similarity of behaviour in these incidents is very clear. 
Whilst ownership of pets is obviously a common factor, this in itself is 
not unusual, some 28% of households in the UK own a dog (Joint National 
Committee on Pets in Society, 1975), and it is estimated that some 5 
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million households keep a caged bird CSecombs, 1978). What appear to be 
the critical factors are, a fire which is perceived as serious, leading 
to fairly immediate exit from the building, and the incident being one in 
which there is extensive spread of dense smoke. It 'is interesting that in 
two of the incidents the person was living alone; and one might intuitively 
expect the incidence of pet-ownership to be higher where people do live 
alone. Although in the cases considered the injury sustained may not 
have been serious, where there was only one person involved in the 
incident, and they return into a smoke-filled building, they are taking 
a very great risk, and the incident could easily lead to collapse whilst 
in the building and fatal inhalation of smoke and fumes. 
The one other incident which involved injuries received on returning 
into the building is of a different type, and is.briefly outlined below. 
Cv) Incident 753 
This fire occurred at 1521 on the ground floor of a two-storey 
dwelling. Again this was a very severe fire for a dwelling, needing 2 
Jets and having a calculated Fire Severity Index of 22. There were 5 
occupants, a man and his wife, both aged 28, and their three young 
children. The adults both became aware of the fire by seeing flames and 
both thought it "extremely serious". The wife told the husband to get 
the small child who was in the bedroom on the first floor. She then ran 
out of the house. The husband lifted the two other children into the 
garden through a ground floor window, and then ran out of the back door, 
round to the front door, into the hall and up the stairs to rescue the 
small child from the bedroom. He then told his next door neighbour to 
ring for the Fire Brigade. He received his injuries in rescuing the 
small child. 
14.3 DISCUSSION 
Examination of the non-fatal injury incidents which occurred in the 
Present Study reveals that Ca) the range of injury-types is very limited, 
and Cb) the manner in which these injuries are sustained is also not 
subject to wide variation. 
Basically, we can categorise our injury-incidents by combining 
injury-type/manner of occurrence in the following way: 
I 
268 
(a) Burns, sustained by moving a burning object. 
(b) Smoke-inhalation, sustained on returning into the building, in many 
cases to rescue a pet. 
(c) Cuts, bruises and abrasions, sustained in leaving the building in a 
non-standard way, usually through a window. 
Of these three categories by far the largest is burns, and within 
that category the majority of incidents involve chip pan fires. Since 
these cases comprise such a large proportion of injury-incidents, it is 
considered worthwhile examining other sources of information relating to 
their occurrence and characteristics. 
The first point which must be made is that in the Present Study, as 
in all others, data on chip pan fires only exists for those incidents 
which result in the attendance of the Fire Brigade. What evidence there 
is suggests that these may represent only a small fraction.of the total 
number of chip pan fires which occur, the majority, presumably, being 
dealt with by the individual involved. One study, for example, showed 
that less than 5% of respondents who claimed to have had a chip pan fire 
actually called the Fire Brigade (Research Services, 1976). 
Recent studies of Home Accidents (Roberts et aI, 1974; Dept of Prices 
and Consumer Protection, 1976) have shown that some 24% of the incidents 
occur in the kitchen, and of these, a large proportion involve burns. 
Other information (Dep~ of the Environment, 1974) confirms that fires 
originating in cooking appliances are responsible for a major, and 
increasing, proportion of fires in dwellings over the preceding 5 years. 
This point is clearly illustrated by reference to Table 108 overleaf which 
shows the percentage contribution of cooking fires to all fires in 
dwellings. It can be seen that over the period shown, cooking fires have 
increased by 5772 (56.5%), whilst all domestic fires have increased by 
9796 (22.7%). 
Preliminary information on more recent fires suggests that in 1973, 
the absolute number of fires in cooking appliances has risen to 18288, 
which represents some 33.0% of all domestic fires. If we examine the 
contribution of fat-fires to this total, we find that these represent 
nearly 80% of the fires originating in cooking appliances. Reverting to 
1972 figures (Dept of the Environment, op cl t), it can be seen that of the 
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TABLE 108. Percentage contribution of cooking appliance fires to 
all domestic fires, 1968-1972. 
Number of Total number % contribution 
Year fires involving of domestic of cooking 
cooking appliances fires fires 
1968 10212 43072 23.7 
1969 11432 45872 24.9 
1970 12468 45305 27.5 
1971 13745 45955 29.9 
1972 15984 52868 30.2 
Source: UK Fire and Loss Statistics 1972 (Dept of the Environment, 1974) 
15984 incidents involving cooking appliances, some 851 (5.3%) incidents 
involved a casualty. In 34 cases the injuries received were fatal, and 
in 935 cases non-fatal. It can thus be seen that in terms of sheer 
numbers, chip pan and other fat fires represent a considerable problem. 
Examination of the chip pan fires discussed in this chapter suggests 
that often the fires start whilst the people involved are not actually in 
the kitchen. This finding is supported by evidence from Andrews (1969) 
in which 58 (88%) of a sample of 66 people who had been involved in chip 
pan fires said they were absent from the kitchen at the time of ignition. 
In the Present Study it was possible in only 5 of the cases 
involving injury to identify what type of cooker was involved (4 electric, 
1 gas). An examination of UK Fire and Loss Statistics for the years 1968 
to 1972 shows that the total nUlllber of fires involving electric cookers 
was at least twice that for gas cookers, as is clea·r from Table 109 below. 
TABLE 109.-Fires in dwellings associated with gas and electric 
cooking appliances, 1968-1972. 
Cooker power 
source 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Electric 6816 7696 8507 9512 11305 
Gas 3396 3736 3961 4233 4679 
Total 10212 11432 12468 13745 15984 
Proportion 2.00 2.06 2.15 2.25 2.42 
electric/gas 
Source: UK Fire and Loss Statistics for 1972 (Dept of the Environment,1974) 
------ - - --------------------------------------------------
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If we examine these figures in relation to the estimated number of 
households using gas and electricity for cooking purposes, as shown in 
Table llD, we can see that the incidence (that is the rate per 100,000 
households) of cooking fires involving electric cookers is over four 
timos that for gas cookers. 
TABLE llO. Incidence of fat pan fires according to cooker power 
source, 1973. 
Cooker power Fat pan fires UK households Rate per 
source in dwellings· using power .. 100,000 
source households 
Gas 3500 10.8 million 32.4 
Electric 10000 7.5 million 133.3 
Total 13500 18.3 million 73.8 
Source: UK Fire and Loss Statistics for 1973 
(Dept of the Environment, 1977) 
A number of reasons have been suggested to account for the widely 
different risk associated with the power source of the cooker and they 
are listed below. I 
1 
(a) Control confusion (on electric cookers). Some control knobs can be ·1 
(b) 
turned through 3600 in either directions. As the "stop" on the 
control wears with use it is possible to turn the knob "through" the 
"OFF" position to "FULL ON". In addition to this possibility, since 
electric cookers can be turned "OFF" both at the mains switch 
(usually on the wall above and behind the cooker), or through 
individual controls to each ring, it is possible to switch "OFF" at 
the main switch, whilst leaving the control to an individual ring 
sti 11 in the "ON" position. 
inadvertantly activate that 
Any subsequent user of the cooker may 
ring when switching the main switch "ON". 
Audibility and visibility of the flame (on gas cookers). Since gas 
cooker burners give much stronger audible and visible cues when they 
are in use, it is thought possible that they are therefore less 
likely to be left "ON". 
* These figures are obtained by multiplying the number of cooking fires 
under each power. source by the proportion of these fires which can be 
attributed to fat (80%). Where the power source is unknown, this has 
been split proportionately between gas and electriCity, and added to the 
total under each heading. 
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(c) Heat retention (on electric cookers). Once a gas burner is switched 
"OFF", it does not retain a substantial degree of heat, \qhereas an 
electric cooker hotplate does for a considerable time. 
(d) Increased heating rate (on electric cookers). More modern designs 
of electric cookers have much more efficient rings than previous 
models. The user may be unfamiliar with the more rapid speed of 
heating and thus leave a pan on it for too long. 
(e) Fat spillage. If droplets of fat are spilled when a pan is being 
heated they can fall through the gas flame without ignition, 
whereas they will fall onto the hot plate of'an electric cooker. 
All the above alternatives provide superficially attractive explanations 
for the occurrence of chip pan fires. There is however no hard evidence 
to suggest which, if any, either singly or in combination, is responsible. 
Examination of the incidents discussed in Section 14.2.1 illustrates 
clearly that injuries were largely sustained due to the inappropriate 
actions of the peop le involved. This aspect has also received attention 
in an earlier study (Chambers, 1967) which examined the methods used in 
dealing with chip pan fires. Briefly, he found that the risk of 
sustaining injury is greatly increased when the pan of hot fat is handled 
directly. To quote from this report" .•. the action which stands out as 
completely inappropriate is removal of the pan out of doors. Although 
the fire is usually prevented from doing much damage to the room, IS 
fires dealt with in this way resulted in six serious injuries (out of 
only eight injuries identified in the whole study)". This report was 
based upon 100 cases. 
In summary, it is likely that the injury-incidents which can be 
identified-as chip pan fires in the Present Study represent only a small 
proportion of the total number of chip pan fires within the Study Sample. 
They are a result of the individual choosing the most inappropriate 
method of dealing with the fire, attempting to move the burning pan. 
Indeed evidence from non-chip pan incidents considered in this chapter 
suggest that we can generalise with some certainty, that this type of 
behaviour is not only ill-advised for chip pans, but for any type of 
burning object, be it a bed, a TV set, a paraffin heater, or any other 
superficially portable item. 
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For those incidents which involve smoke inhalation received on 
returning into the building, it seems likely that they could, with only 
very slight changes in the circumstances, have had much more serious 
consequences. Whilst such behaviour in attempting to rescue a child is 
completelY understandable to most people, in the case of attempts to 
rescue pets, it is perhaps a reaction which is peculiar to a nation 
popularly supposed to be "animal lovers". Only a cross-cultural study 
could test this hypothesis. 
--------
CHAPTER 15 
~UALITATIVE EXAMINATION OF INCIDENTS 
INVOLVING FIRE BRIGADE RESCUES 
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15.0 QUALITATIVE EXAMINATION OF INCIDENTS INVOLVING FIRE BRIGADE RESCUES 
At only 15 incidents, fires from which people were rescued by Fire 
Brigade personnel are only a small percentage of the total incidents. 
Four-fifths of these incidents are in the general category of "Dwellings", 
and nine of these are in the specific categories of blocks of flats, 
mUlti-occupancy dwellings or flats over a shop. The remaining, non-
dwelling fires, occurred in a Hotel (Incident 66, which has already been 
discussed in Section 14.1), a Factory (Incident 884, which also involved 
a fatality, and will be discussed in Chapter 15) and a Boiler House. 
Since rescues from dwellings predominate in the Present Study we will 
confine the discussion here to this general category of building. 
15.1 RESCUES FROM ONE OR TWO-STOREY DWELLING HOUSES 
As mentioned above, all but 3 of the 12 "Dwelling" fires were in 
some form of flat. Of these three, 2 occurred in two-storey dwelling 
houses and 1 in a single-storey house. The incident in the bungalow is 
somewhat anomalous, and the circumstances are outlined below. 
(i) Incident 128 
The fire occurred at 1923. The interviewee, a girl of 15, had been 
left alone in the single-storey dwelling by her parents. When she 
discovered the fire (which she thought was "extremely serious") in the 
living room, she immediately closed the living room door and telephoned 
her parents. She then quickly left the house with the dog. She had not 
actually telephoned the Fire Brigade; her parents were doing this. In 
the period whilst she was outside, her parents telephoned her again. 
Guessing it was her parents, she re-entered the building to answer the 
phone. (As she stated when asked why she 'had returned into the building, 
" •.• phone rang ••• required to hear parent".) By this time the fire had 
developed and,in the smoke ,she became, disoriented, and had to be rescued 
by the Fire Brigade who had now arrived. 
It is clear that the rescue of this girl only became necessary 
because (a) her parents rang her back, and (b) she felt impelled to 
answer the phone knowing it was them. It is possible that she had not 
communicated to them just how serious the fire was (objectively it was 
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quite a severe dwelling fire, requiring 1 Jet and having a Fire Severity 
Index of 16), although this seems unlikely as she not only rated the 
fire as "extremely serious" but once she had telephoned them, had in her 
own words "ran out of house with dog". It may be that her parents were 
merely ringing to reassure the girl that the Fire Brigade were on their 
way. We can of course only speculate on the content or intent of the 
telephone conversations; however the girl's return into the building 
prompted by the ringing of the telephone could easily have led to her 
demise, as the smoke was extremely dense (estimated at "7" on the Fire 
Brigade scale). 
The remaining two dwe lling house fires both occurred at night-time 
although one was in the late evening and one was in the early morning. 
Both inVOlved children under 12. They are briefly described below. 
(ii) Incident 120 
This fire started at 2233 on the ground floor of a two-storey 
dwelling. A woman of 40 and her four children under 12 were upstairs in 
the bedrooms. The mother first became aware of the fire by hearing nOises. 
associated with fire, and immediately thought it was "extremely serious". 
It proved to be a 1 Jet fire and the Fire Severity Index was calculated 
at 14. 
She ran to the children in the bedrooms, opened a window to shout 
for help (presumably in her own bedroom because she then stated that she 
"went back to the children"). All f.i ve of them were rescued by Fire 
Brigade ladder. 
(iii) Incident 932 
This-fire started at 0507 on the first floor of a two-storey 
dwelling house. A man of 47, his 46 year old wife and their two children 
of under 12 years of age were upstairs. The account given by the man has 
some strange features •. For example, he thought the fire was "not at all 
serious", yet the first thing he did was" ..• made for front door". He 
then "went back to (the bedroom)" and "picked up a child". His wife, 
who thought the fire "quite serious", "got up out of bed, '" looked for 
children ••• and put on dressing gown". All four were subsequently 
rescued by the Fire Brigade from a fire which required 1 hose-reel to 
extinguish it. The Fire Severity Index was calculated at 12. 
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The account given by the woman in Incident 120 seems open to 
relatively easy interpretation. She became aware of the fire ,which she 
(accurately) assessed as extremely serious. (This impression must have 
been reinforced by moving into smoke through which she estimated she 
could only see'2 yards.) She realised she could not get all four of the 
children downstairs and did not attempt to do so, but instead made 
efforts to get help by shouting from the window. 
The evidence from Incident 932 is much more puzzling. One can only 
interpret the husband's immediate action in an unfavourable light, 
although this is redeemed by' his subsequent behaviour. Otherwise \~e have 
too little information available to sensibly discuss this incident. 
15.2 RESCUES FROM FLATS 
The 9 flats in which Fire Brigade rescues occurred were all of 3, 4 
or 5 storeys. None of them had lifts. There is considerable similarity 
between the circumstances of the rescues in these fires, and four 
incidents have been selected for brief discussion as being representative 
of this group. Two of the fires occurred in the morning, and two at night. 
Ci) Incident 10 
This fire occurred at 0709 on the ground floor of a four-storey 
block of flats. It required 1 Jet and the Fire Severity Index was 
calculated at 18. Of the 12 occupants, 4 were rescued by the Fire Brigade, 
2 of them being among the 6 people interviewed. 
Three of the interviewees were on the ground floor: a 29 year old 
woman who was in her flat with her young child, a 26 year old man and 
his 24year~oldwife. The two young children of the latter couple were 
also in the flat. The actions of these three interviewees were very 
similar. All thought the fire was "quite serious". All collected their 
children and immediately left their flats and went out into the street, 
moving through smoke with visibi 1i ty of only 2 yards. Once in the 
street, the husband asked a passer-by to telephone for the Fire Brigade. 
The fourth person interviewed, was a man of 60, who was in his first-
floor flat wi th his wife. He also thought the fire was "quite serious" 
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and briefly described his actions as " ••• dressed in a hurry, went to 
window". He did not leave the building, giving as his reason that he 
thought he would be safer where he was, neither did he attempt to move 
through the smoke. 
The two interviewees who were rescued (together with their two 
young children) were in a flat on the second floor. They both thought 
the fire was "extremely serious". The husband (24) wakened his wife (23) 
and children, and they all tried to leave the flat. At the front door 
of the flat, however, they were turned back by the dense smoke (estimated 
visibili ty "0" yards), so they did not leave the flat. Instead they 
went to the front window and awaited rescue by the Fire Brigade. They 
were all evacuated from the building by hydraulic platform. 
(ii) Incident 12 
This fire occurred at 0902 on the second floor of a five-storey 
multi-occupancy dwelling. Of the 20 occupants, 3 were res"cued by Fire 
Brigade personnel, all 3 being among the 6 people interviewed. The fire 
required 1 Jet and the Fire Severity Index was calculated at 15. 
Three of those intervie\~ed were on the same floor, a 15 year old 
girl, her 35 year old mother and her 65 year old grandmother. Allwere 
in the same flat. It appears that the other person in the flat (sex 
unknown, but not a relative) was smoking in bed, which caught fire. The 
mother heard shouts, and on discovering the burning bed shouted to warn 
the person. She then filled the bath with"water which she then threw 
over the bed. Meanwhile her daughter had been sent by her grandmother 
to telephone for the Fire Brigade. None of them left the building, 
although the mother and grandmother attempted to move through the smoke 
and were_turned back (visibility estimate "0" yards). 
The three rescuees were on the third floor, the floor above the 
fire. One of them, a man aged 42, was attempting to leave the building 
when the Fire Brigade arrived. He had moved some 15 yards down the 
stairs, through smoke in which he could see 2 yards, when he was met by 
a Fireman ascending the stairs. He was taken downstairs by the Fireman 
who told him to "stay outside". 
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The second man (27) opened ithe door of his flat but was immediately 
turned back by the dense smoke (visibi li ty estimate "0" yards) after 
venturing only 2 yards. He returned to his room which he then left by 
way of a window onto a flat roof, and waited there until the arrival of 
the Fire Brigade. He was rescued by Fire Brigade ladder. 
The third person, a man of 72, made no attempt to move through the 
smoke but merely went to the windOl" of his room, which he opened' and .. 
awaited rescue there. He was also taken to safety by means of a Fire 
Brigade ladder. 
(iii) Incident 7140 
This fire occurred at 0237 on the ground floor of a four-storey 
building. It required 1 Jet and the Fire Severity Index was calculated 
at 13. The ground floor was used as a Photography shop, with flats on 
the three storey~ above it. The flats were occupied by 6 people, 5 of 
I"holll were rescued, including the 1 person who was rescued. 
On the first floor was a woman of 74 who smelt smoke but thought 
the fire was "not at all serious". She first went to get a bucket of 
water to put on the fire, then went to the open the front door " ••• as 
people were banging on it", and finally left the building. 
There were two flats on the second floor. One contained a man of 
34, his 25 year old wife and their young child. The other flat contained 
a 32 year old man. In the first flat, the wife was woken by shouts. 
She then woke her husband who ran to the window and saw flames. They 
got the child out of bed, the wife wrapping it in a dressing gown, 
before running down the stairs together and out of the building. In the 
second flat, the 32 year old man opened his door and Sal" smoke on the 
staircase-.---He immediately ran down the stairs and out of the building. 
All the second floor occupants estimated they ran 4 yards through smoke 
in which the visibility was "0 yards". 
The sole occupant of the third floor was an 84 year old lady. She 
also was woken by shouting and thought the fire was "extremely serious". 
She got out of bed and put on her dressing gown, then opened the door of 
her flat and tried to get down the stairs. In the process of doing this 
she collapsed, and was subsequently rescued by a Fireman who had entered 
the building. 
278 
(iv) Incident 688 
This fire occurred at 0213 in a three~storey building comprising a 
Solicitors Office on the ground floor, with two flats above. The fire 
broke out on the first floor and was not a 
and with a Fire Severity Index of only 10. 
severe one, no Jets being used 
The flats were occupied by 3 
people, 2 of whom were rescued. All three were interviewed. 
The first person to become aware of the fire was the 20 year old man 
in the first floor flat. He smelt smoke, thought it "extremely serious", 
shouted to warn the occupants upstairs, then went downstairs and out of 
the build1ng. He estimated the vis'ibility through the smoke as "0" yards. 
The occupants of the second floor flat were a 34 year old man and a 
22 year old woman. The man was awoken by the shouting and woke the 
woman. They both then dressed and left the flat though a back window, 
which gave them access to a roof where they then waited for the Fire 
Brigade. They were rescued by ladder. Although both of them said there 
was smoke, neither of them attempted to move through it. 
15.3 DISCUSSION 
Examining these four incidents which, as mentioned earlier, are 
representative of rescues from flats, one clear, although perhaps very 
obvious point emerges. That is that the people who are rescued are 
invariably on floors above the floor on which the fire occurs. Often 
they are two or more floors above, less often just one floor above. This 
pattern is very evident where several people were interviewed at the 
incidents (Incidents 10 and 740 for example). Those on the same floor as 
the fire, or on the one above, managed to leave the building successfully, 
whereas those two or more floors above were prevented from doing so by 
the smoke. 
It is interesting that often those who successfully leave have to 
move through smoke "hich they estimate to be very dense in so doing. In 
undertaking this action they have obviously made some !,'calculation", 
which includes both the thickness of the smoke and the distance they 
estimate they "ill have to move through it. Of those on the floors above, 
many may also be forced to make such a calculation on opening the front 
door of their flats when faced by thick smoke. There are three outcomes 
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to this. They may immediately reject any thought of going down the 
stairs, close the door, go to a window and await Fire Brigade rescue. 
Alternatively they may venture into the smoke, only to be turned back, and 
return to their flats again to await rescue. Or, thirdly, they may 
persist in their attempts to leave via the stairs and, in the cases 
considered here, be subsequently rescued by a Fireman who had entered the 
building and was commencing a search. 
The basis on which individuals make this smoke/distance calculation, 
and the factors which influence their subsequent decision whether or not 
they should attempt to leave, is not readily apparent. However, in the 
cases considered here, the age of the person, the presence of young 
children and the time of day, do not appear to be determining factors. 
One point which should be noted is that in these incidents it was 
the nature of the smoke, rather than the position of the fire or heat 
and flames, which prevented successful evacuation and necessitated Fire 
Brigade rescue. Several of the "Rescue-Incidents" also fell into the 
category of "Injury- Incidents". In each case the inj ury sustained was 
due to smoke inhalation, and in each case the person had elected to move 
down the stairs into dense smoke. 
The occurrence of fires which inVOlve both Rescue and Injury lead 
one to believe that there was some relationship between the two types of 
incident. However, in other ways they are really quite different. For 
example, only rarely do individuals in Rescue-Incidents engage in any 
form of fire-fighting (even those who are close to the fire and are able 
to leave the building unaided), whereas in the majority of Injury-fires 
it is the ill-advised fire-fighting methods which are the cause of the 
injury. A likely explanation for this, and other differences between the 
two types-of-incident, is that in many cases, fires which eventually 
result in injuries are often discovered soon after they have begun. This 
has a dual effect in that, firstly, the smoke has not become thick nor 
spread extensively and, secondly, the fire itself may also appear to be 
of sufficiently small scale to encourage the occupant to tackle it 
himself. Whilst we have no hard evidence, the extent of smoke spread and 
density of the smoke in Rescue-Incidents suggests that the fire may only 
have been discovered some considerable time after it started. This 
interpretation is supported by the analysis conducted in Chapter 7, which 
suggests that not only is the mean Fire Severity Index for Rescue-Incidents 
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considerably greater than the mean FSI for Injury-Incidents (19.1 and 
14.0 respectively), but also that the average number of Jets per incident 
is also slightly higher (0.93 as opposed to 0.68). Thus where incidents 
involve both a Rescue and an Injury, these would most accurately be 
viewed as a special category of Rescue Incidents, rather than vice-versa. 
----------
CHAPTER 16 
EXAMINATION OF A MATCHED SAMPLE OF 
FATAL & NON-FATAL FIRES 
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16.0 FATAL AND NON-FATAL FIRES 
Our sample of building fires comprises 952 incidents. Of these, 7 
incidents involved a fatality. It is obviously of importance to know how 
these fatal incidents differ from the 945 non-fatal ones. We have 
already seen from earlier analyses some of the ways in which they are 
special. For example, all the fatal fires score fairly high in terms of 
"Fire Severity". Yet other fires, equally severe, do not result in death. 
One way in which we can examine the question is to "match" our sample of 
fatal fires with a similar "control" sample of non-fatal ones, and to 
qualitatively examine the differences. Clearly there are difficulties 
with this approach. Firstly, our sample of fatal fires is small, and 
thus we cannot generalise from any findings with a high degree of 
confidence. Secondly, the range of variables covered in the Present 
Study, though large, may not have included those variables which would 
point-up specific differences. Thirdly, we may have difficulties 
obtaining a close enough match between our "control" group'and our "fatal" 
group. Fourthly, in some cases we have less information about the fatal 
fires than we would wish because of their very nature, in that 
participants are less able, or willing, to give information. 
Notwithstanding the possible difficulties outlined above, we feel 
that such an analysis is worth undertaking, especially where the control 
closely matches the fatal incident. In this way we can highlight at 
least some essential differences for that particular incident. On 
examination of the Study Sample it proved impossible to achieve even an 
approximate match for the single fatal incident in a factory. This 
chapter is concerned therefore solely with the six fatal fires which 
occurred in dwellings. 
----~ 
It was decided to attempt to match the "control" and "fatal" samples 
on eight main variab les. These were 
(a) Building type 
Cb) Number of storeys 
(c) Floor on which the fire started 
(d) Time of day 
(e) Number of Jets 
(f) Fire Severity Index 
(g) Number of people in the building when the fire was discovered 
(h) Their position relative to the fire 
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Even with 945 potential control incidents, it was possible to 
provide an exact match for only some of the fatal incidents. The 
variables on which the two samples proved most difficult to match 
exactly were 
(a) Time of day. Where a close agreement between incident times was 
not available, a broad division into night-time and daytime incidents 
allowed control and fatal fires to be paired. 
(b) Number of people in the building. This difficulty only arose with 
the one "Flats" fire involving a fatality, in which 15 people were 
in the building. There were no other "Flats" fires which had a 
similar number of people and at the same time matched the high level 
of Fire Severity. 
Other differences between the control and fatal samples were fairly 
minor and will be discussed in the course of examining each incident. 
16.1 FATAL INCIDENT 1 
This fire occurred in Town A at 0420 in September. The'! fire 
broke out on the ground floor of a two-storey dwelling house. One Jet 
was used, and the Fire Severity Index was calculated to be 13. There 
were two occupants in the house, a 72 year old man and his 65 year old 
wife. Both were asleep in bed on the second floor when the fire started. 
We have the statement of the man who survived the fire. 
Ca) He first became aware of the fire on smelling smoke. 
Cb) As soon as he realised there was a fire he thought it was 
"extremely serious ft • 
(c) He lived in the building and was completely familiar with its layout. 
(d) He stated that his actions were as follows: 
"I got out of bed and went downstairs" 
"1 tried to put the fire out with buckets of water" 
"1 went next door to call for aid". 
-_.- ----------
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(e) He stated that there was smoke, through'which he estimated he moved 
some 20 yards, estimating he could only see 2 yards in front of him. 
Although he judged the smoke to be so dense; he did not turn back 
because of it. 
(f) He returned into the building during the course of the fire, 
although we do not know at what stage. He said his reason for so 
doing was 
"To do what I could for my wife". 
(g) He had never received any training on what action to take in a fire, 
although he had previously been involved in a fire incident. 
16.1.1 CONTROL INCIDENT la 
This fire occurred in Town B at 0103 in October. The fire broke 
out on the ground floor of a two-storey dwelling house. One 
Jet was used, and the Fire Severity Index was calculated to be 11. 
There were two occupants in the building, a 58 year old man and his wife 
(age unknown). Both were asleep on the second ,floor when the fire 
started. 
Of our chosen variables, this incident matches Fatal Fire 1 very 
closely indeed. Again we have the statement of the husband. 
(a) He first became aware of the fire by hearing noises associated with 
the fire. 
(b) He thought the fire was "qui te serious". 
(c) He lived in the building and was completely familiar with its layout. 
(d) He stated that his actions were as follows: 
"I went downstairs and investigated the living room" 
"1 opened the living room door, Sa\~ fire and smoke. I closed it and 
told my wife to evacuate the building" 
"I went to next door neighbour to call the Brigade". 
(e) He stated that there was smoke through which he estimated he moved 
less than 2 yards. He thought that the smoke was thick enough for 
him to see less than 2 yards ahead. (This was presumably when he 
opened the living room door.) 
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(f) He returned into the building, again we do not know at what stage, 
". " to get more clothing". 
(g) He had never received any training, although he had previously 
been involved in a fire. 
16.1.2 DISCUSSION - INCIDENTS 1 AND la 
These two fires are, as we have stated earlier, strikingly similar. 
Perhaps it is in the stated actions of the two husbands that we have a 
clue as to the possible essential differences. 
As a first action, both men went downstairs to investigate. In the 
fatal fire, however, the man then attempted to deal with the fire 
himself. Although he had rated the fire as "extremely serious", he must 
have judged (quite erroneously) that it was within the capacity of a 
72 year old to deal with. His method of fire-fighting involved water in 
buckets, so presumably he would have had to go to the kitchen, find a 
bucket, fill it with water and then carry it to the scene of the fire. 
He must have made at least two of these trips. All the time he was 
doing this, the door would be open allowing the fire, smoke and fumes to 
spread. At some stage he recognised the futility of his fire-fighting 
action and went next door to call for aid. He does not mention shutting 
the door, not attempting to evacuate his wife. At 0420 it must have 
taken some time to rouse his neighbours, again allowing the fire, smoke 
and fumes to spread. By the time the neighbours and Fire Brigade were 
. 
alerted, it is likely that his wife had already succumbed to carbon 
monoxide poisoning. 
In contrast, in the control incident, on discovering the fire (and 
smoke,-which~he specifically mentions), the man closes the door and gets 
his wife outside. He makes no attempt to fight the fire, the smoke and 
flames are contained and no fatality occurs. 
This analysis is supported by examination of the Fire Brigade 
estimates of Smoke Density and Smoke Spread. Although both incidents 
were judged to have the same density of smoke ("3" on the Questionnaire 
scale), in the fatal incident the smoke spread to the floor above, 
whereas in the control incident it was confined to the room of origin. 
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It is possible therefore that the fatality occurred because the 
occupant made a serious misjudgement of either the seriousness of the 
fire or his own capacities. 
fire-fighting actions which 
He undertook injudicious and time-consuming 
allowed the smoke to spread upwards through 
the house. In addition, he failed to shut the door of the room, 
exacerbating the danger from the smoke, and finally he failed to ensure 
that his wife was out of the building in the early stage of the incident. 
16.2 FATAL INCIDENT 2 
This incident occurred in Town C at 0400 in late September. The 
fire broke out on the ground floor of a three-storey dwelling house. One 
Jet was used and the Fire Severity Index was calculated at 13. There 
were 7 occupants of the building, 4 of whom were interviewed. These 
were an 81 year old man, his 42 year old son and 40 year old daughter-in-
law, and his 18 year old grandson. There were in addition, his wife 
(age unknown) who died in the fire, and two other grand-daughters under 
12 years of age. 
The location of the occupants at the time of the fire was as follows. 
The 81 year old man, his wife, son and daughter-in-law were in bed asleep 
on the second floor. The 18 year old grandson and young grand-daughters 
were in bed asleep on the third floor. They all lived in the building 
and were completely familiar with its layout. 
The statements of the participants were as follows: 
42 year old son (second floor) 
(a) He first became aware of the fire by smelling smoke. 
(b) He thought the fire was "extremely serious". 
(c) He stated his actions were as follows: 
"Woke my wife" 
"Roused and evacuated my 18 year old son and two daughters" 
"Told my father to get out". 
(d) He stated that there was smoke, through which he could see "0' yards 
and through which he moved 20 yards. 
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(e) He returned into the building (presumably after the fire was over) 
"to obtain shoes and clothing for my family". 
(f) He said he received training "at least once per month", and he had 
also been previously involved in a fire incident. 
lS'year old grandson (third floor) 
(a) He was woken by shouts from his father and thought the fire was 
"extremely serious". 
(b) He stated his actions were as follows: 
"Jumped out of bed" 
"Got dressed" 
"Ran downstairs to street". 
(c) He also moved 20 yards through smoke,'estimating the visibility at 
"0" yards. 
(d) He said he received training "at least once per month" but had never 
previously been involved in a fire incident. 
81 year old grandfather (second floor) 
(a) He was woken by his son and thought the fire "not at all serious". 
(b) He stated his actions were as follows: 
"Ran for garden hose" 
"Went round rear of house to gain access to fire" 
"Went out to rear garden and then into unaffected area". 
(c) He moved 4 yards through smoke, through which he estimated he could 
see 4 yards. lIe did not have to turn back. 
(d) He returned into the building" ... with garden hose to fight fire". 
(e) He had never received any training, but had previously been 
involved in a fire. 
16.2.1 CONTROL INCIDENT 2a 
This fire occurred in Town 0 at 0533 in August. The 
fire broke out on the ground floor of a two-storey dwelling house. One 
Jet was used and the Fire Severity Index was calculated to be 16. There 
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were 6 occupants of the building, 4 of whom were interviewed. These 
were a 75 year old man, his 75 year old wife, their 34 year old son and 
33 year old daughter-in-la\~. Two grandchildren under 12 years of age 
were also present. 
The location of the occupants at the outbreak of fire was as follows. 
The two 75 year aIds were in bed asleep on the second floor, as was the 
6 year old grandchild. The son, daughter-in-law and the other grandchild 
were in bed asleep on the ground floor. They all lived in the building 
and were completely familiar with its layout. 
The statements of the participants were as follows: 
34 year old son (ground floor) 
(a) He first became aware of the fire by hearing noises associated 
wi th it. He though it was "quite serious". 
(b) His stated actions were as fOllows: 
"Raised occupants" 
"Tackled fire with buckets of water" 
"Completed evacuation". 
(c) He moved an estimated 7 yards through smoke, in which he could .<see 
2 yards ahead. 
(d) He did not return into the building, neither had he previously been 
involved in a fire incident. He received training "once per year". 
33 year .old daughter-in-law (ground floor) 
(a) She was woken by noises associated with the fire, and rated it as 
--- "qui te serious". 
(b) Her actions were as follows: 
"Phoned 999" 
"Evacuated 6 year old child from small front bedroom on first floor" 
"Left building" 
(c) She moved more than 20 yards through smoke with 2 yards visibility. 
(d) She had never received training, nor been previously inVOlved in a 
fire inciderit. She did not return into the building. 
-------- -------
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75 year old grandfather (second floor) 
(a) He was woken by his son telling him of the fire, which he thought 
was "quite serious". 
Cb) His actions were as fOl101~S: 
"Began to dress invalid wife, and then abandoned attempt" 
"Helped evacuate wife" 
"Left the building". 
(c) He also moved more than 20 yards through smoke in which he estimated 
he could see 2 yards. 
(d) He had never been involved in a fire incident, however he had 
received training "once per month" before retiring (presumably 
10 years earlier). 
75 year old grandmother (second floor) 
Ca) Sho was also woken by her son, and thought the fire was "quite serious". 
Cb) She said: 
"I began to get dressed with the assistance of my husband, until my 
son said there was not time" 
"Was assisted downstairs by husband and son" 
"Left building". 
(c) Her smoke movements and visibility estimates were in accord with 
those of her husband. She had never received training, nor had she 
previously been involved in a fire incident. 
16.2.2 DISCUSSION - INCIDENTS 2 AND 2a 
It will be noted that in this case the control incident does not 
match the fatal incident quite as closely as in Incident 1. Whilst the 
fatal fire is in a three-storey dwelling, the control is in a two-storey 
dwelling. In other respects the pairing is very good. We basically have 
a man and wife with young children living with aged grandparents in each 
case. Everyone was in bed when the fires were discovered in the early 
morning. 
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What are we to make of the fatal incident? The grandmother who died 
in the fire is not specifically mentioned by any of the interviewees, 
although we would expect her to be woken when the son warned he~ husband. 
Of th~ interviewees, three are specifically concerned with warning or 
alerting others in the house and evacuating. Only the grandfather under-
takes any fire-fighting action. Can it have been that he left his 
(wakened) wife to dress and leave the building whilst he " ••. ran for the 
garden hose"? Since the others in the building had been alerted first, 
they would be in the process of leaving, assuming perhaps that the 
grandfather and grandmother had left together. By the time everyone was 
outside (and this must have been some considerable time since the 18 year 
old took time to dress), the grandmother might have been trapped by smoke 
on the second floor. Once outside, they might also have assumed that the 
grandmother was at the rear of the house, again with the grandfather. 
In the control incident it is also the son who discovers the fire. As 
in the fatal case he is concerned with alerting everyone and getting them 
outside. The actions of the wives also mirror each other, in that both 
are concerned with the safety of their children. Having woken everyone 
the son starts to fight the fire, but obviously does not continue to do 
this for long, since he has time to check that the grandparents are 
getting out of the building. He must by this time have recognised the 
seriousness of the fire because he tells them they have not got time to 
dress, and helps his invalid mother downstairs. 
The main differences between the two incidents seem to lie in the 
actions of the grandfathers, and to a lesser extent that of their sons. 
In the fatal case the grandfather does not ensure.that his wife is out 
of the building, but instead engages in futile fire-fighting. In the 
control incident, the grandfather is solely concerned with the welfare of 
his--Wife;--Neither of them seem'eto have made an accurate assessment of 
the fire's seriousness, particularly in the fatal case. 
In the fatal case the son is concerned throughout with evacuation; 
however he seems to have assumed that the grandfather will be getting the 
grandmother outside. In the control fire the son first warns everyone, 
then starts to fight the fire, and then goes to check that his parents 
are in the process of leaving the house. When he finds they are not, he 
hustles them out. The occurrence of the fatality therefore seems to rest 
on the inappropriate behaviour of the grandfather, 'and perhaps a 
misunderstanding between him and his son. 
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16.3 FATAL INCIDENT 3 
This fire occurred in Town E at 0236 in late October. The fire 
broke out on the ground floor of'a three-storey dwelling house: Three 
Jets were used and the Fire Severity Index was calculated to be -23. _ 
There were three occupants of the building, a 42 year old man, his 40 
year old wife (who died in the fire), and their 20 year old son. They' 
were all in bed asleep on the second floor "hen the fire was discovered. 
The father and son "ere interviewed. They lived in the building and "ere 
completely familiar wiht its layout. 
20 year old son (second floor) 
(a) He first became aware of the fire by smelling smoke, and immediately 
thought the fire "as "extremely serious". 
(b) His stated actions were; 
"Went to investigate" 
"Called for father" 
After that "he didn I t remember what happened". 
(c) In fact what happened was that the smoke was very thick (he estimated 
that he could see "0" yards in front of him, and the Fire Brigade 
Smoke Density rating was a high "6"), and in attempting to leave the 
room he went into the larder by mistake and passed out. 
(d) He had never received training, nor previously been involved in a 
fire incident. 
42 year old father (second floor) 
(a)-He-first became aware of the fire by hearing shouts from his son 
downstairs. He thought the fire was "quite serious". 
Cb) He said that he 
"Went downstairs to see, then threw coat over fire" 
"Pulled out son" 
"Went to phone for Fire Brigade". 
(c) He moved 4 yards through smoke, estimating he could see "0" yards in 
front of him. He stated that the smoke became even thicker and he 
eventually had to turn back because of its density. 
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(d) He had never received any training, nor been previously involved in 
a fire incident. 
16.3.1 CONTROL INCIDENT 3a 
This incident occurred in Town F at 1246 in mid-September. The fire 
broke out on the ground floor of a two-storey dwelling house. Three Jets 
were used and the Fire Severity Index was calculated at 30. There were 
four occupants, a 53 year old man, his 56 year old wife, and their two 
adult children, a son aged 22 and a daughter aged 24. All lived in the 
building and were completely familiar with its layout. All were 
interviewed._ All except the mother, who was on the ground floor, were in 
bed asleep upstairs on the second floor. 
56 year old mother (ground floor) 
(a) She was first aware of the fire by smelling smoke and immediately 
rated the fire as "extremely serious". 
(b) Her actions were as follows: 
"Went upstairs to rouse family" 
"Went to telephone to call Brigade" 
"Went to knock-up neighbours to assist". 
(c) She said she moved 4 yards through smoke, through which she could 
see "0" yards. 
(d) She had never received training, nor been previously involved in a 
fire incident. 
S3 year old husband (second floor) 
(a) He w·as·woken by hearing shouts and immediately thought the fire 
"extremely serious". 
Cb) His actions were 
"Knocked on daughter's bedroom door" 
"Went back into own bedroom and shut door" 
"Tied three sheets together and made escape through front bedroom 
window" . 
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(c) He tried to move through smoke, an estimated 2 yards through "hich 
he could see 2 yards. The smoke became thicker· ("Q" yards), and 
he had to turn back because of its density. 
(d) He had never received any training, although he. had been previous ly 
involved in a fire incident. 
22 year old son (second floor) 
(a) He also was woken by shouts and thought the fire "extremely serious". 
(b) He said he 
"Shouted to warn rest of the family" 
"Dropped down wi th arms fu lly extended from back bedroom window" 
"Got short ladder to sister's bedroom window". 
(c) He tried to move through smoke, again an estimated 2 yards with a 
visibili ty of "Q" yards. He also had to turn back because of the 
thickening smoke. 
(d) He had never received any training, nor been previously involved in 
a fire incident. 
24 year old daughter (second floor) 
Ca) She was woken by shouts and noise, and immediately thought the fire 
was "extremely serious". 
(b) She stated that she 
"Jumped from bed and s lipped a dress on" 
"Went into both other bedrooms to look for patents" 
"Went to back bedroom window to make escape" 
(c) She moved more than 20 yards through smoke, through which she could 
see "Q" yards. 
(d) She had never received any training, nor been previously involved in 
a fire incident. 
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16.3.2 DISCUSSION - INCIDENTS 3 AND 3a 
These two incidents are quite similar, the main difference being 
that the fatal incident is a three-storey dwelling whereas the control 
is a two-storey dwelling. In this case the difference may be of little 
importance, as none of the occupants were on the third floor of the 
fatal fire. Both fires were very severe for dwelling fires, with three 
Jets required for each. The control fire has a rather higher FSI, 
accounted for by the large number of rooms involved. Smoke Spread is 
similar in each case, being very extensive. The Smoke Density in the 
fatal incident was estimated higher (at "6") than in the control 
incident ("3"). 
In the fatal incident, we again have the strange anomaly of neither 
the husband nor son specifically mentioning the person who perished in the 
fire, the wife. What seems to have happened is that the son, on smelling 
smoke, went downstairs to investigate without alerting either parent. On 
entering the affected room he found very dense smoke. He managed to shout 
for his father (either to warn or for help?) and then probably attempted 
to leave the building thrbhgh the smoke. He became disoriented, and as 
we Sa\~ entered the larder by mistake and passed out. His father was 
obviously alerted by the shouts from his son and also went down to 
investigate. We do not know if the wife was also woken, but in any event 
she remained in the bedroom. The father must have also found the down-
stairs room filled with smoke, probably by now filling the rest of the 
house through the opened door. He must have been aware that his son was 
in the room, for he entered the room and dragged him from the larder. At 
this stage the fire must have been fairly localised, albeit producing 
dense smoke, since the father threw a coat over the burning object. He 
must have dragged his son into the open-air before going to phone the 
Fire Brigade~ Meanwhile his wife was sti 11 upstairs, and she must have 
died from the effects of the smoke which would have poured from the open 
door of the affected room. 
In the control incident it is the wife who discovers the fire. The 
rapidity of the Smoke Spread in this incident can be gauged by the fact 
that she went upstairs to warn the other members of the family, went 
downstairs to telephone the Fire Brigade (and subsequently to summon 
assistance), and she was ill fact the only person in the incident able to 
use the stairs to make her exit. In the period of time between being 
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warned by her, and preparing to leave, all the other members of the 
family found the smoke too thick to move through on the stairs. In the 
event all three had to leave by upstairs windows, in the husband's case 
by the apocryphal method of tying sheets together. (Incidentally, it is 
curious that he specifically mentions "three" sheets, whereas of course 
beds only have two fitted when they are made up. If his statement is 
correct, he must have gone to a linen cup~oard to extract at least one 
extra sheet.) 
To a greater or lesser extent, all three members of the family who 
were upstairs seem concerned about the welfare of other members of the 
family. The son shouts to warn the others, escapes through the window 
and immediately gets a ladder to rescue his sister. The father knocks 
on his daughter's bedroom before being forced back to his own room, and 
with commendable presence of mind, shut the door behind him. The 
daughter, who appears to have moved the furthest through smoke, did so 
in ensuring that neither of her parents were trapped in the bedrooms. 
She then was forced to escape through her own bedroom window. 
The major difference between the two incidents appears to be that 
in the control incident, everyone was warned to leave the building, and 
in fact the participants were checking on each other to ensure that this 
was happening. This does not seem to have happened in the fatal 
incident. The son warned neither of his parents effectively, and was in 
fact lucky not to have succumbed to the smoke himself. His father does 
not mention warning his wife, and obviously would be very concerned to 
discover his son unconscious in the smoke-filled larder. Perhaps this 
concern for the welfare of his son led him into forgetting that his wife 
needed alerting to leave the house as·well. Even when his son is safe, 
his next action is not to rescue his wife, but to call the Fire Brigade. 
Clearly-the-time involved in these actions contributed to the death of 
his wife. 
In both cases the actions of the person who first discovered the 
fire may have led to the difficulties of the other people involved, since 
both appear to have left doors open, allowing dense smoke to spread 
extensively through the houses. In this respect both incidents could 
have become multipt~ fatalities. 
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One further impression gained from studying the two incidents side-
by-side is that the family in the control fire were "closer", more 
dependent, more socially aware than in the fatal incident. This may, 
however, be reading more into the evidence than actually exists. 
16.4 FATAL INCIDENT 4 
This incident occurred in Town G at 1246 in mid-September. The fire 
started on the second floor of a two-storey dwelling house. One Jet was 
used and the Fire Severity Index was calculated at 18. There were three 
occupants of the building, a 21 year old mother and her two children 
under 12 years of age, one of whom died in the fire. The mother, who was 
the only person interviewed, was on the ground floor at the outbreak of 
the fire with the older child. The other child was on the second floor. 
The statement of the mother was as fOllows: 
Ca) She first became aware of the fire by a combination of smelling 
smoke and hearing noises associated with the fire. She immediately 
thought the fire was "extremely serious". 
(b) She said that her actions were: 
"Shout to passer-by to phone Fire Brigade" 
"Attempted to get upstairs to rescue child" 
"Came out when pulled back by man attempting rescue" 
(c) She tried to move through smoke, an estimated 2 yards with 
visibility "0" yards. She had to turn back when the smoke became 
thicker. 
(d) She had never received training, nor been previously involved in a 
fire incident. 
16.4.1 CONTROL INCIDENT 4a 
This incident occurred in Town H at 0859 in early August. The 
fire started on the second floor of a three-storey dwelling. One Jet 
was used and the Fire Severity Index was 10. There were three 
occupants of the building, a mother aged 29 and her two children, both 
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under 12 years of age. The mother, who was interviewed, was on the 
ground floor at the outbreak of the fire. Both children were on the 
second floor. 
The statement of the mother was as follows: 
Ca) She first became aware of the fire by being told by one of her 
children. She inunediately thought it was "quite serious". 
(b) Her stated actions were 
"Evacuated the children" 
"Called the Fire Brigade" 
"Awaited their arrival outside". 
(c) She said there \~as smoke, which she did not attempt to move through. 
(d) She had never received any training, nor been previously involved 
in a fire incident. 
16.4.2 DISCUSSION - INCIDENTS 4 AND 4a 
In all important respects these incidents are again very similar. 
The two main points of difference in terms of pairing are the fact that 
the fatal incident involves a two-storey dwelling whereas the control 
involves a three storey dwelling, and the Fire Severity Index for the 
fatal fire is higher than for the control. We can, I think, discount the 
effect of the former discrepancy in this case, since none of the 
occupants were on the third floor at the time of the fire. The latter 
difference may be of more importance, although we should remember that 
both incidents are unusually severe for dwelling fires in requiring one 
Jet. It is clear, however, that the fatal fire became a more severe 
fire, involving denser smoke and more extensive Smoke Spread. Both of the 
incidents involved a young mother, alone in the house with two young 
children, during the daytime. She is downstairs whilst one or both of 
the children is upstairs. 
To begin with, the actions of the two mothers are virtually identical 
in intention, although the order in which they do them is reversed. We 
cannot know if this is significant, although it seems likely that the 
time taken to shout to a passer-by, before attempting to evacuate the 
child would not make any real difference. The subsequent actions are 
----_._-_._----
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determined by the specific fire in each case. In this particular matching 
of fatal/control, it seems that the behaviour was not a determining 
factor. Rather, it is likely that the extent to which the fire had 
developed when discovered may have been crucial. In the fatal incident 
the fire and smoke must have been very severe by the time the mother was 
aware of it. Even allowing for taking a little time to shout to someone 
outside, the period between discovery and attempting to get upstairs to 
rescue the child must have been very short. Yet she was unable to 
accomplish the rescue. 
In contrast, the mother in the second control incident was told about 
the fire by one of her children, rather than just hearing noises or 
smelling smoke. She was thus probably aware of the fire much earlier in 
its development. She therefore had the time to evacuate the children 
before smoke or other effects of fire prevented her from doing so. Also, 
since the fire was discovered earlier, the Fire Brigade would arrive 
earlier, and prevent it from becoming quite as severe as the fatal 
incident. The occurrence of the fatality may therefore have simply 
rested upon the late discovery of the fire, and the subsequent lack of 
time in which to rescue the child. 
16.5 FATAL INCIDENT 5 
This incident occurred in Town I at 0900 in September. The fire 
started on the second floor of a two-storey dwelling house. Two hose-
reels were used and the Fire Severity Index was calculated at 16. There 
were two occupants in the building, a 42 year old woman and a 38 year 
old man, a friend, who died in the incident. The man was on the second 
floor, and the woman on the ground floor. 
The statement of the woman was as follows: 
Ca) She first became aware of the fire by hearing shouts. She thought 
the fire was "quite serious". 
Cb) Her actions were 
"Along to sitting room, passed open door, thought he was coming out" 
"Ran downstairs and rang 999 for Fire Brigade but couldn I t get 
through" 
"Stayed by telephone, then back upstairs". 
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(c) She moved 10 yards through smoke, through which she could see 
4 yards; the smoke became thicker until she could see "0" yards, 
when she turned back. 
(d) She had never previously been involved in a fire, nor received 
any training. 
16.5.1 CONTROL INCIDENT Sa 
This incident occurred in Town J at 1514 in mid-August. The fire 
started on the second floor of a two-storey dwelling house. One hose-
reel was used and the Fire Severity Index was calculated at 13. There 
were two occupants, a woman aged 45 and her 20 year old son. The mother 
was on the ground floor, and the son on the second floor. Both lived in 
the building and both were interviewed. 
Their statements were as follows: 
20 year old son (second floor) 
(a) He first became aware of the fire by smelling smoke and immediately 
thought the fire "quite serious". 
(b) His actions were 
"Located mother" 
"Closed back bedroom door" 
"Phoned Fire Brigade". 
(c) There was smoke but he did not move through it . 
. (d) He had never received training, nor been previously involved in a 
fire incident. 
45 year old mother (ground floor) 
(a) She also claims to have been first aware of the fire by smelling 
smoke. She thought the fire was "extremely serious". 
(b) Her actions were 
"Phoned Fire Brigade" 
"Started carrying carpets and bedding from the house" 
"Swi tched off electrici ty". 
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(c) She also did not attempt to move through the smoke. 
(d) She had never received any training, nor been previously involved in 
a fire incident. 
16.5.2 DISCUSSION - INOIDENTS S AND Sa 
These incidents are quite similar on .the basis of our se lected 
variables and although the times are different, both are daytime 
incidents. Both incidents contain puzzling features which make them 
rather difficult to interpret. 
Subsidiary information provided by the Fire Brigade suggests that 
in the fatal incident, the man discovered the fire and engaged himself 
in fighting it. He was overcome by smoke and collapsed and subsequently 
died. The woman went to the room involved (which from subsidiary Fire 
Brigade information we know to have been used as a second-floor sitting 
room rather than as a bedroom), past the door through which smoke was 
coming, and then all her efforts were concerned with contacting the Fire 
Brigade. This she was not able to do successfully at first (for reasons 
unknown). The man, therefore, must have been in the affected room for 
some considerable time before she was able to attempt to go upstairs 
again. By this time the smoke was so thick that she had to turn back. 
Although the woman did not check, she states that she thought he was 
leaving the building. 
In the control incident what appears to have happened is that again 
the man discovered the fire, warned his mother and then went to close the 
back bedroom door, thus containing the fire and smoke. His mother seems 
to take up the story from there, phoning t~e Fire Brigade and then 
starting to save some of the furnishings. As a final, sensible, action 
she decides to switch off the electricity. 
Although there are anomalies in both sets of accounts, one essential 
difference is that in the fatal incident, the man decided to fight the 
fire, whereas in the control incident he opted to contain it by shutting 
the door. Clearly the fatally injured man made a serious misjudgement 
of his ability to handle the fire. Once he had collapsed, the smoke 
spread and delay encountered by the \iOman in contacting the Fire Brigade 
. meant that he was exposed to the fumes for a long time. In the control 
incident, neither of the occupants attempted to move through smoke at all, 
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which was confined to the upper storey. Had the son not closed the 
bedroom ,door, the mother's actions in removing furnishings might have 
endangered her life. 
16.6 FATAL INCIDENT 6 
This incident occurred in Town K at 0457 in mid-October. The fire 
started in a flat on the third floor of a three-storey block of flats. 
Two Jets were used and the Fire Severity Index was calculated at 21. 
There were 15 occupants in the building. We do not know the locations 
of all of these people, only of the four who were interviewed. These 
were a 35 year old woman on the first floor, a 68 year old man and 48 
year old woman on the second floor, a 26 year old woman on the third 
floor, and the fatality, a 44 year old man on the third floor. All the 
occupants were in bed asleep at the time of the fire. All lived in the 
building and were completely familiar with its layout. 
The statements, of the four interviewees were as follows: 
35 year old woman (first floor) 
(a) She was told that there was a fire (informant unknown) and 
immediately thought it "quite serious". 
(b) Her actions were simply 
"Stayed in house" and "waited". 
In other words she took no active part in the fire, did not leave the 
building nor move through smoke. 
(c) The other occupant of her flat was her husband, who was not 
interviewed. 
(d) She had never received training, nor been previously involved in a 
fire incident. 
68 year old man (second floor) 
Ca) His first awareness of the fire was when he was "wakened by Fire 
Brigade entering room window". He immediately thought the fire was 
tlquite serious". 
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(b) Like the 35 year old woman above, he took no active part in the 
fire, stating his actions to be 
"Got out of bed" 
"Stayed where I was in bedroom" 
He neither left the building nor moved through smoke. 
(c) He had never received training, nor been previously involved in a 
fire incident. 
(d) He was alone in his flat. 
48 year old woman (second floor) 
(a:) She first became aware of the fire by being told, and immediately 
thought it "extremely serious". 
(b) Her actions were as follows: 
"!Voke son-in-law, went upstairs to waken occupier of flat above 
invol ved in fire" 
"!Vent downstairs" 
"Phoned Fire Brigade". 
She remained downstairs in a neighbour's flat. 
(c) She did move an estimated 4 yards through smoke, through which she 
could see 2 yards. 
(d) She had never received training, not been previously involved in a 
fire incident. 
26 year old woman (third floor) 
(a) She also first became aware of the fire by being told, and thought 
it "extreme ly serious". 
(b) Her actions were as follows: 
"Checked that young child was OK and removed him downstairs" 
"Phoned relatives of occupier of flat" 
"!Vent to downstairs neighbour". 
Here she remained as she "... thought it was safe in ground floor 
flat". 
(c) She also moved 4 yards through smoke, through which she could see 
2 yards. 
.. 
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(d) She had never received training, nor been previously involved in a 
fire incident. 
(e) In addition to her young child, her parents were also in the flat 
with her. 
16.6.1 CONTROL INCIDENT 6a 
This incident occurred in Town L at 0340 in mid-October. 
The fire started on the third floor of a three-storey block of flats. 
One Jet was used, and the Fire Severity Index was calculated at 12. 
There were 40 occupants of the building, 2 of whom were interviewed, a 
50 year old woman on the third floor, and her 18 year old daughter also 
on the third floor. 
..'~ 
Their statements were as follows: 
50 year old woman (third floor) 
(a) She first became aware of the fire by seeing flames and thought it 
was Ilqui te serious". 
(b) Her actions were 
"Threw a bowl of water at fire" 
"The smoke was so bad that I left the flat" 
"Went to friends' flat across the corridor". 
(c) She moved 2 yards through smoke in which she could see 2 yards. 
(d) She had never received training, nor been previously involved in a 
fire incident. 
18 year old daughter (third floor) 
(a) She was first aware of the fire by being told (by her mother). She 
thought the fi re was "quite sed ous". 
(b) She "was told to go to friends'flat across the corridor", which she 
did, and did not thereafter take an active part in the fire. 
(c) She did not move through smoke, had not received training, nor been 
previously involved in a fire incident . 
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16.6.2 DISCUSSION - INCIDENTS 6 AND 6a 
In terms of our selected variables the two main differences between 
these incidents are, firstly, the fatal fire is a more severe fire than 
the control fire, and secondly, the number of occupants in the control 
incident is more than twice as great. This latter point is probably not 
critical; however the former almost certainly is, and together with the 
fact that such a small proportion of the people involved were interviewed 
in each case, we have a much less complete picture of the fire than in 
the earlier paired incidents. UnfortunatelY, the control incident was by 
far the closest match of all the other non-fatal fires in flats. However 
since it does differ in at least one substantial way from the fatal 
incident, we will keep the discussion brief. 
A number of interesting points arise from both incidents. In the 
fatal incident both the 35 year old I~oman and 68 year old man. I~ere 
seemingly prepared to remain in their rooms, even though this was really 
quite a severe fire. (Smoke Spread, for example, was very extensive.) 
The man particularly seems to demonstrate the ultimate in composure, not 
least by the fact that, although wakened at 0500 by a Fireman climbing 
through his bedroom window, he considers the fire only "quite serious"! 
Turning now to the 48 year old woman on the second floor, and the 26 
year old woman on the third floor, they both behaved in what seems a very 
sensible and calm manner, being largely concerned with moving themselves 
and others to places of safety, and also warning other people. 
In contrast with earlier considered pairings of fatal/control fires, 
in this case it is the occupant in the control fire who undertakes fire-
fighting action. Unfortunately, we do not know what was actually on fire; 
however-the action of throwing a bowl of water on 
ineffectual and the woman had to leave the flat. 
it was obviously 
It is interesting to 
note that no-one mentions calling the Fire Brigade, although pr~sumably 
the neighbours may have done this. 
There are few conclusions we can draw from these two particular 
incidents. If anything, the behaviour of those interviewed in the fatal 
fire is more responsible than of those in the control fire. We simply 
lack sufficient information to interpret and compare the incidents fully. 
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16.7 DISCUSSION 
In 1971, the year in which the Present Study was conducted, the 
number of fires repo~ted in dwellings was 45,955, of these incidents 506 
involved fatalities. Thus some 1.10% of fires resulted in fatalities. 
In the Present Study, dwellings accounted for 598 of the incidents 
reported, and 6 of these fires involved a fatality. Thus 1.01% of the 
dwelling fires resulted in fatalities. It would therefore seem that the 
Present Study sample of dwellings has virtually the same incidence of 
fatalities as all dwelling fires. However it should be recalled that the 
Present Study utilised only 12 Fire Brigades in the data-gathering, which 
lasted for a period of only six months. On this basis therefore, fatal 
incidents are over-represented in the Present Study sample of dwellings. 
What we have attempted to do in this chapter is to try to match 
inciqents in terms of some of the "physical variables, so as to examine 
how differences in behaviour may affect the occurrence of a fatal fire. 
We have seen earlier (Section 7.5) that fatal fires are, on average, 
much more severe, both in terms of the number of Jets required and Fire 
Severity Index, than most other dwelling fires. This of course renders 
the task of pairing fatal/non-fatal incidents very difficult. The 
extent to which we were successful in this pairing can be judged by 
examination of Table 111 which summarises this information. It will be 
noted that in only two control incidents (numbers 2 and 3) did we equal, 
or exceed, the fatal incident FSI. In two others (numbers 1 and 5), the 
difference in FSI is probably not important. However in incident 4, and 
definitely incident 6, the degree of difference might be considered to 
invalidate the comparison . 
.. _Leaving aside these latter two incidents for a moment, of the four 
incidents which appear to permit valid comparison, to what extent may we 
consider behaviour to have played a significant role? 
Examination of the Discussion of these incidents shows that in each 
case, the manifest behaviour of the participants differs in at least one 
important respect which may account for the different outcomes. We can 
illustrate this by assigning "positive" and "negative" labels to the 
various actions and summarising them in tabular form (see Table 112, p.306). 
We have assigned "positive" labels to all those actions which would 
con tribute to the safety of life, and "negative" labels to those actions 
-------------:-------------------~--~--~----~---~------------------
TABLE Ill. Comparison of Fatal and Control incidents on the se lected Control variables 
Incident Building Number Floor Time Number FSI Number number type of storeys of fire of Jets of people 
Fatal 1 Dwelling 2 Ground 0240 1 13 2 
Control la Dwelling 2 Ground 0103 1 11 2 
Fatal 2 Dwelling 3 Ground 0400 1 13 7 
Control 2a Dwelling 2 Ground 0533 1 16 6 
Fatal 3 Dwelling 3 Ground 0236 3 23 3 
Control Sa Dwelling 2 Ground 0538 4 30 4 
'" 0 tJl 
Fatal 4· Dwelling 2 First 1246 1 18 3 
Control 4a Dwelling 3 Second 0859 1 10 3 
Fatal 5 Dwelling 2 First 0900 2(hr) 16 2 
Control Sa Dwelling 2 First 1514 l(hr) 13 2 
Fatal 6 Flats 3 Third 0457 3 21 15 
Control 6a Flats 3 Second 0340 1 12 40 
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TABLE 112. Summary of "Posi ti ve" and "Negative" Actions for Fatal and 
Control Incidents 1, 2, S and 5. 
Incident Positive actions Negati ve actions 
number 
Fatal 1 (i) Fire-fighting 
(H) Failure to warn others 
(iii) No attempt to evacuate 
others 
Control la (i) Close doors 
(H) Evacuate others 
Fatal 2 (i) Warn others (i) Fire-fighting 
(ii) Evacuate others 
Control 2a .(i) Warn others (i) Fi re - fi gh ting 
(H) Evacuate others 
(iii) Check evacuation 
(iv) Contact Fire Brigade 
Fatal S (i) Res cue others (i) Fire-fighting 
Cii) Contact Fire Brigade (ii) Failure to warn others 
(Ui) Left doors open 
Control Sa (i) Warn others (all) (i) Leave doors open 
(ii) Contact Fire Brigade 
(iii) Shut doors 
(iv) Rescue others 
Fatal 5 (i) Try to contact Fire Ci) Fire-fighting 
Brigade 
Control Sa (i) Warn others (i) Save effects 
(ii) Close doors 
(iii) Switch-off 
electrici ty 
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whi ch would have the opposite effect. Since all the incidents were 
quite severe, we consider all fire-fighting to be injudicious and it is 
therefore assigned a negative label. 
It will be noted from Table 112 that the "errors" may be of commission 
or omission. Thus "fire-fighting" is an error of commission whilst 
"failure to warn others" is clearly one of omission. Even where fatal 
and control incidents contain the same errors, the situation is changed 
by some additional action in the control incident. Two examples of this 
can be found in Incident 2a, the act of checking evacuation, and in 
Incident 3a, the warning of all others. 
Turning finally to Incidents 4 and 6, the critical factor here may 
well have been independent of the behaviour of the participants. In both 
cases it seems likely that the fatalities occurred primarily as a function 
of Fire or Building variables. In the former, smoke of high density ("6") 
spread to the floor above, whilst in the latter smoke of density "5" 
spread even more extensively through the building. Together with perhaps, 
late discovery of the fire, and rapid fire-spread, insufficient time may 
have been available for any differences in behaviour to be critical. 
I 
------------------------------- - - -
CHAPTER 17 
CONCLUSIONS 
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17.0 CONCLUSIONS 
It is unfortunate that a problem such as behaviour in fires falls 
in the uneasy area where the majority of lay people have an opinion on 
what they, or others "ould do in a fire situation, and yet there is 
virtually no scientific evidence to refute or support these opinions. 
Even those who are most intimately involved, Fire Brigade personnel, 
cannot hope to have a comprehensive picture of fire behaviour. In many 
cases (some 54% in the Present Study), occupants will leave the building 
before the Fire Brigade arrives, and any subsequent questions will be 
centred on how the fire started rather than what i"dividuals did. Nor, 
of course, are Firemen any less susceptible than the rest of us to being 
capable of remembering only the more unusual or lurid incidents, and 
assuming that these are typical. 
There are two points we wish to make from the above discussion. 
Firstly that the research described in this thesis must be regarded as 
exploratory, and secondly that it is very difficult to initially approach 
the problem without preconceptions concerning what people will do and 
what factors will influence their behaviour. Inevitably these two 
considerations will be reflected in the strategy adopted and the 
variables included in the Present Study. 
The theoretical framework on which the work was based is extremely 
simple. It is assumed that people will be threatened by a fire situation. 
Fires will differ in the degree to which they pose a threat dependent 
upon their nature and the characteristics of the building in which they 
occur. People differ in their susceptibility to be threatened and in 
their perception of threat. The behaviour undertaken will be based 
primarily upon the need of the people concerned to reduce the level of 
threat-which they feel, and will differ dependent upon the factors 
outlined above. In the Present Study, four types of variables were 
included: Fire, Building, Personal and Behavioural. The underlying 
assumption is that the first three contain measures of the threat itself, 
perception of threat and susceptibility to be threatened, which in turn 
will be associated with differences in the fourth, behaviour. This may 
be considered a somewhat mechanistic view; however it must be borne in 
mind that conceptual models and variables studied are inevitably governed 
by the type of data which is capable of being collected. As has been 
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clearly demonstrated in the present case, the level of information 
obtained was very much constrained by the data collection method. It 
will be recalled that the original intention was to collect in-depth 
information on a small sample of incidents. Had this proved 'a feasible 
method, then the overall model and the variables studied would have been 
rather different. In the event, of course, a much larger scale, less 
detailed study was eventually undertaken. It would however have been 
unrealisti c to have expected to gain insight into peoples I personali ties', 
motives, thoughts, fears, confusions, emotions and so forth, during the 
course of the ,10 minute interviews conducted by Fire Brigade officers at 
the scene of the fire which constitute the major part of the data in the 
Present Study. In retrospect we feel it could be convincingly argued 
that the original research strategy was in any case incorrect, on the 
basis that exploratory research of this type should concern itself with 
providing information on how people behave in fires, before attempting 
premature explanations of why they behave in certain ways. 
In addition to the large sample of fires, we have of course looked in 
some detail at a sub-sample of incidents, those involving rescues, 
injuries or fatalities. However, even for this detailed study, its value 
is further enhanced by virtue of the fact that it was conducted in the 
context of the large-scale study. As a result of this we have been able 
to compare across RIP and Non-RIF samples on many variables, and to 
explore what characteristics distinguish these unsuccessful responses 
to fire. 
Having'established the underlying philosophy, we may make our 
concluding comments on five aspects of the study, the representativeness 
of the sample, the validity and reliability of the study method, the main 
findings from the study, the methods of analysis utilised and the 
indications for further research. 
17.1 THE STUDY SAMPLE 
The plain fact is that we cannot directly establish how representative 
our sample is, for the simple reasons that for none of the parameters we 
might choose, the incidents, the nature of the fires, or the occupants, 
do we have an established population with which to compare. Thus any 
attempts at assessing the validity of the sample must be by indirect means. 
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In essence, the primary sampling measure was "incidents", that is, 
fire incidents which occurred in buildings, attended by the Fire Brigade, 
in which people were involved. As we have discussed in Chapter 5 
there is no equivalent breakdown of official statistics on fires, the 
nearest being "Fires in Buildings". It is clear that the category "Fires 
in Buildings" will contain some unknown proportion of incidents in which 
people are not involved. Furthermore, it is likely that these incidents 
(those not involving people) will be unevenly distributed between 
building categories. For these reasons, we would suggest that the 
apparent preponderance of Dwelling fires in the sample may not in fact 
indicate a bias in our sample of incidents, but simply reflect the fact 
that Dwelling fires are more likely to invo~ve people than fires in other 
types of occupancy. 
Whilst not conclusive, the evidence from comparing the time of the 
incident between the Present Study and "Fires in Buildings" tends to 
support this conclusion. In this comparison "Fires in Buildings" differ 
from our sample in having an excess of evening and a paucity of morning 
fires, just the times at which we would predict that Non-Dwellings would 
be more likely to be empty of, and contain people, respectively. 
At first sight, it may also appear that the Present Study contains 
• an over-abundance of "small", Low severity fires. For example, only 28% 
of the incidents required Jets to extinguish them. There are four points 
which should be made concerning this aspect. Firstly, the original brief 
for the study was to examine behaviour in a broad range of fires, and 
these incidents therefore have a rightful place in the study. Secondly, 
because only those incidents which are unusual in some way, such as very 
large fires or multiple fatalities, are given publicity, we tend to assume 
that such incidents are the norm, whereas it is likely that the vast 
majority of fires are indeed quite minor and relatively unimportant in 
terms of their effect on the community. Thirdly, all the incidents in 
the sample were attended by the Fire Brigade and were therefore considered 
severe enough by someone to \~arrant a 999 call, and fourthly, the concept 
of Fire Severity itself is not a simple one. We have discussed at some 
length, in Chapters 6 and 7, the variables which were used to assess the 
seriousness of the fire. It is clear from these discussions that there 
is no single measure which provides a valid metric for this aspect. 
Indeed, it is one of the important findings of the study that fires tend 
----- - - - - - - -----------------~-- - - -
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to differ in their nature, in terms of Fire Severity variables such as 
intensity, spread, and smoke characteristics, dependent upon the category 
of building in which they occur. Furthermore, these factors are not 
necessarily related, thus incidents which require Jets to extinguish them, 
implying high intensity of fire, are likely to have low values of Smoke 
Spread and Smoke Density, and vice-versa. 
In the absence of an equivalent population with which to compare the 
severity of the fires in our sample, we cannot of course know whether it 
is representative. Again our only potential comparison is with "Fires in 
Buildings". If we examine the method of extinction for this population, 
we find that of the 105,328 fires which occurred in buildings during 1972, 
17,726 were extinguished using Jets from pumps and hydrants, this figure 
being only 16.8% of the incidents. Therefore on the basis of the above-
mentioned points we feel that the apparent low proportion of incidents on 
one particular severity measure should not be taken as an indication that 
it is unrepresentative in this direction. On the basis that fatal 
incidents, which might validly be taken as a measure of the seriousness 
of the fires, are apparently over-represented in the sample, it could 
equally well be argued that we have a preponderance of severe fires. 
17.2 THE STUDY METHOD 
I\aving rejected, at an early stage, silllulation and direct observation 
as possible study methods, then a method of "indirect observation" became 
the only means of collecting information on behaviour in fires. As has 
been discussed earlier, the particular study method and variables used in 
this research were determined to a large degree by constraints imposed by 
the data collection system. The use of Fire Brigade personnel in this 
role-obviously brought many advantages; however we must examine how 
successful the teChnique has proved in studying the given problem. A 
criticism which can be levelled at any work employing questionnaire or 
interview techniques is that it relies upon what people say they do, 
rather .than measuring what they actually do. Clearly in some studies it 
is possible to check the validity of questionnaire measures by obtaining 
some direct observations of the phenomenon. However we have seen that 
the nature of the fire situation tends to preclude this kind of check. 
One way of checking the validity of the present data was to require the 
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Fire Brigade officers who acted as interviewers, to compare the replies 
gi ven by the respondants with their own first-hand knowledge of the 
particular incident. By operating this check approximatelY 3% of the 
returned forms were rejected prior to analysis. Almost all of these 
rejected questionnaires were endorsed to the effect that the interviewee 
was under the influence of alcohol. An additional check on validi ty was 
possible after initial coding by checking and comparing the responses of 
interviewees from the same incident. The average number of people 
interviewed per incident was slightly over 2, the highest number being 
12, so it was quite feasible to examine a fairly large number for possible 
anomalies which could then be resolved by checking back with the Fire 
Brigade involved. The performance of the Fire Brigade was of course 
closely monitored by the investigator throughout the course of the study, 
and several incidents were attended to confirm correct usage of the 
questionnaire. In addition to these procedures we feel that the actual 
nature of the responses lends weight to their veracity, as is borne out 
by study of the qualitative analyses. There certainly appeared to be 
little attempt to deliberately put actions in a good light. It seems 
likely that many of the people who confessed to an inappropriate action 
were ignorant of the fact that they were so doing. 
The reliability of the method may be open to more question. Having 
defined "involved" in the Introduction, it seems clear that the sample 
collected is somewhat biased, in that the people interviewed tended to 
be those immediately involved with the fire. This inevitably fOllows 
from the use of Fire Brigade officers, who have only a limited time at 
the scene of the incident, as data gatherers. If the fire occurred in a 
large building they they could not possibly hope to interview all the 
people who were aware of the fire, and they therefore, not surprisingly, 
elected to obtain information from those closest to the actual scene. 
H0l4ever; even a large team of independent interviewers would be unlikelY 
to obtain a complete picture of the incident, as the time demanded by 
such an exercise, in say a factory containing 200 people, would be quite 
unacceptable. This possible source of bias should not be over-emphasised, 
as only 6.2% of the incidents in the sample involved buildings which 
contained more than 100 peop le, and in many incidents, particularly fires 
in Dwellings, all the people in the building were interviewed. 
In retrospect, perhaps the least satisfactory aspect of the 
questionnaire lay in the unstructured questions relating to the courses 
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of action. Although these were arranged to provide sequential responses, 
,. 
the difficulty when analysing the data arises from having no knowledge 
of the time scale occupied by each action. The length or brevity of the 
recorded comments did not appear to be related to the duration of the 
actions, rendering it difficult to assess over what period of time a 
person continued to pursue any specific action. This was particularly 
so when the course of action was a general one, ·directed mainly towards 
one end, for instance fire-fighting. It may be that the person was 
fighting the fire for several minutes, but superficially he appears to be 
less "active" than someone who did several specific things, which may 
well have occupied less time. It is difficult to suggest how this 
problem might be overcome, since subjective time estimates, even in non-
stress situations, are notoriously unreliable. 
17.3 THE STUDY FINDINGS 
If we were required to express the findings of the study in one 
short, alliterative, phrase, the one which would spring most readily to 
mind is "Dwellings are different". Whilst the phrase in itself may not 
convey much information without further amplification, it aptly 
summarises the fact that on each of our Study variables, the overall 
impression is that the fires, the people, and the behaviour in Dwellings 
tends to differ from other building categories. Even when we consider 
interactions between variables, we find that the main effect of occupancy 
over-rides other Iactors. 
Even outside the fire situation, Dwellings of course differ 
substantially from other types of building. On the purely physical 
level they are architecturally different, constructed perhaps in different 
materials, and containing the wide range of consumer goods which are 
associated with home living in a developed country in the late 20th 
century. On a functional level, we could go on to list all those 
activities which are implicit in the phrase "home living": eating, sleeping, 
leisure and so on, which set Dwellings apart from other occupancies; 
however the point is too obvious to labour. At least some of these 
intrinsic differences are related to the study findings. For example, 
the nature of the fires in Dwellings is such that they tend to be 
characterised by low intensity/high Smoke Spread and Smoke Density. It 
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would seem reasonable to explain this in terms of the most common sources 
of ignition, cooking appliances, children with fire, smokers' materials, 
and the presence of large quantities of soft furnishings, clothing, etc, 
in most homes. Together with the relatively small volume of space 
enclosed within a Dwelling, the absence of self-closing smoke doors .and 
the fact that most Dwelling fires occur during the day, the nature of 
these fires seems eminently reasonable. 
Dwellings are also distinguished by the characteristics of their 
occupants at the time of the fire. On the evidence of the Present study 
they were more likely to be female, to rate the fire as more serious, to 
be completely familiar with the building, to have never received training, 
to have not had previous experience of fire and to be family members. 
Several of these associations are of course unsurprising, however they do 
reinforce the point we are making that Dwelling incidents differ from 
incidents in other buildings. How are these differen.ces manifest in the 
behaviour of the occupants? Dwelling occupants seem to adopt a very 
diverse range of behaviour patterns which often include some action to 
minimise the risk, such as closing doors or switching-off mains services. 
They also appear to be very concerned with contacting the Fire Brigade. 
These patterns contrast with those in Industrial oc~upancies, where the 
major concern is fire-fighting, Retail occupancies where it is fire-fighting 
and contacting the Fire Brigade, and Institutions where warning others and 
investigating predominate. When looking at the specific actions which 
people took, Dwellings stand out in having a disproportionately large 
number of occupants who leave the building, although an exception to this 
general rule is provided by the occupants of high-rise flats, who tend to 
leave less frequently than the occupants of low-rise dwellings. 
If occupancy is one major determinant of behaviour, then the 
characteristics of the fire must be considered another. Indeed if we 
consider factors which increase evacuation of the building, the single 
most important main effect is that of extensive Smoke Spread. In other 
respects, our measures of Fire Severity appear to have relatively uniform 
effects upon the patterns of behaViour, but inconsistent effects upon 
specific actions. We could perhaps have predicted that warning others, 
evacuating others and evacuating oneself would become increasingly 
frequent components of the action sequences as the fire becomes more 
severe. What we would not have easily foreseen, hOl-leVer, was the manner 
in which fire-fighting, minimising the risk, and in particular, contacting 
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the Fire Brigade, all appear to be associated with the lower levels of 
Fire Severity. A possible interpretation for this finding might be that 
when the fire is less serious, the actions of the occupants are largely 
"fire-oriented", that is, their major concern is to minimise the 
consequences of the fire in terms of damage, extent and expense. In more 
serious fires, however, there is a switch from "fire-oriented" to "safety-
oriented" behaviour, in which the major concern becomes the personal 
safety of the occupants, and the material damage assumes a much less 
pressing concern. 
Over the course of the incident, increasing Fire Severity as measured 
by all our variables, acts uniformly to increase the proportion of people 
leaving. As we have seen, the extent of Smoke Spread is the single most 
powerful determinant for this action. Returning into the building also 
appears to be more closely related to smoke characteristics than other 
severity measures, in this case of course, high levels of smoke variables 
tending to discourage re-entry. Assuming that the relatively large 
numbers of people who move through smoke when it spreads extensively 
simply reflects .the greater exposure; it is the density of the smoke which 
appears to have the greatest deterrent effect. It is clear therefore that 
whilst any of our measures of Fire Severity may be seen to affect 
behaviour, it is the characteristics of the smoke which have the strongest 
and most uniform action. 
The third important factor determining behaviour is the group of 
variables which we have chosen to describe as Personal variables. In a 
way, this set of variables lacks homogeneity, encompassing as it does 
"true" Personal variables such as sex and age, "experiential" variables 
such as training and familiarity, "incident-related" variables such as 
first awareness of the fire and seriousness rating, and "social" variables 
such as the presence and relationships of others in the building. Despite 
these essential differences in the nature of the variables, one can often 
discern a consistent thread in terms of their effects upon behaviour 
patterns. For example, the factors which appear to increase the likelihood 
of an individual attempting fire-fighting include training and previous 
experience of fire, the absence of family members, and men as opposed to 
women. All these factors tend to be associated with a particular occupancy, 
Industrial category buildings, so we are to a large extent confirming the 
already-noted relationship between fire-fighting and Industrial buildings. 
Similarly, contacting the Fire Brigade is more frequent for people who are 
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completely familiar with the building, who are untrained, inexperienced 
in fire and alone in the building, in this case an outline more closely 
related to the occupants of some Dwellings. It is of interest that the 
effect of subjective perception of increased fire seriousness lends 
support to our earlier hypothesis concerning behaviour patterns changing 
from "fire" to "safety" oriented, in this case even to the extent of 
suppressing the powerful initial need to investigate the fire. In the 
majority of cases, "investigating" the fire is the most frequent First 
Action and as we have earlier commented, behaviour patterns are perhaps 
of more interest IVhen investigating is ~ the very first action made. 
This occurrence appears to be associated with quite specific factors such 
as previous experience of fire, training and a particular age range, 41 
to 50 years. It is also notable in incidents where no·other people are 
present in the building, to some extent in Industrial fires, and to a 
rather more obvious degree in Institution fires. It is clear from the 
above that this behaviour pattern, unlike fire-fighting and contacting 
the Fire Brigade, is not related in a simple way to a particular building 
category, but may also be associated with particular "types" of people. 
For the specific actions, evacuation, re-entry and movement through 
smoke, the most clear-cut findings in terms of the effect of Personal 
variables relate to evacuation. A list of those factors which increase 
the number of people leaving: absence of training, inexperience of fire, 
presence of family, increasing age, perception of increased fire 
seriousness, women rather than men, suggests that yet again we are 
describing the characteristics of a particular population of building 
occupants, in this case Dwellings. 
If in the foregoing discussion we have emphasised the effect of 
occu~ancy in interpreting behaviour, and in particular the specific case 
of Dwellings, consideration of those incidents which involved Rescues, 
Injuries and Fatalities serves to confirm this impression. As we have 
noted, these incidents are much more likely to occur in Dwellings than 
in other types of building, the other major distinguishing feature being 
that they are in general more serious, on all our measures of Fire 
Severity, than Non-RIP incidents. This particular group of incidents was 
selected for more detailed study on the basis that they represent an 
"unsuccessful" response to fire. Evidence from the quali tati ve analyses 
leads us to the conclusion, however, that whilst Rescue and Fatal incidents 
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share many similarities, Injury incidents tend to differ from both in 
many respects. Perhaps the most important distinction arises from the 
extent to which behaviour plays a part in determining the unhappy 
outcome. In general we would suggest that the occurrence of injuries at 
a fire incident is largely "behaviour-dependent", whereas at least a 
proportion of the Rescue and Fatal incidents appear to be "behaviour-
independent" • 
inappropriate 
The largest single cause of injuries was of course 
handling of chip pan fires, although this conclusion should 
perhaps be expressed in a more generalised form as inappropriate attempts 
to move the burning object. In contrast to those involved in Rescue 
incidents, these people are, using our terminology, to a large degree 
"fire-oriented", and it may be of significance that of all the RIF 
incidents, Injury incidents had the lowest Fire Severity values. Whilst 
we may only conjecture on the underlying reasons for embarking on this 
type of response, its demonstrated inappropriateness must suggest a clear 
need for more effective education on this aspect. 
We have suggested that the occurrence of both rescues and fatalities 
is to a certain extent independent of the behaviour of the· occupants, 
however this is more clearly true of Rescue incidents than of Fatal 
incidents. In most Rescue incidents, the extent and density of the smoke 
on first discovery of the fire are such that the only variations on 
behaviour are whether to attempt to leave the building by an unorthodox 
route, to remain in the room and await rescue, or to attempt to move 
downstairs through the smoke. The last of these alternatives must in 
general be the most hazardous, although in our sample of incidents the 
outcome for all three was the same, rescue by Fire Brigade personnel. 
The number of Fatal incidents arising in the study was inevitably 
small, nonetheless, we feel that some general conclusions may be drawn 
frolll-them:-- In at least 2 of the 6 incidents considered, we would 
conclude that the particular circumstances and nature of the fire 
situation were the most important factors. In the remaining 4, comparison 
of the Fatal incident with one of equivalent severity suggests that the 
behaviour in them may have been qualitatively different. An overall 
impression is that the occupants in the Control incidents were in general 
more concerned for the safety and welfare of those involved. Looking 
specifically at comparisons between the behaviour patterns, it is clear 
that the responses to similar fire circumstances may either differ 
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completely, or may in fact contain several common elements. Where there 
is complete divergence in behaviour we find that the occupants in the 
Control incident were concerned almost exclusively with the safety of 
life, whilst those in the matched Fatal incident divided their efforts 
between the fire and the other people in the building. Where Fatal and 
Control incidents contain common actions, the difference in behaviour 
shows as some addi tional response on the part of the occupants .in the 
Control incident, which in the cases examined prevented a fatal outcome. 
17.4 METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
Our conclusions regarding the analysis of the data are brief. 
Whilst many multi-variate techniques are now available, it was considered 
that the nature of the data was more suited to simple methods of analysis. 
The reasons for this were three-fold. Firstly, it was not necessary to 
make unwarranted assumptions about the level of measurement or 
distribution of the variables. Secondly, a preliminary analysis using 
Factorial techniques suggested that the variables were related in simple, 
rather than complex ways, and thirdly the interpretation of the findings 
is rendered more simple if it is analysed in the way we have undertaken. 
We are not of course suggesting that other facets of the data could not 
be revealed by more sophisticated techniques, but merely that the 
findings presented earlier are the'major associations between the variables. 
By analysing the data on general behaviour in terms of sequences of 
actions, it can at first sight appear rather complex, especially when 
broken down into several samples. Yet in fact we are providing a very 
much simplified view of what happened. Behaviour is a process, not a 
thing,-and the seeming complexity of the behaviour patterns reflects our 
natural tendency to reduce complicated phenomena to simple forms which are 
easy to 
did not 
grasp. We feel that, whilst in some cases this form of analysis 
reveal the 
it is nonetheless 
information. 
gross differences 
the most valid way 
in responses we might have expected, 
of handling this particular 
319 
17.5 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Under this heading we want to draw both a general.and a specific 
conclusion. The Present Study was based upon a large scale quantitative 
examination of behaviour in a range of fires, and a small scale 
qualitative examination of behaviour in incidents involving rescues, 
injuries or fatalities. It is clear that even our detailed examination 
of this sub-sample of fires does not explore in sufficient depth the 
motives for and determinants of behaviour patterns. Our general 
conclusion therefore must be that any future research in this area should 
concentrate on a detailed, qualitative study of behaviour in fires. The 
evidence from the Present Study suggests that the qualitative aspects of 
the variables may in fact be of considerable importance. Several 
examples come to mind, for instance the measure of fire training. In the 
present case we utilised a simple measure of training frequency, however 
this is clearly inadequate to interpret differences in manifest behaviour, 
and it is likely that the nature and specificity of the training received 
are of at least equal or greater importance. A similar argument applies 
to previous experience of fire, for which the nature of this experience 
and the elapsed time since its occurrence must be considered relevant. 
In respect of the duration over which behaviour: lasted, we would hope 
that a more detailed examination would provide much needed information. 
Certainly one difficulty which arose from the Present Study was in 
requiring interviewees to relate their actions to "the course of the 
incident", which is obviously open to widely different interpretations. 
The motives for behavioural responses were explored only in a very 
generalised way. The reasons why individuals left or returned into the 
building, and the intentions of those who moved through smo~e, could not 
be closely determined within the scope of this study, and can only be 
explored_by a smaller scale qualitative study. 
The specific conclusion relates to those incidents which involved 
cooking fires, in particular chip pan fires. It is clear that even 
though we are relying only on data from incidents attended by the Fire 
Brigade, these are a considerable problem, and represent a drain on both 
medical services and material resources. We would conclude therefore 
that they warrant a major effort in research. 
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The objectives of this research would be as follows: 
(a) To identify the true incidence of these fires and their consequences. 
Cb) To identify the differences, in terms of both behaviour and 
equipment, between incidents which are dealt with successfully and 
those which are not. 
Cc) To derive preventive measures, which might be modified products or 
educational measures, to reduce the incidence of cooking fires. 
It is likely that the realisation of these objectives would require 
a series of investigations, which would include a large scale control 
study, small scale in-depth studies of incidents, field studies of user-
behaviour and laboratory user-trials and evaluation. 
APPENDICES 1-8 
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APPENDIX 1 
Estimating procedure for the number of people involved in fires in 
dwellings per annum. 
All figures relating to population are extracted from Central Statistical 
Office (1970) 
All figures relating to fires are extracted from United Kingdon Fire and 
Loss Statistics, 1969 (op.cit.) 
Ci) 
CH) 
CHi) 
Number of fires attended by Fire Brigades in dwellings 
Fires in dwellings occuring between 5 p.m. and 9 a.m. 
Fires in dwellings occuring between 9 a.m. and 5.p.m. 
The average number of people per household = 2.91 
= 46,000 approx. 
= 26,000 approx. 
= 20,000 
If we assume that all members of the household are present between 
5 p.m. and 9 a.m., then average number of persons involved during these 
hours is 26,000 x 2.91 =~'75,660 
For working hours, 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., we must estimate the average 
population of a dwelling separately. 
To estimate population E£! in dwellings between these hours, 
Total Working Population = 25,200,000 
Total IDI. Forces = 380,000 
Total School children = 9,320,000 
Total Institutional Population = 860,000 
36,160,000 
Total Population = 55,600,000 
population in dwellings between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. = 55,600,00 - 36,160,000 
= 19,440,000 
Estimated number of dwellings 
average population of dwellings between 
9 a,m. to 5 p.m. 
= 
= 
= 
19,634,000 
19/440/000 
19,634,000 
0.99 
Average number of persons involved in fires during these hours = 0.99 x 20,000 
= 19,800 
Total number of persons involved in dwelling fires = 19;800 + 
75/660 
95,460 
322 
APPENDIX 2 
Estimating procedure for number of people involved in fires other than 
dwellings per annum. 
Number of fires in buildings other than dwellings per 
Approximately 40% of fires occur between 9 a.m. and 5 
therefore number of fires in buildings occurring in 
working hours 
(i) Assume each fire in separate building 
(ii) Average number of people per building 
(iii) Assume only 10% of people aware of fire 
Therefore number of people involved 
Total number of persons involved 
Probability of being involved in a fire per annum 
annum 
p_ m. , 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
45,OOOapprox. 
18,000 
150 
15 
15 x 18,000 
270,000 
270,000 
+ 
95,460 
365,460 
365,460/55,600,OO( 
6.5 X la -3 
N.B. Estimate of working hours is probably substantially correct for 
occupancies other than industry. However.in the absence of data 
concerning percentage of industry working shifts, this time-period 
is also applied for industrial occupancies. It is of course 
likely to be an underestimate. 
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. m ............. ............................ _ •••••••••...•••..•••.•.•.••.• *fire Brigade/Fire service 1 .... _Ca_"_N_o. ____ --' 
D,te .nd Day of C.II ........................................................ . 
Additional particulars to follow on form K4H.' No .ddltlonal particulars to follow.' 
Division, etc. . ....... _............................................ ......... ........... ... Statlon ... _. 
{ For Counties (E. & W.) only-County District (I.~ .• Non·County Borough. U.D.C. or R.D.C.) .... . • For Scotland .nd N. Ireland-Administrative Area In which Fire occurred ......................................................... . 
1. Addr ... of Fire. 
2. Name(s) of Occupier(s) ..... 
3. Trade(s) or Business(.s) c.rrled on: 
Where fire started: 
Where fire spread to: ................. . 
1. SUPPOSED CAUSE: 
2. PARTICULARS OF PROPERTY INVOLVED: Type No. 
DESCRIPTION: 
3. PARTICULARS OF CONTENTS: 
... - ... -.....• ... '" ........................ ~ .. 
4. EXTENT OF FIRE 
(i) Fires In Buildings. 
r
room of origin 
CONFINED TO floor of origin. 
1 ~~~~~~gr~~r~~~~·:::::·:: 
(11) Fires other than those In buildings. 
CONFINED to hazard In which fire started ...... ,., 
5. DESCRIPTION OF-DAMAGE: 
...... J .................................... .. 
4. Method of Calling: (a) W.F.B. 
(b) F.B .. _ .... 
S. Discovered by......... ............. . 
6. Weather 
7. Road condition .... 
B. Wind ...... ... 
9. Time of Discovery 
10. Time to Call to W.F.B ... 
11. Time of Arrlv.1 of W.F.B. 
12. Time ofC.1I to F.B ....................... . 
13. Time of Arrlv.1 ofF.B. 
H. Time under control 
15. When last F.B. Appliance returned to Station 
(.) Date . ..... ............... . 
(b) Time ................. . 
16. Risk Category ..... 
... -........ , .... . 
ApprOXimate date of building construction or 
manufacture .......................... . 
EXTENDED TO t.eparate buildings ..... . { 
adlolnlng buildings ..... . 
. other hazards ... . ... . 
EXTENDED 'TO {tbuildlngs ..... 
other hazards 
, . 
..··.~.·· .. ·r··i .. -~ ....... -...... t .. ·· .. ·i-··· 
. ..................... ,. 
6. DEVELOPMENT OF FIRE: AS$lsted by combustible floor. wall. ceiling. roof lining" 
7. SPRINKLERS: 
(i) 'Hand oper.ted system Installed { In room (11) F.iled to oper.te bec.ause 
'Autom.tlc system Installed or section 
'Not Inst.lled .......................................... . 
(lIi) Operated.............. ....................................... he.ds being actuated. and (a) 'Controlled fire.. (bi '.ExtingUished fire. 
(c) 'Did not control fire because ............ ..... . .............................. . 
·Delete as necessary. tSe. separate form(s) K.433 '-'m~a"-'rk~e'-"d"' ...~·==.~ .. ~ ...-'.'-· ______ _ 
3'24 
B. fiRE PROTECTION APPLIANCES OR DEVICES OTHER THAN SPRINKLERS OR PORTABLE HAND OPERATED 
APPLIANCES: 
." ...................... , ..... , ........... " .. , .............. , ........ ~_ ... _ .... _._._ ... _M." .... _ ... _., .... _ •.••.• _ .... _" .............. _ ............... " ......... _ ....... _" .....•.•... " .• " ............ ''' .............. ,''' .......... ,', .................................. , ........... ,,, .. ,,. 
9:·····METHOD···OF··E·xiiNGliiSHiNG·THE··i'iii:ii;·· ... ··· ..................................................... ::; ... : .......................................................... ~ .... ' .............................................. . 
(i) If tackled before the arrival of F.B. give details (Including methods used by Works Fire Brigade): 
••••••••••••••••••••••••••• , ••••• _ •••••••••• , •••••••••• , ....................... _ ...... _ ............... _" ..................... NO ... _ •• _ ... _ .. __ ." .. _" ...... ' .. " ..... ' ..... " ....... ~ .... __ •••••• ":' ................. _ ............ _ ............................. "", •••• , •• , .... , ....... ~ .. ~ ................ . 
......... .................... ~ ................. _ ........................ __ .............. _ ...... _ .... "' ..... ~ ................ '_H ......... , .................... ' ......... ':" ............. ' .. '" .... ~' •• _ .. _ ............. _. ' ........... _ ............. "" ............ , .... , .................... , .. . 
...................... ................................................................ _ ............... - .................................... , ....................................................... -.. __ ..... " ........ --. .... _ ....... , .......................... , ...................................................... .. 
(11) Method used by F.B.: c.> 
......... " ...................................................................................... , ............... , ..... , ....................................................................................... _, .................................................... " ................................................................ . 
........... ....................................... "." ............................................................ , ....................... , .... "" ........... , ........ " ........... , .............. H ....... M ....... " .............................................. " ••• " ..... " ........................ " ....... " .. . 
(lIi) If Immediate water supply was Inadequate. give reason and details of any relay brought Into operation: 
~ Age 
~ Name(s) Sex (years) Method of rescue or escape Person effecting rescue 
~---------------4--~~--r----------------~---------------- 
.; 
~ 
~ 
u· 
.. QI .............. . 
~ 
Age If Injuries prove . 
fatal. cause of death tName(s) Sex (years) Address(es) Nature of Injury 
~----------------~---+--~+----------4--~---------+~--------­
• ~ M' .... .. ......................... _............... .. .... _ ......... _.. .. .................. .. • ............................................................ y ......................... _ ................................................................................... . 
, ' 
~ .... ., ........... " ... " ....... , .. •· .... • .... ·" .. ·1· .......... • ........ • ........................ , ............................... " .......................... " ...... " .......... , ...... " .......................... " ..... " .............. ~ .... " ....... "" ........................................ " ........... . 
~ . ...... ... .......... . ..... " ........ " ................ ~ ........ , ........ " ................................ , ........................................................ , ... -........................ " ............ - ....... ~ ............. " .......... "" .............. " ................. " ...... " .. . 
3 . .. .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... , ......................................................... .. 
) .... , ...... " ...... , ... " ........ , ...... , ....... " ................... "..... ...................... .. ..... , ... ".................... ...; .. !: .. ,J.,' ... , ... "" ....................... : .... ,; .. ,.: ...... : ... ~ ....... "" ... w ... " .. , ........... , ....... . 
*Other than those requiring Flnt·Ald treatment only tFor F.B. personnel add (F.B.) after n .. me 
1. F.B. APPLIANCES: 
(Give Fir. Brigade (name suitably abbreviated), Division (If applicable.) and Station (number or n. ame suitably abbreviated) 
from which th. appliances attended, followed by the total number of appliances In brackets. e.g .• ' "l.C.C. B. 26 (2):~ Relief 
appliances are not to be Induded.) 
P.E..... ... ...................................................................................................... WR.T .............................................................. : ....................................... : ..................... . 
PUMPS .............. , .. .. 
T/L. (Moch.) ...................................................... : .......... . 
... ... ............................................... . ............................ _ ................................... , 
Give particulars of other F.B. appliances: 
T/L. (60' H/O.) ....... !., .............. : ............ : .... . 
2. APPLIANCES OTHER THAN F.B .............................. " ........ , ................... , .................................. : ............................................................ : .. · ..... T ............................. ·· 
3. F.B. PERSONNEL above rank of Station Officert attending before recei'pt of "stop" message (staff. visiting and 'relief 
officers need not be shown). tNote-When the officer In charge of the fire Is of Station Officer rank. or below. his name' 
should be entered. . 
Designation of Station or Headquarters to which 
attached . Rank 
, 
Name. 
...................... ., .............................................................. _ ........................ ~ .. " ............................. ,. ....................................... , .............. , ........................... " .......... ~ ................................................................... .. 
...... " ............................................................ ~ ................................................ . 
~. TOTAL NO. OF PERSONNEL ATIENDING: (a)Whole.time:- (b) Part·tlme:-
......................................................... , ........................................................... , ............................................................ , ..................... , .... , .. , ................ " ................................................. , ................... . 
......... " ••• , ••••••••••••••• " ..... , ........ , ........ "." ... , .......... , .................................................. f •••• , ... , •• " .......... "." ••••••••• ,,, ........ , .................................... " ••••••• ,.; ......... , .... " ......... , ..... , .......................... , ......... . 
.................................................................... H ......... ................................ _ .................................................. , ........... , ............ ~ ...................... , ..... , ..................... , .................................... . 
... _ ....................................................................................................................... " ....................................................... , ................ _ ................................... ~ ........................... ~ ....................... . 
Signature ...... :., .................................................................................................... .. 
Officer In charge of Station! 
Date .............. , .... , .................. " ..... _ ...................................... _ .......................................... .. 
J9 Od.82J717 .5OOm GP lom 
i. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Behaviour of People in' Fires· (Pilot-Study) 
Questionnaire to be completed by Fire Brigade Officer, not the person being interviewed. 
is only necessary to place a tick in the box opposite the appropriate response. 
I) Male Female 
2) Under 25 25 - 45 45+ 
3) How did you first become aware of the fire? 
(a) Heard fire alarm 0 1 
(b) Smelt smoke 0 2 
(c) Saw flames 0 3 ' 
, 
(d) Felt heat 0 4 
(e) Heard shouts 05 
(t) Were told 0 6 
4) What was your position (within the building) at that time? 
(a) On the same floor close to the fire 0 1 
(b) On the same floor remote from fire 0 2 
(c) On the floor above 0 3 
(d) On the floor below 0 4 
(e) In .' !:Dom 05 
(t) In a corridor 0 6 
(g) Don't know 0 7 
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5) What were your immediate feelings? 
(a) Unconcern 0 1 
(b) Slight worry 0 2 
(c) Confusion D3 
(d) Excitement 0 4 
(e) Fear Os 
(f) Desire to escape (move) 0 6 
6) Did these feelings alter during the course of the fire? 
(a) Becom e greater 0 1 
(b) Become less 0 2 
(c) Change corn pletely 0 3 
7) What did you do as soon as you realised there was a fire? 
. (a) Went to see where it was? 0 1 
(b) Prepared to leave the building 0 2 
(c) Went to warn other people 0 3 
(d) Enquired whether Fire Brigade had 0 4 been called 
(e) Attempted to call Fire Brigade 0 5 
(f) A ttem pt to extinguish it 0 6 
(g) Operated the fire alarm 0 7 
(h) Nothing 0 8 
8) Did you attempt to leave the building? 
(a) By your normal route 0 1 
(b) By unother ordinary route 0 2 
(c) By climbing through a window D3 
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9) Did you have any difficulty in moving about due to 
(a) Heat 0 1 
(b) Flames 0 2 
(c) Smoke 0 3 
(d) Choking fumes 0 4 
(e) The actions of other people Os 
(f) None 0 6 
(If 9 (c), then questions (10) and (11) apply, otherwise omit) 
10) How far did you attempt to move through the smoke? 
(a) Three feet 0 1 .. 
(b) Six feet 0 2 
(c) Twelve feet 0 3 
(d) More 0 4 
11) Were you 
(a) Walking upright 0 1 
(b) Running upright 0 2 
(c) Crouching 0 3 
(d) . On hands and knees 0 4 
12) How far could you see through the smoke? 
(a) Three feet 0 1 
(b) Six feet 0 2 
(c) Twelve feet 0 3 
(d) More 0 4 
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13) Where were you when the Fire Brigade arrived? 
(a) In original pla~e 0 1 
(b) Attempting to leave the building 0 2 
(c) Outside the buildIng 0 3 
14) Did you eventually leave the building? 
(a) By your own efforts 0 1 
(b) By the efforts of the Fire Brigade 0 2 
(c) By the help of others 0 3 
(d) Not at all 0 4 
15) Have you ever been involved in a fire incident before? 
(a) At home 0 1 
(b) At work 0 2 
(c) In another building 0 3 
This section to be completed by Fire Brigade Personnel only. 
Date: Fire at: 
. Number of storeys : 
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., A .. p"p. END I X< 5 
Behaviour of Peopie in Fires in .Tall Buildings-CP(lot Study) 
This questionnaire is to be handled by the Fire Brigade Officer, not the person b~ing inter-
viewed. Except for the brief factual details at the beginning of the questionnaire, it is only 
. necessary to place a tick or a number in the box opposite the most appropriate response. 
A ddress of Incident: .... -................................................................... .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Date and tim e: ........................................................................... 
Floor of origin CD 
Number of floors CD 
Fire alarm provided? yes 0 no 0 
Fire equipment provided? yes 0 no 0 
1) Male 0 1 Female 0 2 
2) Under 25 0 1 25 - 45 0 2 45+ 0 3 
3) Flat Number I I I I 
4) Floor Number CD 
5) How did you first become aware of the fire? 
(a) Heard fire alarm 0 1 
(b) Smelt smoke 0 2 
. ------------
(c) Saw flames 0 3 
(d) Felt heat 0 4 
(e) Heard shouts 0 5 
(f) Was told 0 6 
(g) Were not aware of tbe fire 0 7 
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6) Which floor were you on when Y,ou first becarn e aware of the fire? 
Floor munber DJ 
7) What was your position within the building at that time? 
(a) In your flat 0 1 
(b) In the lift 0 2 
(c) In the corridor/entrance hall 0 3 
(d) Don't know 0 4 
8) What what your immediate feelings? 
(a) Unconcern 0 1 
(b) Slight worry 0 2 , 
(c) Confusion 0 3 , 
(d) Excitement 0 4 
(e) Fear 0 5 .. 
(f) Desire to escape (move) 0 6 
9) What did you do as soon as you realised there was a fire? 
(a) Went to see where it was 0 1 
(b) Prepared to leave the building 0 2 
(c~ Went to warn other people 0 3 
(d) Enquired whether Fire Brigade had been called? 0 4 
(el A ttem pted to call Fire Brigade 0 5 
._---
(f) Attempted to exlinguish it 0 6 
(g) Operated the fire alann 0 7 
(h) Nothing 0 8 
331 
10) Did you attempt to leave the building? 
(a) By the lift 0 1 
(b) By the staircase 0 2 
(c) By climbing through a window 0 3 
(d) Not at all 04 
11) Did you have any difficulty in moving about due to 
(a) Heat 0 1 
(b) Flames 0 2 
(c) Smoke 0 3 
(d) Choking fumes 0 4 
(e) The actions of other people Os 
(f) None 0 6 
(If ll(c) is ticked, then questions 12), 13) and 14) apply, otherwise omit}. 
12} How far did you attempt to move through the smoke? . 
(a) No distance 0 1 
(b) Three feet 0 2 
(c) Six feet 0 3 
(d) Twelve feet 0 4 
(e) More Os 
. 13) Were you 
(a) Walking upright 0 1 
(b) Running upright 0 2 
(c) Crouching 0 3 
(d) On hands and knees 0 4 
14) 
15) 
16) 
17) 
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How far could you see through the smoke? 1/ 
(a) No distance, 0 1 
(b) Three feet 0 2 
(c) Six feet 0 3 
(d) Twelve feet 
04 
(e) More 0 5 
Where were you when the Fire Brigade arrived? 
(a) In original place 0 1 
(b) Attem pting to leave the building? 0 2 
(c) Outside the building 0 3 
(d) Moving nearer to the scene of the fire , O-! 
" 
(e) Moving away from the scene of the fire Os 
How did you eventually leave the building during or immediately after 
the incident? 
(a) By your own efforts 
(b) By the efforts of the Fire Brigade 
(c) By the help of others 
(d) Not at all 
Have you ever been involved in a fire incident before? 
(a) At home 
(b) At work 
(c) In another building 
(d) No 
0 1 
0 2 
D3 
0 4 
0 1 
0 2 
0 3 
0 4 
University of Technology, 
Loughborough, 
Leicestershire. 
April, 1970. 
I 
-~-------
APPENDIX 6 
The Behaviour of People in Fires 333 
We are trying to find out if people react differently to fires 
in different kinds of building. This set of questionnaires is' 
concerned with one particular incident and is composed of 
two parts. 
Part I, which is about the fire and the building should be 
answered by the Fire Brigade Personnel. Part 11 comprises 
the six subsequent questionnaires, which are about people 
involved in the fire. The questionnaires in Part 11 are for use 
in interviewing six separate individuals who were in the 
building when the fire was discovered. We are interested in 
anyone who was in the building, not only the person who 
first discovered the fire. 
We would therefore like you to interview as many people as 
possible who were involved with the incident. Both Part I 
and Part II should be handled by Fire Brigade Personnel, not 
by the person being interviewed. Where a question i~ 
followed by a list of suggested alternatives please tick the 
box opposite the most appropriate answer. Where a distance 
estimate is required please circle the relevant number. 
Part 1 Information on the Building and Type of Fire 
Address 1-\ '" R. c:; RE'" v~ S 
tst: LG.R,ollE' ~l). 
lNau..ING 
I<EN, 
1 Is a fire alarm,(manual or automatic) provided in the ~ 
building? ...... , ....................... Yes v' 
. No 
K433 Report Sheet Number 
ro071 
6 What is the maximum number of storeys in the 
building? .................................. [I] 
7 
If so, was it used? ........................ Yese;;:] , 
, . NoD '-,' 
v' , 8 
On which floor did the fire start? 
Basement = -1, ground = 0, first = 1, etc. ......... [0 
2 Is fire fighting equipment provided in the building? a 
. ' Yes V 
, No . 
If so, was it used? ••••••••• : •••.•..••••.•• Y
N
e;53 
3 If ~ire fighting equipment is not provided, was any· 
other attempt made to extinguish the fire before the 
Fire Brigade arrived? .....•............. :. YesD 
NoG2J 
4 Are there any recognised escape routes iri the 
building? ...•..................... ~ ..... Yes[Z] 
. NoD 
If so, were they used? ......... .' ......•... :e;~ 
-If "No", please specify why not 
What category of building is it? In general terms, for 
example - school, block of flats, shop, cinema, 
private dwelling house, multi·occupancy dwelling, 
etc. 
I ~------------------------~ 
~HoP 
Approximately how many people do you think were 
in the building when the fire was discovered? 
, ,~ Please put the number in the box ............... ~
Approximately how many left the building during the~ 
course of the fire? If all, write AL L .•.......... "~ 
How many people were rescued by Fire Brigade :::o:~~~ p~~;"~~;~ i'n'j~;e'd' ~~~"f~;""'y'?' : : : :: :: ~ 
How many people were injured fatally? ..•....... 0 
How many people were injured (fatally or non.fatallYlm 
. . h b 'Id' • 0 In escaplOg t e UI mg ...........•........... 
9 How many 
rooms were involved in the fire .•.......•....... ~ 
levels were involved in the fire .........•....•.. I 
. . led' hf' I constructions were IOVO v 10 t e Ire .......... . 
'0 How many jets were utilised? ...•............. rn 
'1 What was the extent of the smoke spread? 
None .............................•....... 
Confined to room of origin 
Confined to floor of origin ................... . 
Spread to floor above .•...................... 
Even more extensive ......................... V 
12 What was the dens,ity of the smoke at its worst? 
If, on the scale below, 7 represents the thickest 
.smoke you have ever encountered, and 1 represents 
very thin smoke, put a cross in one of the spaces 
which represents the density of the smoke in this . 
incident. 
11 1 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~--~J~ 
rt 2 Information about the Person in the Fire 
Male[ZJ Female 0 Age[Ib] 
How did-you lirst become aware there was a fire? 
Felt heat .••..••.•.........••......•...•.. 
Saw flames .•.•..•••...••••...•.•..•....••• 
Saw or smelt smoke .••••••..••......• , ••.... 
Heard noises associated with the fire •••......•.. 
Heard shouts ....• ~ •...•••• ~ •...••.••.••.• '. 
Was told .................................. . 
Heard fire alarm or fire engines 
you think it was? Extremely serious .....• 
When you realised there was a fire, how serious did .EJ 
I Quite serious ........• 
Not at all serious •..••. 
I 
Are you .. : ......•... completely familiar with it V 
fairly familiar with it .... 
slightly familiar with it " 
How familiar are you with the layout of the bUilding?~ 
I not familiar with it •...• 
What was the first thing you did when you realised 
I there was a fire? 
I ~eet ~ ~t 
~ ~S 
What did you do next? 
~~ect· ~~ tG 
~ '39<)-
and next? 
~ vu.ca:kd ~ 
How, often have you received training on w~~t actions 
.. "'" , .. "., ~ . . At I,east' once per month ~ ..•.......•...•...... 
At '"east once every six months' ..... ' .•....•. -. " .. -- . '-.. -
At least once every year .................... -... 
Les~ frequently than onc~ a_ y~_~r _~_-nev_~r- ..... -. _ ... 
8 Did you know of any means of emergency escape in 
the building? ....•...•...•.. " ....••..••. y..["Z] 
. ~~c===J 
9 Did you leave the building during the fire? ••••• Y~ 
If NO, pleasepass on to question 10 ~r=J 
I 
, 
In leaving did you use . . 
The normal exits .••• ' ........................ ~ 
An emergency exit •• ~ ........................... . 
I1 
Lf_o_m_e...,...o_th_e_r_w_,,_y_p_l_e_as_e_s_p_ec _ if_V __ ' ____________ -;==~I ! I 
§ .i! Did you leave by ••.••• Your own efforts.. •.. • r With Fire Brigade help •• /. 
With the help of others •• 
I 
I 
Did you return into the building during the course 0£jf _ 
the fire? ............................... Y 
N 
If you did, for what reason? 
10 What reason did you have for not leaving? Was it 
because 
You did not think the fire was serious enough ...... Cl /! 
You thought you would be safer where you Were ••• D 
Some other reasdn please specify I 
L..............I __ ----',! 
11 Was there any smOke? ............ , ........ yes~v : 
If NO, omit the rest of this question No 
Did you try to move through it? .•••••••••.•. Yes V 
If NO, omit the rest of this question No 
How far did you try to move through it? 
Yards .... () .••• 2 ... 0. ... la .... 12 .... 15 .... 20 : ... 20+ 
How far ahead could you see at the time? 
Yards .... 0 ... 0 ... 4 .... 10 .... 12 .... 15 .... 20 .... 20+~ 
Did the smoke become thicker? ....•••••.••• Yes V 
No 
Did you have to turn back because of it? •••.•. Yes V 
If NO, omit the next p3rt of the question No 
How far ahead could you see when you turned back? 
Yards ... @ ... 2 .... 4 .... 10 .... 12 .... 15 .... 20 .... 20+ 
12 Were any of the following people with you in the 
buildirig during the fire? Your children under 12 . 
Your children over 12 .• 
Your wifelhusband ..•• 
Your parents ......... . 
Some other relative- •• o •• 
Friends ••• ~ .......... ~ V if I' Acquaintances • • . . •• • . I. I 
People unknown to you. I 
13 Have you ever been involved in a fir;inciderit befo~:b I ' 
NoGZJ . 
Part 2 Information about the Person in the Fire 
MaleO· Female 0 ·Age 143 1 
1 How did you first become aware there was a fire? 
Felt heat .....••.....................•.•.. 
Saw flames .........•.•....••.•••..••...•.. 
Saw or smelt smoke ..•.........•...•.•..•... 
Heard noises associated with the fire ............ . 
Heard shouts ..•. : ......................... . 
Was told •.......••...••..•................ 
Heard fire alarm or fire engines 
2 When you realised there was a fire, how seri.OUS did § 
you think it was? Extremely serious ..... . 
Quite serious 
Not at all serio~: . : : : ::: V 
·3 Which floor were you on when you realised there was 
afire? •••....••••.••..•......•.•... ~D 
4 Do you either live oren the building? vesl V I 
No 
5 !Iow familiar are you With. the layout of the bUilding?~ 
Are yo~ •••.•......•. completely familiar with it V 
fairly familiar with it .... 
slightly familiar with it .. 
not familiar with it ..... 
6 What was the first thing you did when you realised 
there was a fire? 
What did you do next? 
and next? 
·7 How often have you received training on what actions 
to take in a fire? 
At least once per month 
At least once every six months .•............... V 
At least once every year ..••..•..••.....•••.•. 
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8 Did you know of any means of emergency escape in 
. the building? ...•..••....•...•...••... .' ... Ves0 
.. NoD 
9 Did you leave the building during the fire? .....• V~ 
If NO, please pass on to question 10 ~~D 
In leaving did you use 
The normal exits ....•...........•.•..•.•.... [2] 
An emergency exit •..........•.•.....•.•..•• U 
. Some other way please specify 
Did you leave by •••••• Your own efforts ...... § 
With Fire Brigade help ., 
With the help of others .. 
Did you return into the bu ilding d.uring the course of E3 
the fire? ..•..••..•• , ...•......•....... Ves V 
No 
If you did, for what reason? 
·1<--_CW-_ck_"Iit_WM __ c1/wV:_·._--, 
10 What reason did you have for not leaving? Was it 
because 
You did not think the fire was serious enough ..••. 0 
You thought you would be safer where you were ..• 0 
Some other reason please specify 
11 Was there any smoke? •..•.•• , ., ..••••• '" • Ves V 
If NO, omit the rest of this question No 
Did you try to move through it? ••..••••...•. Ves 
If NO, omit the rest of this qUestion No 
How far did you try to move through it? 
Vards .... 0 .... 2 .... 4 .... 10 .... 12 .... 15 .... 20 .: .. 20+ 
How far ahead could you see at the time? 
Vards .... 0 .... 2 .... 4 .... 10 .... 12 .... 15 .... 20 .... 20+~ 
Did the smoke become thicker? •..•....••••. Ves 
No 
Did you have to turn back because of it? ..••.• Ves 
If NO, omit the next part of the question No 
How far ahead could you see when you turned back? 
Vards .... 0 .... 2 .... 4 .... 10 .. ~. 12 .... 15 .... 20 .... 20+ 
12 Were any of the following people with you in the 
building during the fire? Vour children under 12 .. 
Vour children over 12 ... 
Vour wife/h.usband ..••• 
Your parents .•...•..•. 
Some other relative ..... 
Friends ..•..•••...•.• 
Acquaintances. • .... .• • •• V 
People unknown to you .. 
13 Have you ever been involved in a fire incident before? r--
Ves~ 
Part 2 Information about the Person in the Fire 
MaleD Female I vi Age[!f1] 
1 How did you first become aware there was a fire? 
Feltheat _ ••.•. -......... _ ._ ..•...•..•..... -•... 
Saw flames ••.••••..... __ •....•..•.•..••... 
Saw or smelt smoke ....•.•...•..••••••...... 
-Heard noises associated with the fire ..•......... 
Heard shouts •...•..•.•.••.•.•....•..•..... 
Was told •.• '.' .......•.. '.' ..........•...... 
Heard fire alarm or fire engines 
2 When you realised there was a fire, how serious did .§ 
you think it was? Extremely serious ..•... 
V Quite serious ........ . 
No~ at all serious ..... . 
3 Which floor were you on when you realised there was 
afire? •....••.••.•.••••••....•..... ~ 
'4 Do you either live 08in the building? yes0 
NoLJ 
5 How familiar Bre you with the layout of the building? 8 
Are you ••••••••••••• completely familiar with it V 
fairly familiar with it ..•. 
slightly familiar with it .• 
not familiar with it .••.• 
6 What was the first thing you did when you realised 
there was a fire? 
. 
What did you do next? 
and next? 
. 
. 
7 How often have, you received training on what actions 
to take in a fire? 
At least once per month .. ______ . _ ........ ____ Q 
~::::::~~:::~~~:~~~t~~.::::::::::::: ::~_ 
336 
S Did you know of any means of emergency escape in 
the building? ....••..•...•..•..... ,;-" .... .Yes~ 
.. NoD 
9 Did you leave the building during the fire? ..... YeW 
If NO, please pass on to question 10 NoD 
In leaving did you use 
The normal exits ...•.....•.........•........ ~ 
An emergency exit ....•.•• , .••.......... , .•. D 
Isome other way please specify 
Did you leave by •..•.. Your own efforts , ..•.. 
With Fire Brigade help .. 
With the help of others .. 
§ 
Did you return into the building during the course of ~ 
the fire? ••••••.•••.•••.•.........•..••. Ves 
. .. No V-
If you did, for what reason? 
10 What reason did you have for not leaving? Was it 
because 
You did not think the fire was serious enough ...•. D 
You thought you would be safer where you Were .•. D 
11 WasthereanysmOke? •.•..•...•.••.•••.••. ves§ 
If NO, omit the rest of this question No 
Did you try to move through it?· ••• ; ••.••••.. Ves 
If NO, omit the rest of this question No V 
How far did you try to move through it? 
Yards ._ .. 0 ._._ 2 .... 4 .... 10 .... 12 .... 15 .... 20. __ .20+ 
How far ahead could you see at the time? 
Yards ...• 0 .... 2 .... 4 ...• 10 ...• 12 .... 15 .... 20 .... 20+~ 
Did the smoke become thicker? .••...••••... Ves 
No ' 
Did you have to turn back because of it? ••••.• Ves 
If NO, omit the next part of the question No 
How far ahead could you see when you turned back? 
Yards .... 0 .... 2 .... 4 .... 10 .... 12 .... 15 .... 20 .... 20+ 
12 Were any of the following people with you in the 
buildirtg during the fire? Your children under 12 .. 
Your children over 12 .. '1--,1 
Your wife/husband •.... 
Your parents .••• , •.... 
Some other relative ••... 1---1 
Friends ......•..•••.. 1-./_-1 
Acquaintances. " ..•.... 
People unknown to you •. 
13 Have you ever been involved in a fire incident before?.-_-, 
Y eS'I---'-1 
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APPENDIX 7 
Revised Notes of guidance for the completion of questionnaire on "Behaviour of People in a 
- , 
Fire Situation". 
General 
The questionnaires are applicable to fires in buildings which are occupred at the time of the 
fire. 
Each questionnaire con.sists of a booklet of seven pages. The first page is PART I of the 
questionnaire and the next six pages are identical PART H's. PART I is addressed to the 
Fire Brigade, and apart from the address, it is envisaged that it will b-e completed at some._ 
tim e subsequent to the fire. 
The six PART n's are intended to be used in interviewing up to six people at the scene of 
the fire. 
The number of PART H's has been settled at six as this seems a reasonable maximum number 
to aim for at any fire. However, if more than six people were seen, other booklets could 
be used. 
Nationality of people interviewed - Although there is no space on the form for noting this infor-
mation, it has been pointed out that this may well effect behaviour. Therefore if the person 
is not British, and where it would not cause offence, it wouldhelp if his nationality was written 
on the PART II concerned, in the space between the line, "Male", "Female", "Age",?!nd 
Question I, "How did you first become aware of the fire?". -
Age limit of people interviewed - Again,although no specific minimum ege limit is stated for 
persons being interviewed, it is considered that a sensible minimum would be 10 to 12 years 
old. 
Number of People interviewed - There is no maximum m""ber for t..'1e people interviewed. We 
would like as many people as possible in t.he light of the circumstances and time available. As 
far as possible we would like a cross-section of the people involved. 
Accuracy of information obtained - It is reCOgnised that some of the people interviewed, will 
for their own reasons either exaggerate, or tell outright lies cbout their actions. In many 
cases this will be obviOUS to the Fire Brigade Officer using the questionnaire. In such a case, 
if the Fire Brigade Officer has good reason to believe that the information given by any person 
is largely inaccurate, it would be useful if he could endorse u'1e back of the particular intervie\' 
sheet with a comment to this effect. 
So long as the completed questionnaires are legible, it does ~ matter if they are dirty or 
m arked from being used at the scene of a fire. 
Notes about specific questions 
PART I 
Time: 
Question 2 
QuestIon 7 
This refers to the tim e of first call to the Brigade. 
This means any recognised fiJIst-aid, fire-fighting equipment i. e. 
fire-bUCkets, hose-reels etc. 
For example, for a bungalow "0" would be written in the box. 
Question 8 : 
Question 12 
PART II 
Age : 
Question 1 
Question 6 
Question 7 
Question 9 
Question 12 
: 
: 
: 
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Where the number is small, less than 10,it is more important that 
the exact num·ber is entered. 
Where the number is between 20 and 60, an approximation to the 
nearest 10 people is acceptable. 
Where more than 60 people were estimated to be in the building. an 
approximation to the nearest 50 is acceptable. 
If in any case the answer is none, but a "0" in the box. 
lithe answer is not known at all, put a question mark in the box. 
This question is to try and get some idea of how thick the Fire 
Brigade judge the smoke to have been at its worst. For example, if 
the smoke was about halfway between "very thin" and the thickest ever 
encountered by the member of the Brigade completing the questionnair 
the cross would go in the middie box. 
An approximation, i. e. 40 - 50, 35 - 45 is acceptable. 
More tl:an one alternative may be ticked if the person was simultaneou~ 
aware of a number cf the effects of fire; I 
Brief statements are in order here. (for example, "Got dressed", 
"went to door", "ran down corridor", etc.) 
More 4'Jan one such statement may be put in each box. 
This means training in its most general sense, to include any form of 
instructionconceming what to do in fire. i. e. visits or lectures by 
firem en etc. 
If the answer is "yes"ro this. ignore Question 10. 
More than one alternative may be ticked. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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APPENDIX 8 
Reclassification of Actions 
Actions 1<ere recategorised so as to include under each heading those 
responses which expressed similar intent. Where actions were undert3lcen 
by only a scall percentage of the respondents. a "miscellaneous" category 
l'Ias allocated l'Ihich 1<e have chosen to call: "Somethin·g else". The full 
list of rec1assifications is shol'lfl below. 
Kew Action 
1. Investigate 
2. Contact Fire Brigade. 
3. Alert others 
4. Evacuate self 
5. Evacuate others 
6. Fire-fighting 
7. ~~inimise risk 
8. Increase risk 
9. Request assistance 
10. Render assistance 
11. Retreat from fire 
12. Something else 
Original Actions 
Investigate fire 
More tOl'lards fire 
Contact Fire Brigade 
Enquire if Fire Brigade sent for 
Warn other people 
Raise general alarm 
Contact someone in authority 
Move towards exit 
Leave building 
Organise evacuation 
Get family out of huilding 
Some fire-fighting action 
Assist Fire Brigade 
Something to minimise risk 
Swi tch-off gas/electric 
Shut ·doors 
Something which increases risk 
Move burning object 
Request help from others 
Await rescue by Fire Brigade 
Gi ve help to others 
Attempt to rescue·someone 
Move away from fire 
Move to safe place 
. Save personal effects 
Return into building 
Get dressed 
Cover face with wet tOKel 
lfuere individuals undertook a course of action 1<hich ended in them 
"doing nothing". which Ive have previous ly categorised as "Inaction". we 
have ignored the Inaction category and merely categorised the "actions". 
--- ------------------------------------------~------------------------
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